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ABSTRACT. 
FEARING EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: DISCRIMINATION IN N. 
IRELAND. 
This study examines over ten chapters the degree of inequality of opportunity within NI 
during a critical period of Direct Rule from the introduction of the 1976 Fair Employment 
(NI) Act to its replacement by the 1989 Fair Employment (NI) Act. An historical outline is 
given of the Stormont regime to place in context the argument presented that economic 
development in NI stressed patronage for Protestants at the expense of Catholics. The 
practical realisation of Stormonts' agenda to secure and maintain a "Protestant State for a 
Protestant People" and the failure by the British government to fundamentally alter this 
during a critical period of investment under Direct Rule are assessed. It is argued that the 
structural imbalances in terms of employment and unemployment are so great that equality 
of opportunity in terms of the redistribution of employment cannot be provided within 
current political, economic and geographical boundaries. The view is advanced that to 
seek to do so would undermine the very existence of NI as a distinct entity. 
The degree of inequality is evidenced by reference to specific case studies in the private 
and public sector. The extent of legislative reform and their origins in terms of equal 
opportunity laws are evaluated with specific reference to the American and British 
examples. The central part of the thesis covering the period from 1976 to the late 1980's 
with a commentary on the 1990's are selected as marking a period of significant 
developments and international attention on inequalities in NI. This is evaluated by 
reference to the conduct of formal investigations, the response by major employers and the 
development of an international campaign to promote equality within NI. Some comment 
is made on recent political developments under the Good Friday Agreement with reference 
to its Equality Agenda in employment. The consequences of these measures are not 
evaluated however as being beyond the scope of the thesis but also as in many cases they 
are proposals or reforms that have yet to be fully implemented. 
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CHAPTER ONE. NEW BEGINNINGS. 
Introduction. 
An anonymous English 16th century civil servant wrote that the war in Ireland "... would 
always continue without God set in men's [hearts] to find some new remedy that never 
was found before". ' This thesis assesses the application of a key component of British 
social policy - the promotion and enforcement of equal opportunity legislation with 
reference to challenging religious discrimination in Northern Ireland (NI). The context is a 
society noted for its lack of consensus and frequent violent conflict in relation to political 
rule and identity. The constraints in delivering equality of opportunity policy objectives 
are therefore evaluated within the historical and political context of what became known 
as the "Orange State" where power and patronage were exercised in the interests of the 
Protestant majority. The particular application of equal opportunity legislation by the 
British government's local equality enforcement agency - the Fair Employment Agency - 
is the core of the study. It will be argued that NI's "Orange" context predetermined the 
limitations of its enforcement powers and their specific application in employment. This 
will be supported by reference to key case studies and internal policy debates that reflected 
the civil divisions at the heart of this society. 
The thesis will seek to demonstrate that the fundamental schisms which have characterised 
NI since its formal inception in 1921 as a distinct entity within the United Kingdom 
remain and have proven remarkably resilient within the geo-political framework of its 
current borders and power structures. A theoretical discourse on the modem bourgeois 
state, the limitations of social democracy as understood in the West or a Marxist analysis 
of the state is not offered. Rather the study focuses on a very particular society separate 
from but within the UK whose history has seen power overtly wielded for those who 
identified themselves as Protestant. The enthusiastic alliance between what was originally 
the local landed and manufacturing Protestant bourgeoisie with the aggressive support of 
the Protestant working class is assessed within the field of discrimination and its role in 
sustaining the unity of this society. It is also argued that the British State supported the 
maintenance of this loyal paradigm. 
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The impact of covert and overt policies by Stormont and the British government and the 
reaction to them by nationalists and republicans are placed within the struggle for equality 
and the ideologies of supremacy that became associated with Protestant rule in NI. The 
key question as to whether NI is capable of undergoing fundamental reform without 
altering historical and contemporary patterns of employment and inequality is examined. It 
is concluded that the economic and political restrictions on NI as currently structured 
make fundamental change impossible. The conclusions derived from this assessment are 
that the interrelationships of power, politics, prejudice and material benefit are found to be 
too strong a paradigm to be more than marginally altered without leading to the practical 
demise of NI. This argument is supported by reference to analysis of legislation, case 
studies and assessment of a range of initiatives by the British government. The central 
period assessed is the application of equal opportunity legislation from the first Act 
introduced in 1976 to its replacement by a new Act and Commission in 1989/90. The 
significance of the thesis and the questions it raises are singularly relevant to later and 
current developments as the British government's current policy initiatives seek to 
stabilise the North. One of the critical elements of this is what is now broadly described as 
the Equality Agenda. This process started prior to the Belfast Agreement 2 in April 1998 
with the specific events referred to in this thesis. 
On the 10th December 1998, the Fourth Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation 
considered a draft Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order in the British 
House of Commons. The order consolidated and extended legislation unique to NI. On the 
day of the 50th anniversary of the universal declaration of human rights, the Minister of 
State MP, Adam Ingram, asserted that the "Promotion of equality among all sections of 
the population in Northern Ireland has been a priority of successive Administrations since 
the 1970s. " The minister added: 
"This has been a momentous year for human rights in the United Kingdom 
generally and in Northern Ireland in particular. It has seen the enactment of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which will establish a 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. Among the wide -ranging functions 
1 Cited by Canon Nicholas Frayling, Anglican Rector of Liverpool, in `An English Repentance', The 
Guardian, 11 `" March, 2000. 
2 The Belfast Agreement: An Agreement Reached at the Multi-Party Talks on Northern Ireland, April 1998, 
HMSO, Cm 3883. 
2 
of that commission, its task will be to consult and advise on the scope for a bill of 
rights for Northern Ireland. The new protections for human rights will complement 
the extensive protections against discrimination in Northern Ireland law in, 
including fair employment legislation. "3 
The order represented the third major overhaul of fair employment legislation, all of which 
have occurred during significant periods of political turbulence and violence. The 1976 
Act was replaced by the 1989 Act - this was in turn amended twice in 1991 and 1995- and 
then the 1998 Order which extended and consolidated the previous Fair Employment Acts. 
The latter fulfilled the commitment given by the British Government in the Good Friday 
Agreement between the Irish and British governments. The agreement placed an onus on 
the British to "make rapid progress with ... measures on employment equality included in 
the recent White Paper". 4 The order was drafted in post devolution terms to reflect a 
transitional period in line with the provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Apart from 
incorporating various amendments it extended the legislation to include the provision of 
goods and services, the management and disposal of premises including land and brought 
fair employment into line with law on sex and race discrimination. The objective of these 
laws was described by the Minister as a moral one. 
The application of this moral framework is examined within the historical context and 
application of such laws in a society riven by conflict, sectarian patronage, material and 
cultural inequalities. It also tests the popular British view that Britain has been an impartial 
bystander refereeing an incomprehensible conflict and seeks to demonstrate that morality 
has not featured particularly highly as a driving force in managing Britain's problem in NI. 
The thesis does not seek to suggest that British policy and its application has been wholly 
consistent with securing the many variations of the unionist cause. However it will 
demonstrate that sustaining and maintaining the union throughout the modern period of 
direct rule by the passive and active support for a sectarian society has been the prevailing 
modus operandi. As the state has declared it has a moral imperative this will be examined 
by reference to the overtly sectarian period of the Stormont regime - "a Protestant state for 
a Protestant people"- as compared to the more sophisticated approach exercised under 
Direct Rule. For as Adam Ingram MP, Minister of State declared in December 1998 on 
behalf of New Labour that "Equality of opportunity is not something that will happen on 
3 House of Commons Official Report, 10 December 1998, London, The Stationary Office. 
4 Partnership for Equality, March 1998 Cm 3890, HMSO. 
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its own accord; it must be planned for and worked for, like other business objectives". 5 
The promotion of equality of opportunity in NI has thereby become simply another 
business objective that is part of New Labours' modernising agenda. Public services in 
Britain as a whole are the subject of a wholesale managerial revolution -democratic 
renewal, joined up government, thinking the unthinkable - as the government seeks to 
achieve its long term programme of "better government to make life better for people". 6 
Partnership and citizenship, a better deal, public services as a force for good, restoring 
confidence, are all major themes in this agenda. Can a conflict agenda be replaced by a 
managerial modernising one that seeks inclusion rather than exclusion? The thesis 
explores whether the very real political and material structural imbalances created by 
Britain and unionists can now be unravelled. It also poses the fundamental question as to 
whether it is indeed the case that fundamental reforms are impossible in terms of 
delivering their stated objectives - equality of opportunity - without undermining the very 
existence of NI as a separate entity? 
Alternative frameworks of the state in NI. 
In a review of 500 works Whyte (1990) concluded that researchers on NI had reached 
"unanimity only on the barest matters of fact". 7 These related to the bare historical bones 
of the foundation of NI but when more precise discussion was embarked upon as to 
potential solutions and the weight to be given to particular causes - religion, the British 
and Irish states, economic, political and psychological factors- disagreement became 
widespread. Whyte categorised the four major interpretations as traditional nationalist; 
traditional unionist; various Marxist interpretations and those who focused on the matter 
as primarily one of internal conflict between two communities. 8 A brief commentary is 
made on these theoretical frameworks, the practical problems associated with them and the 
general approach in this research. 
The traditional nationalist viewpoint adopts a plain anti-colonial stance whereby a 
5 House of Commons Official Report, 10 December 1998, London, The Stationary Office. 
6 Modernising Central Government, Conference Islington, November 1998, Modernising government, 
March 1999, Citizens First, modernising government annual report 2000,13 September 2000, Cabinet 
Office, Modernising Government Secretariat. 
7 Whyte, John. (1990)Interpreting Northern Ireland, Clarendon Paperbacks, Oxford University Press, see 
pp. 244-61, p. 244. 
Ibid. pp. 113-205. 
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subjected country attributes its misfortunes to the imposition of a foreign rule. Partition 
was no more than a malign settlement as the English imperial power maintained its class 
alliance and broader international interests through unionists in NI. Strauss noted that 
partition was the practical expression of the limits of nationalism where one part of Ireland 
refused to "accept community with the other". He noted that "it (partition) is a permanent 
memento of the limitations of nationalism and a challenge for its transfiguration into a 
higher principle of social action". 9 Thus to endeavour to create a nationalist united Ireland 
derived from nationalist aspirations alone without the support of the majority of 
Protestants whose particular material and political interests were at odds with this 
endeavour would fail. The 1937 Irish Constitution ignored this and simply asserted its 
domain as the whole of Ireland although it did affirm the sovereign right of the whole 
people of Ireland to chose their forms of government and rule, "free from outside 
interference", i. e. England. For the traditional nationalist, partition was an unresolved 
colonial heritage that would be resolved by traditional methods - physical force. The 
integrity of Ireland was more important than any unionist divergence on the matter. This 
model described England as an imperial power that had imposed a border with its unionist 
allies determined by the distribution of religion as a badge of loyalty or rebellion. For 
republicans a final break with England would oblige unionists to see their interests lay 
with their fellow Irishmen. It would also end the oppression of nationalists and Catholics 
in the North. 
Another important and long-standing nationalist strand linked the struggle for self- 
determination into higher "principles of social action". This stems from the influence of 
James Connolly (1870-1916) who took his analysis from the writings of Marx and Engels. 
The objective was a workers victory over the powers of capital and imperialism. The 
struggle for independence in Ireland was part of a wider radical struggle to liberate the 
workers from capital, which in turn would become a cause for unity for among Protestants 
and Catholics. 10 The Marxist anti-imperial stance was succinctly encapsulated by 
Connolly in his remark that the "cause of Ireland is the cause of Labour" alongside his 
trenchant critique of the reactionary history of clericalism in the coercion of Ireland by 
9 See Strauss, E. Irish Nationalism and British Democracy, pp. 290-291, (1951) Greenwood Press, 
Connecticut, USA; Gallagher, Frank, The Indivisible Island: The History of the Partition of Ireland, (1957) 
London, Gollancz. 
lo Connolly, James, in Ryan, Desmond, (ed) (1948) Socialism and Nationalism: A Selection from the 
Writings of James Connolly, pp. 102,73, Dublin: Three Candles. 
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England. 11 The achievement of some form of socialist Ireland needed to link the cause of 
Labour with that of the small farmer, North and South. This was the general position 
expressed by socialists and radical republicans such as Connolly, Liam Mellows and Rory 
O'Connor in the 1916 rising and subsequent civil war. Their position became the 
inspiration for an ad hoc and uneasy ideological alliance between socialists and radical 
nationalists who stressed the cause of Ireland first and possibly the cause of Labour 
second. 
Modem expressions of this dynamic included those such as Farrell (1976). The challenge 
remained the creation of a degree of class unity that went beyond the immediate demand 
for national liberation. Farrell saw discrimination as a mechanism that enabled British 
imperialism and unionism to sustain a class alliance with the Protestant working class. In 
the heady days following the 1974 Loyalist UWC strike and the intense loyalist murder 
campaign Farrell proclaimed the necessity to create a mass anti-imperialist struggle North 
and South to defeat both loyalism and the forces of Catholic reaction governing the South. 
This `two for the price of one' approach would establish a united socialist Ireland. Farrell 
described the choices as, "a semi-fascist Orange statelet in the North matched by a pro- 
imperialist police state in the South, and, on the other hand, an anti-imperialist and 
socialist revolution". 12 Significantly this revolution was to be carried forward by the 
southern working class in alliance with those engaged in a guerrilla war in the North. The 
engagement of the Protestant working class in an enterprise to destroy their supremacy and 
state in a fit of class-consciousness was not deemed likely. The Protestant or unionist 
position would in this scenario adapt to the new material reality of a unified Ireland due to 
the absence of the British State as a guarantor of traditional unionist supremacy. Class 
relations in this new political entity would thereby have the opportunity to come to the 
fore unshackled by nationalist and unionist aspirations which would have either been 
satisfied or no longer relevant as a material reality. McCann's (1974) contribution to this 
debate added the dimension that Protestants had in any case good grounds to reject the 
notion of a united Ireland where the Catholic Church had secured such influence on the 
institutions and ideology of the state. The South as such was an alien entity with the 
solution being to "destroy clerical conservatism in the South", while politicizing the 
" Connolly, James. Selected Political Writings, (1973), pp. 61-162 (ed) Owen Dudley Edwards & Bernard 
Ransom, Jonathon Cape, London. 
12 Farrell, Michael. Northern Ireland: The Orange State, pp. 335, (1976), Pluto. 
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"economic militancy of Protestant trade unionists". 13 
These ambitions were of necessity somewhat tempered by the constant absence of any 
mass class alliance and social revolution as events demonstrated that the Unionist cause 
rested not simply on a bourgeois alliance with `perfidious Albion', but a popular mass 
base among Protestants. 14 By 1988 while continuing the "Long March to Freedom", 
Farrell recognised that not much had changed in 20 years but considered there may be 
some hope for building unity with the Protestant working class. This optimism was based 
on some tentative links he considered existed around common concerns developing over 
the use of plastic bullets, strip-searching, the use of informants and housing developments. 
The challenge was to "link these groups and struggles with the fight against discrimination 
and repression of the nationalist community and bring home a realisation that the Northern 
state itself is inherently sectarian, repressive and irreformable". }5 
The problem with this approach was the overwhelming historical evidence that any desires 
among Protestants for class unity had always been a minority element whose aspirations 
were consistently defined within the context of NI. A more hardheaded conclusion would 
have been that loyalist protests against plastic bullets and other coercive measures was 
driven more by the fact that "their police force" had the audacity to use them against 
Protestants. Farrell's `tentative evidence' gave too much weight to the role of economic 
determinism as a force for class unity. The modern history of NI has provided 
overwhelming evidence since 1976 that such confidence was misplaced. McKay's (2000) 
work illustrates the enduring strength of the Protestant mind set across classes that 
represents a powerful force against any common identification with nationalists seeking to 
end the state of NI or the `Protestant way of life'. 16 The "new all -Ireland socialist 
society" remained a far horizon with the border, and conflict associated with its existence, 
remaining defining characteristics in terms of class and religious allegiance. The material 
and ideological allegiance by Protestants to the NI State was seriously underestimated. 
The possibility that militant unionism may prefer a further repartition of NI to sustain a 
Protestant status quo, as an alternative to class unity and revolution was not countenanced. 
13 McCann, Eamonn. War in an Irish Town, p. 202, (1974), Penguin & Pluto (1980) 
14 Farrell, Michael. Arming the Protestants, (1983), Brandon. 
15 Farrell, Michael. (ed) Twenty Years On, p. 73, Long March to Freedom, pp. 54-74, (1988) Brandon. 
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The traditional unionist approach has a strong strain of "not an inch" 17 so that every 
perceived encroachment by Catholics into employment or political administration is 
simply more evidence that Britain cannot be trusted and "Lundyism" is at work. Unionists 
sought complete political integration into the UK; a return to the Stormont regime or at 
worst the repartition of NI to ensure a Protestant majority. The current NI Assembly may 
prove to be an acceptable alternative as long as Protestant hegemony is not unduly 
threatened by the need to accommodate the Catholic middle class into an active body 
politic. The ideology of supremacy remains. This is in part informed by unionist agitation 
that they are distinct from Catholics; a derivative of some form of Scot-British that makes 
them anything but Irish. Catholics remain the disloyal enemies within their midst even if 
these include the professional, business and administrative groups that are eager to 
participate in legitimising and accepting the status quo. The historical position of unionism 
that the southern economy could not sustain a `British way of life' in any case has been 
made redundant by the current success of the Irish "tiger economy". The unionist 
economic argument against unity now focuses on the North's dependency on massive 
subventions from the UK to survive. This is something the south could not afford nor 
surely desire. The Northern Ireland Economic Council (NIEC) has called for greater co- 
operation for mutual benefit so that "inward investors and indigenous firms might see the 
island more as a single market and the advantages of locating in different parts". 18 The 
securing of an "island economy" however requires a sense of common political purpose, 
political administration and economic interest that is absent. In essence the badge of 
unionism rests on an identity called British that is considered the antithesis of being Irish 
economically, socially and politically. ' 9 
The problem with this model is that it has failed to secure civil and political stability or an 
acceptance by nationalists that the organs and institutions of the state are legitimate and 
worthy of support. It is a model based on the imposition of power supported by Britain. 
While the British government retains what is described by nationalists as a "unionist veto" 
and declare that the union remains safe with Britain then the potential for unionists to see 
alternatives beyond this model are remote. The creation of the NI Assembly has been 
16 McKay, Susan. (2000) Northern Protestants An Unsettled People, Blackstaff Press, Belfast. 
17 Shearman, Hugh. (1942), Not an Inch: A Study of Northern Ireland and Lord Craigavon, Faber & Faber. 
18 NIEC, `The Economic Implications of Peace and Political Stability for N. Ireland', Occasional Paper 4: 
June 1995, p. 32, Belfast. 
19 See Whyte, John. (1990), Chapter 7, pp. 146-174, for a fuller discussion. 
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characterised to date by the need to support unionist hegemony which throughout 2001 
focused on the British governments desire to appease unionism in the form of David 
Trimble MP, the First Minister. While the suspension/restart of the NI Assembly was 
partly influenced by the British government's desire not to have fresh elections, due to the 
view that more militant unionists opposed to the Assembly would dominate, this in itself 
reinforces the view that the future existence of NI is wholly dependant on maintaining a 
unionist paradigm. 
Alternative frameworks that see the conflict as primarily an internal paradigm include 
O'Leary (1985) and the revisionist Marxist views of Bew and Patterson (1979,1980), 
although Bew has now moved to becoming a public spokesperson for the official unionist 
interpretation. 20 The classic position of Marx and Engels was that independence for 
Ireland was essential to end the enduring conflict with England and would act as a means 
of promoting social emancipation for the working class in England. Liberation and class 
unity therefore must be built through a general struggle against imperialism with national 
liberty a legitimate objective. 21 Bew and Patterson considered however that a strategy that 
included national liberation reinforced conservative elements among Protestants making 
them hostile to any such enterprise. Rather they felt a secular labour ethos could be 
fostered by removing the nationalist objective of ending the state of NI. They asserted 
"there is nothing inherently reactionary about the Protestant working class or, for that 
matter, a national frontier which puts Protestants in a numerical majority". 22 In support of 
this they exaggerated the role of the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) pointing to the 
role of the engineering workers as a progressive secular force. The case studies of key 
employers and workforces in the engineering industry presented in this work demonstrate 
this position to be a fallacy. The class alliance among Protestants was not one solely 
between a `labour aristocracy' and local bourgeoisie but a genuine mass one where class 
was mediated by powerful sectarian forces with a material - however uneven the benefits- 
and ideological basis. The most eloquent comment on the strength of the NILP was its 
demise especially as many of its leading figures and local trade unions reinforced sectarian 
20 O'Leary, Brendan. (1985), `Explaining Northern Ireland: A Brief Study guide', Politics, 5(1)(Apr. ), 35- 
41, and Bew, Paul., Gibbon, Peter., Patterson, Henry., The State in Northern Ireland 1921-72, (1979) 
Manchester University Press; and `Some Aspects of Nationalism and Socialism in Ireland: 1968-78', 
pp. 152-171, in Ireland, Divided Nation Divided Class (1980) (ed) Morgan, A. & Purdie, Bob. Ink Links. 
21 Marx, Karl. & Engels, Frederick. Ireland and the Irish Question, A collection of Writings, (1972), 
International Publishers, New York. 
22 Bew, Paul., Patterson, Henry. & Gibbon, Peter. (1979), p. 221. See pp. 207-221. 
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employment patterns. As Hepburn and Rumpf (1977) noted the NILP never held a safe 
seat and its survival rested upon an ability to manipulate the religious balance "by being 
different things to different men" in accordance with the needs of any given sectarian 
electoral calculus. 23 Bew and Patterson also failed to address the consequences for the 
respective working classes, - in terms of their material realities, opportunities, and 
ideological perspectives, - of the creation of a state which had as its raison d'etre the 
maintenance of a Protestant majority to secure unionist rule. Bew and Patterson could 
have been less defensive by simply noting the objective material situation of Protestants in 
their state required them to be a reactionary force. More could also have been made of the 
conservatism of their Catholic counterparts whose `radical' nature is concluded on the 
basis of resistance to Britain's presence. While again this may place Catholics in an 
objectively radical position it does not follow that their class-consciousness was of such 
particular note that they would overwhelmingly support socialist alternatives. The 
evidence of time has shown this not to be the case, North or South. Rather the sectarian 
nature of NI places them in mutual antagonism toward the other because their material and 
political condition places them in opposition. Similarly the fact that Catholics have 
endured the coercive apparatus of the North has allowed the Catholic Church to present 
itself as a defensive bulwark against the power of unionism, something Connolly would 
have had some difficulty reconciling. Partition simply reinforced by default the privileged 
position of the Catholic Church and its institutions that have a long history as a force of 
reaction and accommodation in Ireland. Connolly's brand of anti-clericalism could not 
bear fruit in an area where religious institutions and associated identity were a source of 
solidarity and refuge thereby allowing reactionary theology to flourish. 
The Catholic Church continued its traditional role of condemning those who embraced the 
more radical `physical force tradition'. Thus partition secured the position of the most 
reactionary forces - Catholic and Protestant - North and South. It also as O'Dowd 
(1980)24 noted enabled the British ruling class to overcome their differences over the 
future of Ireland that had proved a constant feature of the 19th and early 20`h centuries. In 
the process the Labour movement became largely irrelevant as the protagonists focused on 
the legitimacy of the new state at Stormont. It is also worth noting that sectarian political 
23 For a discussion on the NILP see Rumpf, E. & Hepburn, A. C. Nationalism and Socialism in 20th Century 
Ireland, (1977) p. 195., See pp. 195-208, Liverpool University Press. 
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divisions did not begin with Partition. Animosity and segregation characterised the North 
since the 17th century plantations. The 1866 Home Rule Bill crisis saw Protestant Belfast 
as a force for unionism. Partition secured the maintenance of local unionists, the political 
and class alliance with Britain and created a devolved parliament to manage this process 
without interfering with British parliamentary processes. The Orange Order bridged the 
divide between the landed urbane Protestant gentry and the emerging Protestant working 
class. The Order was thereby able to successfully broker patronage and ensure class 
relations in the North were primarily conducted via a sectarian prism that reflected 
particular material interests. 25 This material reality has assisted in the accumulation of 
capital and ensured that a history of colonial relationships are reproduced in contemporary 
political frameworks without resolution. As O' Dowd noted, 
"Class relations in NI were only experienced as sectarian class relations. Sectarian 
division is itself a particular historical division of class or more precisely of class 
fractions, cemented together in Protestant and Catholic class alliances. In other 
words sectarian division is a class phenomenon and vice versa". 26 
Miller (1998) develops this theme in the context of a colonial settlement. 27 Britain's long 
relationship with Ireland saw attempts to fully integrate the administration of Ireland as 
part of the United Kingdom. When this broke down the `settler-colonists' had their 
position protected by the creation of Stormont within the British State. Thus to understand 
the particular relation of unionism to Britain and the rest of Ireland requires a conceptual 
framework that accepts the relationship is not yet post-colonial. In this context a 
community of interest does not exist. The distinct sense of identity is a dynamic process 
that develops in accordance with material and ideal interests and or the degree by which 
community interests are placed at risk. What Miller refers to as a "colonial hegemony" 
works to restrict the boundaries of acceptable debate and intellectual development by 
engendering a self-serving lack of interest in academic and political circles. Thus the 
prevailing views aired in popular media and academic discourse are those that see Britain 
as an unfortunate arbitrator imprisoned in a conflict derived from history but not of its 
making. Understanding of the conflict and its potential resolution become contained 
within intellectual and physical borders with acceptable outcomes. The latter are currently 
24 O'Dowd, Liam. `Shaping and Reshaping the Orange State', pp. 1-29., in Northern Ireland Between Civil 
Rights and Civil War, (1980) O'Dowd, Liam., Rolston, Bill., Tomlinson, Mike., CSE Books. 
25 See Gibbon, Peter. The origins of Ulster Unionism, (1975), Manchester University Press. 
26 O'Dowd, Liam. (1980) `Shaping and Reshaping the Orange State', p. 25. See also Hepburn, A. C. & Rumpf. 
E. (1977), `Northern Ireland: The Politics of a Divided State', pp. 164-195. 
27 Miller, David,. (ed) (1998) Rethinking Northern Ireland, Culture, Ideology and Colonialism, Longman. 
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the interests of the "greater number" within NI. Miller describes this process as the 
hegemonic production of consent. 28 The British state has won consent in civil society for 
its approach and where this has not proved possible the application of coercive apparatus 
has neutralised the threat and enabled elements of the opposition to enter a process of 
mediation. The NI Assembly is a useful example as it illustrates the tentative nature of the 
process and its potential to implode on unresolved contradictions. Miller's advocacy of 
study and research that reclaims the concept of colonialism and its physical and 
intellectual expressions has major implications for advocates of solutions that may not 
have "acceptable outcomes" to British `civil society'. 
Other internal models such as O'Leary and as Whyte argues the Cameron Report (1969), 
focus on internal conflict as the primary source of the problem. 29 The thrust of this debate 
is to concentrate on the expressions of internal grievance e. g. discrimination, 
gerrymandering, the B Specials, Special Powers Act, etc. The solution then is to secure 
British rights for British citizens that are at the heart of fair employment and human rights 
legislation. The national aspiration and historical struggle for independence can be 
resolved internally by securing sufficient support and legitimacy for the pursuit of equal 
rights. The role of the NT Assembly in this context is to provide some semblance of power 
sharing to Catholics and thereby facilitate legitimising the processes and institutions of the 
state. It also has the added dimension of legitimising the entry of middle class Catholics to 
the organs of government and control. In essence the sociological description for this 
approach is the functionalist internal model. The legitimacy of the state is accepted as a 
given with the primary question being its role and practices as the tool of a modern liberal 
society (Cormack and Osborne 1983). Their "political arithmetic" model in taking 
"argument, disciplined by facts and figures, addressed to issues of government" 
necessarily involves an ahistorical approach that separates out issues of power, politics and 
prejudice from the status quo. 30 It requires a faith in the integrity of state institutions to act 
as impartial mediators in a sectarian market place once presented with the evidence of 
disadvantage. 
This model is incapable of dealing with the situation whereby the purpose of the state has 
28 Miller, David. (1998) See pp. 18-21, `Colonialism and academic representations of the troubles', pp. 3 -39. 
29 Whyte, John (1991), Chapter 9. pp. 194-205 
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been declared by its founders to ensure these disadvantages exist to secure a Protestant 
class alliance. Their distributive model focuses on the manner by which the market and 
educational system distributes opportunities as opposed to a redistributive model that 
expressly seeks to overcome the inequalities created by maintenance of the status quo. In 
this context they see the agents of the state, such as equal opportunity mechanisms, as part 
of the solution when as will be shown they became very much part of the problem. This 
approach is not sufficient to offer a valid interpretation of the causes of discrimination in 
NI nor offer any prospect of fundamental challenge or material change to the historical 
and contemporary patterns of inequality. It is an organisational model trapped in the time 
and place of a specific set of data relations without reference to questions of the history, 
power, and purpose behind such relations. The Cameron Report and similar government 
commissions become a catalogue for documenting the shortcomings of administrative 
practice and not a means to challenge the fundamental nature of the constitution and 
origins of government. 31 
The approach adopted in this work is to accept the statements of NI's founding fathers that 
NI was created as a unionist state with the specific purpose of securing colonial interests - 
military, strategic, economic- that prevailed at the time. To achieve this and end disruption 
to the imperial class alliance one imperative of the British State had to be securing the 
interests of Protestants in NI. This was achieved by imposing Partition and the 
establishment of the Stormont regime. The inequalities contained within this society where 
a continuation of inequalities of power and privilege associated with the colonial conquest 
of Ireland. It is argued however as Britain's historical imperatives changed in the context 
of international and national developments the nature of the state within NI could not 
change without becoming a source of its own demise. Inequalities drawn from the badge 
of religion associated with national liberation and unionism were and remained essential to 
maintaining the character and dominance of a unionist society. The challenge for New 
Labour's modernising of government agenda is to develop among significant sectors of 
the Catholic and nationalist population loyal acceptance of the constitution and institutions 
of NI. To this end the manipulation of the "equality agenda" is now a formal political 
30 Cormack, R. J., & Osborne, R. D., (eds. ) (1983), Religion, Education and Employment,, Aspects of Equal 
Opportunity in Northern Ireland. Appletree Press, Belfast. 
31 See for example, Report of the Investigatory Commission into NIHE Contracts, (July 1979), 
Cmnd. 7586, HMSO; Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation Procedures in NI, (March 
1979), Cmnd. 7497, HMSO; Report of the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist 
activities in NI, (the Diplock Report, December 1972), Cmnd. 5185, HMSO. 
13 
priority as expressed in the Good Friday Agreement reached between the Irish and British 
governments and the local political parties on the 10th April 1998.32 By assessing the 
practical outcomes of Direct Rule, through its impact on patterns of employment in terms 
of the equality agenda, this work indicates the strength of a colonial heritage that cannot 
be resolved via internal-conflict resolution models alone. While the NI Assembly 
provides an opportunity for enhanced local government with an Irish dimension as a fringe 
benefit for nationalists it does not have the power or ability to change the market place. 
The approach taken suggests that from a macro perspective the potential for the NI 
economy to sustain those currently economically active without British subvention is not 
possible. From this position it is argued that the market place does not have the flexibility 
or opportunities to deliver of itself the degree of redistribution that would overcome 
inequalities in employment that have flowed from the nature of the NI state. Secondly that 
to create such opportunities requires the development of a genuine `island economy' that 
would require cultural changes in identity and perspective that would see the Irish - North 
and South -, with common political and economic interests managed by a common 
administration. Thirdly as this is an unacceptable proposal for the `greater number' the 
economic opportunities that exist will continue to be defined by a market place that carries 
all the weight of inequalities expressed via religious and political identities. This approach 
then while assessing the evidence of inequality within NI postulate resolutions that have 
an Irish and British dimension. It will also be demonstrated that the internal model cannot 
offer a resolution to inequalities of opportunity. The colonial analogy in terms of ideology 
and material reality has been modified by history and the development of the South into a 
set of very complex relations whereby the Irish and British governments appear to have in 
common a greater range of objectives as members of the EEC. Ireland is no longer 
perceived to be a threat in terms of offering other powers a platform for invasion nor as a 
potential source for social revolution. However the colonial model maintains its relevance 
in the context of a modem nation state -Ireland- that remains partitioned and seeks unity as 
a general objective. Within this setting an island economy, a common political 
administration and goals that secure the passive or active acceptance by the majority of 
Irish people cannot be achieved. NI thereby remains in a perpetual state of insecurity and 
instability characterised by a sense of impermanence. In short NI remains a `state' without 
legitimacy and as a place not likely to last. This in turn has intensified the sense of 
32 The Agreement, (10`h April 1998), HMSO, Cm 3883. See pp. 16-20; and Partnership for Equality, (March 
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Protestant insecurity that has found its expression in militant opposition to British policy 
towards nationalists and republicans and at times extreme sectarian violence. 33 
Equality of opportunity in the market place. 
The concept of equality tends to be an idea that is lost in the debate on inequality. The 
popular image of equality as some vaguely defined, if at all, form of egalitarianism, 
becomes lost in itself, in a debate which raged throughout modern times in the struggle 
between left and right during the 19th and 20th centuries. The pursuit of equality may be 
generally categorised as seeking to achieve a collective good for the whole of society and 
subjecting the institutions of the state to this greater good on behalf of the community. 
Inequalities were defined in terms of class and the relationship of a class to ownership of 
the prevailing modes of production. The great proponents of this comprehensive ideal on 
the left were Marx and Lenin. Bourgeois democrats on the other hand, taking their lead 
from the modern British liberal tradition derived from Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau, 
regarded inequalities as essential and natural to society. These were defined more in terms 
of an individuals personal relationship to society. This tradition adopted as its touchstone a 
concept of fairness and justice. An individuals personal inequality became of social 
significance when that inequality was derived from an act of injustice. In short liberty, 
equality and inequality were defined in law and statutes by institutions whose right to draft 
and impose these terms of reference rested on a general consensus of legitimacy given to 
the state or body politic. The common good still existed, but as a concept of greater 
justice, which at times is above and beyond the letter of the law. This may be defined as a 
concept of justice based on fairness. The balance and recognition of these principles is 
mutually interdependent. Modern exponents of this, Rawls 34 for example, can be traced 
1998), HMSO, Cm 3890. 
33 In September 2000 for example the Holy Cross episode occurred whereby Catholic children going to a 
primary school through a Protestant area in the Ardyone, North Belfast, were barracked, abused and attacked 
by loyalist men and women attracted world wide press coverage due to the raw nature of the sectarian hate 
on display. The end result was not a resolution brokered by anyone fostering class unity or sisterhood but the 
extension of a wall to keep the sides apart. One Catholic mother taking her child through this sectarian 
gauntlet related "those people who attack us and abuse children don't deserve to be called human beings. 
Those loyalists are animals". A Protestant mother participating in the protests described without any sense of 
irony that she thought it was "terrible what's happening to those poor little kids. But you have to ask 
yourself why their parents are bringing up children this way? They know we'll be here. They're abusing 
those children and using them as propaganda. You have to be an animal to do that to your own child". ( 
London Evening Standard, 7`h September 2001) A stop to this was brokered on Monday 26`h November 
2001. 
34 Rawls, J. (1958) `Justice as Fairness', Philosophical Review LXVLII, pp. 164- 95, reproduced in 
Blowers, A. and Thompson, G. Inequalities Conflict and Change, Open University Press, 1976. See also 
Alan Ryan, New Society, (5`h February 1981), `John Rawls and his theory of justice'. 
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straight back to Rouseau's (1762) Social Contract and Discourses. 35 Rousseau argued that 
the force of circumstances continually tended to destroy equality so the force of legislation 
"should always tend to its maintenance". This was of course to be maintained in direct 
proportion to the sices, wealth and property of those who embodied the needs of "popular 
sovereignty". The law then has to intervene as regulator and/or source of punitive tool 
when some form of offence takes place that prevents or impedes an individual's ability to 
exercise his/her capacity in their own way. 
Thus what is now popularly known as "liberal morality", has as its essence a concept of 
justice which is an expression of historical social relations that act through various 
institutions in society. Equality before the law rests on inequality in property and wealth. 
Equality is therefore not an abstract ideal but a concept given expression via society's 
legal statutes that is to be applied within a framework where individuals pit their skills, 
abilities and wealth against each other. In short a free market. 36 While the Marxist 
approach also accepted and recognised the role of inequalities in society, Marx focused on 
the relationship between the control and ownership of the means of production as the 
cause of inequality. Legislation was therefore not a tool to control and direct competing 
forces but an instrument of the bourgeois state to impose its will in the interests of a 
market controlled and directed by those whose interests it used the law to protect. 37 Marx, 
by making a distinction between the idealism of a particular moral position and the goals 
which are possible under given economic and political systems directly associated the 
development of the common good with a particular economic system. 
Thus while the distribution of rewards for labour acts to perpetuate inequality by treating 
all classes equally in the sense that their relationship to the means of production remain 
unchallenged this can then find its modern expression in the market as the concept of 
equality of opportunity. It may not be too fanciful to suggest that Marx perhaps saw the 
dictatorship of the proletariat as a form of positive discrimination whereby inequalities in 
35 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract and Discourses, J. M. Dent & Sons, 1973; cf. Plamentz, John. 
Man and Society, Vols. 1&2, Longman 1981, for a critical discussion on social and political theories from 
Machiavelli to Marx. 
36 Gallie, W. B. `Liberal Morality and Socialist Morality' in Laslett, P. (ed) Philosophy and Society, 1st 
Series, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 116-33, (1956). 
37 Marx, Karl. Critique of the Gotha Programme, (ed) C. P. Dutt, International Publishers, USA, (1970), 
pp. 77-81. 
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education, wealth and culture are reduced by treating classes unequally. 38 Whatever the 
case may be the modern legislative concept of equality of opportunity in employment is a 
superficial reflection of a much more fundamental debate. Rather it is a concept of 
inequality where in a society that declares it is committed to meritocracy, the value of 
material incentives, initiative, personal attributes, wealth and education are allowed to 
exercise their full power at the point of entry to the market place of employment. It is an 
aspect of justice that is politically and ideologically specific to the dominant relationships 
of modern capitalist society. Liberty is held, not to be some form of social ideal couched 
in terms of a comprehensive sense of political and economic equality, but a liberty that is 
compatible with free and competitive participation in the market place. Equality of 
opportunity does not seek to challenge the dominant mode of production nor the social 
relations that depend on it. Its' objective is essentially to prevent those competing in the 
market place from having their liberties unnecessarily restricted and thereby finding 
themselves at an unfair disadvantage. Its conceptual framework is the promotion of 
confidence in capital. This is at the centre of equal opportunity theory in terms of its 
legislative objectives in practice. 
In modem times it has been a notable feature of western bourgeois democracies that it has 
been only when those who were deliberately prevented from fully participating in the 
market place expressed their discontent violently that governments' felt obliged to respond 
with anti-discrimination legislation. The classic example of this was the response by the 
US government in the face of severe civil conflict over the denial of civil rights for blacks. 
By introducing legal codes of practice in the form of equal opportunity laws two 
objectives were sought. Firstly political discontent was appeased by this passive 
intervention in the market place and secondly a sense of legitimacy and expectation in the 
prevailing mode of production and social relations were reinforced. 
For the concepts of liberty and justice associated with this to be effective the benevolent 
introduction of equal opportunity laws were seen as essential by the more liberal or 
incisive representatives of bourgeois democracy. The example of black struggles in the 
USA and the Civil Rights Movement in the North of Ireland are not dissimilar examples. 
38 See a useful discussion on this by Paul Hirst, pp. 41-55, in Inequalities Conflict and Change, OUP, 1976 
(ed) A. Blowers and G. Thompson; and Richard Lichtmann, `The Facade of Equality in Liberal Democratic 
Theory', Univ. California, Berkeley, Inquiry, 12, pp. 170-228,1969: USA. 
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The latter may be seen as a direct refraction of this struggle. The intention may be put as 
ensuring inequalities of wealth and power remained unchallenged and accepted as 
legitimate and or objectives to be positively pursued. To be successful this strategy 
requires a large degree of active and passive consensus that the state and its social 
relations are indeed legitimate ones. This is where the situation in NI and the US begin to 
diverge. In NI the pressure to sustain unfair advantages via religious affiliation on top of 
the mode of production required the states intervention in the market place and an overtly 
coercive apparatus to contain the violence against the institutions and character of the 
state. For fundamental changes to occur in an individuals or groups capacity to access the 
market place without deference to material sectarian relations had the capacity to 
undermine the character and institutional solidarity of the state. 
The ability of legal codes to act as bonding agents within this context becomes 
increasingly difficult. The unresolved issues of nationality and unity constantly explode 
the process due to the close correlation between political power and employment. The 
unemployed blacks in the ghettos of Harlem or the rural Southern states may feel 
distanced from political structures, but as a body, on their own, they do not have the power 
to challenge radically or change the dominant political and economic interests which 
control the US. In NI, the forces are much more closely balanced. Loyalism that relies on 
the British guarantee would face a radical challenge to Protestant hegemony if this were 
removed. However it was in the USA that the strongest equal opportunity laws were 
introduced. As the Civil Rights Movement sought to integrate those considered to be 
arbitrarily disadvantaged they found allies in the white US liberal establishment. The 
latter's objective was to promote a concept of justice, totally compatible with the market 
place and integral to the "American Dream". The results were a set of laws introduced 
under the Civil Rights Act 1964 (CRA), which countries such as England, over 35 years 
later, still balk at. 
As the British government embarks on its most ambitious programme to date with the 
support of Irish and American governments to accommodate Catholics and nationalists 
within the context of the prevailing status quo, rights, safeguards and equality of 
opportunity are recognised to be a lynchpin in maintaining its northern edifice. This thesis 
by reference to case study and analysis of the implementation of successive Acts will 
challenge the validity and possibility of such an enterprise. As with many political 
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enterprises in NI it is important to realize from the outset that Acts of Parliament are 
frequently drafted to mean all things to all people. The following comments by the prime 
minister Tony Blair and Martin McGuinness of Sinn Fein conveniently juxtapose the fact 
that the latest Agreement does not reflect a common purpose in terms of ultimate political 
objectives and principles. 
"I believe in the United Kingdom. I value the Union .... none of us in this hall today, even the youngest is likely to see Northern Ireland as anything but a part of 
the United Kingdom ... Unionists have nothing to fear from a new Labour 
government ... The government will not be persuaders for (Irish) unity". 
39 
And the succinct conclusion from Sinn Fein's Martin McGuinness that "The union has 
undoubtedly been weakened ... " 
40 
While all focus on the long game the immediate and fundamental question as to whether 
an internal reconciliation within the Union can be achieved remains unresolved. The focus 
of the thesis will be to explore whether any such resolution is possible in the field of 
equality in the following chapters. 
Structure. 
The thesis begins with a historical introduction that outlines the origins of the "Orange 
State" and its overt policy of political and religious inequality. It will be demonstrated 
that with an ethos of loyalty to Ulster regarded as paramount, Stormont exercised its 
prerogative to reward loyal Protestants. Catholicism on the other hand was identified with 
disloyalty and nationalism to the state. The exclusion of Catholics and nationalists is 
illustrated by reference to DTI's regional economic strategy, which reinforced religious and 
economic inequalities. 
The response by the British government to the Stormont regime is examined within the 
context of the development of an equalities agenda during a period of sustained civil 
conflict. The gradual evolution of British equal opportunities policy is compared with the 
experience elsewhere, particularly the USA. The American experience figured largely in 
the debate upon which British legislators developed the 1976 Fair Employment Act (NI). 
39 Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Belfast, 16th May 1997, Public statement and NIO press release. 
40 Sinn Fein, Ard Fheis, 18th April 1998. 
19 
While reference and example are drawn from a period stretching back to 1921 the primary 
focus of the thesis is from the late 1960's to the introduction of the 1976 Act to its 
replacement by the 1989 Act. Further comment is made from 1989 to the present to offer a 
contemporary context for the 1998 Review (Draft Fair Employment And Treatment Order 
1998), the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement, 1998 and the government's Partnership for 
Equality (March 1998) White Paper proposals. The history of these legislative changes 
and proposals offer a key context for the case studies and assessment of the performance 
of the Fair Employment Agency (FEA). The evidence from these enquiries is given to 
indicate the extent and practice of discrimination on the shop floor and in the public 
sector. The weak response by the FEA and the impact of the Irish-American campaign for 
stronger and more effective powers during a period of major and murderous upheaval is 
used to assess the commitment and nature of the British response. 
It is argued that throughout the 1970's and 1980's British policy was one of containment. 
The more recent proposals (the Good Friday Agreement) it is suggested, demonstrates that 
British policy while now one of overt accommodation with nationalists and republicans 
remains the same, containment within the union for the foreseeable future. The 
significance of this for equality of opportunity is commented upon in the conclusions. 
However a detailed analysis of developments since the Good Friday Agreement is not 
offered. This is beyond the remit of the thesis. There are also several relevant proposals 
that have not been implemented so their consequences remain unknown e. g. the Patten 
Report on Policing -A New Beginning, (September, 1999), 
41 the attempts to relaunch the 
New Targeting Social Need policy through the NI Assembly (2001). 
The penultimate chapter does however comment on several developments beyond 1990 
that are relevant to the thesis. This helps place current, past developments and failures in 
the pursuit of equality in employment within the context of political developments under 
the peace process, - the economic situation, political devolution and the transfer of powers 
to the NI Assembly and the long-term strategy of the British government. Does the future 
remain Orange? Is the partnership with Ireland in this enterprise a fair weather green one 
or will the internal dynamics of the North again force both governments and their 
American sponsors to go beyond the immediate narrow horizons? These wider questions 
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are left for others to address as contemporary history develops. 
The difficulties and challenges faced by this enterprise are underlined in the earlier part of 
the thesis where it is argued that the formation of the "Orange State" required inequality 
to be publicly expressed and demonstrated by widespread sectarian employment practices 
as essential to maintaining the unionist class alliance. This thereby became the very fabric 
of its character and identity. This is followed by assessing the response by Westminster 
when confronted with conflict initially driven by the pursuit of civil rights objectives that 
many of Britain's political elite's accepted as credible and legitimate. The middle section 
of the thesis provides case studies of inequality in employment drawn from the private and 
public sectors to indicate the strength and depth of inequalities and their overt 
identification with the health and well being of the Orange State. The examples also 
demonstrate the failure by Direct Rule to fundamentally alter or reverse the strength of 
these overall and local patterns of employment. The issue of public housing provision is 
also examined as many commentators regard the denial of such provision to Catholics as 
the touchstone that started the current conflict. 42 
The role of the FEA is assessed with reference to its origins and operational practices. It is 
argued that it failed both as an administrative arm of British equal opportunity legislation 
and as a British political instrument for demonstrating that fundamental reforms were 
possible within NI. Reference to the various legislative acts and their impact are made to 
illustrate the point. This also provides a powerful context and rationale for the response by 
the British government to internal conflict that was not dissipating and to the growing 
direct influence of the Irish-American lobby. The most direct expression of this being the 
MacBride Principles Campaign. 43 This Campaign led to a more sophisticated approach 
from the British government than the blind alley support of unionism - whether this was in 
the form of ever more repressive legislation or simple financial subsidy - being adopted. 
The strength and potential of these reforms are examined. The final chapter summarises 
41 A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, The Report of the Independent Commission on Policing 
for Northern Ireland, "The Patten Report", September 1999, HMSO. 
42 See for example, Farrell, M. (1976), Tomlinson, Mike. & Rolston, B. & O'Dowd, Liam. (1980), Bell, 
Geoffrey. (1976). 
43 See Chapter VIII. The MacBride Principles campaign began in 1984 and was promoted by Irish-American 
groups to challenge American investors to adopt a range of equal opportunity principles in NI. 
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the conclusions of the thesis with reference to contemporary political developments and 
challenges that include the restatement of equality of opportunity, fair treatment or merit 
as part of the Good Friday Agreement. 
The production of social facts. 
The intensity of struggle in relation to what constitutes a "social fact" for researchers and 
politicians in NI reflects the experience of generations of conflict where there is a strong 
need to constantly assert a British or unionist view that seeks to legitimise the state and its 
institutions. The data presented in this work may be seen as contributing to controversy in 
a field where the ground for agreement remains narrow. In this context "facts" tend to be 
evaluated as participants in an intellectual and political struggle that may or may not be 
successfully utilised to question or reinforce the objectives of British rule. On occasion 
dispute over the relevance of such facts can become matters of international dispute 
effecting the standing and integrity of the states institutions and processes. 44 Thus the 
pursuit of `truth' in NI is heavily influenced by the prevailing sharp dichotomies. The 
potential for agreed outcomes are therefore restricted particularly when the subject of 
research includes matters of material interest to the character and future of the state. The 
sociological concept of value free research becomes severely exposed as an alien product 
in this environment thereby making such notions as "political arithmetic", futile models 
for evaluating critical areas where the state and its institutions are not regarded as 
impartial arbiters of social policy. 
The use of applied statistics, the arrangement and description of data, the conclusions 
derived from log linear, regression and correlation analysis in areas considered vital to the 
hegemonic view by the state become an issue not wholly anticipated by standard 
textbooks. The relationship between variables can take on a highly charged political 
context. While the social scientist may argue that he or she is engaged in an assessment of 
"best fit" or closest correlation between the data sets in order to complete an analysis NI is 
rarely a "value free" zone. 45 The analysis of social structures and processes are constantly 
given a context that emphasizes the importance of social analysis within the context of the 
`4 See Chapters IV and VII for a detailed discussion. 
as See Yeomans, K. A., Introducing Statistics, (1977) Vol. L, Chapters, 2, &5, Applied Statistics, (1979) 
Vo1.2., Penguin Books. Both volumes were originally published in 1968. 
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social meaning and processes that produce the actual data. The coefficients of correlation 
may be placed in a highly politicised context that is singularly relevant to the publication 
of particular data sets, the suppression of other statistics, their interpretation and 
utilisation. Thus while the researcher endeavours to deduce the significance of these 
correlations and reach conclusions the production of these evaluative techniques are 
reasons for or against a particular point of view. As such their significance is not wholly 
the differences they may signify but the interpretation and context by which inferences 
are drawn from those that are made available. Their significance is enhanced by the 
decision making processes that led to their inclusion as the subject of study in the first 
place. The techniques of applied methodology become in themselves part of a process that 
has been influenced by an interaction with other "social, historical and ideological 
product(s) and not merely a collection of neutral techniques. 46 Research into the degree of 
interplay between religious identity and other variables such as access to employment, 
attainment of particular skills or presence in specific areas of employment become 
powerful sources of contention. 
The production of `pure facts' then presents particular problems for researchers in NI. The 
researcher is an actor in a process that subjects quantitative methods and statistical output 
to the utmost political scrutiny. More often than not, research will be considered to have a 
political objective or at least political consequences and outcomes. This in turn can effect 
the choice of study and its objectives. While research in NI is not immune from the normal 
pressures associated with competition for funding, grant aid, commissioning, and critically 
choice the situation is much more complex. For example if the commissioning agent is 
part of the institutions of the state with a role in legitimising its processes then the 
emphasis on securing a particular outcome is great. Thus in the case of the FEA where the 
primary ethos and policy framework was one of conciliation as opposed to vigorous 
enforcement, the choices made have had a significant bearing on the likely outcomes and 
the purpose to which research may be utilised. For example the 1987 SACHR Report on 
Fair Employment, noted the FEA accepted "that it is sometimes willing to tone down the 
expression of its findings in order to retain the co-operation of the employer", and that a 
board structure "is also a weakness because the need to compromise interests is 
antithetical to setting a coherent policy. Cloaking individual decision makers in anonymity 
46 Irvine, John., Miles, Ian. & Evans, Jeff. (eds) Demystifying Social Statistics, (1979), Ch. 4., 'Eugenics and 
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fosters irresponsibility, encourages delay, and creates difficulties for efficient 
management". 47 Thus any research in a vital area such as this cannot but become a part of 
a wider conflict where the policy of commissioning agents such as the FEA can and will 
be superimposed thereby compromising the integrity of the research. The historical 
analysis of the founding of NI offered in Chapter II provides an essential context for 
interpreting the data presented in this research and the disputes associated with some of 
the material. 
The intensity of disputes over research findings and their overt links to the nature and 
character of society usefully illustrates Whyte's (19991) finding that the problems of NI 
make it difficult to achieve consensus on the barest of facts concerned. One example was 
the research by Queen's University academic Paul Compton. 48 Beginning from the 
position that the FEA had failed to "prove that discrimination on the grounds of religion is 
systematic and widespread" and was engaged in myth making to justify its existence he 
asserted other factors were responsible for inequalities. He argued that "the high incidence 
of Roman Catholic unemployment largely emanates from certain characteristics that are 
inherent to that community and which are not entirely compatible with the maximisation 
of job opportunities and the minimisation of job unemployment". In particular these were 
geographical location, numbers of dependant children and the overrepresentation of 
Catholics in the in the social classes of high unemployment. 49 Compton considered the 
difference in family size in particular accounted for 50% of the difference in 
unemployment levels. On this basis he projected forward to the year 2000 the 1975-76 
fertility and mortality rates and concluded that, 
"because of the marked difference in the rates of natural increase, equality of 
unemployment rate could only be brought about by substantial discrimination 
against Protestants. On the other hand, the Roman Catholic unemployment rate 
could be brought down to the Protestant rate of 3.1 per cent without resorting to 
wholesale discrimination against Protestants if 14,600 of the net increase in the 
size of the Roman Catholic male population of economically active age were to 
emigrate, leaving 6,400 of that community unemployed in Northern Ireland ... In 
the Rise of Mathematical Statistics in Britain', Donald MacKenzie. Pluto. 
47 SACHR, (1987) Report on Fair Employment, pp. 120,155. 
`8 Compton, Paul. `Religious affiliation and unemployment in Northern Ireland", (unpublished). A published 
version was produced in The Contemporary Population of Northern Ireland and Population Related Issues, 
(ed). Paul A. Compton, (1981) Institute of Irish Studies, Queen's University Belfast. 
49 Compton, Paul. (1981), pp. 3-15. All references are from the unpublished version that was widely 
circulated among academic circles. 
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the absence of considerable roman Catholic emigration, the unemployment rates of 
the two denominations could only be kept identical by artificial devices which 
caused the Protestant community to bear the brunt of unemployment, somewhat 
unfair, one would judge, in view of their temperate and sensible reproductive 
behaviour" 5° 
. 
The problems with this approach are that it ignores the influence of history, power and 
prejudice. For example the recognised sectarian spatial divide in NI is the River Bann. 
This marked severe differentials in employment and industrial location to the detriment of 
Catholics and as is argued in this work was reinforced by Stormont's regional and 
economic policies. Secondly the argument for dispersal fails to explain the existence of 
significant employment inequities in places such as Belfast. Here again access to 
employment is influenced by questions of personnel safety and a hostility by employers 
and employees to the recruitment of Catholics. In the context of such factors and the 
express objective of sustaining a Protestant class alliance by the state it is not surprising to 
discover Catholics occupying to a greater degree the lower social classifications. The 
argument also contains a number of value judgements that have as the basis of the research 
that the "innate" characteristics of Catholics are such that they are the author of their own 
misfortune. The starting point for this is the position that the labour market in NI has a 
fixed number of opportunities for Catholics. Hence the need for their emigration. The 
relationship between family size, poverty and hardship is well documented in Britain. 51 
Compton however does not assess how the labour market has been created, the significant 
variations in labour market opportunities and to what degree the nature of this labour 
market entrapped individuals in unemployment. In short, how under the Stormont regime 
did a situation arise that found Catholics with the highest rates of employment, living in 
some of the worst housing conditions and deprived of universal suffrage? Could this have 
influenced the concentration of Catholic working class males in semi-skilled and unskilled 
employment? What role did regional economic policy play in exacerbating these 
inequalities and should it be assumed, as Compton does, that infrastructure and investment 
policies are static entities that cannot be developed in a manner that would change the 
labour market? 
50 Ibid., pp. 17-18. Compton's views gained such influence that he served as an academic advisor to 
the Standing Advisory. Commission on Human Rights Report on Fair Employment in 1987, which 
reflects this view - in a much toned down version- as a potential contributory factor. 5' Townsend, Peter. (1979), Poverty in the United Kingdom, A survey of household resources and standards 
of living, Penguin Books. 
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In addition Compton's research methods would have some difficulty explaining the high 
economic growth rates experienced during the 1990's of neighbouring Catholic countries 
such as Ireland. It may be that the historical weight of Empire exercised some influence on 
the production and export of wealth and its peoples. A methodology that relies on "innate 
abilities" has some difficulty in explaining such phenomena. Thus as with many facets of 
Irish economic and social history "Truth" in NI is very much a matter of interpretation. 
The challenges facing research in NI then may be summarised as difficulties in securing 
consensus on the production of "social facts" and interpreting their relevance; the whole 
commissioning process where choice of research and researcher may be influenced by a 
specific agenda; the ability to gain access to original and unique sources of data; the ability 
to publish any conclusions may be directly hindered by the commissioning agent; and 
finally the threat of judicial action by those who do not share the views or conclusions of 
the researcher particularly where the merits of a given organisations ability and capacity 
are questioned or exposed to public scrutiny. 
Methodological problems in researching the work of the FEA. 
This research encountered several significant problems. They included the question of 
access to data. For example questions asked in the House of Commons by MP's to 
elucidate on FEA enquiries inevitably produced little detail. This in turn required securing 
access to data via a variety of sources in order that original data could be introduced to 
compare against the presentation of "facts" in published FEA versions and government 
policy statements. It also required a range of interviews and correspondence with 
participants who did not necessarily identify with the objectives of the FEA and were 
highly critical of its workings. This in turn produced access to unique data sets in terms of 
quantitative material, unpublished correspondence and papers that inform the 
interpretation presented in this study. The process of commissioning investigations and the 
manner by which data for analysis was selected by the FEA is assessed. It is argued that as 
a result of statements contained in official FEA records that a political process and 
`understanding' existed within the FEA membership that led to the choice, range and 
emphasis of investigation work. At its most crude this could be presented as a religious 
balancing act but due to the emphasis on conciliation as the policy in implementing the 
1976 Act it is argued that a clear process of decision making left the administration of the 
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Act adrift and effectively repealed. This is a matter of interpretation. In the case of the 
FEA access or denial to original data and publications directly influences public 
perceptions and the credibility of any formal findings from investigations. This 
relationship is explored and the consequences outlined for the FEA in Chapter VII by 
reference to a range of documents produced by Agency staff as part of the internal struggle 
to advance reform within the Agency. 
A second problem encountered in this research involved interpreting data where disputes 
existed over conclusions between the researchers and the commissioning agent i. e. the 
FEA - over major equality investigations such as the civil service and engineering 
enquiries, matters that still remain unresolved. Another feature was the lack of consensus 
over what constituted factual findings within the FEA as each set of data outputs was 
frequently placed within a context that questioned the motivation, skills or abilities of 
researchers. In one major incident for example researchers were subject to the threat of 
libel if they published findings deemed to be unacceptable to the FEA. Thus in providing 
an account of this incident the author has to confront the fact that charges of a lack of 
objectivity may be leveled given the authors role as a participant in the original research. 
The matter of interpretation is invariably given a political context that facilitates its 
dismissal from legitimate discourse by those who act as guardians of prevailing opinion 
and ideology. 
This represents a third problem for the research. For the researcher as a participant in the 
process of commissioning and carrying out research that contributed to the internal and 
external challenges facing the FEA is in effect a participant observer. It is important in this 
capacity then to explain the position adopted by the researcher as an actor in this process. 
This is presented in Chapter VII alongside the views of other participants including FEA 
members to present a context that enables the presentation of two opposing views. One 
view was the official policy of conciliation in regard to employers and investigations and 
the other, the position advocated by the researcher and colleagues was a position of active 
enforcement and prosecution of the 1976 Fair Employment Act. Where the author has 
been a participant observer as researcher, trade union representative or advisor to various 
institutions this is indicated by reference and supporting material. This is further tempered 
by reference to contemporary events, and the citation of other commentaries by those 
directly engaged. Chapter VII for example presents the experience of internal dissent 
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within the Agency over policy and practice that engaged a range of independent 
participants and external commentary outside the Agency. While the views of those at the 
heart of this struggle are given where possible by reference to particular documents the 
origin of all sources are not acknowledged. This is necessary to protect the position of 
several sources. However when such sources are utilised sufficient evidence is provided 
to enable the reader to interpret the perspective given and assess the validity of the 
interpretation. Thus while unique insights are offered giving a richer and more detailed 
picture of the nuances, subtleties and shades of meaning in an area fraught with conflict 
over interpretation more general data is provided. This includes for example official 
research such as SACHR's reviews of religious and political discrimination, government 
publications and policy reviews thereby offering a pluralism of research that provides a 
comprehensive and rounder picture of social reality in NI. 52 
In order to manage these issues in the research a methodology is adopted throughout of 
assessing official research output and findings from a range of different angles and 
information. Thus in the case of individual equality investigations, rather than simply 
accepting as given data and findings within the published reports - where they are 
available - the context for the production of such findings is assessed. This involves 
reference to decision-making processes within the Agency, the `religious balancing' 
process taken in the selection of areas for research and finally the methods by which the 
production of data and results were managed. This linking of data includes analysis of 
official survey data, reference to published works and enquiries, unpublished material and 
findings, the application of personal knowledge are all brought to bear in a critical 
interpretation of official findings, policy frameworks and direction in the field of equality 
of opportunity. This includes for example comparative data that illustrates the degree of 
differential employment patterns with reference to specific employers and occupational 
data derived from official sources; historical records drawn from the Public Records 
Office; unpublished works and correspondence derived from a range of exchanges and 
papers produced as a result of disputes and investigations carried out by and or 
commissioned by the FEA. This material is assessed within the prevailing situation of an 
unstable society and the response by government to demands for legislative reform. A 
52 Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, (1987) Religious and Political Discrimination and 
Equality of Opportunity in Northern Ireland, Report on Fair Employment; SACHR, (1990) Second Report; 
SACHR, (1997) Fair Employment Law in Northern Ireland: debates and issues, Vols. I- III. 
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number of primary sources are introduced derived from the authors own research activities 
and a range of papers provided by those engaged in the field of equality of opportunity. A 
number of unstructured interviews with individuals directly effected by acts of 
discrimination are presented as have particular interest groups such as those engaged in the 
MacBride Principles Campaign. The origins of an individual complaint or objective of a 
campaign has been placed in context by reference to the employers and or government's 
viewpoint. This is supported by reference to primary and secondary sources such as 
correspondence, evidence and public statements. The particular insights offered by this 
approach enable the material studied to be given a context that seeks to explain why 
particular decisions where taken or indeed avoided by government agents with the 
responsibility for enforcing fair employment legislation. This work provides a body of 
evidence that recognises the difficulties associated with a region where the possession and 
access to data is closely guarded, this mitigates against the development of a consensus 
around "social facts". This research is invariably a contribution within that context. 
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CHAPTER 2. AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT. 
Introduction. 
This chapter outlines the historical context of Northern Ireland's foundation. An 
overview of the political conflict, often violent and unforgiving, that has been a 
consistent and institutionalised characteristic of what became known as a 
"Protestant state for a Protestant People" is provided. The popular catchword of 
"No surrender" will be seen to be the idiom of a state and its people overtly 
committed to sectarianism in the use of physical, economic and social patronage. A 
stance regarded as the "Protestant birthright". 
The degree of inequality in employment, investment and political gerrymandering 
are exemplified to illustrate the manner by which the Stormont regime secured its 
present and future until the imposition of Direct Rule from Westminster. 
Consolidating inequality and promoting the position of Protestants in employment, 
securing political power through institutionalising prejudice and a denial of 
universal franchise became fundamental tenets of the new state. The Stormont 
regime exercised such powers with the knowledge and support of the British 
government that funded and approved much of the oppressive legislation and their 
instruments of administration. This included the Stormont parliament, a partisan 
police force: - the RUC, including the B and C specials; special and emergency 
powers to arrest, search and hold suspects; trial without jury, and the "supergrass" 
system. These powers reflected Stormont's political attitude towards Catholics 
who were regarded as fundamentally disloyal and opposed to the existence of the 
state at all levels in a very narrowly defined society that would brook no challenge 
to its exclusive Protestant remit. 
The development of post-war planning economic and social strategies is examined 
with reference to their role as an instrument for consolidating power and privilege. 
The impact of these policies are outlined in order to provide the physical context 
within which what became known as the East-West Bann spatial line for 
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investment opportunities and unemployment differentials were consolidated. 1 The 
description of the practices and development of the Stormont regime from its 
inception to the early 1970's offers an historical context essential to later chapters 
and the material evaluation of equality of opportunity policies in practice. It 
indicates the size of the challenge and the cultural milieu within which the 
application or discourse on such aspirations would inevitably conflict. 
Birth of a nation. 
The origins and creation of the Northern Ireland (NI) state have been 
comprehensively documented from many perspectives since the outbreak of open 
warfare and conflict. 2 Such works have only been outpaced by a plethora of 
articles and particular studies on law, Protestants, legitimacy, psychology and 
identity, conflict and war. The government's sponsored Northern Ireland Economic 
Council has been the most consistent commentator on the local economy with over 
114 papers and reports. 3 In the face of an abundance of material documenting 
violence, murder and constant crisis it is argued that the rationale of equality or its 
principle at least in terms of access to the benefits that employment can bring was 
one that did not find fertile ground. Rather inequality was deemed to be vital for 
the Protestant State to protect its' partisan base. More it was woven into every 
fabric of its being and ideological justification. An indication of the strength of the 
spirit that has underwritten loyalty to Ulster is usefully encapsulated by the 
following quote from Unconquerable Ulster: 
"The Loyalist type in Ireland is a well set up individual, with clear, straight, 
honest eyes, a clean skin, and well formed features such as are found in the 
case of human beings of the highest type. His hair is usually fair, or if dark, 
it has a fine texture. This is all as plain as daylight, and everyone knows it... 
Every Loyalist knows the Nationalist type -a person with thick black hair, 
or hair of a pale mouse colour with shifty or dreamy eyes, a complexion - 
1 This refers to the River Bann as a recognised socio-economic spatial line for inequality in 
investment. 
2 Barritt and Carter, The NI Problem, OUP 1972; Farrell, M. The Orange State, Pluto 1976; Gibbon, 
Origins of Ulster Unionism, 1975; Buckland, The Factory of Grievances, 1979; O'Dowd, Rolston 
and Tomlinson, Between Civil Rights and Civil War, 1980, Burton, F. The Politics of Legitimacy 
(1978); Fields, Rona M. Society Under Siege, (1976), and so on. 
3 Northern Ireland Economic Council, e. g. `The Economic Implications of Peace and Political 
Stability for NI', Occasional Paper (June 1995); `NI and the Recent Recession' Report 104, (August 
1993); `Research & Development Activity in NI', Report 101, (May 1993); `Demographic Review' 
(March 1995). 
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among the men - which is curiously dull or very red, and features which 
proclaim it as belonging to a low order among civilised peoples". 4 
Pim's work carried a foreword and endorsement by Edward Carson, the founding 
father of the Stormont State and leader of the anti-Home Rule Bill agitation and at 
a later stage a member of the English governments' Cabinet. The books' 
popularity was such that it ran to three editions from November to December 1919. 
A contemporary illustration that indicates similar sentiments remained at the end of 
the 20th century was the poster campaign by the Community Relations Council, a 
body established by the NIO in the 1990's. It ran a poster illustrating the top of a 
man's head focusing on the distance between his eyes. The slogan ran "ONE OF 
US? OR ONE OF THEM? IF YOU CATCH YOURSELF THINKING LIKE A 
BIGOT CATCH YOURSELF ON". The message reflected the still held popular 
Protestant view that religious identity could be determined by the distance between 
the eyes, in this case one inch. Some local wit had defaced the latter part of the 
slogan by sticking on after "BIGOT", "JOIN THE RUC". The poster appeared in 
Belfast in 1994 as part of the NIO's attempt to question popular bigotry. 5 It 
indicates that popular Protestant ideology and attitudes have travelled a very short 
road since 1919. The graphic trail of loyalist murders of Catholics throughout the 
latest period of conflict adds the mute testimony of their victims to this. In short a 
consistent thread to this research is the evidence in employment and society that a 
Protestant world view which is a loyalist or unionist one is not dissimilar to a 
supremacist or at times racist one. It is an element, however diluted in its 
presentation, that informed political and economic developments and indeed the 
murder and oppression of "disloyal elements". It was also a central ingredient to 
the Protestant class alliance that was vigorously endorsed by the strong relationship 
between fundamentalist Protestantism and the Orange Order. Catholic bigotry or 
sectarianism is not documented as it is the character of the Protestant state, the 
power relationships within it and their consequences that led to the equality laws 
that are the subject of the study. 
The industrial and agrarian history of economic development in Ireland meant that 
4 Pim, Herbert Moore. Unconquerable Ulster, Belfast, Carswell & Son, 1919. 
5 Authors site visit; see also Rolston, B. (1995) Drawing Support 2, Murals of War and Peace, 
Beyond the Pale, Belfast. 
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on partition the balance of power in NI rested within the unionist industrial North- 
East secured by a militant class alliance. Then as now the British public purse was 
vital to the economy. The loyalist heartland in and around Belfast drew its strength 
from employment in the former linen factories, mills, shipyards, manufacturing 
and engineering enterprises. The large-scale development of service industries in 
terms of public services was a development that became particularly significant 
under Direct Rule and remains so. As public administration developed in line with 
increasing education access and attainment new administrative skills and careers 
were offered but again entry to key areas such as the civil service was restricted to 
those considered most loyal. 
Both communities, Protestant and Catholic, were self consciously distinct, with 
mutual badges of hostility defined by dates, place, religion and competing senses 
of identity. Sectarian rioting across these spatial lines has been a constantly 
recurring theme with each period throwing up its fiery preachers to encourage or 
lead the mobs. 6 For example, the unionist Belfast Newsletter (5th September, 1857) 
warned about the threat of Catholics in Belfast: 
It a mighty Romish movement is now in operation in this town to 
assimilate it to the degraded Popish towns of the South and West of Ireland 
...... 
Our object is not to inflame Protestant against Papist. We advocate the 
right of the poor and of the outcasts to have the Gospel preached to them on 
the streets". 
The nationalist Belfast Morning News on the same day (5th September 1857) 
declared that to Catholics: 
"street preaching seemed less the exercise of a religious right than an abuse 
of free speech. Its real object and aim is to insult the feelings of Catholics 
and deride their faith; to show that here in the midst of a population of 
50,000 Catholics, there is a tyrannical, rampant and `dominant' faction, 
struggling for mastery over those who do not agree with them either 
religiously or politically. That faction must be at their old work of division, 
disunion, and religious hate ...... 
The above indicates that sectarian hatred and conflict fuelled by religious 
identity 
has always been an integral part of the Northern cultural psyche, something that 
is 
readily utilised to justify inequality and harsh treatment by the state. 
This `gospel' 
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provided legitimacy for the Orange Order as a religious and political entity to give 
Protestants their organisational base within the workplace. It became the 
instrument to secure allegiance and prevent any dilution of the Protestant `way of 
life' in key facets of rural, industrial, political and social life. The Order cemented 
the aspirations of the rural and urban poor into the economic and political 
aspirations of the indigenous unionist landed gentry and industrialists. The ever- 
present challenge of nationalism, revolution and counter-revolution, religious 
ideologies, cultural and economic competition, endemic sectarianism and rioting 
provided a self-perpetuating reinforcement for the need to hold and maintain. The 
contemporary Protestant labour aristocracy were the semi-skilled and skilled 
craftsmen who provided Ulster's shock troops in times of trouble. 7 Gibbon notes 
that during this period as industry diversified and workers succeeded in gaining 
exclusive forms of training and access to employment - apprenticeships, premiums, 
closed trades etc. -, Catholics became progressively excluded by active policies of 
discrimination. Orange Lodges in the factories sought to promote and protect the 
Protestant position and to specifically exclude or displace Catholics. The unionist 
elite thereby had a most convenient and economic mechanism for the dispensation 
of patronage and securing loyalty to Stormont and Britain. 
Gibbon concluded, "Orangeism gradually became the median for the maintenance 
of political control through nepotism". 8 Members of the Order would also provide 
a ready and willing source of recruits for the wide variety of special forces ranging 
from the 19th century Protestant Defence Association to the more recent and 
infamous B Specials, the RUC Reserve, the UDR, to the UDA and UVF. 
Economic patronage and political power within the protection of an imperial 
Britain, sustained overt religious and political hostility to Catholics as nationalists. 
This confidence in power saw Protestants comfortably through three Home Rule 
Crises from 1886 to the formation of the Stormont regime in 1921. It was also 
reflected in the scale of a new parliament house built in East Belfast. A grandiose 
act of visible assertive and imperial supremacy. A built in Protestant majority was 
secured by partition of the border along religious lines that ensured the three other 
6 cf. PRONI, Report of the Belfast Riot Commissioners, PP 1887 XVIII, Report, p. 4. 
7 cf. Gibbon, Peter. The Origins of Ulster Unionism, (1975) Manchester University Press, CHIV 
for developments throughout the 19th century. 
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counties of Ulster with Catholic majorities were excluded. They became part of the 
new Free State. 
The Protestant State 1922-45: Consolidating Inequality. 
Stormont was officially consecrated by King George V on 22 June, 1921. 
Westminster reserved key sovereign powers such as the post office, armed forces, 
and taxation. Otherwise Stormont was able to make laws for, "the peace, order and 
good government". Local constituencies could return twelve MP's to sit in the 
House of Commons. A small number of public servants transferred from the South 
as permitted under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. The Ministry of Home 
Affairs for example, contained 42 out of 187 staff who had exercised this right by 
18th January 1924. The degree of vigilance exercised to keep out Catholics 
considered unwelcome or disloyal may be discerned from the following incidents. 
Stormonts' Cabinet Secretary, W. B. Spender received a letter on 18th January 1924 
from Mr. S. Watt, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Watt 
confirmed, "that we have only 4 Roman Catholics in the whole office. They are not 
in any way employed on confidential work". Another incident perhaps more akin 
to caustic burlesque than good government indicates the pervasive atmosphere. A 
worker transferred from Dublin used a semi-colon in official letters. 
Representations by an unidentified senior figure called for an investigation, as this 
was considered highly suspicious. Spender was eventually able to report, "On my 
explaining there was nothing sinister or papistical about it, it was allowed to 
pass". 9 The Chairman of the civil service selection board also reassured Spender 
that "satisfactory references as to character and loyalty", would be sought before 
any permanent appointments were made. 1° The transfer of responsibility for the 
prison service saw a dramatic change in its religious composition. Under the 1920 
Act, there were 62 Catholics and 107 Protestants. Out of the 90 appointments made 
between 1922-24,11 or 12% were Catholic. By the end of 1924 the number of 
Catholics had fallen by 62%, 39 (this included 10 females) staff out of 195. 
8 Gibbon, Peter. 1975, p. 97. 
1 Op. cit., F. C. Moore to St. Loe Strachy, 2 August, 1922, House of Lords Record Office, S/21/4/9. 
P. R. O. N. I. CAB 9A/90/1,11th January 1924. 
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By 1927,94% or 215 senior Stormont officials were Protestant. By 1938 it had 
expanded to 3,113 reflecting the consolidation of the administrative arm of 
government. The 1930's also saw a period of internal sectarian wrangling that 
indirectly involved the Prince of Wales. Senior ministers and officials discovered 
one of Stormonts' groundsmen was a Catholic. Normally a straightforward matter 
this one had royal ramifications. The Minister of Finance, H. M. Pollock, in 
response to information provided by the chief whip, Capt. Dixon confirmed there 
were not one but two cases. The minister explained to the Chief Whip, "though I 
have as definite opinion on the subject as you have", a simple sacking wouldn't do. 
The difficulty lay in the fact that the man, "has an extraordinary war record, is a 
Sergeant Major, was in service of the Prince of Wales during the war and had full 
charge of his horse in France". On a recent visit the Prince had "recognised the 
man and spoke to him words of encouragement". Pollock pointed out, "I am sure 
when you realise all these circumstances you will see that would have brought us 
into great disrepute if we had removed him", and "what defence could we offer", to 
the Prince, "simply because he was of a different colour from our own". The 
decision to allocate him a gate lodge however was rescinded. 
In another example, Sir Dawson Bates, Minister of Home affairs wrote to the 
secretary of the Stormont Cabinet, Sir Charles Blackmore on the 14th August 
1934. "I have heard with a great deal of surprise that a Roman Catholic telephonist 
has been appointed to Stormont and I think it would be most undesirable in future 
that you use the telephone to me from Stormont. " On the 17th August, Blackmore 
confirmed, the appointment to which you refer will not take place. " Nor was the 
groundsman to be allowed to rest. On the 8th November 1934, the permanent 
secretary for the ministry of Finance expressed his concern to Spender and 
Blackmore that a deputation was to be made to the Prime Minister to remove the 
Prince's Catholic. Spender described this as a process of "vile persecution" but 
reassured them, "no Roman Catholic has entered the administrative ranks of our 
service, " since he became permanent secretary. He added the number of Catholics 
in the lower posts, "is very far below the average that one would expect", and that 
amongst the labouring classes and junior clerical ranks the proposition was around 
11 Letter from H. M. Pollock, Minister of Finance to Capt. H. Dixon, Chief Whip, February 1934 
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one in ten. In an examination for 70 typing vacancies, the week before, only one 
Roman Catholic or possibly two were successful. One would have expected the 
proportion to be 7 or 8 on the population basis". The recruitment and selection 
process reflected the tone and demeanour of the regime. As the Prime Minister 
stated, "I have always said I am an Orangeman first and a politician and Member 
of this Parliament afterwards ... all 
I boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament 
and a Protestant State". 12 And Lord Brookeborough the next Prime Minister (1943- 
1963) in his clarion call to the faithful on the 12th July: 
"There were a great number of Protestants and Orangemen who employed 
Roman Catholics. He felt that he could speak freely on this subject as he 
had not a Roman Catholic about his own place. He appreciated the great 
difficulty experienced by some of them in procuring suitable Protestant 
labour, but he would point out that Roman Catholics were endeavouring to 
get in everywhere. He would appeal to loyalists, therefore, wherever 
possible to employ good Protestant lads and lassies". 13 
Or again that having thought out the "whole question carefully I recommended 
those people who are Loyalist not to employ Roman Catholics, ninety-nine percent 
of whom are disloyal ... 
". 14 
The Minister of Labour, John Andrews, felt obliged to write to the Prime Minister 
in 1936, refuting allegations that "excessive" numbers of Catholics were employed 
by the Unemployment Assistance Board. The Board had retained, "the irreducible 
minimum of Roman Catholics. A lower proportion might lead to the charge that no 
Catholics at all were able to secure posts in the Boards service, which would I 
think be undesirable. " Fourteen out of the 118 staff were in fact Catholic on 24 
January 1936. Four years service was required before anyone could be considered 
for a permanent position. In 1935, Catholics held 13 out of 73 temporary posts. 
Craig called for greater vigilance with the outbreak of war against Germany in 
1939. To overcome the possibility of a shortage of Protestant women gaining 
temporary clerical posts - the assumption being they would be serving their 
country while Catholics stayed at home - the age of entry was reduced to 17 from 
18. This, it was felt would ensure the "normal rule of putting forward to our 
12 Sir James Craig, later Viscount Craigavon, Prime Minister of N. Ireland, 1921-40,24 April, 1934, 
Parliamentary Debates, N. I. Vol. XVJ, Cols 1091-95. 
13 Fermanagh Times, 13th July 1933. 
14 Londonderry Sentinel, 20 March 1934. 
37 
Selection Boards about 80% to 85% Protestants and 15% to 25% Roman Catholics 
worked smoothly", by providing sufficient numbers of "suitable candidates". 15 
The success of this strategy was proven in a recruitment drive for 100 writing 
assistants when there appeared to be a "scarcity of suitable Protestant applicants", 
for "even on this occasion ... the number of applicants given jobs was in the ratio 
of more than 5: 1 ", in favour of Protestants. The Prime Minister expressed 
particular concern over Agriculture, where there was one branch, "in which the 
percentage of Roman Catholics was very large indeed". 16 The permanent secretary 
replied this was probably due to the fact the Ministry, "found it expedient to send 
them to this particular type of work". The jobs at stake were porters in the abattoir. 
The relevant minister, Sir Basil Brooke, complained "other Ministries had ... put 
pressure on him to accept a larger proportion than they themselves were prepared 
to take". Ministerial involvement also occurred over the funeral of a former staff 
member in the Ministry of Finance. The Cabinet secretaries, prime minister's office 
and Lords Glentoran and Hungerford all intervened when it was found that a man 
called Sloan, an official deemed a Protestant had converted back to Catholicism, 
shortly before his death. When this came to light at his funeral in 1940, Spender 
was obliged to inform all, that: 
It is true that ... 
he did not inform me of the change as I think he ought to 
have done, but I am quite satisfied that it did not in any way prevent him 
from carrying out quite loyally the fair and discreet policy which we have 
tried to observe on this very vexed question ... 
You may have noticed that 
the Presbyterian Minister attended his funeral". 17 
Ministers followed this up with a series of surveys to monitor `Catholic 
infiltration'. An analysis of 1,922 temporary staff employed in every Ministry by 
February 1941, indicated a total of 284 (14%) were Catholic. The highest 
proportions were in education, 6 out of 25 recruits. The lowest, public security, 
where 5 out of 78 recruits were Catholic. A survey in 1943 showed that between 
June 1941 - March 1943 22 out of 158 temporary typists recruited were 
Catholic. 
A ministry of finance survey in 1943 assessed the number of Catholics at senior 
15 Permanent Secretary, Dept. Finance to R. Gransden, Secretary to the Cabinet, PROM, 
22/11941. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Spender to Gransden, 20 September, 1940. 
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management level, from Assistant Principals to Permanent Secretaries. This 
covered five tiers of management including technical staff. Out of 597 staff, 37 
were Catholic. Of these 24 were technical staff at the bottom of the management 
pyramid. None occupied the 44 Permanent and Assistant Secretary posts. '8 By the 
time Stormont was prorogued in 1972, only one Catholic, in response to the reform 
crises that engulfed the North, achieved the level of Permanent Secretary, shortly 
before he retired. 
The administrative arm of government then, faithfully reflected and applied an 
exclusive Protestant ethos as interpreted by the unionist Stormont regime. These 
polices and practices were carried out in the full knowledge of the Westminster 
government. For as Lord Hartingdon, junior minister to the secretary of State, 
noted: 
"With regard to the employment of Catholics in the public service it 
should not be forgotten that broadly speaking, and though there are 
no doubt important exceptions, Catholicism is the religion of the 
masses and Protestantism of the classes and that it is almost 
inevitable that a large majority of posts requiring educated men to 
fill them should be occupied by Protestants". 19 
A briefing paper prepared for Malcolm McDonald, Secretary of State for the 
Dominions, by the Home Office and Sir Samuel Hoare stressed: 
"It must also be borne in mind that the Catholics in Northern 
Ireland, belong, if not almost exclusively, at any rate predominantly 
to the poorer classes, so that the religious difference coincides with 
an economic difference". 
They added: 
"The accusation against the Government of Northern Ireland of 
religious discrimination is somewhat difficult to deal with. In one 
sense it is of course obvious that Northern Ireland is and must be a 
Protestant `state' otherwise it would not have come into being and 
would certainly not continue to exist". 
20 
The same files show the Free State government under De Valera maintained a 
is P. R. O. N. I. CAB 9A/90/1/2. 
19 PRO, London, DOF, 1938,45. 
20 Ibid, p. 44. 
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constant exchange of correspondence with Stormont, Britain and the USA 
protesting at the treatment of Catholics and nationalists. 
Planning and Prejudice. 
In 1939 the unemployment rate was 20.2% which compared with a British average 
of 7.5%. War provided a brief respite, as NI became a staging post for American 
troops, and a labour, munitions and manufacturing resource for an economy on a 
war footing. By 1946, with the end of hostilities it was down to 8.9%, and by 1950, 
5.5%. This experience was short-lived as unemployment rapidly reverted back to 
an average of two, three and on occasion nine times the British average. The 
crushing effect of this and consequent long term unemployment and the associated 
characteristics of poor diet, ill-health, poor housing, emigration and general 
poverty was unevenly experienced. 
As Buckland related, the NI government found itself powerless in the face of 
imperial interests in trade negotiations with the South. The latter declined to offer 
the North a free trade agreement in direct exchange for handing back the Irish ports 
still occupied by the English. British prime minister Chamberlain, mindful of 
"anxieties over the international situation" wished to present an Anglo-Irish 
Agreement along with an Anglo-Italian Agreement, as evidence that peaceful 
means could bring success as "it would greatly add to the impression made upon 
the world. And it is very necessary that an impression of solidarity here should be 
made, and not least in Berlin". 21 The Imperial Cabinet had brushed aside 
protestations with the disdainful question by Sir John Simon, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, "Are we never to be allowed by Ulster to come to terms with the 
South? Is the tail always going to wag the dog" . 
22 England did however agree to 
meet any future NT budget deficit and guaranteed payments under the 
Unemployment Reinsurance Agreement as long as the trade agreement existed. 
Money for industrial development was rejected. The integrity of Orangeism was 
not to be diluted even on the eve of total war in Europe. 
21 Imperial Cabinet Conclusions, 16 March, 1938, P. R. O., CAB 23/93 Sir Warren Fisher's minute, 7 
March, 1938, T160/747/ 14026/04/1; PRONI. CAB 9R/60/3. Chamberlain to Craig, 8 April, 1938 
cited in Buckland, 1979, pp. 113-117. 
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With the decline in Britain's traditional heavy manufacturing industries and its 
post-war displacement as a major imperial power confronting the need to rebuild, 
British governments' looked to mobile and international capital. Unlike Germany, 
it could not benefit from a Marshall Plan to overcome the destruction of total war. 
Mobile capital and economic planning, the direct intervention by the state to direct, 
recruit and target capital resources was taken as given. Full employment was to be 
pursued by economic investment in the regions that in turn would reduce economic 
differentials, generate self-perpetuating growth thereby allowing the rate of direct 
subsistence to be steadily reduced. The planner's targets were high economic 
activity rates, a reduction in the rate of involuntary migration and the full 
utilisation of material and labour resources. The transferring or promotion of 
manufacturing industries to specific areas was an important corner stone of 
regional economic policy. 
The three main methods used to promote this strategy in the UK were: a) 
differential investment incentives; b) physical controls (Industrial Development 
Certificates) policies that were designed to divert new factories into areas of high 
unemployment; and c) employment premiums, that enabled employers to recruit 
labour at a reduced cost to themselves. The cumulative impact of these incentives 
it was expected would be to generate a ripple effect on the wider economy. As a 
peripheral region, the North benefited greatly from this strategy. 23 The existence of 
Stormont as a parliament set it apart from other regions in the UK. The competition 
for public funds occurred at two if not three levels. Firstly against other regions of 
the UK. Secondly at the intra-regional level within the North itself. Thirdly as an 
economy in itself, it suffered from the overwhelming competition of the British 
economy, to which it was a minor provincial player. Within the North, the Belfast 
Urban Area, BUA, acted as the local centre with the rest peripheral to it. The split 
between the East, (overwhelmingly Protestant) and the West, (taking the River 
Bann as the accepted geo-sectarian spatial border), Catholic, in terms of industrial 
investment and employment strategy was and remains a matter of some 
22 Ibid. op. cit Warren Fishers minute, p. 113. 23 See McCrone, Gavin. (1969) Regional Policy in Britain, Open University, George Allen & 
Unwin, and Holland, Stuart. (1976) The Regional Problem, MacMillan Press. 
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controversy. 
In addition the inherent structural problems of the local economy were identified 
early on by Stormont's senior economic advisors - Isles and Cuthbert - who 
carried out the first comprehensive and influential economic survey in 1955. They 
identified the major differences between the economies of NI and GB as: 
".. the lower general level of employment proportionately to the 
labour force, which involves heavier unemployment and therefore 
proportionately more people who earn no income at all, and 
(secondly) the relatively narrow industrial structure which restricts 
the number of openings for the employment of capital and labour at 
rates of earnings equivalent to GB and which thereby depresses the 
income of those who do earn. The general problem of economic 
development in the Province have to do with the causes and effects 
of the relatively large volume of unemployment and narrow 
industrial structure with which the relative lowness of income is 
associated". 24 
They also stressed the pitfalls of conducting business in such a small and partisan 
community. They made the point that the ready access to decision makers by 
particular interests restricted the opportunity for impartiality were it desired, and 
created the scope for the exercise of direct patronage and privilege. They stated: 
"There are various ways in which the Ministry of Commerce like 
the Board of Trade in Great Britain, can influence industrial 
location. In particular, it possesses the power of the purse so far as 
financial assistance in the establishment of new enterprises is 
concerned. .. 
it cannot by means of these controls force new 
enterprises to accept a particular location, but it can usually revent 
them from being established where it does not want them". 
2 
This is at the very heart of the matter of planning and prejudice in NI. An earlier 
pre-war Industries Act had directly assisted 54 schemes. By 1955 they employed 
6,500. Under the 1945 Act, 146 schemes employing 21,000 were assisted. In 
addition 45 projects employing 5,700 were created since 1945 without 
direct 
financial assistance under the new Industries Branch of the local Ministry of 
24 An Economic Survey of Northern Ireland, Belfast 1957. 
25 Isles, K. S. & Cuthbert, N. Ulster Under Home Rule: A Study of the Political and Economic 
Problems of Northern Ireland, Ch. 7, p. 161, (ed) T. Wilson, OUP, London 
1955. 
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Commerce. 26 The 1922 Loans Guarantee Act provided Stormont with the role of 
lead negotiator and guarantor for private sector loans for capital projects. This 
played a vital role toward maintaining the shipyard industry. A similar policy in 
Britain was abandoned by Churchill in 1927 but continued in the North. This 
thereby placed Belfast yards in a more advantageous position to their competitors 
in Britain. Pollock, the Minister of Finance considered this is "a matter of life and 
death for our shipyards". 27 
These early endeavours demonstrated the gains to be made by direct state 
intervention. Buckland however argues that success was limited and that the 
impact of the 1932 and 1937 New Industries (Development) Acts was primarily 
the attraction of Shorts & Harlands, established in 1937, employing 6,552. Claims 
that up to 12,500 jobs would be created were never realised. Employment in such 
firms peaked at 7,292 in 1949.28 Between 1945-51, Stormont directly assisted 77 
new investors locate in ICI. Of the 111 advance factories built by 1964,16 were 
established in the West. By 1968,60,000 workers were employed in the 240 firms 
benefiting from public assistance. Less than 10% of these were located West of the 
River Bann. 29 The creation of Craigavon and the siting of the New University of 
Ulster in Coleraine as opposed to Derry upon the recommendation of Matthew (see 
below) added to the disparities along spatial sectarian lines. 
By 1959,75% of all firms sponsored by Stormont were located within 30 miles of 
Belfast. By 1973 the figure was 65%. By 1961 Derry had still only seen one new 
government aided factory located there with two others receiving assistance to 
expand their works. 30 An analysis of fully developed estates for potential economic 
development held by the local Department of Commerce between 1945-79 shows 
that the West (Fermanagh, Omagh, Dungannon, Cookstown) contained only 3.6% 
of the 803.75 acres available. Of these 4.25 acres were acquired between 1965-69; 
26 Isles and Cuthbert, Economic Survey of N. Ireland, p. 381, Belfast, 1957. 
27 op. cit. Ibid. p 117 
28 Isles & Cuthbert, Economic Survey, p. 381, cf. Buckland, 1979, p. 125. 
29 Dept. of Commerce NI, 1980; See Matthew Report, Appendix XII, 1963. 
30 Hall Report, Economy of NI: Report of the Joint Working Party, Appendix X, Table I, pp77-80; 
Appendix XII, p. 83, HMSO, Cmd 446, Belfast 1962. For a useful discussion on this period see 
O'Dowd, Liam. (1980), `Regional Policy' pp. 30-67, in Northern Ireland, Between Civil Rights and 
Civil War, CSE Books. 
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another 25.30 acres between 1970-74 while none were acquired during 1975-79.31 
A long phase of passivity lasting until the 1960s following these early successes 
occurred. Between 1945-47 the prospective employment of new projects was 
estimated at 16,300 new jobs. By 1947-49 this had declined to 7,200 and by 1949- 
53 to 5,600. Unemployment rates were six times that of the average in GB. 
Employment remained concentrated around Belfast and a 25-mile radius that 
included the industrial towns of the Lagan Valley and Upper Bann. For example by 
1947, over 75% of insured workers were insured at employment exchanges within 
25 miles of Belfast and over 80% within 30 miles. Thus Stormont policy played a 
significant force in maintaining and reinforcing this pattern of employment. 32 
During the 1960's as GB saw a surge in the development of regional location 
policies and practices, local plans were commissioned by the Stormont regime. 
These plans provided the structural framework for the industrial and physical 
planning process for the North right into the 1990's. They included the Hall Report 
(Economy of NI: Report of the Joint Working Party, Cmd 446, Belfast 1962); the 
Matthew Report, (Belfast Regional Survey and Plan, Cmd. 451, Belfast 1963): the 
Wilson Report, (Economic Development in NI, Cmd 479, Belfast 1965); and then 
for the 1970's, the NI Development Programme, 1970-75 (Wilson, Matthew, 
Parkinson, Belfast 1970) and the Quigley Report, (Economic and Industrial 
Strategy for NI: Report of a Review Team, Belfast 1976) The latter report picked 
up from the earlier reports and laid down the strategy for the 1970's to the 1990's. 
Quigley's work was produced under the auspices of Direct Rule. 
Hall stressed the predominance of Belfast and noted that outside a radius of 20 
miles there were no concentrations of time served craftsmen among the 
unemployed. Only 1 in 9 of the unemployed outside the city were craftsmen as 
compared to a ratio of 3: 7 in the Belfast area. Hall reminded indigenous capitalists 
that Britain was both a neighbour and a powerful competitor. While encouraging 
diversification of investment and noting 97% of all external investment by 1961 
was located in the Belfast region he conversely rejected any policy of investment 
31 Department of Commerce (NI) Landholdings 1945-79 as at November 1979, unpublished. The 
original analysis by the author appears in an unpublished FEA draft report on `Regional Planning in 
Northern Ireland'. 1982. 
32 See Buckland, 1979, pp. 382,388. 
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dispersal. He believed the existing imbalance would assist the North escape 
adverse social and economic problems associated with excessive industrial 
concentrations in Britain. 33 Matthew's study was the first major physical, 
geographical and economic study of the North as a whole. It introduced the Belfast 
Stop-line to restrict urban expansion and from a limited terms of reference 
devolved into a full regional plan with a coherent strategy. Nine special Centres of 
Development, (Portadown, Lurgan, Ballymena, Lame, Carrickfergus, Antrim, 
Bangor, Newtownards, Downpatrick) were designated. As such they were targeted 
for accelerated growth and investment. A new city, Craigavon based on Lurgan 
and Portadown was to be created. Matthew believed Craigavon, would act as a 
"stimulus of the greatest value to the future economy and well being of the 
province as a whole". Its purpose was to become a major industrial complex", 
which could serve as a "symbol of regeneration within Northern Ireland" . 
The job 
targets for these overwhelmingly Protestant areas was 30,500 by 1981 and 50,000 
new houses. 34 
Wilson was primarily responsible for economic strategy between 1964-75. 
Wilson's career would include becoming Emeritus Professor at Bristol University 
and economic advisor to South Africa as it developed its policy of apartheid. 
Wilson declared his objective was to achieve self-sustaining growth in order to 
reduce net annual emigration of 9000 a year and to shift away from reliance on 
declining industries. For example since the war direct government assistance had 
sustained 50,000 jobs or 30% of those employed. Comprehensive plans were 
drafted for Belfast, Craigavon, Ballymena, Antrim with other areas left in the 
hands of local authorities. Wilson saw the creation of and proximity of such 
economic centres to a modern industrial centre as essential to success. He opposed 
the dispersion of factories to peripheral areas. While praising the use of IDC 
certificates in Britain as a mechanism to direct companies to given areas (including 
NI), he recorded with praise the fact Stormont had never issued instructions to 
investors to locate in peripheral areas or locations they were opposed to. 
Wilson noted that since the war, of the total number of firms opening, 70% of 
33 Hall Report, Appendix X, pp. 77-80,83. 
34 Matthew Report, Appendix XII, p. 83,1963, HMSO, Cmd 451. 
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those employed in concerns of 300 or more and 50% employed in 500 or more. 
Only 42% expected to employ less than 100.35 Wilson considered location in small 
towns would be wasteful. The potential employment market offered by large 
hinterlands of small towns and villages was discounted. Wilson established job 
targets of 30,000 in manufacturing and services respectively for 1964-70. An 
additional goal of 500 construction jobs completed his extremely ambitious 
programme of 60,000 jobs by 1970. As with the previous six-year target of 18,000 
jobs these ambitions were never realised. 
Nationalist MP's and commentators constantly accused unionists of sinister plots of 
discrimination in housing and employment. 36 Stormont was charged with only 
directing new industry to unionist areas. 37 For example when two new factories 
were opened in Protestant Newtownards and Bangor in 1964 and 1967, nationalist 
MP's asked if the investor had been advised, "there are 1100 to 1200, unemployed 
in Fermanagh and an adequate supply of labour as opposed to only 375 
unemployed in Newtownards. 38 In Bangor the nationalist MP for South Down 
compared the "manpower available in Newry with an unemployment figure of 
2,500" as compared to Bangor's 200.39 If nothing else these exchanges demonstrate 
that each side knew that economic patronage would be politically driven. This 
perception was encouraged by Wilson's own public beliefs. He dismissed the West 
as a region which had to pay the price of a "little transitional unemployment", if 
full employment was to be achieved in the East. 40 He noted that: 
He added that: 
"There is no reason a priori why Catholics, who are one third of the 
population should have one third of the chairs at University, one 
third of the administration posts and so on, for ability and 
inclination together with the competition of the people from outside 
Ulster altogether, may dictate differently. As for business life, 
Presbyterians and Jews are probably endowed with more business 
acumen than Irish Catholics". 
"From any objective point of view it cannot be said that the 
grievances of the Catholics are very real. They have less to 
35 Wilson Report, pp. 5,31,37. 
36 MP for Mid Derry, NI, HC, 7 April, 1965 
37 MP for South Armagh, NI, HC, December 1965 
38 HC, NI, 24 June, 1964. 
39 NI, HC, 24 October, 1967. 
40 "Devolution and Partition", Wilson, Ulster Under Home Rule, 1955, pp. 189. OUP. 
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complain about than the U. S. Negroes and their lot is a very 
pleasant one compared with that of the Nationalists in, say the 
Ukraine 
.... 
Moreover, just as it is necessary to understand the 
"planter psychology" so it is necessary to understand the 
psychology of those who were supplanted. For generations they 
were the underdogs, the despised "croppies", the adherents of a 
persecuted religion who were kept out of the public affairs by the 
Protestant conquerors. They were made to feel inferior, and to make 
matters worse, they often were inferior if only in those personal 
41 qualities that make success in competitive life". 
It may be noted in passing that the current success of the Irish Celtic Tiger 
economy indicates that objective economic analysis comes in many guises. The 
views of Stormonts' leading physical and economic planner reflected the views of 
NI ministers. For example Brian Faulkner, Minister of Commerce, 1963-69, 
Minister of Development and the North's last Prime Minister recommended: 
"Orangemen individually and collectively should interest themselves in the 
economic welfare of the community. I mean by that statement we should be 
anxious to find employment for our brethren". 42 
He later proclaimed, "the Orange Order is the backbone of Ulster". 43 It was 
therefore not surprising to see nationalists reject the unionist view as expressed by 
Faulkner, that "the only thing which holds back individual development in the 
more remote parts of the country", is the lack of an adequate "pool of labour" (10 
March 1965). Wilson for his part had reached the remarkable conclusion that in 
any case the existing pool of labour was too old to meet the demands of new 
industry. The good will to encourage or direct investors to areas with a large 
supply of Catholic labour was simply not there. This was recognised early on by 
those engaged to manage high profile projects such as Craigavon, a new `rainbow 
city'. An English architect, Geoffrey Copcutt, who was recruited to deliver the new 
city resigned making a 7000 word statement in the Irish Times. 44 He regarded the 
linking of Lurgan and Portadown as the basis of a new city inadvisable. He 
suggested Derry was the obvious choice both as a centre for industry and higher 
education. Copcutt declared, the designation of Craigavon was a consequence of 
political and religious considerations and that if Derry were developed in its place, 
41, Ibid., pp. 208-209. 
42 County Down Spectator, Bangor 17th July 1954. 
43 Irish News, Belfast, 13th July 1960. 
44 Irish Times, 15'' August 1964. 
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"this would indeed be earnest of the sincerity of the desire to prepare Ulster for the 
21st Century". He added, "Stormont on my brief but deep acquaintance has shown 
signs of a crisis ridden regime too busy looking over its shoulder to look 
outwards". He further noted, Craigavon would directly prevent growth in other 
areas and that he and his team were not being asked to make a positive contribution 
to NI's growth but rather to, "engineer propaganda rather than a new city". 45 
Events proved him correct. Craigavon became a range of `dump estates' with many 
having to be demolished within a short time as it failed to carry out its designated 
growth centre role. Gillespie found that employment was largely drawn from the 
immediate area with firms complaining about acute labour shortages, especially 
semi-skilled. Neighbouring employment exchanges in Dungannon, Armagh and 
Newry continued to suffer from high rates of male unemployment. Intra-regional 
inequalities remained. Gillespie concluded that although Stormont was clear about 
where it did not want industry to locate it failed to carry out any serious research 
prior to an investment decision in order to evaluate any positive or adverse impact 
the location would have. 46 
In the early 1970's, the search for new initiatives found its expression in the 
Quigley Report. Quigley accepted the failure of the growth centre policies. The 
governments Regional Plan and Research Team (1972) argued, "the growth/key 
policy, as it now stands, originally interpreted is not going to work, because it is 
not politically viable and further exceptionally difficult to manage as it is now 
cast". 47 The dispersal of investment and the promotion of small local economic 
initiatives were adopted as official strategy in response to political and violent 
unrest. Official publications noted: 
"If economic pressures are reduced by planned development and the 
provision of higher amenity level in the environment diffuses social 
tensions, the difference in the cultural values within the Society lose their 
potential for conflict". 48 
By then it was too late. The interests of military strategy and the very existence of 
Stormont were the issues. 
45 Irish Times, Dublin, 15th August 1964. 
46 See Gillespie, A. R. "Growth Centres and Regional Economic Development in NI", 1977, unpub. 
Univ Cambridge, PhD. 
47 op. cit Quigley Report, p. 5. 
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Patterns of Life. 
"The basic fear of the Protestants in Northern Ireland is that they 
will be outbred by the Roman Catholics. It is as simple as that. It is 
frightfully hard to explain to a Protestant that if you give Roman 
Catholics a good job they will live like Protestants, because they 
will see neighbours with cars and TV sets. They will refuse to have 
eighteen children, but if the Roman Catholic is jobless and lives in a 
most ghastly hovel he will rear eighteen children on national 
assistance. It is impossible to explain this to a militant Protestant 
because he is so keen to deny civil rights to his Roman Catholic 
neighbours. He cannot understand in fact that if you treat Roman 
Catholics with due consideration and kindness they will live like 
Protestants in spite of the authoritarian nature of their church". 49 
This comment while reflecting the patrician view of the landed ruling Protestant 
gentry towards Catholics is noteworthy in its failure to realise their traditional 
method of governance and hold over Protestant militants had entered its twilight 
years. O'Neil would be replaced by more urban and militant leadership that did not 
concern itself with the capacity of Catholics to `live like Protestants'. The 
following summary indicates the speed by which events were irrevocably changing 
and provide the context for the introduction of equality codes that sought to placate 
what had become a nationalist revolt. 
Terence O'Neill succeeded Brookeborough as Prime Minister for NI on 25`h 
March 1963. In 1964 serious rioting broke out in Catholic West Belfast in response 
to incitement by the Reverend Ian Paisley when he attempted to remove a tricolour 
from republican election headquarters. He threatened to march on the Catholic 
Divis Street area if the police did not act. The response by the RUC led to four 
days of rioting. In 1965 Sean Lemass, Prime Minister for the Free State visited 
Stormont in January, an unprecedented and controversial event for unionists. In 
April 1965, O'Neill advised the unionist Council that he wanted to, " build the 
Opportunity State in which no man will be imprisoned by his environment". The 
1965 Lockwood report on higher education led to the location of the New 
University of Ulster at Coleraine. Again this was a controversial decision as 
48 NI Regional Geography, Belfast HMSO. 
49 Belfast Telegraph, 5t' May, 1969. Lord O'Neill, then Prime Minister for Northern Ireland. 
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nationalists accused Stormont of open sectarianism against the Catholic Derry 
City. Wilson also published his economic plans. In 1966 Faulkner declared his 
ministry's job creation target for manufacturing alone was 30,000 jobs by 1970. 
Paisley and the son of Carson addressed the newly formed Ulster Protestant 
Volunteers. Gusty Spence and his colleagues from the UVF killed two Catholics in 
separate incidents and wounded two others in May and June 26. On June 28 
O'Neill proscribed the UVF as an illegal organisation. O'Neill accused Paisley of 
having close links with the UVF who was "anxious to wash his hands of it now". 
On January 29 1967 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was formed at a 
meeting in Belfast. Craig the hard line minister for Home Affairs banned any 
celebration of the 1867 Fenian Rising and the Republican Clubs. In December 
1967 Jack Lynch the new Free State Prime Minister paid a courtesy call on 
O'Neill. The first civil rights march took place in Dungannon in August 1968 as 
the campaign for electoral reform, "one man one vote", and an end to 
discrimination in housing and employment gathered apace. A planned march on 5 
October in Derry was banned. NICRA chose to defy the ban and as the 2000 
marchers met the RUC near Craigavon Bridge they were batoned. Rioting ensued. 
A series of civil rights marches took place with objectives of one man, one vote, a 
fair drawing of electoral boundaries, freedom of speech and assembly, repeal of the 
Special Powers Act and the fair allocation of housing and end to discrimination in 
employment. A four-day march from Belfast to Derry starting on the Ist January 
1969 was ambushed at Burntollet Bridge, and then stoned again in Derry on arrival 
in the Protestant area of Irish Street and Spencer road. The UDA was formed 
drawing its strength from loyalist West, North and East Belfast. 
As violence intensified matters developed a momentum of their own. The "Battle 
of the Bogside", between the RUC and residents took place. British troops came 
out of their barracks to patrol the streets and support the RUC. The UVF bombed 
water pipes at the Silent Valley reservoir at Lough Neagh, and blamed the IRA. 
ONeill was replaced by his cousin Chichester-Clark, followed rapidly by Brian 
Faulkner, on a unionist hard line ticket, barricades were put up by residents, 
vigilantes appeared on the streets, armed gunmen patrolled in republican areas and 
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the British Army started to erect "peace lines". N. Ireland settled down for several 
decades of vicious killings and terror. The UDR was created and initially recruited 
from the infamous B Specials. The Provisional IRA was formed in December 1969 
-a momentous period by any account. 50 
The British government decided in the face of this growing civil unrest to establish 
a Commission to "inquire into and report on violence on civil disturbance in NI 
since October 5,1968". The enquiry concluded there was a "failure of leadership 
on all sides". 51 The report recognised that the major underlying cause as: 
"the continuing stresses and tensions within the community, social, 
economic and political, many of which are rooted in the history of 
the people themselves ... they 
had been and remain fundamental 
elements in the pattern of life in this community". 52 
The information provided to the enquiry in terms of discrimination in jobs, 
gerrymandering, housing supply and allocation, the restricted franchise, led the 
enquiry team to conclude the material evidence supported "the inferences that the 
evidence of political or social-political grievance which was presented to us from 
so many quarters, in such detail, and with such frequency, had substantial 
foundation in fact". 53 
Cameron's report and its context are important for several reasons. Firstly it 
provided an official recognition that Catholic grievances were real and some form 
of institutional redress was essential if Catholic support was to be secured. It 
thereby reached out to the moderately disaffected Catholic or nationalist and 
signalled their grievances may be resolved. Secondly as Cameron saw it, reform 
would allow Catholics to participate in political and administrative life and thereby 
provide a credible opposition to a party that had been in power unchallenged since 
1920. Cameron stated, "an Opposition which can never become a Government 
30 For an accessible daily account of this period see Fortnight; NI 1968-73 A Chronology of Events, 
Volume 1,1968-71, Deutsch. R, & Magowan. V, Blackstaff, Belfast, 1973 and The Centre Cannot 
Hold, Collins, T. Bookworks, Dublin, 1983; McCann, Eamonn. (1974,1980) War and an Irish 
Town, Pluto and Farrell, Michael. (1976) for events in Derry and the NICRA march. 
51 Disturbances in Northern Ireland (The Cameron Report) September 1969, HMSO Cmd 532. 
52 Ibid. p. 10. 
53 Cameron Report, p. 11. 
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tends to lose a sense of responsibility". 54 Cameron felt reform would generate a 
sense of responsibility and promote measures, which would secure "on all sides 
loyal acceptance of the Constitutions of Northern Ireland". 55 Thirdly it offered a 
declaration that the ultimate arbiter of power in this case - the British government 
will act to restore equilibrium. This was no more than a recognition that where the 
role of violence is such that a significant part of a population becomes 
disenfranchised from the body politic and its legal mores then the possibility of 
maintaining an acceptance that the market will offer a meritorious entry becomes 
remote. The potential for political and market instability with unforeseen local and 
wider implications becomes a risk that must be managed. 
The British approach to such matters that carry unknown risks and in particular 
where the primary thrust is to manage the situation and maintain existing 
institutions is to establish an enquiry followed by a Working Party. The purpose of 
the first is usually to allow the political administration to agree on a body of 
"facts"; the second is to establish a Working Party to devise a method for mapping 
out a process that will assist restore a sense of equilibrium within the body politic. 
The fact that local protagonists may, as Craig, the Stormont minister responsible 
for unleashing much of the official violence and Paisley condemn the report and 
refuse to co-operate with any enquiry was as useful as any endorsement. 56 The 
British government however decided their first approach was to contain the 
situation by massive force through strengthening local Protestant forces and 
despatch of its own armed forces. 57 
Conclusion. 
54 Cameron Report, p. 12. 
ss Ibid. 
56 The fact the gap between enquiry, report and fresh legal equality of opportunity codes was some 
seven years reflected the emphasis on military solutions. The counterpoint to this however were the 
facts that the Catholic minority was highly significant in terms of numerical comparison and 
political organisation to the local ruling Protestant elite. Secondly they had strong political support 
from a country regarded as their own - the Free State, and a very powerful international ally 
in the 
Irish diaspora in the United States. This meant that their potential challenge within the political 
context of the period was regarded as highly threatening particularly as Britain's first priority was 
to restore the hegemony of Stormont and unionists. 
57 It would be some time before a more sophisticated understanding was reached by the British 
government partly as a result of the end of the cold war and a closer relationship with Ireland. The 
1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement and then more fruitfully the 1998 Belfast or Good Friday Agreement 
are evidence of a more sophisticated approach entering the political arena. 
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The Protestant State had successfully imposed its cultural values and economic 
strategies to secure a sectarian narrow ground. In a society where unemployment 
was historically high and opportunities relatively few the struggle to maintain the 
gains of power, patronage, wealth and employment as reward for loyalty was 
accepted as wholly reasonable and just. Political expediencies as expressed in 
economic and physical planning, combined with the realpolitik of gerrymandering 
to disenfranchise Catholics from political representation and employment secured 
the divisions essential to the maintenance of the state. 
The North however had reached its nadir in the late 1960s, as the challenge to its 
hegemony could no longer be contained within this narrow ground. Due to wider 
changes beyond NI's borders internationally and within Britain the nationalist 
population had in effect declared "they would overcome". The Stormont regimes 
single-minded application of sectarian strategies could no longer be maintained 
without the application of constant ruthless force. The response to force, the 
challenge of civil rights and civil unrest ultimately brought the edifice down and 
saw the introduction of Direct Rule and a period of reform. Britain determined that 
newer forms of management were required to meet its objectives and that to 
sustain some form of consensus reforms were necessary. The challenge to 
achieving reforms whether it was under a new Stormont regime or later Direct 
Rule was to square a loyalist paradigm that demanded the maintenance of the 
status quo while somehow accommodating those Catholics who would or could 
ally themselves to an essentially Protestant or unionist future. It is to an analysis of 
these reforms and the response of the British State we now turn. 
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Chapter 3. The response of Westminster to inequalities in Northern Ireland. 
Introduction. 
The following sections outline the development of equal opportunity legislation in 
the USA, England and NI. This enables the policy evaluation of the practical 
application and origins of NI equal opportunity laws to be placed in context. The 
Civil Rights Act and struggles associated with violence, civil disorder and the need 
for a political accommodation within the USA are presented as the template for 
legal developments in the UK. British legislators made the link explicit and 
acknowledged their debt (Van Straubenzee and SACHR reports) with reference to 
NI. To begin with, the concept of equality of opportunity, the American model and 
its application are examined. This is followed by a brief description of the 
experience of Race Relations legislation and institutions in the UK. Finally the 
powers and duties of the 1976 Fair Employment Act (NI) and its replacement in 
1990 are outlined. 
(I)THE AMERICAN DREAM. 
Strange Fruit. 
Southern trees bear a strange fruit, 
Blood on the leaves and blood at the root, 
Black body swinging in the Southern breeze, 
Strange fruit hanging from the poplar trees. 
Pastoral scene of the gallant South, 
The bulging eyes and the twisted mouth, 
Scent of magnolia sweet and fresh, 
And the sudden smell of burning flesh! 
Here is a fruit for the crows to pluck, 
For the rain to gather, for the wind to suck, 
For the sun to rot, for a tree to drop, 
Here is a strange and bitter crop. (Billie Holiday [Abel Meeropol]) 
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Rights and Procedures. 
President Kennedy introduced the 1964 Civil Rights Act in 1963 as a direct 
response to the civil rights campaign amid growing fears of disorder and violence. 
Discrimination on grounds of race, colour, religion and national origin was made 
illegal. The law applied to the provision of goods and services, education, 
employment, any programme receiving federal financial assistance and the use of 
publicly owned or operated facilities. ' Title VII of the Act (anti-discrimination 
laws) became fully effective on July 2nd 1968, as employers were graduated into 
the laws by size from 1964. A newly created commission, the EEOC, exercised 
responsibility for enforcing these laws. This included equal pay, rehabilitation and 
disability, and age in addition to Title VII. The Commissioner's and General 
Counsel members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The 
public may attend its weekly open sessions and the agenda items are released one 
week prior to each meeting. The EEOC established around 22 district and 27 area 
offices to administer its responsibilities. The law however did not make it unlawful 
to discriminate against an individual who was a member of the Communist Party 
of the United States or any other organisation required to register as a Communist 
action or Communist front organisation. This was done by final order of the 
Subversive Activities Control Board pursuant to the Subversive Activities Control 
Act of 1950.2 
Statutes were made to determine timetables for hearing charges of discrimination. 
An individual had 180 days to file a discrimination charge or up to 240 days if 
there was a State or Local Fair Employment Practice Agency in the area. 3 In some 
cases the time limits may be extended to 300 days. After that the EEOC cannot 
investigate. Charges are made in writing and under oath or by affirmation. 
Employers are notified within ten days and a fact-finding conference convened. 
1 The Republican Party opposed the inclusion of sex discrimination. However the Senate finally 
passed the Bill after cloture had been successfully invoked against a filibuster, the first time in the 
Senate's history. 
2 Sec. 703 (F) CRA 1964, as amended, USA. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act covered non- 
discrimination in Federally assisted programmes and was aimed at State and local governments as 
conduits of Federal aid. See Celada, Raymond. J. `Legislative History and Analysis of Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act 1964', 24th November 1965, E 185 G1,336/38, A-116, Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, USA. 
3 The EEOC has work sharing agreements with 69 state or local agencies. 
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Both parties and any witnesses then put their case. If a settlement is not possible or 
the charge is not deemed appropriate for such a conference, further investigations 
are conducted. If the Commission finds there is no reasonable cause to accept 
discrimination has occurred the individual may exercise a right to sue and go to 
court. The EEOC maintains a panel of attorneys who will pursue such cases on 
behalf of the complainant. 
Determinations by the Commission on reasonable cause are to be made promptly 
and not later than 120 days from the filing of the charge. If the Commission is 
unable to achieve an acceptable conciliation agreement from the respondent, it may 
initiate a civil action. Where the respondent is a government body, agency, or 
political sub-division, matters are automatically referred to the Attorney General. 
She/he may then take a civil action against the respondent in the appropriate 
district court. 4 The chief judges in any district court are duty bound to expedite 
these cases at the earliest practicable date. The identities of employers and 
employees, except in unusual circumstances, must be revealed. The 1971 
amendments to the Act gave the EEOC the power to go directly to court to enforce 
the law and critically provided that discrimination charges may be filed by 
organisations on behalf of aggrieved individuals, as well as by employees and job 
applicants themselves. Legal action then may be initiated from a range of sources. 
The courts attach great weight to statistical data as a measure of the employment 
situation and as an indicator of the steps an employer should be taking to resolve 
any problems. Discriminatory practices may lead to intervention by the Federal 
government, costly litigation for the company, back pay awards and court-imposed 
goals, timetables and changes in employment. The major mechanism for 
overcoming inequalities are programmes of affirmative action. This has entered the 
popular idiom as 'quotas' or 'reverse discrimination'. It is therefore useful to 
outline exactly what affirmative action entailed. 
Affirmative Action. 
"What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary and 
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously 
4 CRA TITLE VII, Sec 706, (b)(f). 
56 
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification". 5 
This included acts that appeared fair in form but effectively discriminated in 
practice. The legal basis for affirmative action programmes is reflected in legal 
titles and a range of Executive orders made by the Presidents office. 6 There is now 
a substantial amount of case law on the issue. A Federal Register is published 
containing a series of technical amendments to the procedural regulations on behalf 
of the EEOC. Other State and Federal laws and Executive Orders that also prohibit 
discrimination in employment support title VII. For example, Age, Equal Pay, 
Education Amendments Act 1972, the National Labor Relations Act and Related 
Laws; the Civil rights Act of 1866 and 1870; and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the 14th Amendments to the Constitution. 
Executive Orders issued by the President lay down that in all areas concerning 
Federal employment policy and practice, positive programmes to realise equal 
opportunity were to be implemented. All contractors had to commit themselves to 
these programmes, and permit "access to his books, records and accounts ... 
for 
purpose of investigation to ascertain compliance with such rules, regulations and 
orders". Non-compliance with the non-discrimination clauses and rules of the 
contract could lead to the termination, cancellation or suspension of the contract. 
The contractor could also be declared ineligible for further contracts and subject to 
other sanctions. 7 These provisions bound sub-contractors and trade unions. The 
Order specifically demands the names of the contractors or unions that have 
complied or failed to comply with its provisions are published. Amendments made 
under Executive Order 11375 in 1967 expressly require that discrimination on 
grounds of sex is stated under the same public terms. 
Although Title VII does not explicitly require affirmative action the Executive 
Orders do. All firms at the time in receipt of Federal grants over $50,000 and 
5 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that 
are fair in form but discriminatory in operation". (US Supreme 
Court Justice Warren Burger, Carter 
V Gallagher, 452, F. 2D, 315,1971). 
6 For example, Title VII of the CRA ACT, the 1972 Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act, Executive 
Orders 11246,11375 and Revised Order No. 4, made by then President, Lyndon Johnson. A guide 
`The time is Now -A call to Business and 
Industry' was published in Johnson's and Hubert 
Humphrey, the vice-president's name in 1965, US 1965 0-783-852. 
Executive Order 11246,1965. 
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employing 50 or more had to develop and implement written programmes. These 
are monitored by a Federal compliance agency. In addition the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance in Revised Order No. 4 (4th December 1971) spelt out the 
specific requirements for "result-orientated" programmes. Within 120 days from 
the start of a contract, a written affirmative action compliance programme for each 
of its establishments must be produced. For a contractor to be considered in 
compliance a "corrective action" programme to remedy an "affected class", who, 
by virtue of past discrimination must be included in the programme. 8 
If a contractor has no programme or has one that is not acceptable he has 30 days 
to show good cause or implement an acceptable action programme. The contract is 
immediately terminated if he fails to do so. Affirmative action programmes were 
defined as: 
"a set of specific and result orientated procedures to which a 
contractor commits himself. An acceptable affirmative action 
programme must include an analysis of areas within which the 
contractor is deficient in the utilisation of minority groups and 
women, and further goals and timetables to which the contractors 
good faith efforts must be directed, to correct the deficiencies and, 
thus to achieve prompt and full utilisation of minorities and women, 
at all levels and in all segments his workforce where deficiencies 
exist". 9 
The courts may "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate", under Title 
VII. This has included numerical hiring and promotion goals to compensate for the 
effects of past discrimination. "Underutilisation", is defined by the EEOC as 
"having fewer minorities or women in a particular job category than would 
reasonably be expected by their presence in the relevant labor market". It also 
includes the employment of people in jobs that fail to make adequate use of their 
skills and training. "Concentration" means more of a particular group (females, 
males, and ethnic minorities) in a job category or department than would 
reasonably be expected by their presence in the workforce. 10 The EEOC 
considered that where statistics demonstrate a significant underutilisation or 
8 Affirmative Action and Equal Employment, A guidebook for employers, Volume 1, EEOC, 
Washington DC, 1974. 
9 Chapter 60, OFFC, Revised Order, No. 4, as amended 1974. 
10 Affirmative Action and Equal Employment, Vol. 1, EEOC, USA, 1974. 
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concentration, "there is a strong probability that discriminatory practices are 
operating in some aspects of your employment system and that you should take 
remedial action to eliminate such practices". 11 To achieve this, specific goals and 
timetables were held to be "the heart of your programme". The courts have 
generally developed these basic principles and placed the onus on the employer to 
demonstrate the absence of minority groups and females is not the result of 
discrimination. The US Supreme Court held: 
"under the (Civil Rights) Act, practices, procedures, .. neutral in their face, 
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 
freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices... 
Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment 
practices, not simply the motivation". 12 
The barriers identified by the EEOC and courts included recruitment, selection, 
placement, testing, systems of transfers, promotion, seniority, lines of progression 
and other basic conditions and terms of employment. Remedies have been 
expensive and far-reaching. Back pay and legal costs may be awarded to both the 
individual and the whole "affected class". This may be backdated up to two years 
before any discrimination charge is made. For example, black employees in the 
Lorrillard Corporation were awarded $500,000 in back pay when the court found 
seniority and limited transfer rights in contracts between the company and local 
trades union restricted their access to most jobs. Every black employee who 
suffered a loss in promotional and pay rise opportunities was duly compensated. 
Virginia Electric Power Company was ordered to pay $250,000 to compensate 
black workers for wages they would have earned, had the company's 
discriminatory system of promotion and unnecessary qualifications requirements 
not prevented their access to better jobs. The company was ordered to ensure at 
least 25% of new union employees were non-white until an employment target in 
union jobs of 21.5% was reached. 
The Household Finance Corporation paid more than $125,000 to white-collar 
female employees who were denied promotion. Under the terms of a consent 
decree they agreed to hire 20% females for branch representative openings; 20% 
from specified minority groups for clerical, credit and branch representative 
jobs 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. Griggs V Duke Power Co. 401, USA, 1971. 
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until total employees reached 65% of their population in the labour recruitment 
area. Sardis Luggage Company was ordered to pay $120,000 plus attorney fees and 
costs to black plaintiffs. They were ordered to recruit black workers in a 2: 1 ratio 
for four years until the ratio of blacks were in direct proportion to the non-white 
workforce in the local catchment area. One of the most expensive warnings to 
employers concerned the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). 
They were obliged to pay approximately $15m in back pay to thousands of 
employees plus an additional $50m in yearly payments for promotion and wage 
adjustments for minority and female employees. Specific hiring and promotion 
targets were established. These were subject to review by the EEOC and Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance. 13 A major sex discrimination settlement was 
finalised in April 1992 against State Farm Insurance Companies on behalf of 814 
women. In the 13 year old case women who had been refused jobs as sales agents 
were awarded $157m initially, with a final compensation level of around $205m. 14 
American courts held numerical goals and timetables to be a necessary and critical 
means of overcoming the present effects of past discrimination. Great weight was 
therefore attached to building remedial programmes upon findings derived from 
statistical data. In the late 1970's a series of court cases appeared to place the future 
of vigorous action programmes in some doubt. The EEOC was forced to address 
the relevance of famous cases such as Bakke in its Affirmative Action Guidelines. 
15 The EEOC rejected the view that affirmative action programmes on race, sex 
and national origin were a form of "reverse discrimination". In the Bakke case the 
University did not assert reliance on any detailed guidance and procedures for 
creating an action programme. The Commission reviewed its guidelines in the light 
of the Supreme Court's opinions and concluded they were a consistent and lawful 
foundation for voluntary action under Title VII. 
16 The EEOC determined to 
support any employer that was subjected to similar allegations. 
13 op. cit. EEOC Affirmative Action and Equal Employment, January 
1974, p. 8-11. USA. The court 
references are cited on pp. 65-67. See also `Equal Opportunity 
in the USA - Recent Developments' 
Rees, Tom. Runnymede Trust, August 1974, Ref S7, pp. 9-12 describes ATT's response to a 
consent decree by the Federal Courts. 
14 The Guardian April 1992, press report. 




"In such a situation both the affirmative action undertaken to 
improve the condition of minorities and women, and the objection 
to that action, are based upon the principles of Title VII. Any 
uncertainty as to the meaning and application of Title VII in such 
situations threatens the accomplishment of the clear Congressional 
intent to encourage voluntary action. The Commission believes that 
by the enactment of Title VII Congress did not intend to expose 
those who comply with the Act to charges that they are violating the 
very statute they are seeking to implement". 17 
Although EEOC guidelines stress voluntary action without resort to litigation, its 
role as the Federal body responsible for co-ordinating and enforcing equal 
opportunity programmes and statutes demanded that its' guidelines should form 
the basis for action and constitute a lawful defence under Title VII in the event of 
counter litigation. 18 The Federal Communications General Counsel, concluded in 
September 1978, "that the Bakke case does not cast any doubt on the validity of the 
Commissions equal opportunity policies and rules". 19 This followed on from the 
Supreme Court's view that racial preferences may be a valid remedy only where 
there has been a judicial, legislative or administrative finding of past 
discrimination. There had been no such finding in the Bakke case. Furthermore, the 
EEOC's programmes did not impose an arbitrary quota system. A distinction is 
drawn between arbitrary quotas and a system that imposed hiring goals and 
timetables after the Commission determines an employer or union is 
discriminating or not providing equal opportunities. The practices of the employer 
are evaluated `within a zone of reasonableness' that considers numerous factors 
such as efforts to recruit minorities and women. 20 
In the Bakke case, the Court noted, "Every decision upholding the requirement of 
preferential hiring under the authority of Executive Order 11246 has emphasised 
the existence of previous discrimination as a predicate for the imposition of a 
preferential remedy .. ". 
21 The university had 'erred' by firstly not acting under the 
authority of a discrimination finding and secondly by failing to adopt a programme 
16 Affirmative Action Guidelines, Part XI, January 1979, USA. 
17 Ibid., See Downing. Paul. M., Affirmative Action Regulations of the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programmes, Report No. 79-75, HD 6305C, pp. 15-26,13th March 1979, Congressional 
Research Service that summarises the position of various American Departments in response to the 
Supreme Court's decision on the Bakke case. 
18 Executive Order 12067, USA. 
19 Federal Communications General Counsel, September 1978. 
20 Non-Discrimination in Employment practices, FCC, Code of Federal Regulations, 60-2,1977. 
21 op. cit Congressional Research Service, Report No. 79-75 Gov., USA 13th 
March 1979. 
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of affirmative action that was based on EEOC guidelines. 22 As the EEOC stressed, 
there is in fact no separate concept under Title VII of "reverse discrimination". 
Discrimination against all individuals because of race, colour, religion, sex or 
national origin is illegal under Title VII. 23 
The distinction between `quotas', numerical goals and timetables may appear 
academic but in practice it is vital in terms of effective affirmative action 
programmes. 24 The EEOC stated in its Guidelines, "Affirmative action under these 
Guidelines may include interim goals or targets ... In order to achieve such interim 
goals or targets, an employer may consider race, sex, and/or national origin in 
making selections from among qualified or qualifiable applicants". To make it 
clear they added, "any numerical objective is subject to the availability of 
sufficient applicants who are qualified by proper, validated standards". 25 The goals 
are therefore not arbitrary, but may also be higher than the percentage of a 
previously excluded group's availability in the workforce, "so that the long term 
goal may be met in a reasonable time". Affirmative action and merit are considered 
to be complimentary elements. The objective of affirmative action is to overcome 
the underutilisation and under-representation of minority groups and women and to 
provide them with skills that render them competitive with others. These rules and 
laws apply to all employers, their subsidiaries, suppliers and sub-contractors. The 
EEOC provide illuminating standard letters for communicating between a main 
contractor and supplier. It states in part: 
".. in accordance with the Executive Orders, contractors and sub- 
contractors are obliged to take affirmative action to provide equal 
employment opportunity without regard to race, creed, colour, 
national origin, age or sex. We expect to see our commitment to 
equal opportunity employment opportunity to be reflected in the 
racial and sexual composition of your firms workforce and urge a 
vigorous affirmative action programme to overcome 
underutilisation". 26 
22 Federal Register, Vol. 44 No. 14,19th January, 1979. 
23 Ibid. McDonald V Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 US 273 1976. 
24 See Bronagh, R. (ed) Philosophical Law, Authority, Equality, Adjudication and Privacy, 
Greenwood Press, USA, 1978: pp. 6-45,52-58,84-93. 
25 Affirmative Action Guidelines, Part XI, 1979,4425. 
26 US EEOC Affirmative Action and Equal Employment, Vol. 2, Appendices. 
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The supplier is expected to complete a form confirming for the contractor they are 
in compliance with these requirements. It is instructive to reflect upon what has 
been achieved by these laws. 
Unfilled Dreams. 
A common perception is that while the black middle class may have materially 
benefited the position for the working class minorities remains essentially 
unchanged. During a critical period for the development of American equal 
opportunity laws, 1960-76, public employment grew by 7.2 millions. Much of this 
was in education, welfare, health, housing and employment security programmes 
such as manpower training. Over 55% of net employment gains for blacks 
occurred in public programmes that compared with 25% for whites. Of the 2.3m 
employment increase for blacks over this period, 850,000 (36%) were in public 
social welfare programmes underpinned by Federal funds. The comparable figure 
for whites was 18%. Because of this the black middle class tripled as they moved 
out into non-educational public employment. By 1976,45% of all black 
professionals worked in public social welfare programmes as service providers. 
Over the same period, during the National War on Poverty and Model Cities 
programmes, the black poor relied on various forms of income maintenance 
support for two-thirds of their income. 27 
During the conservative `roll-back' years of the Reagan/Bush administrations the 
opportunities for the black middle class to enter into public welfare spheres of 
employment were curtailed. Anti-poverty programmes were cut and material 
deprivation among the black poor intensified. In overall terms the black 
unemployment rate was twice the rate of whites; the median 
income remained 
about three-fifths of white families; the proportion of black workers employed 
in 
professional and technical jobs increased by 1.2 million to 9.7% 
between 1961-82 
and in managerial jobs, from 2.5% to 5.5%. These gains occurred primarily 
in 
Federal, state and local government employment. In private 
industry, 
27Brown, M. & Erie, S., `Blacks and the Legacy of the Great Society', Public Policy, Vol. 29, No. 3, 
Summer 1981, USA. 
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notwithstanding the potential heavy penalties and threat of losing major contracts, 
little progress was recorded. 28 
Between 1968 -1980, the official unemployment rate grew from 3.6% to 7.1%. For 
non-whites the increase was much sharper, from 5.6% to 13.3% as compared to an 
average 6.3% for whites. 29 The net impact of tax cuts and benefit changes, reduced 
family income of those earning under $10,000 by $560 and increased the income 
of those earning above $80,000 by $15,025. The average tax bill for whites fell at 
twice the rate of poorer black households. 30 The US Commission on Civil Rights31 
in the face of Reagan cuts to civil rights programmes in 1983, declared that, "the 
declining support for civil rights enforcement, unless halted, could leave our 
Federal civil rights law little more than devalued pieces of paper". 32 Since statistics 
have been gathered the black unemployment rate has been twice that of whites. In 
the 1950's it was 10%, during the 1969-71 recession, 180,000 black workers lost 
their jobs and by the end of 1982, the unemployment rate for black men and 
women was 20.2% as compared with 9.3% for whites. The comparative rates for 
teenagers were 46.7% and 21.7%. 33 Commentators argued that while the impact of 
Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society", had little impact on the material lot of the 
black poor it had succeeded in assisting an emerging black middle class. They 
however were strongly associated with a social welfare economy of publicly 
funded middle income service providers supporting their fellow low-income 
service dependants. Between 1960-76 Federal and state intervention created 
2,000,000 new jobs representing 40% of the 4.8million increase in public, social 
welfare employment and 28% of the 7.2 million increase in all government 
employment. The proportion of blacks employed in the public sector increased 
from 15 to 27% Thus public programmes accounted for 55% of the net 
employment increase for blacks since 1960.34 This expansion enabled blacks to 
move beyond education and into a range of social welfare agencies at state and 
28 Bureau of the Census, Population Reports, USA. 
29 Bureau of Labour, Population Survey Bulletins, USA. 
30 Business Incentives and Minority Employment, September, 1982, Wisconsin Advisory 
Committee to US Commission on Civil Rights. 
31 A bipartisan independent agency created by the Civil Rights Act of 1957. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Reid, John. `Black Americans in the 1980's', Population Bulletin, Vol. 37, No. 4, December 1982, 
USA. 
34 Brown, Micheal. K. & Erie, Steven. P., `Blacks and the Legacy of the Great Society: The 
Economic and Political Impact of Federal Social Policy', Public Policy 
Volume 29 No. 3 (Summer 
1981), pp. 299-330. Pp. 302,304,309. Harvard College, USA 1981. 
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locals levels thereby increasing the size of the middle class by almost three times 
during this period. Brown (1981) argued this enabled blacks to gain leverage over 
the allocations of `soft money' in the competition for grants but in so doing created 
a schism between the black service providers and the black poor which was 
reflected in diverging voter participation rates. The black middle class registered 
voter turn out at around 76% during 1964-76 while their poor counterparts ranged 
from 32% to 52% representing an average decline of 25%. 35 The American state 
then has successfully brokered this interest group to create a vested interest in the 
institutions and the legitimacy of the state. The control and reward functions of the 
social welfare economy may lead the black poor to regard participation in the 
political process as futile but they are securely locked into the process. The 
incorporation of their middle class counterparts has been achieved primarily by the 
expansion of the public sector in its broadest sense of direct and indirect local, state 
and federal employment. 
A survey carried out by the Black Enterprise magazine of the top 200 black owned 
corporations found only one with sales above $l bn - Beatrice Foods. The major 
source of independent black wealth was gained through car dealerships. This 
accounted for 37% of the top 200. Together they employed a total of 38,783 people 
with a combined revenue of $7.9bn, slightly above the income generated by 
McDonald's Burgers chain. Half of these companies were located in five states, 
Michigan (22), Illinois (19), California (18), New York (17) and Texas (13). 
While the Pentagon and the defence department claim minority owned Small 
Disadvantaged Businesses companies benefit from $1.3bn in procurement 
contracts, (the law requires it set aside 5% of contracts to small minority 
companies), only one of the top 25 civilian defence contractors met the 
5% target 
in 1991.36 
As technological advances changed the occupational structure, blacks moved out 
of agriculture (41 % in 1940 to 11 % in the 1980's) and 
domestic and personal 
services into the white collar public sector. Their 
distribution still reflected past 
and current inequities. Within the public sector, which accounted 
for 40% of black 
35 Ibid., pp. 326-327. 
36 The Guardian, 6t' June, 1992. 
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employment, in engineering, medicine, law and the universities blacks made up 
2% to 3% of these jobs. Approximately 34% of all blacks lived below the official 
poverty line with over half (52.9%) of all black single parents living below this. 37 
When cutbacks in benefits and welfare programmes were made the black 
population was among the hardest hit. Figures from the US census bureau 
(September 1992) indicated 35.7m people in 1991 were living below the official 
poverty line. Falling income was felt right across race lines although the National 
Urban League estimated in January 1992 that black families earned around 60% of 
what white families earn. The census found that unemployment rates for blacks 
were 32.7% and 28.7% for Hispanics. 38 A report by the Carnegie Corporation 
concluded that 3 million children in the USA live in poverty with many locked out 
of federal health, education and nutrition programmes. Many of these come from 
single parent, poorly educated or unemployed and immigrant families. 39 
Public sector cuts reinforced the prevailing economic and social relationship 
between blacks and whites. Unemployment rates were double for blacks of all ages 
and sexes, as were the educational levels in all regions, cities and suburbs of the 
country. Unemployment for black teenagers remained consistently above 30%. 40 
Successive reports from the EEOC have indicated that fundamental patterns of 
inequality remain despite the wealth of equal opportunity legislation. From data 
collected from 132,000 companies, that employed 50 or more and accounted for 
32.5m of all private non-farm workers, major inequalities were revealed. Among 
the 3.98m black workers, male and female, 4.3% were recorded as officials and 
managers; 4.8% as professionals; 18% clerical; 23.3% operatives; 10.7% labourers 
and 18.6% service workers. Only 7.7% were recorded as craft or skilled workers. 
41 
In the ghettos the consequences are stark, brutal and stretch well beyond the 
relatively narrow confines of employment. 
In Washington, the seat of American power and headquarters for the EEOC, the 
37 Congressional Research Centre, Economic Progress of Blacks Since the 1960's, Economics 
Division, USA, May 1983. 
38 US Census Bureau Reports, September 1992. 
39 Poor children were defined as those in families whose annual income in 1989 was 
below $12,674 
for a family of four. Carnegie Corporation, USA, 1994. 
40 Congressional Research Service, Economic Progress of Blacks Since the 1960's, Economics 
Division USA, May 1983. 
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evidence of this is a daily occurrence. During 1988, virtually all of the 372 murder 
victims, " and likewise almost all of the perpetrators of violence were young black 
males, an epidemic of violence unprecedented in our capital's history", according 
to Judge Ressie Walton of the Washington Superior Court. 42 The riots in Los 
Angeles in May 1992, left 37 killed, more than 1,200 injured, 2,000 fires reported 
and over 3000 looters arrested. Damage to property exceeded $250m. The social 
context of this explosion against legal injustice is the steady decline between 1973- 
90 of income by 44% for black high school graduates and 35% for the Latino or 
Hispanic groups. Nationally, blacks constitute approximately 11% of the 
population but represent 45% of all murder victims. Nearly one in four black males 
in their twenties is in jail, on parole or on probation. The comparable figure for 
white males aged between 20 and 29 is one in 16 and for Hispanics one in 10. The 
Sentencing Project pressure group in Washington further estimated that 610,000 
young black males are caught up in the criminal justice system, which compares 
with 436,000 enrolled in higher education colleges. 43 The Justice Department 
accepted the analysis as in line with official studies. By 1992, the comparative 
unemployment rates were 6.5% for whites and 14.1 % for blacks. 44 
The legal facilities to promote equality of opportunity cannot be assumed to be 
sacrosanct and immutable. The Supreme and state Court judiciary are political 
appointees. As such the emphasis on affirmative action and protection can change. 
For example the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, required state and local 
governments to use 10% of federal funds granted from public works to procure 
services from businesses owned or controlled by ethnic minorities. The groups 
included, "Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts". 45 
The purpose of this provision was to promote the development of minority-owned 
businesses by ensuring they got access to government sponsored projects. 
Additional assistance is also provided under the Small Business Act. 
In 1980 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this provision when a 
41 Job Patterns for Minorities and Women in Private Industry 1986, EEOC, 1988, USA. 
42 The Guardian, London, 16th January, 1989. 
43 Sentencing Project, February 1990, USA. 
44 LA Times, 17th October, 1995. 
45 The term Negro is replaced in guidance with "black" and Eskimos by "Inuit". 
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contractor tried to argue the Act placed "select minority groups", in a preferential 
position. The Court asserted the programme was remedial in character and had as 
its purpose achieving a more equitable position for such groups competing for 
public contracts. In another case by comparison the Supreme Court struck down a 
law in Richmond, Virginia which set aside 30% of city construction work for 
minority owned companies. The dissenting judge, Harry A. Blackmun, criticised 
the court for pretending past grievances and injustices could be remedied by 
asserting society was colour blind and ignoring the effects of three centuries of 
slavery and segregation. Richmond is the seat of the Old Confederacy. 46 
Twenty-five years after the introduction of these civil right freedoms, the Supreme 
Court spent much of 1989 reversing positive action programmes. Apart from 
Virginia, the Court reversed an 18-year-old precedent, by imposing on the plaintiff, 
rather than the employer, the burden of proof in discrimination cases. In a case 
concerning the Fire Department in Birmingham Alabama, white firemen were 
given leave to challenge and have banned the City's affirmative action programme 
when the first black person was promoted to lieutenant. The city employed 453 
firemen, including 42 blacks. None of its 140 lieutenants, captains and battalion 
chiefs were black. The Supreme Court said although the trade unions and city had 
agreed to an affirmative action programme, the newly appointed firemen were not 
bound by this agreement and could therefore challenge it. 
47 The first President 
Bush followed this up by threatening to veto a new civil rights bill in 1991. Bush 
argued that it represented a new `quotas charter' without limits on damages for 
sexual or racial harassment. When an amended bill was finally agreed a 
presidential directive was issued to government agencies effectively ordering civil 
servants to evade the bills provisions. Kerry Scanlon of the National 
Association 
for the Advancement of Coloured People declared the order was "flagrantly 
unconstitutional". Following a storm of protest the former President 
had the order 
rewritten claiming the press reports were on an "early draft" on 
how to implement 
the Civil Rights Act. 48 
46 Baltimore Sun, 26 January, 1989. 
47 The Guardian, London, 14th June 1989. 
48 The Guardian, London, 22nd November 1991. 
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The Supreme Court further weakened hard won safeguards in January 1992 in an 
unprecedented narrow ruling that the Voting Rights Act 1965 did not apply to two 
cases in Alabama. Two county boards with white majorities had acted to reduce 
the executive powers attached to jobs which black officials had been elected. The 
Court in a 6-3 majority voted the electors intentions had not been subverted when 
they were subsequently stripped of their powers. The justice department had 
contended the purpose of the 1965 Act had been defeated. Following a decision by 
the Supreme Court in 1993 which found in favour of complaints by white voters 
that a district in North Carolina had been created to ensure a black representative 
was elected conservatives mounted a campaign to redraw constituency boundaries 
in around 50 electoral districts. Prior to the 1992 elections boundaries had been 
redrawn to assist black majority areas return a black candidate. The number of 
blacks in Congress rose from 26 to 39 as a result. Judge Sandra Day O'Connor 
wrote that the area "bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid". 
Black activists responded by pointing out that the rezoning process was required 
under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and an amendment in 1982 that sought to 
secure increased representation for minorities. They added, that in many southern 
states, not a single black representative has been elected since the civil war. 
Lawsuits were filed in Georgia, Texas, and Florida. 49 The US Supreme court ruled 
in 1995, (5-4 majority) that districts in Georgia designed to ensure black majorities 
in an attempt to overcome the racist past of Georgia, violated the equal protection 
rights of white voters. The National Association of Coloured People charged this 
was "the first step in the resegregation of American electoral democracy 1'. 
50 
Former President Clinton described the "decision (as) is a setback in the struggle to 
ensure that all Americans participate fully in the electoral process and it threatened 
to undermine the promise of the Voting Rights Act". 
51 
Conclusion. 
In the US the introduction of comparatively strong equal opportunity laws and 
programmes of affirmative action, were directed at approximately 15% of the 
49 The Guardian, 16th February 1994. 
so Irish Times, 1st July 1995. 
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population (mainly Blacks and Hispanics) excluding women. The concept of 
equality of opportunity and the institutions with the responsibility for punishing 
those who impeded its realisation failed to create a society of equal unequals in the 
market place. The patterns of employment demonstrate a structural pattern of 
inequality that must in some form meet a need of the market place. Thus to 
disproportionately reward the fruits of labour while simultaneously undermining a 
commutative sense of justice which requires and assumes each individual is a free 
choosing agent at liberty in the market is no more than the dynamic of capital at 
work. This simultaneously represents a process that is a daily challenge to the 
concept of equality within the framework of modern liberal morality. If American 
laws and enforcement agencies have failed to deliver a fundamental change to the 
statistical profile of inequality it really does beg the question, what needs to be 
done in a society, such as Northern Ireland, where the inequalities are as great but 
the `minority' population is around 40%. The disparities in the USA are likely to 
widen with the end of the Clinton administration and the new Bush era. The new 
President has already made public statements that as part of his tax cutting agenda 
and reversal of intervention by the Federal Government that he will reduce 
financial assistance and reverse what he regards as the inequities of affirmative 
action. 52 If rigorously pursued this may effect the perception and actual 
opportunity for small-scale business from black and ethnic minorities to gain entry 
into one the richest middle class clubs on the planet. If so then the US will have 
decided the full force of the market requires no mitigation or cloak of morality to 
promote consensus in its legitimacy. 
The American experience that a range of macro economic policies aligned with 
public sector programmes including affirmative action directed at incorporating the 
black middle class offer interesting parallels for the Catholic middle class in NI. 
One challenge facing the British government is to devise a strategy of social 
welfare programmes that create the opportunities for incorporation over the long 
term thereby enabling the Catholic middle class to adopt a position of separation 
from their Catholic working class counterparts. If social and economic policies can 
liberate the Catholic middle class from the prison of geography that has obliged 
51 Ibid. 
52 Guardian press and television news reports during the first week of January 2001. 
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them to passively or actively support the emotional and political aspiration for a 
united Ireland then Britain will have generated significant incentives for 
maintaining a new class relationship. Effective equality policies can assist this 
process by legitimising Catholic participation in the institutions of the state and 
offering the prospect of opportunities for working class Catholics. The context for 
this challenge however is a market place not traditionally amenable to large-scale 
entry by other 'traditions'. 
Section II. RACE RELATIONS: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE. 
The Art of the possible. 
The White Man's Burden. 
Take up the white man's burden - 
Send forth the best ye breed - 
Go bind your souls to exile 
To serve your captives need; 
To wait in heavy harness 
On fluttered folk and wild - 
Your new-caught sullen peoples 
Half-devil, half-child. 
Rudyard Kipling, 1899. 
The first Race Relations Act in 1965 prohibited discrimination only in public 
places. The broader 1968 Act established the Race Relations Board followed by 
the Race Relations Act 1976, which introduced the Commission for Racial 
Equality (CRE) as the arm of enforcement replacing the RRB. The evolutionary 
process was not a smooth one. The CRE combined the roles of enforcer, 
conciliator and propagandist through its sponsorship of local Community Relations 
Councils. The CRC's were designed to act as the Commission's "major partners in 
the work of equality of opportunity and good race relations". This union was not 
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always happy or productive. 
The 1976 Act. 
The Act and its subsequent Code of Practice seek to prevent discrimination on 
grounds of race and or nationality. It included direct and indirect forms of 
discrimination. It also permitted forms of positive discrimination i. e. the provision 
of extra training opportunities and the targeting of recruitment at specific groups 
identified as being under-represented in employment. In addition, if a particular 
form of employment required a person from a specific racial group e. g. the 
provision of personal welfare service, then this was accepted as a legitimate form 
of positive action. The prevention of discrimination on grounds of religion was 
excluded from the Act. The Race Relations Act made unlawful discrimination in 
the provision of goods, facilities and services, employment, membership of trade 
unions and employers organisations, the letting and provision of housing, business 
and other premises, and advertisement and public notices. 
The CRE enforces the Act by assisting individuals take a complaint before an 
industrial tribunal. Although there is no legal aid the CRE may choose to provide 
advice, legal representation of financial support to bring a case. The remedies are 
the same as those under the Employment Consolidation Act 1980. The CRE may 
also carry out formal investigations, use subpoena powers to obtain information 
and witnesses. If the CRE concludes the Act has been contravened, it can serve a 
Non-Discrimination Notice that requires the respondent to cease such practices. 
The Notice may require specific changes to be made; formal monitoring of the 
Notice, and where non-compliance occurs seek a court injunction. The CRE has 
the added responsibility for keeping the Race Relations Act under review. While it 
is funded by an annual grant from the Home Office and its' Commissioners are 
appointed by the Home Secretary, it together with local authorities funds a network 
of Racial Equality Councils (formerly CRC's). As autonomous and voluntary 
organisations, their brief is to work closely with the CRE, local authorities and 
institutions to promote equality of opportunity locally. The CRE provides funding 
for 87 REC's which includes five in Scotland and three in Wales. The first review 
of the Act by the CRE was carried out in 1985. The CRE pressed 
for a widening 
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of the law especially in relation to indirect discrimination. It sought similar 
punitive powers and levels of compensation to be brought into line with the 1989 
Fair Employment (NI) Act. 53 The CRE demanded new areas such as discrimination 
on grounds of religion be included, the extension of race to NI and the introduction 
of specific laws to protect against harassment and violence. The CRE demanded 
parity with the 1989 Fair Employment (NI) Act by making ethnic monitoring 
compulsory; the introduction of formal contract compliance and the ability to 
initiate investigations without having the precondition that it must believe 
discrimination is taking place. The CRE called for specific industrial tribunals to 
consider individual and group cases, legal aid and a duty to be placed on employers 
to return questionnaires. 54 
The Act in its early and current form has been criticised as too limited and not 
powerful enough by successive CRE chairs, academics and activists. Geoffrey 
Bindman and Anthony Lester provided an early and comprehensive critique of the 
1968 Act. 55 Immigration and nationality laws were and remain outside the CRE's 
remit. However it was accepted that the adoption of a law with the prime purpose 
of actively promoting equality represented a radical departure from a legal system 
traditionally passive in these areas. By so doing the state was in effect creating in 
statute the "merit principle" as a demonstration of its acceptance of the need to 
mediate the application of a liberal market morality in daily life. While criminal 
and civil laws existed to provide remedies against an injury or damage to the 
person and property, laws on race sought to address situations that previously had 
been taken for granted in society and the market place. Previously the legal system 
did not recognise that an injury had occurred or an individual's opportunity to enter 
the market place had been impeded. The British legal system in effect accepted 
that minority groups should indeed be treated unequally in the labour market. The 
Race Relations Act thereby endeavoured to restore some balance or equity by 
recognising injustice on grounds of race as unfair and oppressive. This was a 
recognition that the market place was changing and that demographic changes 
required greater sophistication in the politics of legitimacy and market mediation. 
53 At the time in NI compensation limits were £30,000 and under review while in Britain 
compensation for racial discrimination was up to £10,000. 
54. Act for Equality, Strengthening the Race Relations Act, 1994. 
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High levels of dissatisfaction with this mediation led to a Home Affairs Committee 
Report into what they concluded was an abysmal performance by the CRE. Many 
of its most vociferous critics were funded by the CRE. The Committee noted, "The 
relationship both in general and in particular cases has been bedevilled by 
accusations of mutual discourtesy, lack of consultation and bad faith". Given the 
Commission spent almost as much money on paying the staff of the CRCs, £1.6m 
in 1980-81, as it did on its own (£2.3m), their bitter relationship had produced little 
in return in terms of achieving progress in challenging racism effectively. 56 The 
Commission at this stage had only been operational since June 1977. The Home 
Affairs Committee in its earlier reports on Racial Disadvantage, "were not greatly 
impressed by the quality of evidence submitted by the Commission in the course of 
that enquiry", and in "the light of their own misgivings and of widespread public 
criticisms", decided to subject the Commission itself to detailed scrutiny. 57 The 
enquiry noted that, 
"the Commission's gravest defect is incoherence. The commission operate 
without any obvious sense of priorities or any clearly defined objectives. 
There are few subjects on which they prove unwilling to pronounce and 
few projects upon which they are unwilling to embark. Where specific 
policy objectives have been established, they are rarely translated into 
58 concrete activity". 
What went wrong? 
The particular history of these bodies that have been empowered to secure civil 
rights and promote means of ending discrimination has been the rapid exposure of 
fundamental contradictions or tensions existing between the stated public 
objectives as laid down by statute; the political and economic context within which 
that remit is formulated, and the ambivalent and sometimes overt hostility by the 
body politic against the full application of these laws. Legislation produced in 
response to public pressure and political turbulence has rarely been vigorously 
55 Bindman, Geoffrey. & Lester, Anthony. Race and Law, Penguin 1972. 
56 Home Affairs Committee, Commission for Racial Equality, Vol. 1, pp. xlii, xliii, 23d November 
1981, HMSO London. 
57 HC 424-I, 20 July 1981, and Vol. 1, Session 1981-82, p. viii, Commission for Racial Equality, 23rd 
November 1981, HMSO London. 
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pursued or fully funded in Britain. The last three CRE chairman - Peter Newsam, 
Herman Oussley and Gurbux Singh - have all been high profile critics on these 
points. It is remarkable however that the early experience of such institutions has 
been so similar. 
The Commission's first Chair was former Conservative MP, David Lane. The 
Select Committee described the CRE as a body without coherence or rationale and 
demanded it concentrate on law enforcement. 59 The CRE lost key support from 
those who had campaigned since the early 1950's and race riots of 1958 for a better 
deal. Conciliation as a major tool of the Act was rejected as insufficient. The 
context for this appears to have been the reported increase in attacks on ethnic 
minorities by groups such as the fascist National Front during the early 1970's. 
This included allegations by ethnic groups that accused the police of protecting NF 
members from prosecution and collusion. 60 The introduction of the CRE then was 
failing in the attempt to achieve an accommodation between ethnic minorities, 
pressure groups and the state. The Commission's brief was to promote equality of 
opportunity by persuasion, public education and by establishing good relations 
"between different racial groups as well", via community affairs and liaison. 
Instead its first chairman antagonised these groups and undermined their 
confidence in the CRE. 
On 5th July 1976, David Lane informed the House of Commons, Britain could set 
an example to the world in race relations, "but this will depend more than anything 
else on reassuring the white majority that immigration is being strictly controlled at 
a manageably low level by a determined Government". Lane added to this by 
giving his support to strengthening the Home office special intelligence unit. This 
had gained public notoriety for harassing black communities on the pretext of 
searching for illegal immigrants. Internally industrial relations were strained with 
allegations of racism levelled at senior management. Two prominent black 
employees won unfair dismissal cases when they were not offered senior jobs. This 
58 Home Affairs Committee, Session 1981-82, Vol. 1, Commission for Racial Equality, p. x, 23rd 
November 1981, HMSO, London. 
59 New Statesman, January 1982 
60 The recent Macpherson Report (March 1999) finding that the police were 
institutionally racist 
suggests these claims may have had some justification. 
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led to the resignation of the Chief Executive who had previously been with the 
Race Relations Board. The local trade union, ASTMS, attacked the investigations 
division as "a white power base, a sort of elite within the Commission and race 
relations". They questioned their commitment to equality of opportunity and 
charged them as people who "constantly used their position to frustrate and 
undermine the work of the black staff! "61 They claimed investigations would be 
dropped when employers such as Massey Ferguson, who had six black employees 
out of a total workforce of 5,000 in 1978, argued important contracts might be 
endangered by adverse publicity. A former Deputy Chairman of the CRE, Pranlal 
Sheth commented "we've spent the last 25 years promoting, educating and 
exhorting in the race relations field. Only through direct legal action with the evil 
of racialism be exposed". He added the CRE took a lenient approach to "avoid 
alienating the white community". 62 Whatever the merits of the opposing positions 
it is clear that the aspirations of those effected by actual or perceived 
discrimination were well beyond what the law offered and the CRE had delivered. 
Lane opposed the scrapping of the infamous "sus" laws, even though the 
Commission itself had called for their abolition. In the Commission's first research 
report on racial conflict in London's East End, Brick Lane and Beyond, 
63 the role of 
the National Front in attacking the Bengali community was not mentioned. 
Officials claimed key passages recording alleged brutal attacks by the police on 
young black girls were omitted. As the CRE endeavoured to promote harmony, 
violence and discrimination against ethnic minorities became of major public 
concern and debate. This series of events led to the enquiry by Parliament. 
Following the Home Office report, Lane retired in 1982. He declared the "criticism 
has been excessive", and "discouragingly hostile". 
64 Peter Newsam, an immigrant 
of French and West Indian descent, replaced him in September 1982. The 
CRE 
was reorganised the same year. 
A fresh start. 
61 New Statesman, 13 July 1979. 
62 Cited in Grosskurth, Anne, `Toothless Watchdog', March/April 1983, pp. 19-24. Roof, 
Shelter. 
63 See Racial Harassment in London, Report of a Panel of Enquiry Set Up by the Greater 
London 
Council Police Committee, 1983, GLC 1984. 
64 Speech, 28th March, 1982, UK Immigrants Advisory Service. 
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Newsam had been head of the Inner London Education Authority. He was 
responsible for a budget of £800m and 80,000 staff. He took a 25% cut in salary to 
take over the CRE with a budget of £8m and 200 staff riddled with discontent, 
suspicion and severely demoralised. In one of his first public statements he 
declared his intention to enforce the law and confront white prejudices. "The real 
problem after all is with the white community. If it wasn't, we wouldn't have a 
problem". 65 Six months later he was still as forthright when he criticised the 
government's response to race riots as purely political "but they're not interested in 
the causes at all". 66 Newsam also criticised the Race Relations Act as seriously 
defective and cumbersome. This was a view shared by the idiosyncratic former 
Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning. He said: 
"the machinery of the Act is so elaborate and cumbersome that it is in 
danger of grinding to a halt. I am very sorry for the Commission, but they 
have been caught up in a spider's web by Parliament from which there is 
little hope of escaping. X67 
Concurrent with these developments were policies and changes within local 
government, particularly within labour controlled areas of inner London. The 
leading organisation that provided leadership during what were to become the 
Thatcher years, was the Greater London Council (GLC). The measures it adopted 
and pursued both in terms of the awarding of contracts, recruitment and public 
education provided a significant example for the CRE itself. As such it is worth 
noting briefly its role. Under the leadership of Ken Livingstone MP now Mayor for 
London, the GLC implemented radical employment, transport and social policies. 
The labour controlled GLC acted as a catalyst for London local authorities to 
develop and promote programmes of positive action in recruitment and introduce 
equal opportunity sections into their organisations. Livingstone said: 
"what has been lacking until recently has been a reluctance to admit that 
racism and discrimination have been deeply institutionalised. And this has 
become manifestly more clear through the impact of successive 
65 The Observer, 17th January, 1982. 
66 The Guardian, 9 March, 1983. 
67 Regina v Commission for Racial Equality, ex parte Hillingdon London Borough 
Council, Court 
of Appeal, Lord Denning, Judgement 16th July 1981, see Times report. 
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government's policies on race relations, immigration, nationality, policing 
and inner-city deprivation". 68 
During 1982-83, the GLC's Ethnic Minorities Unit allocated £95,000 in grants to 
ethnic community, medical, arts, advisory, housing and other projects. 
Interestingly the GLC took the lead in giving recognition to the Irish community as 
an ethnic minority. Race was made a public issue as the GLC sought to educate 
and challenge racist practices. In terms of housing for example the GLC's 
campaign slogan was, "Black people Do Not Cause Slums .... They are forced to 
live in them". While a number of Labour controlled boroughs actively sought to 
eliminate discriminatory practices in the management and allocation of houses a 
number of high profile investigations and incidents indicated the extent of the 
problem. 69 In Tory controlled Hillingdon for example the Council's housing 
chairman put a Kenyan Asian family into a taxi on their arrival at Heathrow and 
dumped them on the door of the Foreign Office. Lord Denning rejected a request to 
investigate Hillingdon by the CRE. 70 A long-winded investigation between 1977- 
81 by the CRE in Rochdale discovered Asians were twice as likely to be refused a 
mortgage as whites. The Building Societies named in the report included the 
Halifax, the Middleton, the Bradford and Bingley, the Burnley and the 
Provincial. 71 A later analysis by the CRE found that generally, ethnic minorities 
live in accommodation that is more overcrowded, run down and on public estates 
regarded as 'difficult to let'. 72 Within such a context the GLC and other local 
authority organisations did much to raise and drive forward a broad equality 
agenda within local government. Pressure groups remained critical of the CRE's 
failure to fully apply its limited legislative arsenal and expressed little optimism 
that real measurable change would be achieved. 73 
However as already indicated the CRE in its research was ready to campaign for 
stronger legislative powers to meet its critics and publish wider based hard hitting 
reports beyond the immediate brief of employment. Living In Terror for example 
68 Ethnic Minorities, GLC, February 1983. 
69 See CRE Investigation Reports in London Boroughs of Hackney (1984), Lambeth (1989), Tower 
Hamlets, (1988), Liverpool (1985,1989). 
70 16th July 1981, The Times. 
71 CRE, October 1985. 
72 Housing and Ethnic Minorities, Statistical Information, CRE October, 1988. 
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provided a harrowing analysis of violence against ethnic minorities. 74 This report 
confirmed that the earlier findings of research by the Home Office had not 
diminished in scale or direction. 75 Some local authorities attempted to utilise 
existing laws innovatively. Section 11 of the local Government Act 1966 was 
utilised as a source of funds from the Home office to meet the special needs of 
Commonwealth immigrants. The GLC recommended the inclusion of their 
descendants to promote employment, training and positive action plans under the 
Race Relations Act. Under section 11 the Home Office would reimburse local 
authority spending up to 75% towards the cost of employing staff. Recruitment had 
to be for new posts representing a special provision for Commonwealth immigrants 
under Section 71 of the Race Relations Act and Section 37 and 38. Many London 
labour controlled authorities integrated Section 11 money into an overall coherent 
Race Equality Strategy. Section 37 and 38 allowed positive action where a 
particular racial group is under-represented. It allowed employers to provide 
specific training for that group and to encourage only members of that racial group 
to take advantage of this opportunity. 
It became common in London for recruitment statements to indicate posts were 
covered by Section 38 and only applicants from ethnic minorities need apply. 
Other jobs were advertised under Section 5(2)(d) wherein being of a particular 
racial group was a genuine occupational qualification. The guide to the Act 
suggests social workers and personal services may be appropriate categories. This 
led to some social service departments recruiting "Black Social Service officers, 
Black Assistant Home Care Organiser, Black Team Leaders", etc. positive equal 
opportunity statements were made e. g. "Applications are welcome 
from people 
regardless of race, creed, nationality, disability, age, sex, sexual orientation or 
responsibility for children or dependants". Others stuck to the safer and 
terse 
assertion they were "An Equal opportunity Employer". 
While this approach may have concealed many shortcomings they offered a more 
positive message to potential applicants. As the number of 
jobs funded by Home 
73 See Caribbean Times, Gujerat and Roof, Shelter, 1988,1989 issues. 
74 A report on racial violence & harassment in 
housing ... 
Living in Terror, CRE September 1987. 
75 Home Office Report - Racial Attacks, HMSO, 
1981. 
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office grants and restricted under Section 38, grew the government decided to 
impose heavy financial penalties. Hackney in London for example, which had 
spent £ 10m on a highly successful job training programme offering real jobs and 
work, found itself in 1988-89 searching to meet this deficit as government refused 
to meet the costs from Home office grants. The potential for reversing the 
pervasive institutional and economic racism which can characterise Britain was 
made acutely more difficult under such circumstances. 
Contract compliance and local government. 
In the USA contract compliance is a means of enforcement that is not encouraged 
by statute in Britain. The CRE's Principles of Practice, noted the objective of 
contract compliance "is not to enforce race relations legislation by excluding 
`offending' companies from tendering for contracts". 76 Rather companies were to 
be encouraged by practical advice and assistance over time to provide equal 
opportunities. Clients seeking to promote an ethos of equality through their 
contracting arrangements had to rely on the issue of a voluntary questionnaire to 
obtain a general description of a company's practices. As a purchasing authority 
however it could not impose its will in this regard although it could ultimately 
remove a company from its tender list after a laborious process that in effect only 
demanded any such company declare its intent to offer equality of opportunity. 
In the absence of clear enforcement laws, employers were left treading a very grey 
area. The GLC for example with 20,000 companies on its approved lists removed 
those contractors which refused to supply information, but was unable to identify 
them publicly due to legal difficulties. 77 Equal opportunity agreements were 
reached with 134 companies before the government abolished the GLC in 1986. 
The 1987 CRE Annual Report recognised this weakness. They noted the White 
paper that preceded the 1976 Act envisaged a strong role for contract compliance. 
The Chair of the CRE declared, "Contract compliance was also to be a major 
weapon, of which central government, in spite of our repeated representations, has 
76 Principles of Practice, September 1987, paras. 1, -5,8-13. CRE. 
77 Ethnic Minority/Contract Compliance, GLC, May 1984, pp 16,17. See also Ethnic Minorities in 
London, `The GLC's work to assist Ethnic Minorities', GLC, February 1983. 
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made no use, in striking contrast to its policy in Northern Ireland". 78 The general 
thrust of government policy was to ensure large clients such as public authorities 
did not consider `non-commercial' matters when evaluating tenders for contracts. 
The then Conservative Environment Minister, Patrick Jenkin, criticised the GLC 
for having removed 22 contractors from its list, including Rowntree Mackintosh. 
The GLC's annual procurements ran to £500m so its impact in terms of educating 
contractors and promoting equal opportunities in the workplace was potentially 
great. Jenkin condemned the use of this power to further racial or sexual 
equality. 79 This debate raged until 1989. The Local government Act 1988, 
removed any grey areas and largely halted any initiatives in the use of contracts. 
This included the elimination of clauses in contracts to use local labour in run 
down inner city areas. According to legal opinion given by Lord Irvine QC, to the 
Inner London Education Authority, a strong advocate of contract compliance, 
public bodies would be prevented from withholding contracts because of the 
contractors work-force composition and recruitment policy. 80 This meant that 
programmes run by large local authorities such as Sheffield and Birmingham that 
required contractors to employ a quota of local labour had to end. In the words of 
then local government Minister, Mr. Howard MP, the 160 and more local 
authorities boycotting South African goods and companies linked to South Africa, 
as part of their tendering process, would be prevented from taking "into account 
irrelevant factors". 81 Employers such as Islington Council in London were taken to 
the High Court by the Building Employers Federation to prevent them as clients 
issuing standard contracts which provided for full access to company records to 
enable the Council to satisfy itself a contractor did not discriminate. 82 
When Councils took active steps to promote equal opportunities they were 
subjected to tirades of abuse by the popular press. Rupert Murdoch's flagship, the 
Sun, led the way. The term `loony left' was coined along with fabricated stories to 
discredit such policies. Lambeth Council in London for example, was pilloried for 
78 1987 CRE Annual Report, June 1988, CRE. 
79 The Guardian 14th October, 1985. 
80 ILEA, Lord Irvine QC, July 1987. 
81 Michael Howard NIP, cited in the Guardian, 20th November 1987. 
82 London Borough of Islington Council Committee papers, September 1988, see The Guardian, 
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conducting a campaign to meet the statutory quota for disabled employees. The 
Mail on Sunday claimed Haringey Council had banned bin liners because they 
were black. It also charged Brent Council with recruiting "Race Spies". They were 
actually race advisors who were recruited to comply with a Home Office directive 
when the council was Tory controlled. The Daily mail accused Camden Council of 
banning the term black coffee. Islington Council was lambasted in 1990 by the Sun 
because it funded a centre for battered women and a welfare rights agency. The 
latter received 75% of its funds from the government. 83 This insidious campaign 
entered the national consciousness in the sense that the main stream political 
parties distanced themselves from their local government counterparts and joined 
in their condemnation. By so doing they legitimised the tabloid message that ethnic 
minority groups where gaining an unfair advantage in the market place. The merit 
principle had become a tool to be utilised inversely to justify protecting the 
particulars of a white market. 
The CRE continued in its unsuccessful efforts to press the government to introduce 
compulsory monitoring of recruitment and contract compliance while the evidence 
of pervasive discrimination mounted. Research by the Department of Employment 
found the unemployment rate for West Indian men was 20.6%, Asian men 16.9% 
and 9.7% for white men. For women the respective figures were 14.5%, 17.9% and 
8.7%. 84 The Policy Studies Institute found over half of the black unemployed men 
were unemployed for more than a year as compared to a third of white unemployed 
men. When educational qualifications were taken into account, black workers still 
fared worse than whites. Average weekly earnings were 15% lower e. g. white male 
£ 129, West Indian £ 109.20, Asian E110.70.85 These patterns were similar to its 
first land mark study in 1976.86 The Employment Institute report on the UK labour 
market carried out by the PSI concluded that higher rates of unemployment 
reflected active discrimination by employers rather than a marked difference in 
qualifications. The PSI noted the levels of discrimination did not appear to have 
changed since the mid-1970's. 
23rd September 1988. 
83 Association of London Authorities, Islington Council, 1992. 
"Employment Gazette 1984. 
85 Black and White Britain, Policy Studies Institute (formerly PEP), London 1984. 
86 The Facts of Racial Disadvantage, PEP, London, 1976. 
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The government's Manpower Services Commission recorded race bias in training 
programmes for the unemployed. Its report "Ethnic Minorities and Job Centres", 
found 47% of blacks and 24% of Asians alleged they had been discriminated 
against when looking for employment at Job Centres. Between April and August 
1986,69% leaving the one-year youth Training Scheme found employment but 
only 48% of black leavers and 52% of Asians. The MSC reported 30 firms to the 
CRE and achieved local resolutions in 102 other cases during 1986.87 
A CRE survey in 1987 indicated low numbers of black people training to be 
nurses. While 5% of the economically active population is black and the national 
figure for general-nursing trainees is 3% these figures concealed wide disparities. 
For example in Greater London, where the ethnic population is 14.6%, only 1% of 
trainees at three leading London schools were black. The equivalent figure for a 
school in Slough was 5.8% where the ethnic population was 31 %. 88 These 
findings were reinforced by later research carried out by the Medical Practitioners' 
Union. 89 In 1988 the CRE issued a report which found St. George's hospital 
medical school, part of London University, guilty of discrimination. The former 
dean and vice-dean, Dr. Franglen designed a computer selection system that 
refused sixty candidates a year because they were black or female, from 1982-83 to 
1985-86. The CRE did not press prosecution when the new Dean scrapped the 
programme and assisted the investigation. 90 
Wider Afield. 
In other fields such as education a CRE study Learning in Terror, (February 1988) 
catalogued a record of malicious injustice. Bewildered school children found 
87 Ethnic Minorities and Job Centres, MSC, February 1987. 
88 CRE Report 1987. 
89 The Medical Practioners Union which is part of the general technical union MSF, found that 
over a ten year period, 1988 to 1991, almost 60% of doctors called to face 
discipline before the 
General Medical Council were from ethnic minority groups. Of all doctors practising, around 18% 
are from ethnic minorities. The report also suggested ethnic minority candidates were 
three times 
less likely than whites to get into medical school and when qualified, three times 
less likely to 
become consultants. The GMC responded by questioning the validity of the 
data and asserted any 
action taken by itself was "free from racial discrimination". MPU, 
March 1994. 
90 St. George's Hospital Report, CRE, 1988. 
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themselves the victims of racial insults and assaults ranging from maiming to 
murder. Only 47 of the country's 115 Local Education Authorities had any policies 
directed at addressing these fundamental problems. A campaign by parents in 
Dewsbury, Kirklees succeeded in allowing 26 white families to withdraw their 
children from Headfield Junior school because it was over 90% Asian. The 
conservative Education Minister, Kenneth Baker, promised to change the law so 
those parents could exercise the right to choose. In 1988 the London Metropolitan 
Police reported a 25% increase in racial harassment during 1987. Scotland Yard 
recorded 2179 allegations that included attacks, threatening telephone calls and 
intimidation. 
Studies by the CRE have also found the potential for redress is slim. Compensation 
levels are low and re-employment almost non-existent. (CRE 1986) In 1989 the 
CRE publicly announced in its annual report that due to a lack of funds it was 
forced to decline support for complaints of discriminatory practices in increasing 
numbers. The Society of Black Lawyers claimed in their submission to the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice that black defendants were being wrongly 
convicted by bigoted white juries after a biased summing up by judges. 91 
Conclusion. 
The ethnic minority population of Great Britain is approximately 4.5% 
(2,432,000) of the general population. It is concentrated in England, especially 
Greater London (over 40%) and the Midlands. The CRE in successive Annual 
Reports made the point that the overall position of black people in the labour 
market remains unsatisfactory. Their unemployment rates have tended to be twice 
that of the white population leading the CRE to conclude, "All the evidence 
suggests racial discrimination is a major contributory factor to this situation'. 
92 
The 1976 Act has been regarded as inadequate in providing equality of opportunity 
in employment and tackling wider issues of discrimination. Although the 
CRE 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s campaigned for stronger legislation even the 
91 May 1992. It is interesting to note that of the 127,127 police officers in the UK, 1,592 (1.3%) 
were from ethnic minorities at this time. 
92 CRE Annual Reports, 1988. 
84 
simple expedients of compulsory monitoring, contract compliance and the 
financial capacity to enforce the law proved consistently beyond it. 
The notion of "unfair deprivation" (Lester and Bindman), that is, an act which is 
necessarily detrimental, to a person or group, or is a "result of action rather than 
reflection", 93 has remained prevalent in Britain. The black and ethnic minority 
groups in Britain tend only to have a voice in the Midlands and London. This 
however remains rather mute reflecting their relative small percentage in Britain. 
Their potential similarity with Catholics in NI is the readiness by which their 
middle class seek economic and political assimilation. Unlike NI however they do 
not have the potential to become the predominant group whose mores and culture 
could prevail or dominate existing traditions and culture. As such the prevailing 
political liberal tradition can afford to offer an accommodation that is only seen as 
threatening by those who can be readily marginalised as racist. The British market 
can offer an entry place on merit without detriment to the prevailing market 
relations. The evidence provided above however indicates that overall those that 
control entry to the market place have chosen not to do so. One of the challenges 
New Labour has set itself is to offer an inclusive agenda that creates the 
momentum for constant accommodation by putting "citizens first" in a 
modernised, modem Britain. 94 
As with the USA however this remains an objective where any lack of attainment 
will not challenge the status quo or destabilise significantly the market place. In NI 
matters are somewhat different. 
Section III. 
NI: The 'Black' North. 
Colour is an important element of life in Northern Ireland. The kaleidoscope of 
colours however indicate a political and religious affiliation rather than an ethnic 
origin. Black is synonymous with the loyalist world of orange and 
blue. This is 
derived from the loyal "Black Institutions" which are the higher ranks of the 
93 Park. R, Race and Culture, Free Press, USA, 1958. 
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Orange Order, the colours of the union jack and William Prince of Orange. Green 
is reserved for the Catholic and nationalist as the colour of Ireland. The Irish 
tricolour also includes orange as a symbol of unity with green subject of course to 
there being peace between the two hence the white strip in the tricolour. 
Discrimination or "colour" therefore has been a consistent characteristic on 
patterns of opportunity in employment, housing, health, welfare, and the exercise 
of power as well as the colour of kerbstones. This small excluding society has been 
constantly riven apart by the inability to reconcile these inherent contradictions. 
The 1976 Fair Employment Act was one endeavour aimed at making the colours 
run more smoothly. The palette was prepared by a Working Party established in 
1972 to report on "what steps should be taken to counter religious discrimination 
where it may exist in the private sector of employment". The report was published 
in 1973 and became known as the Van Straubenzee Report after the Conservative 
MP who chaired its deliberations. The local Ministry of Health and Social Services 
appointed the Working Party's 15 members that contained a minority of Catholics. 
95 
The Van Straubenzee Report. 
The Working Party stressed the need for a voluntary and conciliatory approach to 
ending discrimination in employment. While commending, "policies of 
conciliation and persuasion", it was accepted, "they will be inadequate", without 
the force of the law. However they stressed, "Sanctions ought not to be the order of 
the day". 96 Quotas in employment were dismissed on "moral and practical 
grounds". They saw "serious objections of both a moral and practical nature to 
both 
quotas and benign discrimination. One of their objections was that quotas were 
regarded as involving the abrogation of the very principles, which they seek to 
assert, and which the law would aim to establish. To be effective 
in their view 
required religious discrimination. 
94 The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 widened the scope of the 1976 Act to 
include all 
functions of public authorities - hospitals, schools, 
local councils, ministers and the police. It came 
into force on April 20001. See Race Equality in Public Services, 
Home Office, February 20001. 
95 Report and Recommendations of the Working Party on 
Discrimination in the Private Sector of 
Employment Belfast, HMSO, 1973. 
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"They involve an inherent contradiction between a completely and 
genuinely open system of employment, which requires recruitment 
and treatment on the basis of merit or suitability, and a closed 
system which by definition requires discrimination on the basis of 
religious persuasion". 97 
They added: 
"Perhaps the most serious objection, however, is that the effect of 
quotas would not be to reconcile the communities in Northern 
Ireland but on the contrary to reinforce and in some measure to 
perpetuate the divisions between them. The concept is 
fundamentally at variance with any philosophy that seeks to create 
an open or mixed society. ... There can be few policies which are 
more likely to produce a counter reaction. " 98 
This stance is as an overtly political one rather than a moral one. It indicates that 
political factors, as much as, or greater than philosophical concerns, influenced 
their deliberations and proposals. The relationship between quotas and merit on the 
American model was not fully explored nor does it appear was the American 
practice of utilising quotas as an objective with specific time scales and targets for 
change. While reference was made to American example it was generally to 
dismiss it as not applicable to NI. Thus the effect of the Black American lobby on 
the Democratic Party in securing legislation and the experience of developing 
platforms of joint responsibility to devise local and national training courses that 
would enable the acquisition of skills previously denied and the targeting of such 
opportunities on specific groups was ignored. The use of quotas as affirmative 
action programmes with targets to set a measurable and public yardstick against 
which the claims of private and public employers may be evaluated were rejected. 
The potential or challenge that quotas would bring in endeavouring to reverse the 
pervasive historical patterns of inequality was deemed not appropriate for NI. The 
Working Party also considered "contract compliance legislation unnecessary". 
Given Cameron's consideration to devise mechanisms that offered protection 
against discrimination while securing the loyal acceptance of the Constitutions of 
N. Ireland, the Working Party's dilemma was how limited should such 
enforcement laws be without losing the potential for an accommodation with 
96 Van Straubenzee, 1973: p. 8. 
97 Ibid. p. 11. 
98 Ibid. para. 53, p. 12. 
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Catholics. Sanctions which made discrimination a criminal offence with fines and 
imprisonment were ruled out as the "most likely to provoke sectarian hostility in 
industry and thus be counter-productive". 99 The British Government did not take 
up a suggestion that actual physical intimidation should attract criminal penalties. 
Although the jargon of "affirmative action" was adopted its intent, meaning and 
application did not travel across the Atlantic in their original form. Specific 
programmes of action were side-stepped by claiming "Precise definition incurs the 
risk of appearing to limit potential scope". loo A Fair Employment Bill was 
eventually published on the 18th December 1975 and a Fair Employment Act was 
introduced on 22 July 1976. The Act created the Fair Employment Agency (FEA) 
to promote equality of opportunity and work to eliminate discrimination. 
The Fair Employment (NI) Act 1976. 
The Fair Employment Act (NI) 1976, (the Act) came into effect rather belatedly on 
the 1St December 1976 considering the levels of violence and recommendations 
made by Cameron seven years earlier. The Fair Employment Agency was 
established with an initial staff establishment of eight in September 1976 
responsible for promoting equality of opportunity in employment where religious 
and/or political prejudice may lead to discrimination. Sex discrimination was made 
the responsibility of the local Equal Opportunities Commission under the 1976 Sex 
Discrimination Order. The Act offered no protection against discrimination in 
housing, education, the criminal law, or against sectarian harassment and 
victimisation by the police and military, nor was any redress provided for or 
against the promotion of racist/sectarian literature. The Act also excluded any 
protection against racial discrimination perpetrated against the North's small ethnic 
population. 101 Proposals to remove employers from the equal opportunity register 
of employers "if a subsequent finding of discriminatory practice", were made was 
rejected by the Agency itself as unnecessary and counterproductive. This remained 
a matter of public policy for the life of the Act and the Agency. The issue of 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. p. 15. 
101 The NIO estimated the North's ethnic minority population to be around 10,000. Chinese are the 
largest grouping at around 5,000 followed by a 1000 strong and relatively recent Indian community 
and 1000 traditional Irish Travellers. NIO, 5thDecember 1992. 
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contract compliance was also absent from the Act. 
The Agency's primary duties were to educate, research general patterns of 
employment, conduct enquiries into individual complaints of discrimination and 
initiate formal investigations. The latter represented a powerful tool not available 
to the CRE. It enabled the Agency to conduct formal investigations under Section 
12 of the Act into the composition of an employer's workforce and its recruitment 
practices. Under Sections 13 and 27, recommendations and remedies could be 
sought following a broad investigation or response to an individual complaint. It 
had the powers of the High Court to subpoena evidence - an option never used 
during this first Act- from uncooperative employers. Appeals against an Agency 
finding in terms of individual complaints were to the County Court. Appeals 
against Agency directions following an investigation under Section 12 and 13, 
were to an Appeals Board. It was six years before this body was established due to 
the Agency's lack of work in the field of investigations. 
There was also a duty to maintain and monitor a Register of Equal Opportunity 
Employers and Organisations (the Register), and signatories had to sign a 
Declaration of principle and Intent (the Declaration), signifying they would 
"promote and protect equality of opportunity". To become an equal opportunity 
employer required no more than a telephone call and completion of a form. No 
vetting procedure, even against employers with a sectarian reputation, was utilised. 
A power which the Agency failed to use was the ability to restrain an employer or 
agent from publishing advertisements or statements, which "could reasonably be 
understood as indicating an intention" to discriminate (Section 33). Exceptions to 
the Act included employment in private households, school teachers, the clergy 
and charitable acts. Another important exception was Section 42 (S42). This 
empowered the Secretary of State to issue a S42 certificate, which stated a given 
act was done "for the purpose of safeguarding national security or of protecting 
public safety or public order". There was neither right of appeal nor any 
requirement to explain the grounds. This rapidly became the subject of political 
criticism from the SDLP, Sinn Fein and loyalists as a mechanism for concealing 
discriminatory acts against Protestants and Catholics who may have had a family 
or activist connection. The Act was introduced in stages: those employing 25 or 
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more which was equivalent to approximately 1700 employers; from the 1 st 
September 1978, all employing 10 or more; and from the 1st September 1979, all 
employers. 
The Agency Board were appointed by government through the former NI 
Department of Manpower Services. Appointments were initially for three years. 
Some members served three terms and its full time chairman, a Mr. Robert Cooper, 
remained unchanged from 1976 until his retirement. 102 The Board was composed 
of a variety of unionists, a leading member of the UDA, Glenn Barr, trade union 
representatives from NIC/ICTU and several leading Catholics. The Agency's 
chairman recommended the UDA representative to government. He had played a 
leading role in the Ulster Workers Council that brought down the power-sharing 
executive. His organisation was responsible for planting bombs in Dublin and 
Monaghan that killed 33 and injured over a hundred. The UDA declared at the time 
that they were "very happy about the bombing in Dublin". They continued to be 
engaged in a campaign of sectarian murder and intimidation throughout Barr's 
tenure at the FEA. Coming from Derry he became its self-appointed representative 
within the FEA and served as a member of the complaints committee that 
determined whether unlawful discrimination had taken place. Individual Catholics 
would have to be particularly resolute in the pursuit of their grievance as they 
would have to endure scrutiny by a committee with the UDA present on a body 
established to promote equality of opportunity. 
Loyalist reaction to the 1976 Act was hostile. Unionist Councillors had themselves 
photographed tearing up the Act; the CBI condemned it as unnecessary and refused 
to sign the voluntary equal opportunity declaration as did many government 
sponsored quangos. Unionist hostility appears to have reflected a view that the Act 
was a challenge to Protestant hegemony and could lead to the institutional 
undermining or fracturing of the integrity of their own solidarity and self- 
confidence. However it may be argued (Cameron) that in line with laws elsewhere, 
this attempt by the British had, at least as one of its objectives, an attempt to 
restore cohesion to the North by giving Catholics, particularly the middle class a 
102 Mr Robert Cooper was a member of the Unionist party, then the Alliance party and a member of 
the short- lived Power Sharing Executive brought down by the 
1974, UWC strike. 
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vested interest in this society. For this project to be successful Catholics had to see 
institutions being introduced which had as a primary objective the development of 
some form of equity in the market place. However, at this stage, successive 
government ministers rejected the introduction of strong aggressive forms of 
enforcement. This in turn undermined the ability of the Act to serve as a credible 
means of coagulant for aspiring Catholics. It would also prove a flaw fatal to the 
implementation of the Act and the credibility of the Agency. In its first Annual 
Report, Cooper stressed, "the considerable importance on the educational 
function", to generate "a commitment from both sides of industry as well as from 
the general public to the ideal of Equality of opportunity". He added: 
"All obstacles which prevent Equality of Opportunity and so prevent the 
use of the talents of all our people in the most appropriate places are 
detrimental to the whole economy. We have also been anxious to make the 
point that whereas positive religious or political discrimination may be one 
obstacle, we are concerned about other obstacles that prevent Equality of 
Opportunity. Such factors as the accepted concepts about firms, myths, 
traditional methods of recruitment of labour, traditional community patterns 
of employment, training facilities, the consequences of past discrimination, 
transport, location of industry, fear and violence are important obstacles 
which concern us". 103 
Thus while the scale of the challenge was clear to all the solutions proved 
insufficient. This failure would give rise to bitter internal incriminations and 
disillusion among FEA staff. 104 In one sense the Act partially met Cameron's 
objectives, namely his concern that the provision of remedies to protect against 
discrimination "will in no sense endanger the stability of the constitution or afford 
opportunity to ill disposed persons to work to undermine or destroy it". An Act 
with significant exceptions and weaknesses was not likely to undermine the 
institutions of NI. By the same token it did little to disarm or incorporate its 
opponents into accepting the integrity of the Orange State. The Act also failed to 
meet Cameron's objective of pursuing equal opportunity firmly and fairly by 
which, "a significant and important step will have been taken towards eliminating 
causes of division and sectarian strife and in helping to unite the people of 
Northern Ireland". 105 The evidence for this would be unchanging patterns of 
103 FEA First Annual Report, 1976-77, p. 7,30th November 1977, HMSO. 
104 See chapters 7 and 8. 
105 Cameron Report, p. 58. 
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inequality; the controversy over allegations of appeasement and cover up in FEA 
investigations; the conclusions reached by the NIO and those commissioned to 
analyse the efficacy of the Agency that the FEA had made no discernible progress. 
These matters are assessed in later chapters. 106 
A Fresh Start? 
Legislative changes were made in response to a barrage of international and local 
criticism that patterns of inequality in the public and private sectors of employment 
remained as entrenched as at the time of Cameron. For example by the mid-1980s 
government research demonstrated patterns of inequality for Catholics had 
remained unchanged. 107 As criticism of the FEA's record mounted coupled with the 
start of a major Irish-American campaign under the name of Sean MacBride108 that 
challenged Britain's role and intentions a series of reports were commissioned into 
the workings of the Act. In January 1985, the local Standing Advisory Commission 
on Human Rights was given a brief by the NIO to undertake a: 
"major review to examine whether in practice the law gives adequate 
protection against discrimination on the grounds of religious belief or 
political opinion and whether there exists equality of opportunity in 
Northern Ireland". 
SACHR in turn commissioned the London based Policy Studies Institute (PSI) to 
carry out an analysis "of differences in rates of unemployment and job levels 
between Protestants and Catholics". 109 The results of both these reviews were 
published in October 1987. They confirmed the local labour market remained a 
partisan one and concluded that the Act was insufficient to tackle the scale of the 
problem. 110 On the 17th September 1986, the government published a consultative 
document Future Strategy Options. This included detailed analysis of the 
employment differentials between Catholics and Protestants 
from 1971 to 1985. 
The reports' data showed that: 
106 See Ch. 7., FEA INACTION. 
107 Policy Planning Research Unit, Monitor, No. 2, June 1985, DED, NI. 
108 The MacBride Principles Campaign are assessed and explained in Chapter 8. 
109 Report on Fair Employment, Religious and Political Discrimination and 
Equality of Opportunity 
in Northern Ireland, SACHR, Cm 237, HMSO October 1987. 
110 The detail of the reports are discussed in Chapter 8, The Government's 
Response. 
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"between 1971-85 the catholic community's disadvantage in 
employment remained both quantitative and qualitative obtained 
throughout the Province 1 ----_-- .-vv (even in areas of relatively high 
employment) and persisted despite progressive conversion of 
educational attainment between the two communities. The overall 
unemployment rate of Catholics remained double that of Protestants; in 1984/85 catholic males experienced levels of 
unemployment almost two and a half times that of Protestant males; 
and catholic females experienced levels of unemployment 
approximately one and a half times those of Protestant females. ""' 
The options presented indicated an attempt to develop a more coherent policy for 
equality of opportunity in employment in the longer term. It reiterated 
governments' opposition to quotas as being "inconsistent with the merit principle". 
The government held a "basic moral objection to any preferential approach in 
which the end is considered to justify the means" They added that quotas would 
"abrogate the principal it seeks to assert by actually requiring discrimination - by 
promoting inequity in the name of equity". The report accepted that no significant 
progress had been made in any equality of opportunity dimension". 112 This was 
followed in April 1988 by Fair Treatment For All for distribution in the US to 
counter the MacBride Campaign' 13 and a new Guide to Effective Practice 114 The 
documents confirmed government's intention to "introduce new legislation as soon 
as possible". A White Paper was published setting out the details of new legislation 
on 25th May 1988. The Secretary of State announced: 
"Its key features will be compulsory monitoring as the basis for 
affirmative action measures where necessary, the outlawing of 
indirect as well as direct discrimination, use of the criminal as well 
as the civil law in enforcement, the use of Government's economic 
muscle to support good practice, and the reorganisation of the 
existing Fair Employment Agency into a new Commission with 
increased resources". 115 
A task force of Ministers, Agency members, staff and chairman, trade union 
officials and local politicians were sent out to the US to assist Britain sell the 
111 Equality of Opportunity in 
thployment 
in Northern Ireland, Future Strategy Options, A 
Consultative Paper, DED, NI, 17 September 1986, HMSO. p. 5. 
112 Ibid. pp. 20,21. 
113 Northern Ireland, Fair Treatment for All; Equality of Employment Opportunity in Northern 
Ireland; Fair Employment in Northern Ireland and the MacBride Principles; NIO, April 1987. 
114 Religious Equality of Opportunity in Employment, Guide to Effective Practice, DED, September 
1987. 
115 NIO Press Statement, Fair Employment in NI Government Publishes White Paper. 
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package and counter the MacBride Campaign. On the 15th December 1988, a new 
Fair Employment Bill was published. This was approved by Parliament late in July 
1989 and became law in January 1990. Sinn Fein fair employment spokesperson 
Mitchell Mclaughlin said the new law "has more to do with defusing the MacBride 
campaign in the US than seriously confronting the fundamental evil of 
discrimination". 116 
Labour's former opposition spokesperson on Northern Ireland, Kevin McNamara 
MP, stated during the preparation of this Bill declared, "I simply do not trust the 
DED to implement effective legislation to combat inequalities. For almost ten 
years it tolerated massive ongoing inequality with complacency". 117 In reply Tom 
King MP, then Secretary of State, rejected this but conceded, "It has now become 
widely recognised that the regime for fair employment, enacted under a Labour 
Government in 1976, has not been effective as well as we would all have wished". 
He also confirmed the government's initiative was a direct response to US 
pressure. King asserted, "the measures we will be introducing will be more 
effective than the MacBride principles could ever be in assuring equal treatment 
for all. " A commitment was given to review the effectiveness of the legislation 
after five years. 118 
At the press conference to launch the Bill on 15th December 1988, King said the 
legislation was a demonstration of the government's determination to deal with the 
"last great area of concern and grievance", discrimination in employment. The 
other areas he identified, electoral gerrymandering and housing provision are now 
"very different and transformed". He said it must be "absolutely clear there is to be 
no discrimination in Northern Ireland and it is in the interests of every single 
person in the province that there is equal opportunity for all". 
119 
The Bill established a new Fair Employment Commission to replace the Fair 
Employment Agency and introduced a new Fair Employment Tribunal. The 1976 
116 Op. cit. Northern Ireland, Investor Responsibility Research Centre, Washington, 
News, 
September 1989. 
117 Kevin McNamara MP, 28th November 1987. 
118 Tom King MP, Secretary of State, 3rd December 1987. 
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Act was amended to reflect these changes leaving the Commission to monitor and 
measure patterns of employment, and conduct educational activities. The new 
tribunal took over from the Agency in hearing individual complaints. It has the 
added power of imposing fines against employers who fail to adhere to directions 
from the Commission. Indirect discrimination became illegal for the first time and 
"affirmative action" was couched in the vague and undefined concept of "fair 
participation". King asserted, "this is the strongest and clearest statement of aims 
of any anti-discrimination legislation in the UK". 120 
The law failed to include mechanisms similar to the Race Relations Act that 
permitted positive action by providing `client' orientated training in the general 
sense and at specific points of employment. Nor was the possibility of recruiting 
specific people where it was considered the services may be provided most 
effectively "by a person of the same racial group". 121 The Fair Employment Act 
1989 simply referred instead to training the unemployed in areas where 
unemployment is exceptionally high. Training was restricted to the unemployed. 
The potential for targeting specific groups by religion and the setting of goals and 
timetables for the recruitment of specific groups was excluded from the legislation. 
Given the serious conflict that forms the backdrop for this legislation and the 
contemporary and historical patterns of inequality it was a critical shortcoming to 
exclude measures to change the composition of the existing workforce over time. 
The government estimated labour turnover averaged 20% with 100,000 vacancies 
a year. SACHR in its Report on Fair Employment urged the government to 
establish "the goal which they would wish to achieve in five years". SACHR 
suggested the government should aim to reduce unemployment differentials 
between "the male Catholic unemployment rate and the male Protestant 
unemployment rate from two and a half times to one and a half times within five 
years". 122 The government rejected general and specific targets. Instead it referred 
to the importance of its new concept, "employment equity", which it failed to 
119 Tom King MP, Secretary of State, introductory remarks at press conference. See Graham, D. 
"Mutton dressed as lamb", New Society/Statesman, 23/30 December 1988. 
120 Fair Employment in Northern Ireland, Key Details of the Bill, DED, NT, December 1988. 
121 Race Relations Act 1976, S37,38 S5(2)(d). 
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define clearly. 123 
Public sector employers were automatically registered with the FEC. Private 
concerns employing ten or more were required to register - for the first two years 
only those with 25 employees or more were required to register. Employers are 
required to submit an annual monitoring return. Employers with 250 or more 
employees are required to monitor and submit returns on applications received. 
Failure to comply with these requirements became a criminal offence. The FEC 
was thereby placed in a position to monitor employment practices more effectively 
and speedily than the FEA. 
The Commission was given a default power that enabled it to serve notice that an 
employer was not qualified to accept an offer of a public contract or if a public 
contract was already engaged in, the public authority has to take steps to ensure 
"no work is executed or goods or services supplied for the purposes of the contract 
by any unqualified person". These provisions were significantly weakened by a 
caveat allowing the Secretary of State and any Northern Ireland department to use 
the services of a discriminatory employer when it is "in the public interest" or it 
would otherwise be disproportionately expensive, or "for the purpose of 
safeguarding national security", and protecting "public order. i 
124 The security 
exclusion includes discriminatory acts against the individual. A certificate blocking 
any investigation issued by the Secretary of State will continue to impede the 
pursuit of justice without redress. 
The Fair Employment Tribunal would hear individual cases of discrimination and 
appeals against directions made by the Commission. It also enforces those 
directions as a statutory body with the power to award damages and 
issue orders of 
compliance when an employer failed to comply with a 
direction made by the FEC 
in an investigation. In the latter case the tribunal could 
impose cash penalties up to 
£30,000 on employers who breach its orders. Any 
breach of these orders can be 
referred to the High Court that can impose unlimited 
fines or imprisonment, or 
122 Religious and Political Discrimination and Equality of Opportunity 
in Northern Ireland, Report 
on Fair Employment, SACHR, October 1987, HMSO, 
Cm 237, paras 4.7,4.8, p. 42. 
123 The concepts of equity and merit are discussed in 
Chapter 9. 
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both. The previously secretive excesses of the Agency however were duplicated in 
the tribunal. The hearing must be in private and the identity of sectarian or 
discriminatory employers are to be concealed. While there may be grounds for 
protecting an individuals identity, should they request it, the grounds for 
maintaining this veil of secrecy for employers which began in 1976, is difficult to 
square with the broader educational role that should have as its core changing the 
culture of the workplace. This makes it exceedingly difficult to promote Cameron's 
original goal of promoting public confidence in the institutions of NI. The 
procedure ensures debate on discrimination is neither a public or fully informed 
one. It also fails to meet the requirements of the 1989 Act to develop and promote 
public education on equality of opportunity. Employers may escape the negative 
consequences of discriminatory actions being in the public eye. The tribunal may 
prohibit the disclosure of any information, which will add to this concealment 
while simultaneously make it difficult if not impossible to monitor its own 
performance and the quality of its judgements. The tribunal's lack of accountability 
was a fundamental shortcoming as this process reinforced the difficulty of 
engaging in open debate and scrutiny as to the causes and consequences of 
discriminatory acts. Indirect discrimination was defined in terms of proportions 
which are considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not of that religious 
125 126 belief'. Race and housing remained outside the Act. 
In the House of Commons, King had said, 
"The legislation we shall bring forward will be tough. It will be much 
tougher than anything that has been done before, but it will be tough only 
for people who are determined to flout it". 
He added, "At every level and in every respect we wish to root out sectarianism 
from society". 127 To achieve this however required the government to cross 
significant hurdles it had created. Firstly they had declared they did not wish to 
transfer hardship from one community to the other. Secondly the use of quotas was 
ruled out on moral grounds as detrimental to the pursuit of equity. 
Thirdly the 
124 Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Bill, 6`h June 1989, HL Bill 52, HMSO London. 
125 Fair Employment in Northern Ireland, Key Details of the Act, DED, NI, August 1989, HMSO 
Belfast. 
126 Proposals to include race were brought forward seven years later under the 1996 review. 
127 NIO Press statement, Ist July 1988. 
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concepts of "fair treatment" and "merit" although presented as moral arguments 
were no more than those of political expediency. For example, the government 
explained that: 
" to set merit aside and to make appointments or promotions on the 
basis of favouring one religious group over another would be 
grossly unfair to the individuals thus excluded. It would also 
institutionalise bad practice rather than good and it would tend to 
exacerbate sectarian divisions rather than heal them. The fact that 
some would see it as being done from a good motive, e. g. to counter 
balance historical disadvantage would make it no less inequitable or 
unsatisfactory" . 
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This is the core of the problem. This argument gains its veracity from its accuracy. 
Within the context of NI as historically constituted to do otherwise would be to 
undermine its existence. Thus in order to manage the situation, the government 
must appeal to popular notions of fairness and merit as self evident axioms that can 
be accepted in themselves as concepts and practices. The problem however is that 
once applied to NI they carry with them the weight of historical and contemporary 
inequities that have proven to be the source of the conflict. As such the most the 
government can hope for is to persuade a significant enough number of Catholics 
that the deal is good enough for them. The opportunity to meet their aspirations 
will be given on the understanding that the institutions of NI are accepted within 
the confines of the UK. The presentation of a political reality as a moral objective 
does not conceal the plain fact that such morality only gains its credence by being 
placed within a unionist paradigm. The government may indeed use its legislative 
muscle to police this arrangement but it significantly does not undertake to do 
more than that. Thus while a fresh start was made in 1990 with a new Act and 
Commission the starting point remained remarkably similar to Cameron in 1969. 
Violent conflict, employment differentials determined by religion and a 
lack of 
consensus over the institutions of the state. 
Patterns of inequality under Direct Rule have remained constant as measured 
by 
successive Census reports, labour force surveys and 
Continuous Household 
Surveys (CHS) carried out by government. For example the 1983-85 
CHS showed 
the average male unemployment rate was 14.9% 
for Protestants as compared to 
128 Fair Employment in Northern Ireland, May 1988, p. 13, HMSO, Cm380. 
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35.1% for Catholics. For each socio-economic group the distribution of 
economically active males within their respective religious categories showed 
broad similarities. For example 17% of Protestant males belonged to the 
professional and managerial group compared with 9% for Catholics; 42% of 
Protestant men were in skilled manual occupations as compared to 45% for 
Catholics. While the rate of unemployment across religion differed radically so did 
the rate of unemployment within religions. According to CHS findings 12% of 
Catholics in professional and managerial occupations were unemployed as 
compared with 58% of those in the unskilled manual occupations. 129 It may be 
concluded then, that in common with other parts of Britain, the life chances of 
productive employment are enhanced by class membership and its related 
attributes. Those in lower socio-economic groups will consistently experience 
greater degrees of casual, unskilled and manual employment alongside periods of 
long term unemployment. In the context of NI this disproportionate experience has 
the added dimension of religion and the nature of a society that constructed its 
socio-economic opportunities around a religious badge of identity. According to 
FEC monitoring returns that covered around 70% of employees for employers 
engaging 26 or more employees Catholics have increased their presence in non- 
manual, professional and managerial occupations to around 34%. This is around a 
3.9% increase as the Catholic workforce increased by 1.8% in the public sector and 
2.6% in the private sector in those companies monitored. The figures exclude the 
unemployed and reflect the general growth in the Catholic workforce which is 
around 40%. Catholics are also over-represented by around 25% among the long 
term unemployed and for those without qualifications the unemployment rate was 
over 30% or almost one in three. 
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Smith & Chambers (1991) while noting the influence of socio-economic group and 
other factors such as education, age, practical and academic qualifications, 
numbers of dependant children found that religion was "strongly related 
to the 
probability that a man will be unemployed" and that predicted rates 
for a typical 
skilled manual worker aged 25-44 with two children and no qualifications 
was 




nearly twice as high for a Catholic than a Protestant. 131 It would appear then that 
within the dynamic process of a labour market the historical attributes of the 
Catholic middle-class continues to position them in a much stronger place to take 
advantage of any aggressive equality policies that seek to accommodate their skills 
and abilities into the unionist matrix. The Stormont regime had denied this 
opportunity. With the reintroduction of devolved government via the NI Assembly 
a second opportunity exists for unionists not to repeat the strategic mistake of their 
forefathers by excluding their natural allies. Employment and promotion in the 
public sector and related institutions will present highly visible opportunities to 
consolidate this alliance. Thus as with the US model, legal codes seeking to 
mediate access to the market alongside corresponding political developments and 
economic policies may deliver such opportunities. However the challenge will be 
to what degree will the prevailing forces of unionism and the British desire to 
maintain a stable alliance influence any equality agenda. 
The American experience contained distributive and redistributive elements within 
a highly developed mobile market where the legitimacy of the state and its 
institutions were not under threat or at risk. Its failure to deliver a disproportionate 
share of justice via the redistribution of equity left significant patterns of inequality 
in employment unaffected. This had no effect on its political or market systems. In 
NI the economically active Catholic population is around 36%. If only a small 
proportion of Catholics can be successfully accommodated into the local labour 
market without the threat of further political instability or fundamentally altering 
the dynamics of the labour market then the separation by class and socio-economic 
group within each religious group may lead to a political separation that finds 
current political aspirations and alliances torn asunder. The historical record of NI 
and Ireland is that the Protestant class alliance is stronger than any Catholic or 
nationalist one. This is precisely because the Protestant class alliance has as its 
purpose the maintenance of NI itself. The equality model in NI is primarily 
distributive. It does not seek to offer equity via redistribution of opportunities on 
an individual or group basis. The inability to change the nature of the market place 
130 FEC, 1996, p. 10. See also Monitoring Report No. 5, Monitoring Returns, 1994, FEC, 
1995; and 
SACHR, Employment Equality in NJ, Vol. 11, Ch. 1., p. 4, pp. 2-25.1997. 
131 Smith, David. J. & Chambers, Gerald. (1991), pp. 195-6. 
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will present a greater challenge to the republican base of Sinn Fein as they find the 
current internal political settlement is of little relevance to the economic 
opportunities for their militant urban base. The American equality model 
demonstrates what can be achieved alongside the limitations of the practical 
implementation of legal codes to the labour market. The test for NI is not simply 
the efficacy and strength of such codes but the degree by which they can be utilised 
to legitimise the constitution and institutions of the state and contribute to the entry 
by middle class Catholics to such institutions. It may be going too far to give the 
added responsibility of maintaining the Catholic class alliance under such 
conditions to such codes also but they do have a role in mediating this process. 
Conclusion. 
This chapter outlines the administrative response by the British government to the 
latest outbreak of civil and military conflict in N. Ireland. By describing the issues 
that led to the internal crisis we have provided the context within which legislative 
reform was driven and formed. A primary objective was to create confidence and 
stability in the institutions of NI. It has been argued the response by Britain to a 
violent political challenge to its hegemony was to maintain an Orange status quo. 
The implementation of such reforms as initially outlined by Cameron was dilatory 
-a seven year gap- while other organisational reforms were made such as the 
introduction of large quangos to provide public services, the critical ground of 
employment was simply not addressed. The emphasis from 1969 to 1976 was 
primarily a military solution. In drafting fair employment Bills and Acts due 
deference was made to the American experience. However as has been shown this 
experience did not travel well across the Atlantic and both the philosophical 
underpinning of the American Civil Rights Act and the majority of its powers were 
not adopted or were specifically rejected. The example of the Race Relations Act 
illustrates the practices and shortcomings of parallel legislation in another part of 
Britain. It has been argued however that the situation in NI was much more urgent 
and vital as the essence of the challenge experienced was about the very nature and 
existence of the state. By this is meant that the absence of redress could see 
the 
demise of the state of NI. The black and ethnic minority groups 
in the UK could 
not mount such a challenge even if desired. In NI this 
desire already existed, as did 
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the existence of another country that had within its constitution that NI was part of 
the Irish domain. 
This work is about the root cause of sectarianism and its many manifestations in 
the private and public sphere of employment, investment, planning, housing and 
politics. It will be demonstrated that legislation has not been and is not "tough 
enough" nor have the means of enforcement. Fundamental questions as to the 
critical role these inequalities continue to play in securing and moulding the North 
in the image laid down by its British and Unionist founding fathers are addressed. 
Then as now the question to be addressed is that indicated by earlier Secretaries for 
the Dominion's, namely would the rooting out of sectarian employment patterns 
mark the demise of 'Ulster' as we know it and thereby eliminate the need for its 
very existence? Flowing from this is the all embracing question of the stated 
policy objectives of successive British governments in relation to equality of 
opportunity and the actual patterns of inequality on the ground as the illusive 
`accommodation' with republicans and nationalists through the Good Friday 
Agreement is sought. An accommodation that remains under threat from unionism 
and militant republicanism. 
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CHAPTER IV. EQUALITY IN EMPLOYMENT. 
Introduction 
Chapters 4,5 &6 utilise a range of case studies to demonstrate the existence and 
depth of discrimination on the shop floor in public and private spheres of 
employment. At the centre of these examples is the degree to which unionist 
patronage was so successful that to change this would indeed be to the widespread 
detriment of Protestants. British legislators have shown that this is a step they 
cannot contemplate for in their view to do so would be to risk the political integrity 
of NI, further civil conflict, unrest and an outcome that may be beyond their 
political managerial capacities. The examples provided reinforce the argument that 
fundamental reforms that effect the "class" position of one whole group are simply 
not possible. Together they indicate the strength of the challenge to any reform 
process and indeed question whether any such process can be successful within NI. 
They reinforce the historical and contemporary evidence that the mediation of the 
market in NI must remain essentially partial to sustain its current character and 
legitimacy to the "greater number". The analysis begins with public administration 
then moves on to the private sector. 
Public Services: An Anatomy 
Direct Rule marked a significant period of expansion and change to the public 
services especially up to the late 1970's. This represented a major employment and 
equality opportunity. Many new service areas were created as a result of taking 
direct service provision away from local authorities e. g. environment, 
housing, 
education, social services. It is argued that despite creating and 
funding this rapid 
expansion the government failed to actively seek to reverse or significantly change 
entrenched patterns of inequality. This failure in turn undermined the 
British 
governments' declaration that it would achieve positive social reform 
in the 
fundamental and keenly fought over area of employment opportunity and anti- 
discrimination. At the same time the governments' pro-unionist political support 
for NI as an entity and its war against republicans restricted the 
breadth of social 
policy. This in turn meant that the public service 
failed to offer a leadership 
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example or promote best practices and thereby could not act as a driving force or 
example for the private sector, much of which was dependent on government 
grants. The case studies examined include the Northern Ireland civil service, public 
utilities (before privatisation), essential services, health, education, emergency 
services and public sector housing. 
The Civil Service. 
" The weight and extent of the evidence which was presented to us 
concerned with social and economic grievances or abuses of 
political power was such that we are compelled to conclude that 
they had substantial foundations in fact and were in a very real 
sense an immediate and operative cause of the demonstrations and 
consequent disorders after 5th October 1968". 1 
"The Augean stables were nothing to the mess he had found at 
Stormont. Disproportionate.... salaries ... 
jobs for the 
Protestant boys; every power of the Government used to depress the 
tv2 Catholics... 
These comments demonstrate that from the very outset British ministers were fully 
aware of the task in front of them and the need for change if the objectives laid out 
by Cameron were to be achieved. The challenge facing Westminster was either to 
carry out radical root and branch surgery or to preen around the edges. A choice 
between maintaining an absolute unionist hegemony or work to achieve a real 
accommodation with Catholics that Cameron appeared to be suggesting. In a 
situation where republicans were engaged in a war with Britain the former would 
not appear to offer the possibility of peace or a political settlement. Yet the British 
government chose this route for over two decades. By the mid-1980's, the 
government was obliged to officially recognise little had been achieved. 
"Data published today by the Department of Finance and Personnel 
illustrates a number of marked differences between the 
characteristics of Protestant and Roman Catholic communities in 
Northern Ireland, in such areas as educational background, 
employment and occupation and housing. While such deeply rooted 
reasons for difference exist it will not be easy to secure early 
'The Cameron Report, Ch. 12, p. 55. Disturbances: Northern Ireland, September 1969, Belfast 
HMSO. 
2 William Whitelaw MP, Secretary of State for N. Ireland to Cecil King, 14th April 1972, op. cit. 
Cecil King Diaries, 1970-74, p. 194. 
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dramatic changes". 3 
A short ten years later the government proclaimed: 
"So far as legislation and Government policies are concerned, most 
- if not all - sources of inequality between the two main parts of the 
community have now been removed. Intensive efforts have been 
and are being made to tackle the residual problems of inequality, 
and to target the areas of greatest social need, wherever they occur. 
But there remain substantial social and economic inequalities". 4 
Under Direct Rule then the British viewpoint moved from an "Augean stable" to 
the remote possibility of "early dramatic changes" some 23 years after the 
imposition of Direct Rule to the assertion that "the sources of inequality ... have 
now been removed". Inequalities are now to be seen as primarily "social and 
economic", i. e. more to do with the nature of the economy, or is the government 
saying "the source", i. e. itself, in terms of sustaining an unequal framework has 
been finally removed? While the message is unclear there is now an unequivocal 
public commitment to the ending of inequalities. This in itself makes debate on the 
shop floor or recruitment proclamations a legitimate activity. For example: 
"Targeting Social Need is a major part of Government's effort to 
secure this objective and has been adopted as a third public 
expenditure priority alongside "law and order" and "strengthening 
the economy". The essential foundation of this initiative is for all 
Government Departments to monitor more closely the impact of 
their policies and programmes on the two sections of the 
community, and to develop action plans to address unfair 
differentials. 0 
Chapter 2 demonstrated the overtly Protestant bias and effects of the Stormont 
regime. This did not engender Catholic support. Loyalty to the Union and Orange 
institutions were considered paramount and often proclaimed in public from the 
prime minister down. The intensity of these declarations reflected the instability 
and general sense of insecurity of the new state. What then could or did the 
government do to eradicate strategic and operational prejudice in its own arm of 
3 Douglas Hurd MP, Secretary of State for N. Ireland, NIO, 3rd July, 1985. 
4 NIO, 9th &I 5th December 1994; Exploratory Dialogue with Sinn Fein; the Progressive Unionist 
Party and the Ulster Democratic Party. 
5 Peter Brooke MP, Secretary of State, 10th March, 1992, NIO. 
105 
administration or address what it now chose to term unfair differentials? 
An analysis of the civil service management group from 1927 to 1959, which 
included the "take-off' post of Staff Officer (372 posts) demonstrated the strength 
of Protestant hegemony. Out of a total of 740 posts, 46 (6%) were occupied by 
Catholics. They remained concentrated at the lower levels, e. g. 17 out of 216 
Deputy and Assistant Principals; 23 out of 372 Staff Officers; 4 out of 107 
Principal Officers; 2 out of 38 Second and Assistant Secretaries and none of the 7 
Permanent Secretaries. Protestant domination ranged from 92% to 100% in each 
category. 6 The authors, leading Quakers, represented one of the first "respectable" 
profiles of inequality, first published in 1962 and re-issued in 1972 under the 
momentum of the "troubles". It could therefore not be easily dismissed as 
republican propaganda. Their analysis clearly showed the success of the Protestant 
project in securing an administration in its own image. 
In July 1973 an article in New Society by Professor David Donnison, Director of 
the Centre for Environmental Studies claimed Protestants occupied 95% of all 
senior posts from the grade of assistant principal upwards. 7 The civil service 
challenged this publicly and claimed the true figure was 15% for Catholics. 
However an examination of the figures used show this was arrived at by including 
the larger category of Staff Officer where 20 Catholics held posts. The end result 
was a figure of 12% with Protestant domination ranging from 86% to 95% within 
the senior categories. 8 By this time Direct Rule had been imposed with a 
commitment to eradicate discrimination. The civil service rapidly expanded. From 
a staff of 8,000 it grew to 23,000 between 1972-77. This dramatic expansion 
provided the most significant single opportunity to fundamentally alter the 
sectarian class relations of the past within the civil service. The possibility of 
achieving Cameron's twin goals of reducing tension and encouraging loyalty to the 
constitution presented itself. Successive Labour and Conservative administrations 
however shied away from disturbing Protestant hegemony. 
6 Barritt, D. P. and Carter, C. F., The Northern Ireland Problem, p. 96. OUP, London, 1972. 
7 Donnison David, The Northern Ireland Civil Service, New Society, 5th July 1973. See also 
"Northen Ireland a New Society social studies reader", 1973. 
8 Unpublished correspondence from NI Civil Service Permanent Secretary, Mr. K. Shimeld and 
authors analysis of data in the NICS press release of 6th July 1973. 
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In December 1983 an assessment of the composition of the service was published 
by the FEA. This represented the outcome of a formal investigation that began in 
1980. Although the analysis was completed by July 1981 and fully reported to the 
FEA Board in November 1981, two years would elapse before the government 
permitted the FEA to publish the results. Those directly involved in the 
investigation considered the end product was largely manufactured and dictated by 
the civil service itself. 9 They considered the report published by the NICS did not 
accurately reflect the research findings or conclusions and specifically breached 
undertakings to include as an appendices Miller's critical methodological analysis 
of the NICS reinterpretation of the data. The data referred to below are taken from 
the original, unpublished analysis agreed by the consultants and FEA research 
officer. 
From the very first meeting of the investigation steering group, the FEA, Northern 
Ireland Public Service Alliance (NIPSA) trades union and the civil service agreed 
to exclude security linked personnel, e. g. prison officers, security guards, civilian 
search personnel, the RUC and UDR, etc. At the time the complete service 
employed 31,000 but the investigation was restricted to the 22,864 non-industrial 
administrative, professional and technical workforce. '° 
Religious identity could not be established for 3,211 because they were either not 
born in NI, data was unavailable or they were local government transferees. The 
religious composition of the remaining 19,653 was 69.5% Protestant (P) and 
30.5% Catholic (RC). The NI Catholic population was just over 39% at the time. 11 
9 The consultants were Michael Pearn, former Director of Runnymede Trust, then Director of an 
independent Equality Consultancy; Robert Miller from Queens University Belfast, and the author as 
secretary to the working group and researcher to the FEA. 
loAnother example of reconciling the transition from an all Ireland state to Stormont was 
recruitment to the Prison Service. Under the 1920 Act, the composition of the service was, 
36.7% 
(62) Catholic, and 63.3% (107) Protestant. Out of the 90 appointments made between 1922-24,12% 
(11) were Catholic. By the end of 1924, from a total staff of 195,20% (39) were 
Catholic. This was 
a fall in overall terms of 62%. The number of female Catholics remained stable at ten while males 
fell from 52 to 29. (By 1990 the growth in security related occupations employed 20,848 in the 
UDR, RUC, Prison Service, Territorial Army, Royal Navy Reserve, with 3177 alone in the Police 
Authority. Of these 1457 6.9% were Catholic. Monitoring Returns, Fair Employment Commission, 
Research Report No. 1,2,1991,1992). 
11 See Eversley, D. Univ. of Cambridge & Herr, V., Univ. of Berkeley, The Roman 
Catholic 
Population of NI in 1981, A Revised Estimate, (1985) FEA, Belfast. 
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When the overall figures were broken down into 25 equivalent and comparable 
occupational groups, significant differentials emerged. The original analysis 
presented by Miller to the FEA concluded religion had a "distinct and unique effect 
upon the salary level an individual holds, the occupational group in which he 
works, and the department in which he is found ". Protestants remained dominant in 
the higher and better paid occupations. They enjoyed higher than average salaries 
in 17 out of 24 groups (the Miscellaneous category were excluded), while 
Catholics tended to be concentrated in the lower paid and menial occupations. The 
averages for the seven groups (Ancillary, Clerk and Superintendent of Works, Data 
Processing, Ordnance Survey, PSV Examiners, Legal and Medical staff) where 
Catholics had higher pay scales than their brethren elsewhere were inflated by the 
inclusion of medical and legal staff. However the majority were in the lower paid 
Ancillary and Data Processing Groups. Together they constituted 7.7% of the 
whole investigation. Within the five non-menial groups in this section, there were 
proportionately more Protestants than was typical for the service as a whole, e. g. 
Legal, Medical and Works Superintendents groups. 
In three groups, General Service, Typing and Data Processing, there were 
proportionately more Catholics. Again they occupied the lower paid categories. 
Tables 1 and 2 below provide a religious composition comparison by salaries and 
department by collapsing the various occupations into a range of comparable grade 
bands that were agreed as valid by the FEA, civil service and NIPSA. 
Table 1. SALARY GRADES BY RELIGION. July 1981 
Protestant (%) Roman Catholic (%) 
Senior Principal or higher 87.3 12.7 
Principal and Deputy Principal 83.2 16.8 
Staff Officer 82.7 17.3 
Executive Officer 1 





Executive Officer 2 71.7 28.3 
Clerk 63.8 36.2 
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Clerical Assistant 
(Survey Number 19,604) 
63.6 36.4 
Miller R. Analysis Results - Incorporating Occupational Groups and Pay Levels, Draft Reports 1 
and 2, Civil Service Investigation, to FEA, July 1981, November 1981. 
The majority of Catholics were located in the bottom four grades. These grades 
constituted 82.5% of the whole service. The administration under Direct Rule then 
had left power and influence in traditional hands. With the exception of education, 
Protestants were on higher pay scales in all departments. This was especially 
notable in the four key areas of administration, Commerce, Environment, Finance 
and Agriculture. In three departments, Health and Social Services (43%), 
Manpower Services (39.5%), and Commerce had proportionately more Catholics 
than the average of 30%. The following table illustrates inequalities at the 
departmental level. 
Table 2. DEPARTMENT BY RELIGION. (July 1981) 
Protestant (%) 
l 
Catholic (%) Numbers. 
Agriculture 72.0 28.0 3,259 
Court Service 79.2 20.8 178 
Commerce 66.1 33.9 734 
Civil Service 77.1 22.9 773 
Education 83.3 16.7 652 
Environment 73.9 26.1 43,385 
Exchequer & Audit 84.8 15.2 67 
Finance 72.8 27.2 2,806 
Health & Social 
Services 
57.0 43.0 5,589 
Manpower Services 60.5 39.5 2,005 
Northern Ireland 
Office 
79.1 20.9 1,010 
Police Authority 89.0 11.0 1,748 
FEA. Civil Service Investigation, July 1981, November 19 1. 
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These findings were withheld from publication by the civil service for two years 
and only made public in a form dictated by it. This became significant during the 
Irish American MacBride Principles Campaign to challenge discrimination in NI. 12 
On the 4th December 1984, fifteen years after the Cameron Report, the civil 
service issued an equal opportunities statement to its staff for the first time. 
The British governments' Downing Street declaration in August 1969 that 
"irrespective of political views or religion" equality of treatment and freedom from 
discrimination would be secured via the creation of an impartial tier of 
administration between government and people had not been secured. The status 
quo remained essentially in place precisely due to the absence of any radical 
challenge to change the nature of the local labour market. This highly significant 
failure was conveniently illustrated by the situation in the then Department of Civil 
Service. It was responsible for personnel and recruitment practices for the whole 
civil service. In the top four grades, Assistant Secretary to Permanent Secretary, all 
12 post-holders were Protestant. At the next tier, one out of 19 Principal Officers 
was Catholic. At the next two senior levels, Deputy Principal (29 posts) and Staff 
Officer (48 posts), there were 5 and 8 Catholics respectively. 13 The Head of the 
DOCS at the first meeting between the FEA, the civil service and NIPSA to 
discuss the enquiry fiercely opposed any notion of monitoring by religion or the 
introduction of formal equality opportunity programmes. He remained consistent 
throughout the investigation. 14 
An interesting feature discovered upon assessing the data was the position of 
women. Inequality of opportunity in terms of gender was apparent with Catholic 
women suffering an additional burden. Although females accounted for 50.3% of 
the workforce, 87% of them were concentrated in 4 groups; General Services, 
12 See Graham, D. Critique 16, A Journal of Socialist Theory, `Northern Ireland: A State Beyond 
Reform', 1983; Critical Social Policy, Issue 9 Spring 1984, `Discrimination in Northern Ireland: the 
failure of the Fair Employment Agency'; New Society, 22/29 December 1983, `Religious Bias in 
civil service; Suppressed Report sparks Ulster row', New Society, 26th June 1987 and Pollak, Andy. 
Fortnight, Issue No. 188, October 1982, Belfast, `The Civil Service Investigation: The FEA's Last 
Chance'?, and Miller, R. `Evaluation Research in a Politicised Context: An investigation of the 
Northern Irish Civil Service by the Fair Employment Agency', 1987, Queens University Belfast. 
13 FEA. Unpublished Data from Civil Service Investigation, 1981. 
14 Authors' observation and meeting records. A contemporaneous and full record was made for 
each meeting by the research officer who then produced a shorter minute for agreement. 
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Typing, Data Processing and Drawing Office Staff. Although the average pay scale 
was higher for Protestants, the predominant source of inequality for women was 
their sex. Again key departments such as Commerce, Environment, Exchequer and 
Audit and the appropriately named Manpower Services contained fewer than the 
average for other departments. 
The Minister Adam Butler MP, declared, the evidence, "shows that the Northern 
Ireland Civil Service practices fair recruitment and promotion procedures". 15 In 
March 1984 the Secretary of State, James Prior MP announced a programme of 
cut-backs that reduced the service by over 700 by 1988. The period of growth 
apart from some transfer of jobs under the Government's Next Steps Agency 
programme during 1990-92 had ended and with it the opportunity to achieve 
significant change through growth alone. While the transfer of several 
administrative functions such as the processing of DSS claims for areas of London 
to Belfast created around 940 office jobs, other bodies operating under the aegis of 
the NIO lost 856 jobs while public corporations lost another 828 in the same 
period. 16 
In January 1985, Ministers claimed in parliament, that the overall composition of 
the civil service was 58.4% Protestant (30.2%Male, 28.2% Female) and 32.7% 
Catholic (14.7% Male, 18% Female). This included 1,600 ancillary and related 
grades. Security related personnel were excluded. In 1987 the NIO produced a 
booklet "Fair Treatment For All", primarily for distribution to the American 
political market. In this they stated the composition in 1985 was 63.6% Protestant 
and 36.4% Catholic. Monitoring returns to the FEC for the whole civil service 
including the prison Service indicated 32.8% (11,763) of 35,853 were Catholic in 
1990. Of these 47% occupied clerical and secretarial jobs, 17% were managers and 
administrative officers and 2.8% were engaged in security related occupations. By 
1994 the numbers of Catholics employed fell by 0.6% giving an overall ratio of 
33% Catholics in the 40,049 workforce. If the figures for security related 
occupations including the Police Authority for NI and prison service are added in 
then the figures vary significantly. The latter account for 21,358 employees of 
is NIO226th January, 1984. 
16 NJEC Report 93, April 1992. 
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whom 92% are Protestant. This would give an overall total in the civil service of 
75% Protestants. l7 
Shortly after the edited version of the civil service report was published in 
December 1983 and as Ministers defended their record, the public service trade 
union, NIPSA, charged it with adopting recruitment practices which, "smacked of 
maladministration and should be stopped". NIPSA further added, it was only "with 
considerable reluctance", the service suspended these practices. 18 Clearly if the 
potential remained for acts which may be discretionary or plainly iniquitous in 
mainstream recruitment practices the possibility of sustaining patterns of religious 
inequality is strong. As David Donnison stated much earlier in his New Society 
article Catholics are unlikely to trust a regime where their potential to serve is 
highly restricted by the very forces that claim to wish to offer them equality in the 
first place. He noted this pattern is self-sustaining, particularly in a society where 
historical relations are all pervasive. 19 
It may be argued then that Direct Rule largely reproduced or at least reinforced 
earlier `Orange' paradigms in the civil service. One may also postulate that if some 
form of political settlement is to be achieved internally the Catholic middle class 
will desire greater entry at all levels to this market place. 
Health and Education. 
Queen's University medical faculty is the first critical step for aspiring student 
doctors in NI. Its 30 chairs represent almost one third of professorships of which 
77% were held by local Protestants. The rest were occupied by British academics. 
Since the 1970's, Catholic students have increased to almost 45% of the student 
body. In Medicine however the pattern had remained largely unchanged since 1953 
when Catholics peaked at 103 (18%) out of 564 medical students. In 1969 when 
the civil rights movement was at its height, there were 31 Catholics out of 
387 
consultants or specialists. The management committees of the 97 
hospitals 
17 FEC, 1991,1992,1995 Monitoring Returns, analysis by author. 
18 NIPSA Annual Reports, 1985,1986. 
19 Donnison, D. New Society, 5th July 1973. 
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contained 72 Catholics among 456 members. All eight of the full time medical 
referees were Protestant as were 44 of the 50 part- time referees. No Catholics 
were employed as Chief County or Borough Medical Officers, Dental Officers, or 
Public Health Inspectors. Of the 16 public health inspectors, 3 were Catholic. 20 
By 1987 of the 2991 employed by Queens, 19% were Catholics which when 
broken down into medicine indicated there were 72 Catholics out of 448 
employees who serviced a student medical body which was almost 42% Catholic. 21 
Again an opportunity to intervene by increasing the number of Catholic staff 
especially when the demographic base of the student body was radically changing 
and new hospitals were being built was not taken. 
Under Direct Rule the government delegated responsibility for vital services such 
as the provision of health and education to new health and social services 
education and library boards. By 1990 there were more than 98 public sector 
bodies or Quango's delivering services in NI. As such they were directly 
accountable to local ministers for the manner by which these powers were 
exercised and services provided. Their general perception as overtly unionist 
stemmed from the various public positions they adopted in relation to a range of 
matters they considered undermined unionist hegemony. For example Education 
and Library Boards openly refused to sign the FEA's original equal opportunity 
declaration in 1976 and declared they would not accept tenders from firms that 
signed it. Unionist Assembly members who also served on these boards claimed 
their opposition was based on moral grounds and to prevent "inhibiting the 
freedom of the people". 22 Investigations into their employment practices by the 
FEA found this ethos reflected in employment practices. 
For example in 1978 a short list of 18 for ambulance 
drivers/attendants in the 
Northern Health and Social Services Board was composed of 15 Protestants and 
three Catholics. Every Protestant who applied was shortlisted but only three of the 
13 Catholics. A Protestant was appointed. In 1978 at the Masserene 
hospital in 
20 plain Truth, Campaign for Social Justice, 15th June 1969, Iris No. 9, Dublin 
1984. 
21 Annual Reports, Catholic Chaplaincy, (unpublished); QUB, FEA Section 
12 Investigation, 1988. 
22 The local press carried constant statements and pictures of unionist politicians 
tearing up the Fair 
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County Antrim, the 18 driver attendants included one Catholic. The same pattern 
existed among the drivers for the Maghera and Cookstown hospital with one 
Catholic out of 16 in 1978. Thirty out of a work force of 200 at Banbridge hospital 
which is managed by the Southern Board were Catholic in March 1979. An 
advertisement for domestic workers in August 1979 for the Waveney/Braid 
hospitals in Ballymena saw one Catholic on a short list of 22. During this period 
several investigations were carried out by the PEA but no findings of 
discrimination were made. The Southern Education Board voted in July 1983 to 
reject equal opportunity clauses in contracts. During the same month the Western 
Health and Social Services Board was found to have discriminated against a 
Catholic man employed as a temporary driver. This reflected the traditional hold of 
Protestant management serving its unionist board. 23 
Matters became further complicated when Sinn Fein, following the 1981 Hunger 
Strike, decided to embark on an interventionist strategy. As SF members became 
councillors, unionist controlled councils sought to prevent their nominations to 
such Boards. In Belfast for example, non-unionist representation was prevented by 
the simple expedient of only putting forward for approval to Ministers unionist 
members. Chris Patten MP the Minister then responsible and former Governor of 
Hong Kong accepted this controversial approach which later led to successful legal 
action by Sinn Fein to stop such discrimination. 
Another example of political intervention being able to make a difference, when 
desired, came from the FEA in response to direct pressure from the late unionist 
Harold McCusker MP, on the FEA Chair, Cooper. The FEA started a formal 
investigation in 1983 into the Southern Health Board that McCusker considered to 
be Catholic dominated. FEA findings were leaked in 1986. They indicated that 
although Catholics constituted 54% of the population in the area they made up 
47% of the workforce. Protestants were found to dominate the higher grades. For 
example Catholics accounted for 58% of the trained nurses while Protestants 
accounted for 66% of the 756 clerical and senior administrative grades. 
Three of 
Employment Act, calling for the FEA's demise and refusals to co-operate. 
23 Graham, D. `No room in the ambulance', New Society, 14th February 1984; 
Irish News, 18th 
January 1985. Fair Employment Agency, Report of an Investigation into the Ambulance 
Services of 
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the 31 senior administrative staff were Catholic. This pattern was reflected at the 
district level. In Armagh and Dungannon no Catholics occupied senior posts; in 
Craigavon of the 16 senior posts, five were Catholic and in overall terms, 
Protestants occupied 56 (75%) of the 75 senior district posts. Eleven of the 38 front 
line managers were Catholic with most of these employed in the Catholic Newry 
and Mourne District. 24 What this illustrates is not simply the difficulty of 
addressing inequalities but two other significant points. The first that Direct Rule 
had essentially only marked time and secondly that political will could make a 
difference. In this case a formal investigation. On a much larger scale it could if 
exercised in a positive manner have imposed structural change. The period these 
examples encapsulate are twenty years of British direct rule, accountability and 
responsibility. Structural inequalities were apparent yet the solutions proffered 
focused on the individual and not redress on a "class" basis. The responsibility for 
change and indeed the failure to achieve it is thereby reduced to the efficacy of the 
law for the individual and not the wider Protestant/Catholic power relationships. 
This is again illustrated by patterns of power within employment in the Western 
Health Board. Employing approximately 6,200 and covering the largely Catholic 
West including Derry, Omagh and Fermanagh the religious composition of the 
workforce monitored was 2457 (39.7%) Protestant and 3205 (51.7%) Catholic. 25 
The DED's Guide to Effective Practice estimated the working population for the 
area to be 40.8% Protestant (59,030) and 59.2% (85,784) Catholic. While this may 
suggest a general under-representation for Catholics, Protestant staff at Board 
Headquarters exceeded their average with 49.2% (63). At the area management 
level Protestant representation ranged from 34.2% (543) in Omagh to 47.3% (462) 
in Fermanagh. Around 534 were not assigned a religious category. When 
aggregated into senior and middle management categories, out of the 668 total, 315 
(47%) were Catholic. Of these 25 were senior managers out of a potential 65 while 
290 were middle managers out of a total 603. The highest percentage of Catholics 
were found in nursing (58.4%, 1436) and social service (56%, 
366) occupations. 
the Health & Social Services Boards in Northern Ireland, November 1985. 
24 FEA unpublished report; Irish News 21 March 1986. In 1992 
FEC monitoring returns indicated 
the Southern Board's workforce of 7029 included 3450 (49%) Catholics. 
25 The FEA excluded ambulance staff, home helps, and medical staff which also 
involved Queen's 
University staff who were involved in making certain medical appointments. 
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Catholic tradesmen by comparison accounted for 27% (50) of the 185 total 
employed. 26 This reflected the difference between domination in traditional 
occupations as compared with the new brought about by the general expansion in 
medical and social care. As the economy becomes progressively more service 
orientated public funded employment will remain a vital resource for employment 
in rural areas where significant industrial clusters are absent. 
One of the more openly sectarian employers has been the North-Eastern Education 
and Library Board. It services the needs of a largely Protestant population with a 
Catholic working population of approximately 23% (49,209). It adopted a high 
profile opposition to equal opportunities and only agreed to sign an equal 
opportunity declaration late in 1988 under duress of pending legislation. An 
investigation by the FEA actually found the Board failed to afford equal 
opportunity and criticised its public stance on the issue. Employing 5,309, the 
overall composition was 69.5% (3690) and 22.4% (1192) Catholic. The latter were 
concentrated in staff providing school meals, caretaking and cleaning. The 
headquarters staff for example was 78.2% Protestant and 62 (16.5%) Catholic. In 
the senior and administration and professional grades Protestants accounted for 
79.4% (81) as compared to 20.5% (21) Catholics. A religious classification was not 
made in 6 cases. Of the non-school based staff e. g. tradesmen, libraries, technical 
college teachers etc. Catholics composed 15.7% of the 1,370 employed. In 
tradesmen type activities for example there were 13 Catholics out of 151 jobs; and 
again among the 270 library staff they accounted for 17%. Only 5 of the 75 most 
senior posts in technical colleges were held by Catholics. The latter's 
representation was higher among the 3,900 school based staff e. g. cleaning, 
caretaking, meals which in large part is a reflection of the highly segregated 
education system with each school being largely serviced by its `own' people. 
27 
Ambulance services are controlled by the Health Boards. Again employment in 
this vital and sensitive area was the subject of public controversy with 
demands 
26 DED Guide to Effective Practice, September 1987; FEA Investigation into the Western Health 
and Social Services Board, October 1988, pp. 11-24. 
27FEA Investigation Report into the North Eastern Education and Library Board 1986 (published 
1988) The FEC 1995 monitoring return indicated how little progress has been made. 
Its 3667 
workforce included 870 Catholics. 
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made for formal investigations as soon as the 1976 Act came into effect. The FEA 
did conduct an enquiry beginning in 1982 and formally ending in November 1985, 
following the leaking of findings in January 1985. Although staff were directly 
employed by all the Health Boards they were recruited by a central Staffs' Council. 
133 out of 599 were Catholic. In all Board areas including the Catholic West where 
Catholics held 32 (16%) of posts, Protestants dominated. At the more senior 
grades, 10 of the 71 leading ambulance men and 2 of the 45 Ambulance officers 
were Catholic. 
Within Belfast, which falls under the Eastern Board, the majority of all Catholics 
(34) were concentrated in the Central Ambulance depot at Broadway on the Falls 
road where they represented 40% of the staff. Prior to October 1973 when the 
Boards were created under Direct Rule, there were 36 (16%) out of 219 ambulance 
staff Catholic. By the end of 1985 they represented 23.8% of the 559 workforce. 
Although the FEA concluded, "there are no satisfactory reasons for the low 
numbers of Roman Catholics in the Ambulance Services to be found", no findings 
of discrimination were made. 28 In April 1987 the NIO asserted progress had been 
made. 
Catholics in 1994 accounted for 18,683 (41.7%) employees in the four Area Health 
Service Boards workforce of 44,737. Many, 8090, were employed as nurses while 
others worked in menial tasks such as porters and kitchen staff (3446). Of the 950 
employed as managers or administrators 274 (28.8%) were Catholic. In March 
1992, the Fair Employment tribunal reported on its finding that a Catholic 
applicant had been subjected to "fear, humiliation, frustration, insult, stress and 
deep hurt arising out of a blatant act of unlawful discrimination", by a health 
authority which was ordered to pay £25,000 compensation. In the five Education 
and Library Boards, there were 6,778 (40.5%) Catholics employed in the total 
16,696 workforce by 1994. Catholics accounted for 99 (28.6%) of the 
345 
employed as managers and administrators; 1,043 (35.5%) of the 2,935 employed 
in 
professional occupations; 72 (21%) of the 339 working in skilled manual 
jobs and 
1,226 of the 3,179 engaged in clerical and secretarial work. 
29 
28 FEA Investigation Report into the Ambulance Services, November 1985 
29 Fair Employment Commission, Monitoring Reports, 1992, No. 5,1995. 
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The argument advanced that the British administration largely adopted a passive 
and non-interventionist equal opportunity policy in public services including those 
which by their very nature - province wide services - should have offered wider 
opportunities is strongly supported by such examples. A situation where equality 
policies are accepted with reluctance or actively opposed by agents of the 
government cannot but engender stronger feelings of alienation by the Catholic 
populace towards the British administration. The absence of leadership or 
structural intervention by government confounded the potential for long term 
solutions in the interest of short-term expediency to appease unionists. 30 
The Fire Authority. 
Another public area fraught with a history of exclusion and sectarianism is the fire 
brigade service. Again a universal service where there was an expectation reforms 
would be applied. A relatively small area of employment it expanded under Direct 
Rule and in response to increased demand caused by the "troubles". Work by the 
FEA in this field began on 3rd December 1981 following an intense internal 
campaign by staff to secure an enquiry in opposition to the FEA Board. This 
example offers a useful insight as to the internal employment culture and absence 
of demand by government to achieve change. 
An enquiry followed an individual's complaint that had revealed that between 
1977-80, Catholics had less than half the chance of being appointed than 
30 It is interesting to note in this context that British Ministers put forward quota systems for top 
jobs in the National Health Service. This was a direct response to sustained evidence that many 
ethnic minority patients were exposed to poor health care derived from their absence 
in the Health 
Service's senior management posts. The NHS Executive introduced quotas for women at the top. 
(Guardian, 30th January, 1992) In the highly sensitive area of policing the outcry over the 1999 
Lawrence enquiry obliged the Chief Constable for the Metropolitan police, Sir 
Paul Condon, to 
publicly apologise for the endemic racism in his force and their operational practices and 
directly 
led to the Home Office setting specific quotas for the police force. Over a ten year period each 
force 
was instructed by Home Secretary, Jack Straw, to recruit more than 8000 
Asian and black officers. 
In London for example the Met employs 865 ethnic minority officers, - 
its target over 10 years is to 
recruit 5,662 officers. In rural areas such as Devon, Cornwall, Dyfed 
Powys, a1 per cent base line 
for ethnic recruitment was set. Straw declared that he wanted 
`the police service to become the 
champions of a multicultural society not just because that 
is right in itself, but also because it will 
make it a more effective police service'. He added that without 
`the kickstart the targets provide I 
can see little prospect of the police service attaining a proper ethnic 
balance at any stage over the 
next quarter of a century'. (Home Office, Chief Constables 
Conference, 14th April 1999) The Patten 
Report on policing in NI has raised similar demands that unionists challenge 
could change the ethos 
and culture of the RUC if implemented (September 
1999). 
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Protestants. Over this period, 48 from 884 Catholic applicants were appointed as 
compared to 211 from 1,431 Protestant applicants. The composition of full time 
officers, was 556 (82.2%) Protestant, 106 (15.7%) Catholic and 14 English or 
others. One of the senior eight officers was Catholic. When faced with the 
impending broader enquiry the Chair of the Fire Authority, Ms. McMahon had a 
private meeting with the FEA's chairman Mr. Cooper in the summer of 1981. The 
Fire Authority wished to include part time retained firemen in the analysis. Their 
view was that as they would be locally based there would be more Catholics 
present. Cooper's `off the record' minute notes that the Chief Fire Officer, Mr. 
Morrison, "made a long and detailed plea to leave well alone". Ms. McMahon also 
made "a plea that the Agency should use its discretionary powers and not 
proceed" . 
31 This however was a period of intense political turmoil following the 
1981 Hunger Strike when the Agency was under pressure from the NIO to show 
results at home in America. An analysis was completed in 1982 but only published 
in July 1984 following sustained pressure from nationalists who had obtained 
copies of the report. 32 Cooper denied the Fire Authority had asked him to drop the 
investigation, adding "There was no question of us being pressured to abandon 
it" . 
33 
The investigation confirmed, "Catholic representation among full time firemen is 
substantially below the proportion to be expected". Those recruited since 1974 had 
failed to enter the higher ranks "to any appreciable extent". Recruitment between 
1981-83 demonstrated a Protestant success rate four times that of Catholics. From 
May 1981 to April 1982,89 men were recruited as retained firemen. Seventeen 
were Catholic. In 23 out of 31 recruiting stations, no Catholics were appointed. In 
one station, Catholics only were appointed. Protestant interviewers had simply 
selected out of the process the majority of Catholics. In 1974,19% of appointments 
were Catholic. In 1983, the figure had fallen to 12%. 
In the case of the original complaint the FEA failed to find against the Authority 
which in terms of the investigation noted, "it (the FEA) did not raise any charge of 
31 Notes of Meeting with members of the Fire Authority for NI with 
Mr. Cooper and Mr. Sefton, 
FEA, 1981. 
32 Danny Morrison, Sinn Fein, Irish News, 14th March 1984. 
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discrimination against the authority ... ". 
34 The very next day, the Minister Chris 
Patten announced a £6m development scheme for the Fire Authority's Lisburn 
Headquarters. He had himself photographed at the wheel of a fire tender. He 
praised their "standing and prestige within the British Fire Services as something 
we can be proud of'. A public stamp of approval during a public controversy over 
sectarian employment practices was a message that nationalists were likely to 
interpret as government agreeing with the Fire Authority that: "well should indeed 
be left well alone". A postscript to all this was the attitude of the eight unionist 
councillors on the Fire Authority who sought to remove emergency cover from 
border areas and prevent cross-border co-operation in fire fighting as part of the 
protests against the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. 35 
The NI Electricity Service 
As with other public bodies the Northern Ireland Electricity Service (NIES) was a 
child of Direct Rule combining the original four sources of supply into one. The 
control of power was critical to the success of the loyalist para-military strike in 
1974. Paramilitary groupings and recruitment were carried out quite openly with 
loyalist emblems adorning the workplace. John Turnly, of the Irish Independence 
party, who was assassinated by loyalists had earlier described the situation at 
Ballylumford power station as "no more than a virtual Orange Lodge, controlled 
by UDA mobsters". 36 When 18 jobs were advertised at Ballylumford, all jobs went 
to Protestants. When the Kilroot power station, outside Lame, came into service in 
1980, recruitment policies stayed deep within Protestant furrows. The NIES 
employed over 5,700 and received public subsidies ranging from £45m to £ 105m 
depending on fuel costs. As another wholly owned public enterprise government 
was again placed to exercise considerable influence. The later strategy of 
privatisation provided further critical leverage to achieve dramatic turnarounds in 
employment as part of the contractual process. There is no evidence that 
government placed equality of opportunity as central to this process thereby 
33 Irish News, 14th March 1984. 
34 Fair Employment Agency, Investigation Report into the Fire Authority for Northern Ireland, June 
1984; Be fast Telegraph 2d and 3rd July 1984. 
35 Irish News 24th June 1986. 
36 Irish News 29th April 1979. 
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casting aside a critical symbolic and practical opportunity. It also thereby left a 
loyalist power base intact. 
The 1971 Population Census, indicated that of the 5068 men employed, in this 
field, 725 were Catholic with 311 of those enumerated not recording any religion. 
Of the 617 females employed, 82 were Catholic, 45 did not specify a religion. 37 
With a high public profile as a loyalist stronghold complaints were numerous. 
Indeed some of the FEA's first investigations started in 1977-78 were into the 
NIES. The FEA had decided to conduct a formal Section 12 investigation into the 
NIES on the 3rd and 10th October 1978.38 Although "significant matters had been 
brought to light", by six individual complaints between May 1977 and August 
1979 the complaints sub-committee, which included a UDA representative, failed 
to find any findings that discrimination had occurred. The NIES were allowed to 
retain their equal opportunity certificate and no findings of discrimination against 
the NIES made. The security reception area at NIES headquarters in South Belfast 
through which every visitor, worker and potential recruit had to pass, displayed 
large paramilitary and Ulster Vanguard flags. Management declined to instruct 
their employees to remove these. The FEA established "there were only two 
Catholics out of 64 members on management grades". This led to clarification by 
the NIES Assistant Secretary, "that if one was going to quote figures, the current 
figure was 2 out of 63". 39 Of the top 241 management grade employees 7 were 
Catholic in 1979. All the six directors and ten top managers were Protestant. Peter 
O'Keefe, Deputy Co-Ordinator for the FEA described this as part of a 
"considerable failure to respond to our statutory obligations". 
40 Following an 
intense internal row Cooper wrote to the NIES chairman on the 19th November 
informing him a formal investigation would commence. 
When a draft report was issued to the NIES by the FEA on Ist May 
1981, the NIES 
personnel director responded on the 22nd May 1981, stating, 
"the Service is 
concerned and aggrieved with the overall impression given 
by the report. Some of 
the assumptions made and conclusions drawn cannot 
be justified on the basis of the 
37 Religion Tables, Census of Population 1971, NI, 1975, HMSO: Belfast. 
38Research Sub Committee and FEA Board Minutes. 
39 FEA Minutes 12t' September, 1978. This is examined further in Chapter 
7. 
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factual information provided". He added that to monitor religion would be a 
"retrograde step", and declared, "The Service is not aware that an atmosphere 
exists at any of its establishments which is anything other than conducive to a 
harmonious workplace". Cooper at a meeting with the Deputy chairman of the 
NIES, Mr. Gaston and Mr. Nickell, secretary for the NIES, accepted that much of 
this imbalance (7 of the 250 top staff being Catholic) managers could have arisen 
from past practices. 41 
Between December 1983-1988 the NIES cut 400-500 jobs to achieve savings of 
£3.75m a year. From 1981 to 1989 the NIES benefited from over £350m in direct 
subsidies. In July 1988, Ministers announced the decision to privatise the NIES by 
1992. Phase II of the Kilroot power station was completed in preparation for this. 
The objective was to power it by lignite from the shores of Lough Neagh. This 
threatened one of Ireland's oldest fishing communities. They happened to be 
Catholic. After the signing of the Anglo-Irish Accord, the power workers made it 
clear Catholics were not welcome. On the 11th February 1986, on BBC's 
Panorama programme, the Ballylumford manager declared, he and his fellow 
workers would switch off the lights on the Agreement. 
NIES management responded to nationalist criticism by stating "there is no basis 
for disciplinary action to be taken, it was a personal view expressed outside 
working hours". 42 A banner proclaiming "Ballylumford Says No", was hung on the 
station and solid support given by workers to the Loyalist Day of Action on 3rd 
March 1986. They also refused to work with a Catholic engineer who arrived from 
Dublin to learn how power was generated in the North. Perhaps it was obvious. 
The NIES proclaimed it was an equal opportunity employer. The NIO continued to 
assert progress was being made. 
On the 4th March 1992, the government announced that the board of NIE plc 
would act as the transmission, distribution and supply company on 
full 
privatisation of the four power stations. Its members were 
largely drawn from 
40 O'Keefe, P. to Cooper, R. Chairman FEA, 12th October 1979, Correspondence. 
al NIES to FEA, 22nd May 1981; Minutes of 11th November 1981 meeting. 
42 NIES, press statement 12th February 1986. 
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existing non-executive directors and senior executives of the NIES. Its chair 
remained Sir Desmond Lorimer. On 5th March 1992, the Secretary of State 
informed parliament of the full privatisation programme. Ballylumford power 
station was sold to British Gas for £132.4m helped by an 90 million ecu grant from 
the EEC; Belfast West and Kilroot power stations were sold for £214m to an 
American and Belgian consortium, Applied Energy Services/Tractebel. AES is 
based in Arlington, Virginia and has a stock market valuation of $1.25bn. The 
smallest and oldest station at Coolkeeragh went to a management/employee buyout 
for £6.5m. The sale was completed in June 1992.43 During the same year the Fair 
Employment Tribunal finally ruled on a case dating back to 1990, that the NIE had 
discriminated against a Catholic applicant on "the most subjective basis possible", 
for the post of way-leave officer in Omagh, Co. Tyrone. The minister declared, "I 
am very conscious of the service which NIE's employees have given to the 
community over the years. They have served Northern Ireland well". 44 
In September 1994, NIE threatened to sack its 400 shop workers in its 33 outlets 
unless they accepted pay cuts of 6.1 %. Some would suffer real cuts of around 14%. 
It also aimed to reduce its power workers to 2,407 from 2607 by the end of 1994. 
Results for the first six months of the 1994 financial year showed a pre-tax profit 
of 16.5% to £48.6m. Privatisation had the effect of reducing general employment 
opportunities and impacting mostly on the unskilled and low paid. While this has 
been a common outcome in all public privatisations it had the added factor in NI of 
reinforcing religious inequalities. 45 
Conclusions. 
43 Northern Ireland Office press release, 4t' March 1992. 
44 NIO 5th March 1992. 
as The NIE later became a subsidiary part of the international Viridian Group PLC and as such may 
be exposed to scrutiny by a wider interest base including English local authorities that utilise 
Viridian's software products. At May 1999, the workforce was 71% Protestant and 29% 
Catholic. 
Its literature notes the joint declaration of Equality of Opportunity in Employment made 
between 
management and the local trade unions in 1988 was its foundation for equal opportunities policies 
and practices. This was updated and signed by the English based trade unions 
during May 1998-99. 
Viridian also established a harassment hot line in 1994 to deal with problems relating 
to sectarian 
harassment and ended the flying of union flags at its establishments 
late in 1999. Equal 
Opportunities in Viridian Group PLC, 2000. 
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In the range of services examined the British government exercised direct and 
indirect control as paymaster, legislator, policy maker and promoter of change. 
Both the economic muscle and fresh opportunities were there due to growth in 
public sector employment as a direct result of its own policies. The political will to 
confront the entrenched forces of inequality however was not. Indeed the language 
of equality of opportunity by government ministers only become prevalent in the 
very late 1980's. The responsibility for providing leadership, ensuring 
accountability and protecting the public purse in terms of employment promotion 
and affording of equality of opportunity were not realised. The major ethos 
characterising Direct Rule in this regard was one of passive acquiescence with 
attention apparently focused on military solutions rather than the underlying 
problems recorded by Cameron 27 years earlier. The net results were employment 
patterns and inequalities that remained fundamentally unchanged. The impact of 
further education has undoubtedly left middle class Catholics and successful 
working class Protestants and Catholics much better equipped to compete and enter 
a larger white collar public sector market. Entrance to this market however is 
evidently a marginal and painful process. This in turn has exacerbated underlying 
political problems whereby the perception of a commitment to change is often as 
important as any real change. It has also strengthened those resistant to change in 
the labour market and further afield. The failure to address fundamental matters of 
inequality in such vital and essential services as outlined above supports the 
argument that the British government did not seek to alter existing religious class 
relations. 
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Chapter 5. Public Sector Housing. 
Introduction. 
The provision and allocation of public sector housing was at the centre of civil 
rights protests. Charges of discrimination, choosing locations to maintain 
Protestant gerrymandered political boundaries, declining to build in others to keep 
Catholics out were the daily bread of politics under Stormont. The Cameron Report 
had concluded, "Council housing policy has also been distorted for political ends 
in the unionist controlled areas ... 
houses have been built and allocated in such a 
way that they will not disturb the political balance ... " .1 The British government 
having accepted the charges of discrimination were "justified in fact", concluded in 
October 1970 local authorities were not fit to handle the task of ending 
discrimination in housing allocations or provide a common rent structure. Part of 
this was due to the fact the location of new working class housing estates was part 
of the gerrymandering process utilised to deny electoral representation. A "single 
purpose efficient and streamlined central housing authority", the Northern Ireland 
Housing Executive (NIHE) was created. Its first meeting took place on 13th May 
1971 and between October 1971 and July 1973 it took over the responsibilities of 
the 61 local authorities, three Development Commissions and the Housing Trust. 
This included 2,200 former housing authority staff. The "democratic" input to 
housing was to be three nominees from the unionist controlled Housing Council 
who joined six other government appointees to form the Executive Board. As an 
advisory body representing the 26 District Councils it refuses to nominate non- 
unionists. Accountability lay directly with government ministers for housing 
management policies and employment practices. The NIHE inherited 146,000 
dwellings much of which required significant capital investment or slum clearance. 
A key figure was Charles Brett, its vice chair from 1976 and then chair from 1979 
until 1984. The first full-time chief executive was John Gorman, 1979-85, a 
government appointee whose previous experience was in a career with the 
British 
Army, the RUC and as Director of BOAC security. During Brett's resignation 
1 Cameron Report, Belfast, HMSO, 1969, p61. 
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speech in 1984 to the Housing Council as chair of the NIHE he declared his regret 
"that the Board of the Executive has become more political in character than is 
desirable". He stated the unionist Housing Council had sought to "impose its will 
and its own interest without qualification on a minority", although he still believed 
the NIHE was "a model of a housing authority because there is no party politics 
involved". He added he had done his utmost to: 
"act in all matters political with total integrity and impartiality; recognising 
and respecting all points of view ... I have on occasions been attacked: the Executive has been accused on the one hand of a conspiracy to de- 
Protestantise Belfast, on the other hand of deliberate failure to devote a 
proportionate share of its resources to Catholic West Belfast. I utterly 
repudiate and indeed personally resent both accusations. If I have failed in 
impartiality, I have failed, but it has not been wittingly or deliberately; and 
I have spared no effort to ensure the administration of housing should be 
2 wholly non-sectarian and non-partisan". 
While few would question Brett's integrity, his assessment in these matters can be 
challenged. This will be examined by reference to NIHE employment practices and 
its strategic housing role as a landlord within the political and sectarian context that 
such services were and are delivered. 
Employment. 
An important case meriting particular attention concerned a senior Catholic 
manager at the heart of the Executive's employment practices, Oliver Kearney, 
then the NIHE personnel manager, the late unionist MP Harold McCusker, Charles 
Brett and the then director of personnel, a Welsh Catholic, Mr. 
Mander. The 
UDA's journal COMBAT 3 accused Kearney of discriminating against Protestants in 
recruitment. COMBAT noted, "he was seen walking 
behind the tricolour draped 
coffin", of the brother of Peter Shevlin, who also worked 
in the personnel 
department. The UDA warned, "all concerned that the loyalists are not going to 
take this lying down". This warning along with pressure from unionists 
like 
McCusker produced an intolerable working environment 
for Kearney. He decided 
to resign on the 30th November 1982 thereby ending 
ten years service and sued 
McCusker for libel. This rested on McCusker's allegation that 
Kearney abused his 
2 NIHE, 8t' March 1984. 
3 UDA, Vol. 4, Issue 9,1980. 
126 
position to promote Catholics and discriminate against Protestants. Prior to this, in 
November 1981, Gorman had promoted Kearney to a new post of Assistant 
Director for Manpower. However approval was withheld, according to Kearney, by 
an Assistant Secretary in the DOE. 4 
At the height of the 1981 Hunger Strike, McCusker wrote to Gorman alleging 
housing policies were undermining the safety of his constituents. He was 
extremely concerned that formerly "safe areas for members of the RUC and UDR 
to live are no longer safe". He further complained "numerous estates 100% Roman 
Catholic but none of any size 100% Protestant". In an earlier letter to the local 
housing district manager he accused the NIHE of the "shoddy fixing of 
allocations", adding if he were in charge, "I could rig things also". 5 
McCusker asked, why is it "in my constituency 4 out of 5 district managers are 
Roman Catholic " and "why in the Newry district where there are approximately 
100 Housing Executive employees are they approximately 100% Catholic". He 
added: 
"Why when the Executive recently recruited graduate trainees were 75% 
Roman Catholic ... Should I 
be surprised when your Personnel Manager 
and his Deputy are Roman Catholic when the interview panel for Manager 
Trainees are predominantly Roman Catholic if not 100% or so". 
He concluded by seeking reassurances that no staff had stopped work over the 
previous two weeks in support of the Hunger Strike, and declared his intention to 
ensure "that the people who elected me", get "their share (McCusker's emphasis) 
of publicly financed housing and jobs in your organisation ... Craigavon and 
6 Armagh district councils are being pillorized for less". 
Another unionist MP, the late Robert Bradford charged the Executive in the House 
of Commons, of having "a dreadful record in discriminatory acts" against 
4 Author's personal conversation with Oliver Kearney 1984, and particulars of allegation of 
discrimination drafted by FEA, 30th January 1984; and Originating Industrial Tribunal Application, 
December 1982. 
5 Correspondence, Harold McCusker MP to John Gorman, Chief Executive NINE 19th May 1981 
and 12th May 1981. 
6 Harold McCusker MP to John Gorman NIHE, 19th May 1981. 
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Protestants carried out by the personnel department. His attack included charges of 
"religious and political bias in the building programme", because it had 
"swallowed the lie that persistent and systematic discrimination in housing existed 
in Northern Ireland (against Catholics)". 7 
Unionists demanded the DOE instruct the Fair Employment Agency to conduct an 
immediate investigation. This was the public context against which Kearney's libel 
case was heard during April 1983. Judge Ian Higgins found that McCusker's 
allegations were "false and injurious" and "that the words complained of are 
defamatory". He added, McCuskers's conclusions owed more to prejudice than to 
reason or logic". The case was dismissed however on the grounds his comments 
were covered by parliamentary privilege. McCusker had used House of Commons 
headed notepaper. Higgins concluded that as McCusker had believed, "in the truth 
of what he wrote", "malicious intent was absent". g 
Kearney had already resigned by this stage. He considered the last straw for him 
was when the director of personnel, Mr. Mander, advised him he was "politically 
unacceptable". The court case had revealed that McCusker was receiving hand 
written information on the appointments and character of staff. He refused to name 
the man on the grounds that to do so would be to jeopardise the career of one of the 
Executive's most senior managers. Kearney claimed Mander told him the 
informant was a member of a panel that had earlier interviewed him. This included 
the then Chief Executive, Victor Blease, Mander, Gorman and Mr. James, 
Regional Controller for the Southeast region. As Gorman had confirmed Kearney's 
appointment in November 1981, and James warned Kearney that two other 
regional controllers were keen to prevent his promotion and had approached him; 
this left only two likely candidates. Judge Higgins however ruled the 
circumstances of Kearney's resignation were not relevant to the libel action. 
No internal enquiry was carried out by the NIHE. Earlier in August 1982, 
Mander 
7Robert Braford MP (Unionist), Hansard, Cols. 15,16,66 10th and 24th June 1981; and David 
Mitchell MP, Minister for Environment (NI), Northern Ireland Committee, Housing Conditions in 
N. Ireland, House of Commons. 
8 Judge Ian Higgins Belfast Recorders Court, 2901 April 1983; reported in Belfast Telegraph, 
Irish 
News and Newsletter, 29th and 30th April 1983. 
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had warned Kearney of the possible inflammatory consequences of McCusker's 
letters during the forthcoming NI Assembly elections. Kearney was directed to 
"correct" the proportion of Catholics in the personnel department by taking 
disciplinary action against specific individuals named by McCusker. This included 
a Mr. Paul Shevlin whose case is outlined below. A transfer to the Eastern Health 
and Social Services Board was also suggested. In his submission to an Industrial 
Tribunal, Kearney argued he had been subjected to "an orchestrated exercise in 
sectarian pressure as to offer him no alternative but resignation". 9 A further twist to 
this intrigue occurred in 1983 when PA Management consultants in Belfast, 
advertised for a Manpower Services Manager for an unnamed client. Kearney 
applied and was duly interviewed on 28th October. On the 7th November PA 
confirmed his place on the short-list. Kearney stated `silence then enveloped the 
proceedings'. The employer turned out to be the NIHE. No appointment was made. 
Kearney lodged a formal complaint with the FEA on 30th January 1984. By 1986 
the FEA had failed to obtain essential correspondence from the NIHE and in the 
middle of 1987, three and a half years later the FEA concluded no unlawful 
discrimination had occurred. 
Paul Shevlin also worked for the personnel department. His association with 
Kearney loomed large. Charles Brett, then Chairman, advised Kearney on the 18th 
August that the unionist NIHE "Board still harbour deep suspicion of your 
association with Shevlin". 10 McCusker had included Shevlin in his public diatribes. 
The individuals felt their personal association was one of the reasons for the 
concerted campaign against the personnel department by unionist MP's. Shevlin 
claimed Mander had attempted to summarily dismiss him in July 1983. This 
followed an internal Auditors report alleging corruption over the recruitment of a 
training consultant and a newspaper article in the local West Belfast Andersontown 
News. It alleged three Catholics in the personnel department were being 
discriminated against. It appears this public exposure led to direct intervention by 
Brett to prevent Mander carrying out this action. Shevlin however was suspended 
and subjected to the humiliating experience of being supervised by a senior 
9 Industrial Tribunal Application, 1982 and particulars of allegation of unlawful discrimination. 
'° Kearney, Oliver. Study of Employment Experience of four people employed in the NM M, July 
1983. 
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security officer while clearing his desk before being publicly escorted from the 
building. " Brett stressed his "confidence in the integrity" of Mander and referred 
to staff suffering from an "incurable chips" syndrome. Shevlin in turn submitted a 
closely worded 14-page document alleging political victimisation against himself 
and three others, including Kearney. Brett rejected the submission calling it "a 
farrago of half-truths, false inferences and malicious innuendo". 12 Shevlin later 
won a case of unfair dismissal at an industrial tribunal in April 1984. Mander's 
actions were criticised as "unreasonable and unwarranted". The NIHE refused to 
reinstate him. 
In July 1981 the Environment Minister conceded to unionist's demands and agreed 
to direct the FEA to conduct an enquiry with specific reference to their allegations 
of discrimination against Protestants. Brett welcomed this. However the FEA 
Chairman advised Brett, "There has as yet been no contact from the Minister ... 
The agency is not therefore in a position at the moment to determine what action 
should be taken". 13 Instructions duly arrived on the 10th July and the FEA finally 
issued a notice of investigation on the 29th March 1982. The Minister told Cooper 
to "keep me in touch". The material gleaned from this enquiry can usefully be cited 
at this stage to complete the picture. 
Brett revealed in his correspondence with McCusker that although "he should 
regard (it) as a highly retrograde step", if the religious affiliation of job applicants 
were recorded, some "trial balances", "so to speak" had been recorded. These 
unofficial and private trawls revealed "the total staff of the Executive divides 
somewhere between 66: 33 and 50: 50 in favour of the Protestant community". 
The 
Executive attributed a "preponderance of Protestant" in certain areas to the 
numbers of staff "inherited" from those local authorities previously responsible 
for 
housing provision. In addition Brett provided McCusker with the religious 
breakdown of the staff in his own constituency. 
14 Seven days later Brett advised 
'1 Personal conversation with author 1984. July 1983; 12 Correspondence between Charles Brett Chair NIHE and Paul Shevlin, 13th and 19th 
and Kearney, Oliver. Study of Employment Experience of 
four people, employed in the NIHE, July 
1983. 
13 Robert Cooper Chair FEA to Charles Brett Chair NINE, 7th July 1981 and 
David Mitchell MP 
Minister for Environment (NI) to Cooper 10t July 1981. 
14 Brett to McCusker, 22nd May 1981. 
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McCusker that any absence "due to voluntary participation in political activities 
(attendance at marches or funerals in support of Hunger Strikers) will be reported 
with a view to possible disciplinary action". 15 
McCusker replied criticising Brett for only suggesting in some areas "there may be 
a preponderance of Protestants - in fact there should always (his emphasis) be so if 
your employment practices are in keeping with the objective of the FEA". 16 The 
FEA's investigation took over three years to complete. Ready early in 1985, its 
issue was delayed until well after the marching season in October 1985. The FEA 
concluded that "by and large equality of opportunity in employment is being 
provided by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive for both Protestants and 
Roman Catholics ... 
further detailed investigation of recruitment and promotion 
was not necessary". The specific meaning of "by and large" as a measure in 
relation to equal opportunities was not amplified. Unionist's claimed the draft 
report had been sent to the NIO for final vetting and alteration. The report did not 
examine any of the specific issues raised by the Kearney case; McCusker's 
allegations, nor the replies given by Brett. The FEA merely recommended the 
Executive adopt the government's voluntary equal opportunity code. No targets, 
goals or programmes of action were established. In its preface to the final report 
the FEA noted the enquiry was in response to "problems in the Executive which 
suggested that in some areas there was discrimination against Protestants". 
17 
Although 5000 workers were then employed the enquiry was restricted to 3,500 
non-industrial workers. One year after the enquiry had formally started the 
FEA 
sent out a voluntary religious questionnaire to Executive staff. When this 
failed, 
the FEA gave notice in June 1984, two years after the original notice of enquiry 
(March 1982), that the elementary task of directly examining personnel records to 
establish religious affiliation was "the only acceptable method". 
In the event only a 
limited examination was carried out. As the Housing Executive 
is divided into six 
major administrative regions covering the whole of the 
North the opportunity to 
offer reasonable employment opportunities 
for both religions exists. The 
15 Brett to McCusker, 28th May, 1981. 
16 McCusker to Brett, 29th June 1981. 
17 Report of an Investigation by the FEA for NI 
into the NINE, October 1985. 
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opportunity for examining this in detail presented itself but was not taken 
In overall terms the composition of the workforce examined was 61.9% (2172) 
Protestant and 36.6% (1284) Catholic with 1.6% (55) Others or unidentified. In the 
primarily Catholic South and Western regions the proportion of Catholics at 7-10% 
were comparatively lower than the actual population figures indicated. For 
example, in the South the 410 staff were 45% Catholic (55% population); in the 
West, the 246 staff were 50% Catholic (the population 57%). In terms of the 
occupational patterns the FEA expressed its satisfaction with the "the single 
exception of technical services". Out of 354 staff, 71.2% were Protestant; 26.3% 
Catholic and 2.2% Others. A further examination of occupational groups revealed 
major disparities in key areas at both the regional and overall levels. In technical 
services for example overall patterns of inequality were mirrored across every 
region with Protestant ratios exceeding Catholics by two to seven times. 
The FEA did not examine the causes of this disparity or suggest specific 
programmes to overcome it. In the Northwest, due to "particular (loyalist) 
allegations about over-representation by Roman Catholics in Londonderry", a 
specific analysis was completed. The religious composition given was 52% 
Catholic, 45% Protestant and 7.6% Others. The Catholic population for the region 
was 56%. This compares with the Protestant Northeast where Protestants hold 81% 
of the jobs and represent 77% of the population. In the Northwest the only 
comparable Catholic figure was in the Derry district office. There, 69.9% (72) of 
the workforce were Catholics as compared to 31 Protestants. Within the Northwest 
region, only in Strabane did Catholics exceed the number of Protestant workers 18 
Catholics to 15 Protestants. In the three other district offices, Magherafelt, 
Coleraine and Limavady, Protestants accounted for 66% (60) of the 91 total staff. 
In the Northeast, in the tiny Ballycastle office, Catholics exceeded Protestants. 
(8RC, 5P) In the other seven offices the proportions ranged from a high of 25.5% 
(11) in Antrim to a low 9% (6) Catholics in the two offices at Newtownabbey. 
18 
The majority of Catholics employed, 958 (total 1284), in the Executive occupied 
18 All references to the NINE are from the FEA Investigation Report, 
1985. 
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administrative and clerical grades. Of the employees inherited by the Executive, 
607 (17.3%) were still employed. This group alone filled 3.5% (86) of senior 
management positions. Seventy of them were Protestants. From the pool of 224 
managerial staff (i. e. POI and above), 67 (27.5%) were Catholic. In one year, 
1980, more Catholics were recruited than Protestants. The Executive explained this 
was due to the appointment of 226 supernumerary staff who later became 
permanent. Contrary to Brett's claims that religion was never monitored, it was 
found that the Executive Board was so concerned at this phenomenon that they 
instructed the recruitment be investigated. This showed 55% of the recruits were 
Catholic, but "no improper discrimination", had occurred. The recruitment of 
Catholics was clearly a matter of deep concern at all levels. 
The FEA opted for the politically safe conclusion that discrimination had occurred 
in the past particularly in the group inherited by the Executive from local councils 
and the former Housing Trust. It was all in the past. The public scandal of the 
Kearney and Shevlin cases indicated at the very least sectarianism remained a 
contemporary and highly sensitive issue at the most senior levels. 
The unionist controlled Housing Council that nominates members to the NIHE 
Board continued to only nominate unionists. In 1983 it rejected any moves for 
contractors to become equal opportunity signatories as they considered this to be 
"discrimination against firms who do not hold an Equal Opportunity Certificate 
issued by the FEA". '9 Requests by the Minister to nominate non-unionists were 
not responded to. In line with the wider `loyalist family', the Board participated in 
the adjournment protests against the 1985 Anglo-Irish Accord. In December1986 
two NIHE officials who were founding members of the Fair Employment Trust, a 
voluntary body set up to campaign against discrimination and promote the 
MacBride Principles were informed their duties, "were incompatible with 
membership of the Trust on the grounds that the MacBride principles are contrary 
to the employment laws of Northern Ireland". Although no legal opinion was ever 
produced the NIHE made it clear their views were in accordance with the public 
statements made by the FEA. The Trust in turn accused the 
NIHE of attempting to 
19 Local press reports 2 1St and 22nd April 1983 Irish News, Belfast 
Telegraph. 
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"subject our members to political intimidation in its most sinister form". All non- 
unionist parties made public protests. The Trust asked why membership was 
unacceptable when no action had ever been taken against employees who were 
members of avowedly sectarian groups such as "the Masonic Order, the Orange 
Order, the Ulster Clubs", and others. In 1987 the men were threatened with the 
sack and denied internal promotion. Their trade union, the Northern Ireland Public 
Service Alliance (NIPSA), condemned the Executive's action and accused it of 
breaking its own code of conduct. NIPSA asserted the rights of its members to 
"belong to any legal organisation ". 20 
It's worth recalling at this point Brett's confidence in the integrity of his 
management team and his belief that, "we have established a reputation for fairness 
and impartiality" and his pleasure that Board members "leave their prejudices 
outside in the umbrella stand". Two years later in April 1989 the NIHE finally took 
the initiative and announced a decision to monitor its workforce. Taking the 3rd of 
July 1988 as its starting point the workforce was given as 54.5%(1788) Protestant; 
41.6% (1366) Catholic with no religion assigned to those educated outside the 
North (109 or 3.3% and 0.5%Unknown). The Technical Services Division 
remained dominated by Protestants (60%, 599 Protestant; 34%, 377 Catholic). At 
the regional level inequalities persisted in the Northeast and Southeast. Protestants 
accounted for 76.2% (304) and 70% (305) of the staff respectively. In the two 
regions where Catholics formed the majority, (West and Northwest), the respective 
figures were 55.9% (133) and 60.2% (241). An analysis by grades indicated 
Protestant representation was higher at middle and senior management levels than 
their overall percentage in the workforce (63.4%, 473). Catholic proportions were 
correspondingly lower (30.6%, 228). Above P02 level, the religious composition 
was 53.8% (28) Protestant and 21.2% (11) Catholic. The longer service record 
for 
Protestants was reflected in their seniority and higher rates of retirement. 
21 
This new database anticipated the 1989 Fair Employment and offered a 
distinct 
improvement on the FEA's work. It also meant the government and 
its agent were 
20 Local press reports on the Fair Employment Trust, 
11th and 30th December 1986; and 3rd, 7th and 
9" February 1987. Irish News and Belfast Telegraph. 
21 Equal Opportunities Monitoring in the NIHE, April 1989 NU-1E Belfast. 
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clearly aware of patterns of inequality within the NIHE. 22 
Physical Strategies. 
By the mid 1990's NIHE housing stock was approximately 160,000 dwellings with 
over 50,000 dwellings having been sold to tenants under the Right to Buy 
scheme. 23 The 1987 House Condition Survey indicated unfitness rates for the 
public sector of 1.4% with 10.6% in need of improvement and repair. The private 
sector by comparison had an unfitness rate of 11.8% with 17.2% in need of repair 
and improvement. The overall unfitness rate however was down to 8.45% (42,900 
dwellings). In 1972/3 one in five or 19.6% of the total housing stock was 
statutorily unfit (89,370 dwellings); 60% of these were in Belfast with over 40,000 
in need of urgent repair. The NIHE also manages the housing benefit scheme that 
provides help with rent and rate payments to council and private tenants, and 
owner-occupiers. Around 130,000 households receive over £130m a year through 
housing benefit support. 
The physical challenge was great and remains so amidst a set of very complex 
relations involving the government directly via the DOE, the NIHE as its agent, 
tenants and the sectarian environment. Another aspect of this physical challenge 
were the question marks remaining over the whole planning and allocation process 
which had previously been characterised by unionist sectarianism. In Dungannon, 
for example, housing provision became an explosive issue. In 1963, there were 
approximately 300 families on Dungannon's waiting list, some for as long as 
twelve years, yet not one new Catholic family had been allocated a permanent 
house for 34 years. Out of the 204 houses built since 1944 in the area of the 
Dungannon Catholic Parish, two were allocated to Catholic families. 
24 
Other examples of perceived sectarianism in the planning process were the creation 
of a whole new town, Craigavon named after Stormont's first prime minister and 
22 Its monitoring returns to the FEC in 1992 for example gave the number of Catholics employed 
in 
its 5231 workforce as 2313 (44%). 
23 NIHE Housing Strategy, 1993-96 and 1987 House Condition Survey, NINE Belfast 1988. 
24 Plain Truth, Campaign for Social Justice, Dungannon, June, 1969. 
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the new university at Coleraine. Controversy over the latter decision raged as many 
nationalists felt Derry to be the obvious choice. It already had strong educational 
traditions and was the North's second major city. It was a city however which 
unionists only held by gerrymandering. This made any investment insecure in 
unionist eyes. Over £500m was spent on the new "rainbow" city, which was to 
cover 100 square miles with a population target of 100,000. It proved to be an 
expensive failure. Whole public sector housing estates were later demolished due 
to poor design and high vacancy rates as people declined to live in what was 
regarded as an artificial environment without any proper infrastructure. The 
Lurgan/Portadown triangle has also become infamous for the number of sectarian 
murders by loyalists and the Drumcree march debacle. 
The English architect appointed to design the new city resigned making a 7000 
word public statement. He said he had been "asked to engineer propaganda rather 
than a new city", and that Derry was the most obvious choice as a centre for 
industrial development and higher education. 25 The new city and university failed. 
In 1985 the university merged with the Ulster Polytechnic to form the multi- 
campus New University of Ulster to avoid closure. Craigavon's unemployment rate 
averaged 26% and the population targets were never reached. Problems may have 
been compounded by the local council's reputation for blatant sectarianism in 
employment over the provision of sports facilities, play areas for children, refuse 
collection and so on. In 1992 it employed 123 Catholics, mostly in lower grades in 
its 382 workforce. 26 Some of its more celebrated cases are examined later. It is 
likely that the nature of Craigavon's high profile loyalist stance alongside its tragic 
record of sectarian murders impeded population choices and its failure as a new 
city. 
One important question to be asked is was the approach of "sectarian blindness" 
adopted by the Executive within the context of its structural and 
ideological 
inheritance one which directly assisted the reproduction of sectarian ghettos and 
passively promoted military planning and the creation of "secure zones" or was 
it 
25 Irish Times, 15th August 1964. 
26 FEC Monitoring Return 1992. 
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simply an agent caught up in a political trauma which it could not hope to 
overcome within its own remit and limited powers? Although the sectarian 
allocation of houses was a major civil rights issue, no serious analysis of 
allocations has been carried out. In part a "self-selection" process whereby people 
opted for "safe areas" according to their religion left any concept of integrated 
housing estates no more than an empty platitude. Sectarian or religious blinkers 
also meant that the application of capital investment could be couched in a 
traditional housing needs criteria as opposed to an investment strategy that 
recognised the historical geographical inequalities associated with active 
discrimination. Competition for resources in this context could be presented and 
deliberated upon from an even starting point. Thus as with the labour market the 
government and its agents chose to legitimise their approach by assessment of an 
individuals needs as opposed to for example designating a specific capital 
allocation for given religious communities. The administration of housing services 
via six regions simply placed the regions in competition with each other for 
resources as opposed to weighting the resources by religion. At the individual level 
the impact of universal policies such as the right to buy or repair grants was not 
assessed with reference to the generations of advantage given to employed 
Protestants to secure the best houses, areas and financial discounts. This in turn 
was compounded by the intensifying civil conflict that saw whole communities 
burnt or intimidated out of their homes. 
Competition for finite resources and debate over military intervention in the 
planning process remained significant areas of conflict. A major example was the 
Poleglass estate, built as an overspill for Catholic West Belfast. As it is located 
within the boundaries of loyalist Lisburn on the edge of Belfast, its development 
led to large loyalist protests and threats of para-military violence. Put forward by 
the DOE in 1973, construction did not begin until December 1979. Public 
objections by the unionist parties and the UDA moved the DOE to adopt a much- 
reduced scheme. The DOE had earlier declared that without Poleglass, 
"the 
regeneration of inner Belfast could not be achieved in the west of the city". 
It 
proposed the building of 4000 units to cater for the needs of 
18,000 people. By the 
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end of 1989,1,563 public sector houses had been provided. 27 Threatened with 
UDA violence the first tenants had also to endure the open hostility of Lisburn 
council. One loyalist councillor was also a member of the Executive Board. He 
demanded building should stop because some tenants had arrears. A common 
popular loyalist charge was that rent arrears were republican inspired as opposed to 
having a correlation with unemployment and material deprivation. The Council 
refused to provide a refuse service, or support a proposed community centre and 
turned down permission for a public library and health centre. The DOE had to 
eventually make an order under the Public Health Act to force Lisburn to provide a 
refuse service. The Commissioner for Complaints found the council guilty of 
maladministration for refusing to allow its community service minibus to be used 
by a Catholic school for an All-Ireland football match. Arrears on the estate were 
in fact below the average at the time. 28 
The Executive's role in this affair, by passively accepting and endorsing sectarian 
planning decisions and tolerating sectarian councillors on its board may be viewed 
as a certain dereliction of duty with regard to its statutory role to provide housing 
free from discrimination. The following examples tend to support this. 
Divis and Unity flats29 in Belfast were two of the worst examples of system built 
flats that the 1960's planners had to offer. Many of the occupants came from areas 
where they had been subjected to loyalist intimidation or simply burnt out. While 
the Catholic residents of these blocks fought long and hard campaigns for repairs, 
demolition and redevelopment, their counterparts on the Loyalist Shankill Road 
had their equally reasonable demands met. Two storey dwellings replaced the 750 
"Wheatabix" flats. Nationalists campaigning for the same were pilloried as 
republicans, terrorists and uncivilised. Divis residents also endured 24-hour sound 
and camera surveillance from a permanent British Army base perched on the top of 
Divis Tower. The Divis Residents Association developed into a major international 
campaign that was able to take advantage of the political disturbances caused 
by 
the Anglo-Irish Accord. Under pressure from America and the English housing 
27 Greater West Belfast Housing Study, 1985-1990, DOE (NI) January 1985. 
28 Graham, D. (1984) Opposition restricts Poleglass Project, Roof, Shelter, London. 
29 Graham, D. Unity Flats -Criminal Neglect, North 
Belfast Resource Centre, 1985; The Divis 
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lobby, which adopted the campaign, a commitment was eventually forced from the 
government to demolish late in 1986. Unity Flats residents which loyalists 
described as a "cancer on the main artery of Belfast", intensified their campaign 
and secured demolition and redevelopment on the back of this decision the 
following year. They both failed however to gain any right to produce their own 
redevelopment plans or select appropriately skilled professionals to assist them in 
any form of community planning. Indeed the Town and Country Planning 
Association in London had provided the services of its mobile Planning Aid Unit 
led by Brian Anson, a leading community architect, to support the residents. When 
a major exhibition in London by the group generated international coverage 
leading to the residents demands being raised in Washington, Moscow and 
throughout the British housing world, the Unit's funding was cut by the DOE. This 
followed the refusal of Brian Anson, supported by the TCPA to have an agenda, 
which was other than the tenants. 30 
In January 1985, the DOE published a housing strategy for the Greater West 
Belfast Area up to 1990. It included the Catholic estates, Poleglass and 
Twinbrook, in Lisburn. The report accepted that the areas youthful age structure 
and large family size indicated it was likely to grow well beyond its current 
population of 93,100. The DOE recognised the possibility of families from the area 
moving to other areas of the city "is very small" and that "West Belfast has the 
lowest level of owner occupation of any part of the city". The option chosen by the 
DOE simply reinforced the sectarian practices of earlier administrations by 
concluding "any additional land to deal with housing needs of Greater West Belfast 
must therefore be found within the same area". 
Further expansion into loyalist Lisburn or other Protestant areas was ruled out 
leaving the population to endure further pressure in terms of services, population 
size, density, housing shortages and diminished potential for employment 
Report - Set Them Free, Divis Residents Association, 
September 1986, Belfast. 
30 Interview with Brian Anson by author (1986) who became a member of the planning group 
chaired by the TCPA after the Unit's demise. At the end of 1986 the TCPA invited the 
DRA 
representatives and advisors to their headquarters to discuss the implications of TCPA's continued 
involvement due to the extreme pressure from government. Respecting this difficulty and the 
fact 
the TCPA had gone out on a limb to help, the DRA undertook to use the name of the TCPA with 
circumspection. Brian Anson and his team however were left without 
funding by the DOE. 
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opportunities within the area. 31 As the DUP said, "People do not want a ghetto line 
stretching from Castle Street in Belfast to Dunmurray". 32 To avoid this industrial 
areas in West Belfast would be rezoned for housing thereby eliminating the 
possibility for any significant future investments. The DoE had in effect ceded to a 
sectarian inspired agenda and failed to ensure the planning process was placed 
outside such a framework. These short-term measures may have accorded with the 
personal beliefs of DOE civil servants but nevertheless a physical planning 
decision of such a magnitude is one that has an impact on the opportunities for 
several generations. This can only blight their futures. 
Inequalities. 
During the late 1980's an initiative by the Standing Advisory Commission on 
Human Rights led to the production of two studies which sought to assess whether 
there was equal access to housing, a parity in standards, loans and new build and 
the degree of integration. The first, Inequalities in Opportunity, remains 
unpublished while the latter, Equality and Inequality in NI. " Public Housing, was 
published by the body commissioned to carry it out, the independent Policy Studies 
Institute. 33 
Hillyard considered that while the NIHE recognised a problem of polarisation 
existed there was no positive policy to achieve or promote overcoming this as a 
corporate objective. The points system introduced to provide a needs analysis 
ensured a focus on individual circumstances but offered no indicator for 
community or investment needs. The latter strategies were primarily left to the 
DOE e. g. Poleglass. In short "need" was considered to offer a robust enough 
yardstick to reflect historical and particular circumstances. Administrators then, 
could act within a terms of reference which by their nature precluded any measure 
of religious inequality, a practice that could be defended as neutral but which in 
effect failed to challenge or seek to positively intervene in an environment where 
3'Greater West Belfast Housing Study, 1985-1990, DOE, Belfast, January, 1985. 
32 Newsletter, Belfast, 23rd January 1985. 
33Hillyard, P. Inequalities in Opportunity among Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland: An 
exploratory study of Housing Policy, University of Bristol, March 1986, unpublished, and 
Equality 
and Inequality in NI: Public Housing, Policy Studies Institute, London, 
Smith, David J. & 
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the struggle over space and resources were and remain highly politicised. In 
addition as the Right to Buy and new build had not overwhelming changed the 
tenure type and standards of housing at this stage, (1971-73) ownership, 
overcrowding and house fitness indicated, that Catholics suffered worse 
conditions, had fewer facilities and opportunities than Protestants e. g. where 
Catholics were in the majority in nine district councils, these areas experienced the 
highest rates of unfitness. 34 At the political level, unionists felt confident enough in 
the late 1980's to question whether the "state has a responsibility to provide houses 
for people who belong to a faith that encourages them to make absolutely no 
attempt to control family size". 35 
In addition, Hillyard suggested that the very success of the right to buy policy gave 
an advantage to Protestants as their cycle of income would allow them to purchase 
the better quality of stock they had resided in during the 1950's and 1960's which 
by virtue of occupation through earlier sectarian location and investment decisions 
gave them the asset of an historical discount, i. e. a financial and locational subsidy. 
Catholics through the development of new build in the 1970's and 1980's would 
thereby only gain this advantage over a longer time span. This may also mean that 
much of what is in effect becoming a residual form of housing for low-income 
groups may eventually become a primarily Catholic rented sector. Similar 
economic criteria may also influence rehabilitation programmes for sub-standard 
privately owned property. In essence then this approach is suggesting that the 
absence of a macro socio-economic strategy in terms of housing investment 
decisions, inevitably means that other factors, apart from a criteria of need, no 
matter how individual and objective, must necessarily have contributed to 
sustaining inequalities. A hidden subsidy and penalty. 
The PSI study also raised doubts about equality of access to public housing. 
While 
the results were inconclusive, the report confirmed a higher proportion of 
Catholics 
occupying public sector housing (43%) than Protestants 
(33%) thereby confirming 
the impact of social and economic factors over time. It was notable that 
the repair 
Chambers, Gerald. PSI Occasional Paper 47,22nd June 1989. 
34 Hillyard, P. pp. 11,12,18,20. 
35 NI Assembly Report, 13, November 1985: 94. 
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conditions of Catholic estates in Belfast in particular were below that of Protestant 
estates as reflected in the average improvement costs. Significantly when a test of 
equality of access was carried out in Belfast, Catholic applicants had "a 
considerably lower chance of being rehoused than Protestant applicants". This 
pattern was reflected across district towns but found to be roughly even in rural 
areas. When looking at the reasons for this, one conclusion was that Protestant 
tenants had a greater potential for changing tenure or accommodation and that 
properties on Catholic estates are less likely to become available to new tenants 
than those on Protestant estates. 36 
This would support the contention put earlier in relation to the DOE analysis of 
future need that the physical restriction of development in Catholic areas 
compounds problems of access and location and restricts spatial and personal 
mobility. The younger age profile of West Belfast can only increasingly exacerbate 
these tensions and disparities. The fact of segregation across all tenures, the PSI 
concluded, raised the possibility that NIHE policies and practices had directly 
contributed to "residential segregation between Protestants and Catholics". 37 
Although there was no conclusive evidence of direct or indirect discrimination the 
PSI felt the "public housing system did not succeed in delivering equal 
opportunities to Protestant and Catholic applicants, probably because Protestant 
tenants were more likely than Catholics" to change tenures. In other words, the 
question of equity was again seen not simply as a narrow issue of personal need 
but the historical weight of equality of access to resources and socio-economic 
conditions which provided the overriding context for housing opportunities. The 
PSI commented that as the repair problem effected Catholic estates 
disproportionately, repair schedules should be planned to produce a more equitable 
result. Or as Hillyard noted earlier, a positive and direct intervention 
is required, 
beyond the personal circumstances of a given applicant. 
Hidden factors. 
Another factor rarely subject to scrutiny in assessing housing 
demand is security. 
36 Smith and Chambers, pp. 27-29,42-43,56. 
37 Ibid, p58. 
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In the early 1970's the so-called corrugated iron "peace-lines" were an obvious 
expression of this concern. Many of these have become permanent brick or steel 
walls, or unnecessary motorways cutting off a particular area. Requests for these 
barriers are usually directed through the Belfast Development Office (BDO) which 
was a division of the DOE. There common interests such as accessible estate lay- 
outs, the blocking of potential escape routes, the reinforcement of paths in estates 
for military vehicles, ramps to slow traffic and secure estate lay-outs are all 
mapped out. High rise walls can cost as much as £240,000 be twenty feet high, and 
run for hundreds of feet. The cost is met from the housing budget. 
Intimidation is very costly. A new housing development at Manor Street in North 
Belfast was the target of intense loyalist attacks at the peak of protests against the 
Anglo-Irish agreement in 1986. Twenty-five new houses previously occupied were 
demolished in 1989, as they proved too dangerous or impossible to let. One 13-foot 
wall built in 1985 to separate part of the Shankill Road from the nationalist 
Ardoyne offers an interesting insight into how the security forces operate. The 
BDO claimed the request came from the residents. Locals however alleged this 
"need" was manufactured by the security forces by a series of bomb hoaxes and 
unnecessary searches by the British Army during 1984-85. It was also claimed 
there was no record of these incidents being logged at the local RUC barracks. 
There are however clear examples of where residents have demanded the closure 
and blocking of public ways to prevent sectarian assassins having easy access 
points or escape routes. Allegations have even been made by republicans that the 
failure to close some routes has been part of British policy to intimidate the 
local 
population or assist collaboration. Whatever conclusions one reaches 
it is self 
evident that the erection of barriers may serve a primary security 
interest alone 
while damaging the long term potential for reconciliation 
by cutting off all 
interfaces and exchanges permanently. 
Another case was the building of a wall at 
Springmartin, a loyalist area 
overlooking a British army base. A number of 
leaks from within the DOE and 
NINE during 1982 revealed the degree of collaboration 
between the BDO's 
planners and the British army. A special 
"Security Committee on Housing" was 
created excluding the NIHE. This exercised a veto 
over any development 
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proposals. It inevitably filtered down into the day to day practices of the NIHE. For 
example one internal memo outlined problems in the loyalist Oldpark. "The area 
suffers sectarian strife. Future real demand from `Orange' will be minimal, while 
future real demand from `Green' will be maximal. The problem is to proceed to 
public enquiry, where sectarian issues are likely to be raised since `redevelopment' 
will be seen as the replacement of Protestants for more Catholic houses". 38 Press 
articles carried by The Guardian and a local community magazine in early1982 
added further confirmation of the military's role. For example, in the Catholic 
Ardoyne a row of houses was arbitrarily removed form the redevelopment 
programme without the knowledge of the NIHE. This occurred after the NIHE had 
submitted plans for approval to the BDO. The military regarded this as a potential 
security threat due to their proximity to the loyalist Woodvale area. The head of the 
BDO to the Belfast Regional Controller stated: 
"We have in recent months sought to remind everyone concerned in DOE 
and NIBE of the need to involve the security forces at an early stage of 
proposed new works involving new buildings, road realignments etc. We 
have however subsequently had several instances where it emerged that 
plans were afoot - and virtually at a starting date - where the proposals were 
unacceptable to the Security Forces and we have had to make last minute 
and potentially costly changes". 39 
"Costly changes", were successfully avoided during the redevelopment of the New 
Lodge at the junction of the Antrim Road in North Belfast during 1986. This was 
done in such a way so as to `turn' the corner houses to provide the permanent 
military post at this junction with a clear field of fire and vision as far as Artillery 
Flats. There, another base was perched on top of the flats conducting constant 
sound and camera surveillance. Again in 1986 when the NIHE finally caved in to a 
momentous struggle by the Divis Residents Association, to achieve demolition and 
redevelopment a hidden agenda was discovered. The NINE had `commissioned' an 
analysis from the RUC, which concluded they would favour either of two options. 
The isolation and partial demolition of the blocks or total 
demolition with 
replacement by two storey dwellings. The RUC considered the 
latter would 
enhance "security surveillance and hot pursuit of 
known criminals", i. e. 
38 The Guardian, 13th March 1982; Scope, Belfast, April 1982. 
39 Irish News, 15th March 1982, Belfast. 
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republicans. The 19 storey Tower Block should stay as it provided the British 
Army with a clear vantage point over the entire city as well as Divis 
The NIHE were obliged to confirm security considerations swung the balance in 
favour of demolition. The RUC document specifically identifies "(a) the problems 
of pursuit (b) the difficulties for residents surveillance", and the "Divis connection 
with over 500 stolen vehicle and joy riding incidents during 1985". It also noted 
that a recent conference at Downing Street on crime prevention, "the importance of 
tenant security", and "the disappearance of the severe policing problems following 
demolition of the T Block in Turf Lodge" (a nationalist area). The local residents 
association stated they had never before noticed a concern for tenant's security by 
40 the RUC. 
Another critical example was Unity Flats in Belfast. In July 1987 the residents 
campaign for demolition was acceded to. Informal approaches to the residents by 
NINE officials had suggested if they accepted removal to another area, the 
government would more readily bow to their demands. This was rejected and the 
struggle to demolish and rebuild on the same site pursued. However the price of 
this victory, was the loss of 100 units and the refusal to use adjacent derelict land 
for additional housing. An eight-lane motorway was proposed to be constructed 
along the edge of the estate thereby sealing it in on four sides by motorways. 
Belfast is a small provincial city, which does not require an eight-lane motorway in 
terms of traffic volumes and car ownership. Immediate access to the city centre 
would be denied thereby restricting the easy flow of a nationalist population. 
41 
The point of the above examples is not to construct a scenario which demands 
military intervention at all levels of planning. However, when military forces 
consider they do have an interest, this can clearly be to the detriment of the 
`normal planning process'. The Housing Executive, in these circumstances, 
demonstrated itself to be no more than the passive or active agent for forces much 
40 RUC report on Divis and record of meeting attended by author with 
Divis Residents Association 
and the NINE, 1986. 
41 In the end a very wide five lane motoryway (one a slip road 
leading to the multi-story car park 
at the back of a new shopping centre) was constructed thereby creating a secure military 
"clean" 
zone around the flats. 
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stronger than itself. An agent controlled is one where the agenda is dictated 
elsewhere and thereby leaves questions as to the integrity of the administration and 
the degree by which it can be wilfully manipulated to meet objectives beyond its 
stated remit. It is also a comment on the unaccountable nature of quangos, 
especially a housing one whose clients are very much on the outside looking in. 
Intimidation. 
It would be an oversight in any debate over the allocation and use of resources not 
to indicate the sometimes violent and extreme situation faced in the provision of 
housing services. In November 1985 the Anglo-Irish Accord was formally signed. 
Tom King, then Secretary of State declared its purpose was to create, "a more 
peaceful, tolerant and prosperous society". In violent scenes reminiscent of the 
early 1970's, loyalists subjected the Catholic population to intimidation, 
firebombing of homes and sectarian assassinations. In Lisburn for example 114 
families were intimidated or burnt out. Another 47 demanded to be rehoused in 
another area. One attack at Jeremy Walk saw loyalist's seal off the estate, cut the 
power from streetlights and then proceed to stone and petrol bomb every Catholic 
house. The mob chanted "Get the Fenian bastards". Although the attack lasted from 
l 0pm until lam the press reported residents' claims that the RUC failed to put in 
an appearance. 
During April 1986 alone, the RUC reported 79 attacks on Catholic homes, 337 
formal complaints of intimidation and 92 attacks on Catholic premises such as 
church halls, schools and commercial property. One factory sustained £2m worth 
of damage. On the 12th July weekend another 71 families were forced out. On the 
edge of the Catholic New Lodge in North Belfast at Hillman Street, one family was 
forced to leave a newly completed house by a group of 200 men in para-military 
uniform. The British Army constantly patrolled this area. Opposite the New Lodge 
in the newly completed development at Manor Street, 22 families were 
forced out. 
Their houses were demolished in 1989. 
Another shocking attack occurred in the village of Rasharkin 
in Co. Antrim. 
Loyalists in paramilitary uniform carrying sledgehammers, 
hatchets and iron bars 
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systematically attacked Catholic homes beating up anyone too slow to escape. By 
September1986, the NIHE had recorded 392 requests for transfers due to 
intimidation and violence. Of these 228 were given priority status. No action was 
taken by the NIHE to terminate the tenancies of those found to be actively 
involved in the physical attacks on their neighbours. Frightened tenants in Agnes 
Street, South Belfast, after their houses were engulfed in flames and they narrowly 
escaped, condemned the Executive for doing nothing. They demanded to know 
"how much longer will you leave it before someone else is killed", as they sought 
refuge outside the area. One family that fled to Peterborough was granted refugee 
status. Local Tories criticised this as opening the "floodgates for other Irish 
families". 42 
Petrol bomb attacks and bullets in the post became so commonplace as to attract 
only a passing footnote in the press. One savage attack on a Protestant family 
occurred at Steelstown on the outskirts of Derry. Petrol bombs thrown at farm 
buildings destroyed thousands of bales of fodder, farm equipment and family pets. 
An editorial in the Republican News condemned, "the people who carried out this 
attack (and) inflicted needless suffering on a blind old woman and her family for a 
purely sectarian motive". 43 The UDA which was still a legal entity at the time was 
responsible for car bombs in Dublin killing 21 and a long litany of sectarian 
assassinations in the North expressed no reservations about its terror campaign 
then or now. Indeed a British TV series interviewing former loyalist terrorists bore 
witness to their, on the whole, vigorous endorsement of individual terror. 44 
Their contribution to the housing debate, apart from burning people out of their 
homes, was usefully captured in the UDA's views on the decision to demolish 
Divis. An editorial in its journal ULSTER thundered: 
"And when Divis comes tumbling down, where is the NIHE intending to 
accommodate these mealy-mouthed scavengers? Will Poleglass be extended 
or will further encroachment into Protestant areas be on the agenda. 
42 Details of these incidents are recorded in the local press especially April to December 1986. See 
Graham, D. `Housing Terror in Northern Ireland', Roof, Shelter, November/December 1986; The 
Guardian, 1St October 1986; Graham, D. `Northern Ireland: smooth talking about tough times', 
Roof, November/December 1987, Shelter. 
43 AP/RN 13th August 1987. 
44 Loyalists, Taylor. P. March 1999. 
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Whichever way it goes, the memory of stench-filled Divis should remain in Protestant minds as a poignant reminder that this is the way we would expect to stagnate in any future, All-Ireland Socialist State. There's food for 
thought". 
ULSTER further added, Divis should 
"remain standing, gaunt against the West Belfast skyline, as a grim reminder 
of how Catholics can turn a palace into a human cesspool... are their filthy 
habits too deeply ingrained to be removed"? 45 
Physical violence has not abated; it is simply not as widely reported, unless there is 
an immediate and larger political backdrop. The catalogue of despair and hatred 
quietly continues. 46 Paradoxically, while this context attracts a `sympathy vote' for 
the NIHE, especially in the British professional press, this attitude lends itself to a 
lack of enquiry and analysis that both reports above noted was a serious deficiency 
in the development of public policy. It also effectively accepts as given assurances 
about equality that have not been resolved. 
CONCLUSIONS. 
More than thirty years after the introduction of the Housing Executive as the main 
provider of public housing ample evidence remains to demonstrate its extreme 
sensitivity to the various forces of loyalism and the more covert policies of the 
British government. The earlier objective of integrating and rebuilding 
communities has long since been abandoned. This was clearly beyond the realm of 
its own abilities. The wider political crises have however been faithfully reflected 
in Executive management and recruitment practices. For this it carries direct 
responsibility. Its ready accession to forces stronger than itself may be considered 
inevitable but no less excusable given its statutory duties and wider responsibility 
to those in need of a housing service which is equitable and fair. 
as Ulster, September 1986. 
46 During the current peace process the level of intimidation against Catholic families by loyalists 
has continued. The NIHE's Annual Report for 1998 reported 318 people were given priority 
housing due to intimidation and over 253 private homes had been bought back at a cost of £9m to 
the public purse. (NIHE Annual Review, September, 1999). An added twist to this was the 
internal 
loyalist feud on the Shankill Road during 2000 that led to loyalists intimidating fellow loyalists out 
of their homes. 
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Historical and contemporary studies continue to confirm the existence of major 
inequalities in public sector provision, material conditions and employment 
practices. While quantitative changes have undoubtedly occurred in terms of the 
physical stock, qualitatively, things remain very much the same. The reasons for 
doing little to actively overcome existing inequalities in terms of religion continue 
to be presented as `something beyond our control'. The integrity and ability then to 
provide a service, which is beyond reproach, above manipulation by other covert 
and overt interests and one, which visibly demonstrates that under Direct Rule the 
issue of inequality has been overcome, has not been achieved. 
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Chapter 6. Equality of Opportunity in the Private Sector. 
Introduction. 
The following assessment includes key manufacturing employers such as Harland and 
Wolff shipyard, Short Bros., manufacturers of aircraft and missiles and Ford. As important 
loyalist symbols a commentary is provided on their historical development. These 
examples demonstrate the enduring strength of inequalities in engineering and 
manufacturing and the overt resistance to equality of opportunity by employers, workers 
and their trade unions. They also show that the British government failed to provide 
effective direction, leadership or utilise its financial power to promote equality of 
opportunity in the very firms associated with the historical and contemporary promotion of 
militant sectarianism. As a consequence it is argued the responsibilities advocated by the 
Cameron Report and the duties of good government towards its citizens were abrogated by 
government. Britain's "moral agenda" was rejected. We will begin with one of Belfast's 
most potent loyalist symbols, Harland and Wolff, or "the yard", as it is more commonly 
known. 
"This We Will Maintain". 
Harland and Wolff (H&W) has for generations been a source of Protestant strength, unity 
and patronage. Its two giant yellow "Goliath", Krupp gantry cranes dominate Belfast's 
landscape. Previously held to be symbols of pride and domination they now represent 
uncertainty and economic insecurity. The shipyards at their post war peak in 1952 
employed 24,350. Prior to privatisation in March 1989 it was a wholly owned government 
enterprise. Public subventions were high. In 1980 for example the Public Accounts 
Committee estimated that the average cost of sustaining jobs was £17,900 per annum. 2 By 
1988, taking into account a then average inflation rate of 7%, the real cost was almost 
£28,000. In 1999, it posted profits of £5m, its first in 20 years, under the Norwegian owner 
Fred Olsen. However by March 2000 numbers had fallen to around 1745 and by February 
2001 its workforce was down to 500 on a three day week having lost £26m. Without an 
' This is a general loyalist refrain printed on banners, slogans and graffiti around NI. It encapsulates the 
desire to maintain loyalist dominance and maintain the sectarian status quo. 
2 Public Accounts Report, HMSO 1980 London. The £28,000 is the authors estimate. 
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order in October 2000 for two British naval vessels it would have closed. Trade unions 
claim the owner was more interested in the development of the yards 300 acre site than 
shipbuilding as its seeks planning permission to create a £400m science and leisure park 
on the land it leases. 3 A brief history will aid comprehension as to the yards' significance 
as a bastion of Protestantism. This is in turn underpins the scale of failure by successive 
governments to challenge sectarian employment patterns and recruitment practices in the 
yard. For it was precisely in such companies that nationalists expected tangible changes to 
be made. Indeed the failure to achieve this became a self-evident truism for nationalists 
that Britain's agenda was a unionist one. 
In 1858, Edward Harland from Glasgow and Wilhelm Wolff purchased an existing 
shipbuilders to establish Harland and Wolff. Both became unionist MP's. By 1866, they 
employed 3000,224 were Catholics. These were primarily general labourers. Earlier in 
1864 the skilled shipwrights led armed attacks on Catholics, axing one, Neal Fagan to 
death in front of a large force of the RIC and British troops. When Gladstone, the British 
Prime Minister, introduced the first Home Rule Bill, further violent attacks led to the death 
of Seamus Curran, a Catholic navvy in June 1866. On Saturday August 7th, after the Bill 
was defeated, all the Catholics were driven from the yard. A Catholic delegation to 
Harland seeking to have the yard closed until the attacks ceased was dismissed as 
"preposterous". During the centenary of the United Irishmen in 1898,700 Catholics were 
expelled from Belfast's linen mills and shipyards. By 1911, Harland's and Workman, Clark 
& Co., the second largest shipbuilder, together employed 518 Catholics in a workforce of 
6,809.4 
Catholic's tenure in these areas remained precarious. The 1912 Home Rule crisis saw a 
succession of attacks. Brutal pogroms occurred in July 1920 and spread to other 
engineering firms. One estimate suggested 8000 to 11000 were forced out of which at least 
1225 had been soldiers in the Great War. 5 A boycott by the Dublin based Trades Union 
Congress was ignored. During the mid-30' as unemployment grew so did the level of riots 
and sectarian attacks. NI's Prime Minister, James Craig, encouraged Protestants not to 
3 Press reports, The Guardian, 100`, 11"' March 2000; 6th February 2001. 
4 See Bardon, Jonathan. Belfast An Illustrated History, pp. 126-132,149-150, Blackstaff Press, 1982; 
Downing, Taylor. (ed) The Troubles, Thames MacDonald 1980, for a general picture. 
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employ, "disloyalists", as this "is prejudicial to the state and takes jobs away from 
loyalists". Attacks continued at times of tension and celebration. At the time of the 
George V Jubilee in 1935 over 200 Catholics were driven from the yards. 
Although the 2nd World War saw a brief resurgence with the yard building over 200 ships 
for the navy and merchant vessels its decline had begun. The 1971 Census indicated that 
about 9,654 workers remained engaged in shipbuilding activities. Approximately 460 were 
Catholic. By 1982 this was less than 150. The intensification of the sectarian murder 
campaigns during the 1970's accompanied by brutal tortures and intimidation left only 
those Catholics who had effectively concealed their religion (see Chapter 7). In 1971 
workers from Shorts and the yard led demonstrations calling for internment and 
participated en masse in neo-fascist rallies at East Belfast's Victoria park where former 
Stormont Home Affairs Minister, Bill Craig offered to lead them into the "final offensive" 
against nationalists. His Vanguard movement laid the groundwork for the creation of the 
UDA, a strengthened UVF, and a myriad of other loyalist groups such as TARA. Many 
members worked in the yard or Shorts, where illicit weapons were manufactured. In an 
interview on Channel 4's "the Protestants" with the now Lord Gus Mcdonald, a former 
chairman of the Boilermakers Society from the shipyard saw no contradiction in 
describing himself as a staunch trade unionist while simultaneously promising, if called 
upon, to lead a scorched earth policy against nationalist areas to resolve the "problem once 
and for all", until their "national aspirations were extinguished". 6 
Under Direct Rule in 1972, a £35m expansion plan was announced to enable the yard to 
build oil tankers. With the collapse of this market it became a wholly owned state 
company in 1975. In 1976 the Fair Employment Act became law and the shipyard became 
the 219th firm to sign its equality of opportunity Declaration. 
7 
A Fresh Start? 
As the yard continued to lose millions, Jim Prior MP, Secretary of State, approached John 
5 Hassan Father John, Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogram, Belfast, op. cit. Andrew Boyd, 
`Sad Saga of 
Bigotry at Work'. Irish News, 1st September 1986, Republican News, `Harland & Wolff -A Bastion of 
Sectarian Privilege', 30th October 1986. 
6 Channel 4, British Television, "The Protestants", with Gus McDonald, May, 1984. 
7 In 1977 the FEA began an enquiry which would last six years into employment patterns 
in the yard. cf. 
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Parker, a senior figure in British Ships to take over. Parker had started his apprentice as a 
naval architect in the yard in 1958. He returned in February 1983, in time to record a £26m 
loss for that financial year. A rationalisation programme that made 1700 men redundant 
did not prevent a £42.8m loss for 1983-84. The search for contracts led Parker to the 
offices of New Orleans ship owners, Lykes Brothers. Two years of negotiations produced 
a letter of intent for £55m ($72m) for two automated containerships. This in turn however 
provided an opening for the Irish American lobby to level charges of discrimination! 
Another untimely mishap was the recording of discrimination by an unnamed trade union 
against a "Roman Catholic Tradesman", in the FEA's seventh annual report for 1982-83. 
The company was the shipyard; the trade union, the General and Municipal Boilermakers 
and Allied Trade Union (GMBATU) which operated a closed shop agreement. The 
individual was a registered union member who had been seeking employment in the red- 
leading department for over two years. 9 A third event that focused much public attention 
on the yard was the first MOD contract since 1971 to build a floating £60m port and road 
for the Falklands/Malvinas in October 1983. 
Lyke's letter of intent included an option to buy four more ships worth £ 100m. On the 
12th April 1984 the Irish National Caucus (INC), launched its campaign to prevent US 
dollars finance discrimination in the yard. They demanded large numbers of Catholic 
apprentices and adults be hired; a training school be set up in West Belfast as originally 
promised by Ministers in 1974; adequate security be provided and all "offensive and 
sectarian emblems and slogans" be removed. In meetings with Lykes the INC urged him 
"to use your bargaining position to help alleviate at least some of the Catholic grievances 
against Harland and Wolff'. 1° Lykes sought a reply from Parker on 19th April. Before 
replying in a closely typed confidential letter on the 8th June 1984, Parker played the FEA 
card. 
Parker made a public statement claiming Harland's was an equal opportunity employer 
FEA In Action, Chapter 7. 
Northern Ireland Office Press Releases, 27th March 1984 and Sunday Times, 1st April 1984. 
9 Fair Employment Agency (Ni) Seventh Annual Report, 1 April 1982 to 31 March 1983, HMSO Belfast, 8th 
February 1984. 
lo Irish National Caucus records of exchanges with W. J. Amoss President, Lykes 
Brothers, New Orleans and 
INC Harland and Wow A Case Study in Anti-Catholic Discrimination, 12th 
April 1984, Washington, USA, 
and Graham, D. `Shipyard contract may founder on discrimination', New Statesman, 
Ist June 1984. 
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fully endorsed by the FEA. Cooper supported this adding management had "accepted the 
necessity to recruit more Catholics". Lykes sought proof demanding Parker "supply 
information to show that his company is absolutely against discrimination". Parker 
declined to provide details as "I do not think it would serve any useful purpose to throw 
around statistics" and asserted "in the last decade (and possibly earlier) there has been a 
positive company policy to afford equal opportunity of employment to all persuasions in 
the Province. " Usually under such circumstances employers seek to prove their credentials 
by providing information on the companies special education programmes, formal trade 
union and employer equality agreements or declarations or targeted training and 
recruitment initiatives. Parker was unable to do this and instead said, "we do not as a 
Management know the religion of our employees". " Andrew Davis, legal officer at the 
English headquarters of the GMBATU, confirmed Harlands had done nothing. He said, 
"Our feeling is that there are a lot of people doing little more than paying lip service to 
equal opportunity but I don't think there is a lot of evidence to suggest that Catholics are a 
lot better of than they were in 1968". 12 
Parker concluded by advising Lykes, Catholics, "work without fear or hindrance, being 
fully accepted and acceptable members of the work community ... you will appreciate I 
cannot force anyone to apply for a job. " He ended on a personal note, "At the end of the 
day Jim you must judge if we are the type of management that would honour the 
commitment entered into with the Fair Employment Agency". 13 
In the end the Lykes order went to Japan in September 1984 as Parker took on another 
contract with BP worth £75m. The yard claimed "this precluded the building of the 
containership for Lykes", as delivery dates could not be met. 
14 A licence agreement was 
signed with Mechanical Systems Inc., Houston Texas, to make the Sea King Crane in 
September 1984, representing a breakthrough into the American markets. 
15 The Irish 
National Caucus had demonstrated their intent to confront any American contract 
negotiations with a powerful institutional investors lobby. 
11 Correspondence between Lykes and John Parker, 19th April 1984, and 8th June 1984 from Parker to 
W. J. Amoss. 
12 Irish News, 20th June 1984. 
13 Parker to Lykes Correspondence, 8th June 1984. 
14 Belfast Telegraph, 8th September 1984. 
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GMBATU's closed shop agreement required that unemployed union men be selected from 
its list before non-union applicants. The investigation by the FEA had discovered that the 
local convenor and shop stewards had contrived over a two year period to ensure an 
unemployed Catholic member registered on the union's books didn't get a job. Over 105 
men, including 60 non-union members, were hired over this period. Union officials 
attempted to conceal their actions by ripping out pages of the "Unemployed Book" and re- 
writing other pages to give the impression the man had not signed regularly. The English 
headquarters adopted a tough stance against local members as the union accepted 
discrimination had occurred and made an out of court settlement of £10,000. Andrew 
Davis pointedly criticised the "lip service paid to equal opportunity" by the employer and 
commented "it wasn't entirely our fault, we carried the can". At a special conference in 
Belfast on 26th September 1984, Davis announced the scrapping of the "unemployed list" 
and demanded pressure be put on "companies like Harland and Wolff with overwhelming 
Protestant workforces to ensure they too review their practices". 16 The trade unions most 
senior official in NI was Tom Douglas, a Fair Employment Agency Board member. 
Despite GMBATU's exhortations and support for trade union principles of equity yard 
men continued to demonstrate their mettle. The normal July 12th parades with bands took 
place in the yard. The Irish News reported nationalist allegations that the UVF controlled 
recruitment of all stagers and the machine shop remained a `no go' area for Catholics. On 
the signing of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, men from the yard were to the fore of 
loyalist protests. They blocked main roads into Belfast as part of the loyalist Day of 
Action and led by the DUP marched on the offices housing the Agreements secretariat 
near Holywood. They threatened to set up an Ulster TUC, and generally exercised their 
traditional role as a Protestant shock force. The comments of then Grand Master of the 
Orange Order and unionist MP, the Rev. Martin Smyth, much earlier appropriately 
describe the loyalist ethos that motivates such actions. He stated "many loyalists will not 
trust Roman Catholics, they will be loath to employ them, work with them, or live with 
them". 17 
is NIO and Belfast Telegraph 20th September 1984. 
16 In January 1983, the brother of the man at the centre of this dispute had been critically stabbed 
by a 
Protestant workmate in the red-leader section. His attacker was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced 
to 12 years. He was released in June 1984 on grounds of ill-health, and 
died of cancer in 1986. 
17 The Battle for N. Ireland, Orange Order, 1972, Belfast. 
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The Orangeman's Dole? 
The commonly held nationalist perception and experience was that the shipyard was a 
place that offered privileged employment for generations of Protestants. Under Direct 
Rule successive governments provided significant financial support in the face of massive 
losses while other yards in Britain on the Clydeside, Teesside and Tyneside, went under. 
Between 1972-79 over £103m was given in grants while annual losses of £35m were 
soaked up by the public purse. Additional subsidies were contained on work carried out of 
up to 35%. As a whole the yard took on average 1.3% of the total budget for NI which was 
£5140m for 1988-89.18 During 1983-85 Parker sought to reduce losses by cutting 
overheads, selling land and reducing the workforce by 1200. In 1986 the industry minister 
increased the grant to £68m to cover trading losses and 800 redundancies. He said that 
between 1976-86 the yard "had received £340m in government funding plus the additional 
0 7m necessary in this financial year". 19 
In January 1989, further job losses of 470 were confirmed bringing employment to the 
lowest in the yard's history, at 2,880.20 For the financial year ending March 1987, the 
yards losses ran to £75.6m. The government responded by increasing its grant to £58.6m 
from £30m. This represented 26% of total gross resources for industrial development. As 
former Secretary of State Jim Prior said on the launch of a bulk carrier in 1984, "The 
relationship between Government and Harland and Wolff is unusually close. This reflects 
not just the usual relationship between a company and its shareholders, it springs also from 
the special place which the Yard occupies in the hearts of people in Northern Ireland. It 
goes well beyond the economic importance of the place which we can measure in terms of 
employment, direct and indirect - vital though that is. This is no ordinary shipyard. " 
21 
It was ironic that one service yard men did provide for Catholics, was the construction of 
the huge box-girders spans for Derry's new Foyle Bridge. This cost £27m. The Commons 
Public Accounts Committee lambasted the project saying "We have the gravest doubts 
about the cost effectiveness of this expenditure". It was established the existing bridge 
18 Minister for Industry for NI, NIO, 25th November 1986. 
19 NIO 25t' November 1986. 
20 In 1985,5000 were employed representing 6% of the North's manufacturing workforce. 
At its height 
during the war years direct employment reached 30,000. During the 1960's it was 11,000. 21 NIO 13th March 1984. 
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only operated at a 45% capacity and no reliable transport surveys to justify a new bridge 
had been carried out. A fee of £ 1.1 m for consultants was deemed unnecessary and highly 
questionable. As government double funding of the shipyard continued other British yards 
finally expressed their exasperation publicly. The privatised Swan Hunter accused the 
government of simply buying off shipyard men to cool loyalist opposition to the Anglo- 
Irish Agreement. Swan Hunter declared, "while we recognise the need for harmony in 
N. Ireland, we do not see why Newcastle (Upon Tyne) should be sacrificed on the alter of 
Belfast. 22 When the yard was offered another MOD contract to build an Auxiliary Oil 
Replenishment ship, Labour's MP for the Northeast angrily retorted "The government has 
surrendered to political terrorism (loyalist)". Rhetoric aside, British Shipbuilders 
announced in May 1986 plans to close three of their six yards and axe 3495 jobs. Another 
1500 went in 1991 at its Vickers yard. As the Economist magazine had commented 1980, 
hand-outs to the yard, "is almost entirely a subsidy to militant Protestant workers in an 
23 industry that is anyway bound to die". 
Parliament's National Audit Office in July 1992 criticised the government for placing this 
order that was delivered three years late and £70m over budget. The yards original bid of 
£122m was much lower than Swan Hunter and was accepted despite Ministry of Defence 
rules that contracts should not be awarded to yards where delays already existed in 
fulfilling current orders. In addition the yard was supposed to deliver a ship capable of 
defending itself. Over £200m later a defenceless oil tanker went on sea trials in the Irish 
Sea and was not delivered until 1998. This was despite the fact that following privatisation 
in 1989 another £73m had been granted to complete the project. Labour MP, Nick Brown, 
for Newcastle upon Tyne East said, "The ship ought to be called HMS Delorean not Fort 
Victoria". While calling for a formal enquiry he added, "It seems to me that the money 
was spent on appeasing terrorism by keeping Protestant jobs in a Belfast yard rather than 
accepting a realistic bid". 24 During May 1993 the receivers were called into Swann Hunter 
whose collapse the company claimed was due to the MOD not paying bills and awarding 
major contracts elsewhere, such as Harland's and more recently Yarrow on the Clyde. An 
120 year shipbuilding tradition came to a painful close the remaining 2,200 workers faced 
redundancy. When Swan Hunter had been privatised in 1986 it employed 4,500. 
22 The Guardian, 23rd March 1986. 
23 Irish News, Swan Hunter shipyards, 23rd March 1986,24th March 1986. 
24 Nick Brown MP, 17t' July 1992. 
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At the end of 1988 the government announced a cash injection of £1.2 billion to ensure a 
successful privatisation. 25 This included £400m to write off debts, pay redundancies and 
meet restructuring costs. A Commons Select Committee estimated grants worth £530m 
had been given since 1975. As part of the agreed management buy out workers were 
required to subscribe £2.35m. Although this was a condition of the buy out, it was waived 
as merchant bankers made up the shortfall of over £ Im. In February 1990, an All Party 
Commons select defence committee, accused the government of sharp practice and 
subterfuge on the deal. "A bizarre fiscal gavotte", were their words. They claimed that 
what happened was that an extra £22.5m was paid for an MOD ship when MOD lawyers 
had confirmed only £5m was due. The committee concluded, "The evidence before us 
suggests that a subterfuge has been attempted upon Parliament". 26 
Perhaps as some form of footnote on the affair, the IRA in September 1990 planted a 
bomb which damaged the engine room of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary supply vessel, Fort 
Victoria, which was nearing completion. It has been argued that the British government 
failed to intervene strategically to effect a structural shift in sectarian employment 
patterns. When it did intervene as with the yard it was to prop up an industry wholly 
associated with Protestant domination and sectarianism without securing any gain in 
promoting equality of access to employment or change to the loyalist working 
environment. This pattern was repeated at Shorts Bros. 
Shorts. 
Shorts was founded in 1901 to make aerial balloons on the Isle of Sheppey, Kent. 
Attracted under the early industry development grants it began life in 1937 and employed 
6,273 locating along Belfast harbour adjacent to Harland's it linked up to form its Belfast 
subsidiary. It also had plants in other strongly loyalist areas such as Castlereagh in East 
Belfast, Newtownards and Crossgar in County Down and Maghaberry in County Antrim. 
During the war it made Sunderland flying boat and Stirling bombers. After this 
it went 
into a long recession and would have closed but for government grants. Between 
1967-83, 
25 NIO, 23rd February 1989. 




over £45m was lost and 1000 redundancies made. By 1983 Shorts employed 6,300. In 
1967 the company decided to reorganise and broaden its production base by restructuring 
into a small aircraft division, the Skyvan, missile systems and airframe sub-contract work. 
The Skyvan and variations proved successful with for example over £ 100m in receipts for 
150 planes in 1983. As the military versions of the Sherpa variation proved attractive to 
the United States Air Force (USAF) Shorts entered the Irish American arena as it bid for a 
27 £65m contract. 
Its former chairman Philip Foreman, managing director since 1967, then chairman from 
1983 until he resigned in 1989 was knighted in 1981. He first joined the company in 1958 
and would later play a significant role in impeding progress on equal opportunities within 
Shorts (see below). Short's horizons stretched far beyond Belfast harbour as it supplied at 
least 18 US airliners, the US and other foreign militaries, with sales in over 15 countries. 
More than 16 armed forces utilised its blowpipe missile technology. In terms of the British 
aerospace industry then, Shorts is an important player on an international stage. 
Within this context allegations of discrimination in the plant became an acute 
embarrassment for the British government in Washington when Shorts was bidding for 
contracts in the US. The management response at Short's was not untypical in denying a 
problem existed. For example at a meeting in 1978, with FEA officials the personnel 
manager Mr. Cockram claimed, "religious belief was irrelevant", and "the Catholic 
members of the workforce were in no way harassed by their Protestant work-mates". 
Shorts asserted management "would not allow any sectarianism" and were unaware of any 
religious bias or intolerance in the plant. 28 
Contact with Catholic schools was considered "a waste of time", as most of the 100 
annual intake of apprentices were drawn from local Protestant schools. In 1977,800 
workers were recruited with 2000 out of 5000 applicants interviewed. The numbers of 
Catholics did not change. Shorts claimed in 1978, "advertising for recruitment was rare", 
as recruits were generally drawn from within the company's "family tradition". 
29 They 
refused to publicly endorse any equal opportunity declaration. Shorts did finally accede to 
27 NIO, 9ý' March 1983, News Letter Industrial Review, December 1983, Belfast Telegraph, 9` January 
1983. 
28 W. Cockram, Shorts Bros., to Peter Sefton Co-ordinating Director, FEA, 1978. 
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this in 1981 in order to deflect intense criticism in the US that was placing a USAF 
contract in jeopardy. It was in the US that a major political storm broke over Shorts at the 
end of February 1983. 
Shorts in the USA. 
A group of Congressmen led by Mario Biaggi, and the Irish National Caucus (INC) 
mounted a sustained campaign against Shorts in 1983. They charged Shorts with a history 
of overt sectarianism and intimidation against Catholics. In response the NIO gave a 
commitment Shorts would open a plant on the site of the abandoned De Lorean factory 
where Catholics had ready access on one side due to its geographic location if a contract 
were awarded. The Americans were led to believe this would create 200 jobs. During this 
period Shorts secured orders worth £11.5m from American companies and announced 300 
new jobs. It also opened Belfast, Sydenham airport for commercial commuter services and 
government increased aid by £ 12m. The INC circulated details on Shorts employment 
composition which indicated the company was 95% Protestant, to 10,000 members of 
Congress. Among the 980 fitters for example, 53 were Catholic. 30 The men from Shorts 
also featured prominently at loyalist protests The ethos at Shorts was expressed in the 
range of loyalist insiginia adorning the plant and at the annual prize giving ceremony 
when the British Anthem was played. As the INC's campaign took effect, 27 Congress 
members formally protested against any order going to Shorts and supported a boycott of 
its products. 
The NIO and BIO responded with the help of the NIC (ICTU), local trade unions and the 
FEA. They were also helped by the purchase of an aircraft by Dublin based Avair airline. 
The NIO/BIO declared, "if the Irish can buy why not the US"? The joint Shop Stewards 
Works Committee representing the shipyard and engineering unions provided Foreman 
with a letter for this Atlantic tussle. Dated 13th April 1983, it: 
"unequivocally state(s) the following -As a Trade Union principle we would not 
now, or historically permit Shorts or any other company in our jurisdiction to 
operate Religious, Sexual or Trade Union discrimination". 
29 Ibid. 
30 Shorts to FEA, 25th January, 1980. 
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The signatories from the Works Committee included those who had been highly active in 
the loyalist UWC strike that ended an attempt to share power with moderate nationalists. 
The secretary, Harry Patterson had been vice chairman of the UWC. The letter opposed 
religious monitoring and concluded, "As Trade Unionists we would finally state that we 
reject all acts of discrimination no matter where or how the practise is demonstrated". 31 
In another letter to the NIC (ICTU) on the 9th May, Patterson asked they formally endorse 
this statement as: 
"This matter is of the utmost urgency for Shorts and the workforce in general, as 
we are tendering for a lucrative contract in America which would keep a balanced 
labour force for the next two years or more". 32 
The BIO's wide circulation of the Works Committee letter rebounded when the militant 
loyalist activities of Patterson and others were exposed by the INC. Another faux pas by 
the BIO in May, was an article in Aviation Week and Space Technology. The BIO 
informed the American magazine: 
"Short Brothers is located in a Protestant area of Belfast. Its chairman and 
managing director, Sir Philip Foreman, in an intensive search for Catholic skilled 
workers once walked door to door in the Catholic Bogside area of Belfast offering 
jobs". 
The Bogside is in Derry, some 80 miles away. There was no proof presented during a long 
FEA enquiry by Shorts that its chairman had either walked around Belfast or Derry in such 
an endeavour nor were there any reports of gainful employment opportunities secured. 33 
The then British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Wright, formerly a senior member 
of M15 in the North, took the unprecedented step of issuing an 11 page document to every 
member of Congress and key opinion maker on the 10th May 1983. His objective was "to 
set the record straight". He claimed Shorts was "fully committed", to equal opportunities 
and this "has been reaffirmed on a number of occasions over many years". The support of 
the trade unions and the FEA were cited. It claimed Shorts are operating an "Affirmative 
action programme agreed with the FEA to encourage more Catholics to seek employment 
with the company". The sum of this agreement with the FEA in 1983 was simply to 
31 Statement by Joint Shop Stewards Works Committee, Shorts, 13th April 1983 to Philip Foreman, Shorts 
Chairman. 
32 Patterson H to T. Gillen, NIC (ICTU), 9th May, 1983 following telephone call and letter of 6th May 
from 
T. Gi11en. 
33 Aviation Week and Space Technology, USA, 16th May 1983. 
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"advertise in the Catholic newspapers, " i. e. the Belfast based Irish News. 34 
The BIO correspondence used terminology rather subtly. For example the term 
"affirmative action" and phrase "to encourage more Catholics to apply", would imply to an 
American audience that some form of proactive equality programme was in place and that 
the matter was not a current one but one where changes had been already achieved for 
Catholic employees. A trump card however was the contract with Aer Lingus. Shorts 
marketing director, Mr. Roberts, would later confirm in the local press these purchases 
proved invaluable in the USAF bid. Given the storm of public controversy, in Ireland and 
abroad, republicans accused Aer Lingus, an Irish state owned company, of being 
instructed to assist Shorts, as part of the Irish governments strategy to establish its 
credentials with unionists. In return Aer Lingus did receive a sub-contract to paint Shorts 
planes. Wright enclosed as supporting evidence the trade union statement, a copy of the 
FEA equal opportunity certificate dated 23rd March 1979 and a copy of Shorts 
"Programme of Actions to Ensure Equality of Opportunity in Shorts". The latter document 
was remarkable in the extreme. Over the six year period of the FEA investigation into 
Shorts (cf. below), the existence of such an important document had never been 
discovered or referred to by Short's management. Its 14 points alleged to record "Action 
programmes", to "ensure equality of opportunity", such as visits to Catholic schools, youth 
organisations, advertising widely, etc., over a 15 year period. 35 
During June 1983 the Works Committee lobbied the NIC (ICTU) to get a "statement of 
denial" that discrimination took place in Shorts. The FEA's chairman assisted by writing a 
supporting letter to the NIC. No specific positive action programmes that included specific 
goals and programmes to correct inequality were imposed. No steps were taken to remove 
the display of intimidating loyalist symbols, end loyalist parades or protect Catholics in 
the plants from para-military threats. Catholics were however to be invited to the prize 
giving day. Cooper advised the NIC these "contacts with Catholic schools etc. should go a 
long way to eliminate past practices which militated against equality of opportunity". 
36 
" Sir Oliver Wright, British Ambassador to US Congress members, British Embassy, Washington, 10th May 
1983. 
35 Author's comments based on personal involvement and copies of correspondence 
between NIC(ICTU) 
and Joint Shop Stewards Works Committee which show the document was drafted between 10th and 
24th 
June 1983. The FEA chair, Cooper informed the AFL/CIO the agreement was made 
in April 1983. 
36 Cooper, R. FEA, 28th June, 1983. 
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Inez McCormack, regional organiser for NUPE, NIC member and a former Agency board 
member, later commented publicly on the affair. She stated: 
"Shorts anxiety to get the US order gave the FEA the best opportunity they will 
ever have to persuade both management and workers to accept a real affirmative 
action programme. They seem to have thrown it away". 37 
The American AFLCIO trade union body decided to embark on a fact-finding tour in July 
so that they could determine their position independently. The Secretary of State, James 
Prior, Cooper, Foreman, various religious figures and leaders of the political parties in the 
South all met the delegation to lobby and discuss Shorts. Aer Lingus distributed a letter 
they had written to the INC. It stated "We are satisfied that their is no religious 
discrimination in the recruitment of employment practices of Shorts". The US Deputy 
Under Secretary for Defence replied to Senators enquiries on the contract by repeating 
verbatim Wright's correspondence. No one however was able to explain why out of 18 
apprentices started in June, only one was Catholic. 38 
As the AFLCIO delegation arrived the NIC published Short's "Affirmative Action", 
programme which Wright claimed already existed in May. The NIC expected the AFLCIO 
delegation would publicly endorse this and support the contract bid. The delegation 
declined. Instead they said the AFLCIO would only be satisfied when more Catholics 
were recruited. A dinner with Prior, Cooper and Foreman left them unimpressed. Charles 
Haughey, then in opposition, urged them in a private meeting to support Shorts as did then 
premiere Garret Fitzgerald and his ministers. On their return to the States, a report was 
submitted to their executive in August. 39 
The AFLCIO adopted a firm stance. Stress was laid upon the "responsibility on every 
purchaser, an individual or a government to inquire into the conditions under which the 
product is produced". Protestations by the USAF and defence department that current 
procurement procedures and contracts excluded foreign suppliers were rejected, 
37 McCormack, Inez. NUPE, op. cit. Farrell, M. & Graham, D. Sunday Tribune, Dublin, 19th February 1984, 
`Why the North's Job Agency Cannot Give a Fair Deal'. 
38 Doherty, Pat. New York City Comptrollers' Office to author 1983. 
39 Authors conversation with New York Comptrollers Office, Pat Doherty, Special Investment 
representative, August 1983. 
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"at least with respect to minimal fair employment conditions. We believe 
that AFL/CIO should consistently urge such a policy upon the US 
government and we believe that in the case of Shorts Brothers some 
assurances of non discriminatory employment, beyond those offered by the 
Fair Employment Agency of the United Kingdom are in order ..... the statistics strongly indicate a pattern of past discrimination and strong 
affirmative action policy is called for to begin to redress the imbalance". 40 
A telling comment compared the `explanations' offered as extremely similar to 
discussions in the US during the late 1950's and early 1960's. They concluded, 
"If the discriminatory patterns of employment are ever to be redressed, the 
full range of anti-discrimination measures undertaken in the United States 
will have to be developed by the employers in Northern Ireland, by the Fair 
Employment Agency and by Unions of Northern Ireland". 
Without "forceful and forthright", action against discrimination they considered there 
was little hope, "for a reduction in violence or for the development of attitudes which will 
bring about a stable society". 41 They also gave their support to a draft bill before Congress 
that urged US firms should not be permitted to invest in companies operating in the North 
that discriminated. In response the NIO organised and paid for local politicians from the 
SDLP and unionist party, business men and advisors to go on a US tour to drum up 
support. According to the Comptroller's Office American Senators were in turn invited 
along with their families to visit Britain and NI fully funded by the NIO on "fact finding 
tours". Their starting point could be anywhere in Europe. In August a delegation from the 
Irish National Caucus and US Congress members, Biaggio and Bob Blancato, met with the 
FEA and Shorts separately. The Congressmen left "unconvinced the company had taken 
all the necessary steps to alleviate concern that they are practising discrimination". They 
expressed criticism of the "semantic discussion" with Shorts which declined to concede 
any acts of discrimination, past or present. 42 All this activity may be understood when it is 
appreciated the closing date for the USAF bid was 5th August and Shorts was competing 
against 20 others. 
The BIO in Washington hired a major public relations company to present Shorts case; 
it 
40 AFL/CIO Report on Visit to NI and Republic of Ireland (July 1983), AFL/CIO Executive 
Report, 8/9th 
August 1983, and Farrell, M. Sunday Tribune, Dublin 24th July 1983, `Fate of £50m order 
hinges on 
religion of Shorts apprentices'. 41 AFL/CIO Report, August 1983. 
42 42 US Congress Members and INC press reports, Irish News, Belfast Telegraph, 16th -186' 
August 1983. 
164 
was reported Mrs. Thatcher took matters up personally with Reagan; local trade union 
leaders, FEA board members and politicians were sent to America to lobby for support. 
The FEA reported that over the last six months of 1983, Shorts recruited 222 employees. 
187 were Protestant, 34 Catholic. The FEA described this as a "very substantial 
improvement". However when the occupations recruited were examined the average ratio 
between Protestants and Catholics varied from three to nine times, e. g. riveters, 51 to 6; 
electricians, 45 to 5; technicians 25 to 8, and so on. 43 On the 8th December 1983 the US 
Department of the Air Force concluded "employees who were not recruited within the 
United States, " fell outside its equal opportunity contract clauses. The Secretary therefore 
did not feel "authorised to verify", practices in other countries and in closing advised 
Congress members, Shorts, "possesses an Equal Opportunity Certificate". 44 In February 
1984 the FEA attempted to bolster Shorts image by convening a meeting between Catholic 
school principals and Shorts that included former Agency member and careers teacher, 
Des Bannon's school. He condemned the meeting as a "political move" designed simply to 
enhance Shorts position in the US. 45 Foreman asserted, "It is not a question of not wanting 
to employ them. Our problem is to get Catholics to apply for jobs". 46 
The Ides of March. 
This intense activity began to bear fruit. On the 2nd March 1984 Shorts announced they 
had won the contract with a potential worth of £460m if the USAF took up its options. 
Foreman acknowledged the "Fair Employment Agency report", played a key role along 
with "enormous support from a lot of unexpected quarters", whom he did not wish to name 
"because they would not want me to" . 
47 They included John Hume, leader of the SDLP, 
the Irish premier and opposition leader, Aer Lingus, the ICTU NIC and senior church 
figures. Shorts estimated the order would create 600 jobs. A spokesman indicated "It's not 
clear whether the jobs will be advertised or filled from the applications file". 
48 The 
practice of banking files that was part of the "family tradition" at Shorts is a practice 
wholly at odds with the most basic of equal opportunity practices and within the context of 
43 FEA statement on Shorts, Irish Times, 1st and 2nd July 1983. Analysis of figures 
by author. 
44Department of USAF, 8th December 1983, Report, D. A. R. 7-103.18; 12-808 
[b]. 
as Des Bannon's comments to author. 
46Media interview and reports. 
47 Irish News, Newsletter, Belfast Telegraph, 3rd, 4th March 1984. 
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Shorts guaranteed to ensure opportunities primarily for Protestants. On top of this the 
shipyard, simultaneously announced an order from the MOD worth £3 0m which would 
sustain 1000 jobs until 1986. This was its first MOD order in fifteen years. 
While the combined orders left Protestant East Belfast, "dizzy with success", there were 
no corresponding pints of cheer for Catholic West Belfast. As Inez Mccormack said in the 
Sunday Tribune with reference to Shorts and the civil service: 
"The Agency can no longer claim to be independent of government and employers. 
it has been used by those who have power to effect change as a political excuse for 
not doing so. By letting employers feel that it can be used to say that there is no 
problem here, the Agency itself has become part of the problem". 49 
One goal that continued to elude Shorts was the ability to make a profit. Although orders 
secured in March were valued at £150m from the USAF and others such as British 
Midland and Jordan's armed forces, Shorts continued to report operating losses in excess 
of £ 19m. Nevertheless the British government announced a "reversion to private 
ownership in due course". 50 Shorts was given permission to enter into a variety of 
financial deals in preparation for this with American, British and European banks. 
Attempts by Irish-Americans to force the British to honour their pledge to oblige Shorts to 
open a unit on the De Lorean site were met with hostility by Unionists in 1984. 
When unionists discovered preliminary discussions had taken place with the IDB to secure 
a site for an ancillary unit on the De Lorean plant, the move was roundly condemned. The 
DUP deputy leader, Peter Robinson MP predicted "another politically motivated 
commercial failure", describing the proposal as "purely sectarian" and a "political sop". 
Foreman claimed 200 jobs might be created. sl In March 1985, Michael Heseltine MP then 
Defence Secretary, accepted a joint bid from Shorts and Embear of Brazil for the Tucano 
trainer. This was worth potentially £125m and 1,200 jobs. British Aerospace Managing 
director, Sir Raymond Lygo said Foreman, "has exploited the political factors to 
maximum advantage". Politics however began to catch up with Shorts fortunes. In June 
1985 it became known that senior directors were refusing to endorse any move to West 
48 Shorts press comment, Irish News report, 5th March, 1984. 49 Sunday Tribune, Dublin 19th December 1984. 
50 NIO, 26th April 1984. 
s' Local press and media Irish News, elfast Telegraph,. 24,25,26,27,28th June, 
1984. Peter Robinson MP 
quoted in Belfast Telegraph report, 26th June 1984. This row continued into 1987. 
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Belfast and only the necessity to appease US opinion was keeping the scheme alive. 
Applicants interviewed had been told to expect to start work in the summer. The SDLP 
now changed its position from one of open support, to alleging Shorts had been acting in 
bad faith by "simply making the right noises to ward off American criticism and secure 
US contracts". 52 The SDLP also drew attention to the treatment of two Catholic 
schoolgirls who had been interviewed for jobs in 1984. Although advised of their success 
they were still without a job. When New York's then Comptroller, Harrison Goldin, whose 
office was playing a significant role in the anti-discrimination lobby, arrived in June to 
investigate progress, Foreman made a sudden announcement that an agreement had been 
reached with the IDB. He "totally rejected", suggestions he had delayed progress while 
seeking to abandon the plan. 53 
In July as the Orange marching season intensified loyalist flags, para-military slogans and 
posters, dominated every work area with loyalist bands parading through the factory. 
Intimidation was reported as particularly intense around the aircraft assembly building 
where about 50 Catholics worked. One Catholic worker reported that a band and about 
200 loyalist workers had marched through the building and around the aircraft where they 
worked. He stated "the management never even tried to stop them, it was mob rule. We 
had no protection. Security did not even come down while the band was here". 54 
Management, internal security and trade unions declined to intervene to prevent acts of 
intimidation. Shorts did however agree to talk to the senior shop stewards when Catholic 
workers made statements to the press. These stewards were loyalist activists in the UWC 
strike. A week after these incidents pictures from within the plant, published by the Irish 
News, showed loyalist displays all over the plant. When damage was caused to three 
planes unionists immediately alleged this was the work of republicans. Catholic workers 
claimed this was an attempt to "set them up" for assassination and justify loyalist 
intimidation and marches. Foreman's public statements exacerbated matters when he 
claimed Shorts was "actively encouraging people from the minority to work for the 
company". 55 As Irish-American pressure intensified Foreman announced changes in 
"recruitment procedures in furtherance of the Company's Equal Opportunity Employment 
52 Irish News, Brian Feeney, SDLP Councillor, 6th June 1985. 
53 Shorts announcement was reported on 14th June 1985, Irish News, and Foreman's comments on 
26th June 
1985, Irish News in response to charges insufficient Catholics were being recruited. sa Irish News, 5"' July 1985. 
55 Almost daily press reports, Irish News, Belfast Telegraph, Newsletter, 10th, 11th July 
1985. 
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Policy", in that "any application of a speculative nature", would not be accepted. In other 
words they would not solely utilise their bank of family friendly applications from existing 
employees. The SDLP said the initiative only proved the so called "affirmative action 
programme had failed". A company spokesman later attributed the change to more prosaic 
reasons. The volume of applications was running at 10,000 a year. They simply couldn't 
cope. This included, from April to December 1984,2,649 Catholics and 7,294 Protestants. 
From these applicants 95 Catholics and 507 Protestants were hired. 56 Of the 109 
apprentices recruited, careers teachers estimated 11 to 13 were Catholic. In an earlier 
meeting with former Agency member, Des Bannon in 1986, Cooper claimed he could do 
nothing and suggested Catholic teachers put pressure on Shorts. 57 
Meanwhile the UDA and UVF placed recruitment posters in the factory that depicted men 
with knapsacks and rifles on manoeuvres. The AUEW passed a factory motion expressing 
"opposition to opening a subsidiary factory in West Belfast (at the old De Lorean Plant)" 
and threatened to black components from any new factory. 58 Shorts 1985 annual report 
showed the 6,587 workforce received in salaries £71.1m, a massive injection to the local 
economy. This went primarily to Protestants. By January 1987, only 20 men had been 
recruited to the old De Lorean site, and not until August did advertisements appear for key 
staff such as production managers and supervisors. As the workforce joined the "Ulster 
Says No" campaign, Irish-Americans forced Shorts to issue a warning that unless posters 
and emblems were removed disciplinary action may be taken. This was ignored by the 
workforce. The number of displays were increased and a fictitious death notice of the 
manager saddled with carrying this message posted on factory walls and a local 
59 newspaper. 
When workers participated in the April Loyalist Day of Action and other protests a few 
individual managers docked their clocking in cards and removed some of the posters. The 
Shorts Peoples Loyalist Council responded with more threats and demonstrations and put 
posters up warning managers the Shorts Peoples' Loyalist Council knew who they were. 
60 
56 Irish News report, 7t' November 1985 and 21st December 1985. 57 Des Bannon's comment to author. 58 The UVF displayed its recruitment posters again in December 1985 as Noraid called for the withdrawal of 
its FEA certificate in the US. Irish News, 24`h December 1985. 
5914th November 1985, reported in the press on 15th November 1986. 
60 Sunday World, 16th February 1986. It also reported on Shorts workers defying any flags ban on 12th, & 
26'h January 1986. 
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The failure of management to prevent this attracted much public criticism as the feeling 
spread they had effectively lost control. Despite the protests the MOD placed orders worth 
£290m. This included orders for Javelin missiles valued at £25m in addition to an export 
contract for Blowpipe missiles valued at £40m Another order, the Starstreak High 
Velocity Missile, was estimated to have a long term export value of £1.5bn. Tom King, 
then Secretary of State, said this would "provide employment for years to come", for at 
least 1500 workers. 61 
As orders from government, American airlines and others flowed in the uglier side of 
Shorts rarely left the local headlines. A Catholic female typist was denied employment 
because she had an address in West Belfast. This decision was confirmed by Tom King 
MP on behalf of the MOD who exercised a right of veto using a Section 42 certificate. 62 
Nine Catholics had their clocking in cards torn up by the loyalist Shorts peoples Council 
as a warning to `republicans'. Posters were put up warning management they must accept 
responsibility for the safety of Catholics. One notice entitled, "THE PAPISTS INSIDE 
SHORTS", listed personal details and names of a number of Catholics. It ended: 
"The above are only a few of the fenian bastards we have to work with ... laughing when our flags were torn down but most of all laughing at the Stupid 
Orange bastards who let them work alongside them. From now on anyone found 
fraternising with taigs will be deemed as wanting them to stay and dictate to, and 
threaten the lives of Loyalists in Shorts. The aforementioned are advised not to 
return to Shorts or they and all collaborators will be dealt with". 63 
As these events were published in the US, Shorts called in the RUC and said "Anyone 
found guilty of participation in these activities will be dismissed". In a public statement 
the FEA chair, Cooper appeared to attribute the disturbances to misconceptions created by 
unionist representatives among Protestant workers that the industry would no longer be 
dominated by them. M The Orange Order with over 1800 members in Shorts, many of them 
supervisors and foremen, said any attempt to remove loyalist flags, the Orange Arch, 
plaques to loyalist paramilitaries and the UVF on and other emblems would produce a 
mass walk out. When 2000 workers staged a half day strike all threats of 
disciplinary 
action were dropped and replaced by a request placed in the workers pay packets to 
61 Tom King MP, Secretary of State for NI, 15th December1986; Rhodes Boyson MP Minister of State, 16th 
January 1986, NIO. 
62 Report in Andersontown News, Vol. 11, No. 57,1St February 1986., Belfast. 
63 Loyalist Notice placed in Shorts workplaces in mid-August 1986. 
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remove flags and regalia. Foreman's personal statement reassured them, "So that there is 
no misunderstanding on this issue the Union flag will henceforth be flown every day on 
our headquarters". 65 Further protests led to Shorts placing full page notices in the three 
local daily newspapers, " in order to make the Company's position quite clear to the local 
community". In heavy bold print, Foreman declared, "There has been no discussion on this 
matter with the NIO or the FEA, no discussions and no financial or other pressures have 
been applied to us by Government". Shorts decision was taken "solely for business, not 
political reasons", and stories "about reverse discrimination by Shorts in favour of Roman 
Catholics are completely untrue". 66 The true position was revealed in a debate on fair 
employment at Westminster two years later. Labour's then opposition spokesperson, Kevin 
McNamara MP, revealed that Congress had arrived at an agreement with Michael Stone, 
Under Secretary of the US Army over a $60m contract for Shorts Sherpa aircraft. Stone 
had obliged Shorts to agree to spend $5m of this on subcontractors with predominantly 
Catholic work forces. Specific employment goals also had to be met. These were 17.5% of 
new recruits in 1988,25% in 1989 and 33% in 1990. As McNamara said and Shorts fully 
appreciated, "United States pressure will not go away. It is here to stay and must be 
addressed". 67 Although the US General Accounting office concluded the Sherpa had 
insufficient air range it renewed options with Shorts for four years. The work force 
continued to fly close to the wind by demonstrating when Tom King paid a visit in 
January 1987 by putting up more loyalist regalia. 
Another side of Shorts role for Britain was teased out in the US as part of the larger 
scandal surrounding Oliver North. The Tower Commission on Irangate, indicated a direct 
collusion between North and Shorts to supply the Contras in Nicaragua with Blowpipe 
missiles. North's memo in March 1986, confirmed, "The MFGR (manufacturer) of the 
blowpipe is willing to arrange the deal, conduct the training and even send UK technical 
reps forward if we can close the arrangement". 
68 A deposit was paid. At this stage the 
Contras had killed over 1200 Nicaraguans. The Independent newspaper provided 
further 
revelations in June 1987. British intelligence services collaborated with the CIA to supply 
330 Blowpipe missiles to the Afghan Mojahedin. One leader, Abdul 
Hag, had discussed 
64Guardian report, 19th August 1986 for both statements. 
6 Belfast Telegraph, 29th August 1986. 
66 6 Shorts full page advertisement in all the three major dailies Irish News, 
Belfast Telegraph, Newsletter,, 
30th August 1986. 
67 Hansard, Cols., 643-645,1 July 1988. 
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the arms supply on a visit to Downing Street in March 1986. An M15 officer, Peter Preece 
had acted as go between. The newspaper claimed four senior executives from Shorts were 
aware of the M15/CIA operation and given the order a special code number. 69 The Foreign 
Secretary, Geoffrey Howe MP replied by expressing astonishment, "anyone should be 
alarmed or dismayed at the efforts of the Afghan people to defend themselves. They face 
the might of a vast modem army. Most MP's will thank goodness that modem weapons are 
getting through". " Apart from registering formal protests, the then Soviet Union 
confirmed British instructors had been sent to train the Mojahedin in the use of Short's 
Blowpipes. 
In the midst of this militant sectarianism the MOD awarded another contract worth £2m in 
June 1987. Almost immediately another incident led to a walk out by 3000 workers when 
a token gesture was made by Shorts to remove some flags. Workers accused Foreman of 
breaching the agreement made the previous year. Foreman appealed to all workers to let 
common sense prevail and allow Shorts to demonstrate it "runs a tight ship". Bunting went 
up on all Shorts plants and pickets brought production to a standstill. Loyalists at 
Ballylumford power station threatened to come out in support. This would have brought 
the North's energy supplies to a standstill. Boeing in the US however told Foreman to "get 
tough", or lose a contract worth £200m to participate in Boeing's new 150 seater aircraft. 
Foreman had described this as Shorts "ticket to the 21 st century" 
The factories were closed on the Friday as negotiations took place with the unions, local 
politicians and the NIO. To ward off pressure from the US, management removed bunting 
from production areas and returned them to the factory loyalist committee. Flags in other 
areas remained. Everyone's pride appeared to have been satisfied. To celebrate, 500 
workers carrying UDA, UVF and Red hand Commando flags marched around the harbour 
estate joined by men from the shipyard. Foreman retired in March 1988. In his thirty years 
at the company Foreman's contribution to equality of opportunity had proved 
indiscernible. 71 
68 Guardian, 28th February 1987, and 8th July 1987, for British sales to the Mojahedin in Afghanistan. 
69 The Independent, London, June 1987. 
70 Hansard, 26th June, 1987. Press reports include Irish News, 19th & 27th June 1987. 
" Local press reports , Irish 
News, Belfast Telegraph, 18th -30th August 1986, and 
Graham, D. `Short-lived 
success? ', New Society, 5th September 1986. 
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The government decided to privatise Shorts in 1988. Its losses on the year ending March 
1988 were £142.5m on sales of £192m. In February 1989 the government took over 
£390m of Shorts bank loans as a first step in reducing liabilities to potential buyers. In 
October the privatisation process was completed by the sale to Bombardier Inc. of Canada 
for £30m. The Secretary of State confirmed "The Government is prepared to provide 
substantial funding in order to put the company on a sound financial base". 72 While Shorts 
had lost over £200m in the previous two years, the government further committed sums in 
excess of £780m in write-offs, capital reconstruction and investment. The totals worked 
out at approximately £ 111,000 per job for its 7000 work force. The MOD boosted this by 
placing orders worth £40m in December 1989. An Audit Office report in 1991 revealed 
the privatisation had cost the taxpayer £300m more than estimated due to the unexpectedly 
high costs of Shorts past and weak management controls over finance. 73 
Roy McNulty, the president of Shorts, predicted sales of up to £800m a year, equivalent to 
profits of around £30m by around 1998, due to work on Fokker jetliners, sales of nacelles 
for Rolls-Royce engines and work for their Canadian parent. 74 In addition their ownership 
of Belfast Harbour Airport saw aviation services growing with 1.2 million customers a 
year. At the end of 1995, the MOD awarded another contract worth £37m for Starstreak 
missiles with a further order of £28m in 1996. This was expected to secure 550 jobs over 
the medium term. Shorts had become the largest single manufacturer in the North 
accounting for around 10% of its GDP. 
The take over by the French Canadian engineering group Bombardier Corporation may 
create some interesting dilemmas. It has expressed a formal commitment to equal 
opportunities and has been influenced by its contracts with New York City to build 
subway trains. The latter played a major leadership role in the promotion of the MacBride 
equal opportunity principles (cf. below). Bombardier indicated to the Quebec Committee 
on Ireland as well as to its own Canadian trade union groups who have been supporting 
strong affirmative policies at Shorts that it aimed to get Catholics up to 
25% of the 
workforce in as short a period as possible. Short's (relatively new at the time) equal 
opportunities manager, a former employee of the FEA, Rory Galway, claimed strenuous 
72 Peter Viggers MP Under Secretary of State, 21St & 22nd July 1988, NIO press notices. 
7s NIO, Ibid. 
74 Roy McNulty, President of Short Bros., press statements 1995. 
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efforts were now made to promote shorts in Catholic schools and newspapers. He 
considered the disparity was now due not to actual discrimination but to "in-built selection 
procedures which perpetuate the existing imbalance". He added, "It has to be recognised 
that Short Brothers was seen as more or less a no go area for many Catholics. Now we are 
saying this is a company to which you can apply in confidence and know you will be 
treated fairly". 75 There is substantial evidence this view was not shared by the workforce 
who manufactured the product and carry out the recruitment for manufacturing staff. As 
Shorts and Harland & Wolff laid down their strategies for the 21st century, the message 
for Catholics within and outside the factory gates remained the traditional one. 76 
Shorts exercised a critical role in the NI economy. Its products placed it at the centre of 
British military intelligence and Foreign Office considerations thereby having the full 
support of government and its agents. Such was its importance that the government could 
require a purportedly independent equal opportunity enforcement agency, the FEA, to 
become its advocate with foreign states to assist secure orders for military hardware. This 
wholly unprecedented activity by any equal opportunity body in Britain or the US 
effectively reduced the FEA to no more than a propaganda vehicle. This proved a fatal 
blow to its credibility in the US and would lead to its demise. However this was a prime 
example of a situation where the government did intervene financially throughout the 
1970's and 1980's but not seek to alter employment inequalities. It was only when 
loyalists demonstrated so vigorously against British policies within the workplace during a 
highly sensitive time for contract negotiations with the US and the Irish American lobby 
became so effective that the government acted to take off the hard loyalist edge. Kevin 
McNamara MP claimed a secret deal was done to secure greater Catholic recruitment. If 
so the fact that it was secret indicates again the degree to which government policy was 
led by a unionist agenda. The end result was highly damaging to the local political process 
and simply confirmed loyalist workplaces were no go areas for Catholics. The symbolic 
role of the British governments' partnership with Shorts and the shipyard cannot 
be 
underestimated. Its actions were highly counterproductive in terms of 
laying foundations 
for an accommodation with nationalists. 
75 People Management, London 1P' January 1996. 
76 Following the attacks on New York on 110' September 2001, combined with a slow 
down in demands for 
aerospace products Bombardier announced plans to reduce its workforce 
from 7,300 at Shorts by 480 with 
another 400 temporary staff in January 2002. Its order book remained 




The motor car industry has a significant presence in Belfast in the form of Ford Autolite 
which is located in Andersonstown, Catholic West Belfast. Established in 1965 constant 
allegations of discrimination were made by civil rights protesters. Ford's work force in the 
late 1960's was estimated to be 1200 and around 67% Protestant. The closed shop 
agreement ensured skilled apprentice jobs were handed down to sons of existing skilled 
workers as recruits were employed by word of mouth and family connections. People's 
Democracy, which emerged from the civil rights movement alleged the then personnel 
officer was a member of the UDR who was openly hostile to Catholics. They claimed 
personnel officers simply destroyed applications from Catholics. 77 By 1981 Ford 
employed 1504. The skilled workforce of 90 was 91% Protestant. Local Ford management 
opposed the application of equal opportunity legislation. They for example refused to co- 
operate with the FEA's equality study during 1977-80. In response to requests for 
compositional information Ford management asserted their work force was evenly 
balanced and declined to provide the FEA with any evidence to support or assess this 
claim. 78 
The ninth annual FEA report for 1983-84 recorded a finding of discrimination against an 
unnamed engineering company. This was Fords. In 1983 Fords had refused two Catholic 
workers pass outs which would have allowed the men to leave at 2pm rather than 4.30pm. 
The plant manager, Mr. Carruthers imposed a blanket ban on the morning of St. Patrick's 
day. When the two left regardless they were disciplined. It was then discovered two 
Protestants retained their pass outs to attend the opening of a golf club. Further enquiries 
revealed that on the day, 10 Catholics had requested pass outs and 4 Protestants. The 
Protestants were granted passes and the Catholics refused. Faced with this "coincidence" 
the FEA concluded the company was guilty of discrimination. Fords' policy towards 
Orange celebrations was similar to Shorts. As part of the annual Protestant 12th and 
13th 
July demonstrations, Fords always closed two hours early on the 11th July. This meant 
Catholic workers were deprived of two hours wages to subsidise this 
holiday. Holidays on 
"Discrimination in Autolite, Peoples Democracy. Undated, March/April 1977. People Democracy was 
formed in 1968 in Belfast as a general leftist student based civil rights organisation. 
78 Fair Employment Agency, Fords, August 1977, January 1980,3rd February 1981 Reports. 
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the 12th and 13th were compulsory. Fords insisted however that St. Patrick's was of no 
significance to Catholics as a holiday. 79 
These disputes coincided with growing activity by the Irish National Caucus and its allies 
in the American Congress. As little progress was made they began to intervene. The 
Comptroller's Office for New York and others submitted shareholder resolutions in 1986 
demanding Ford adopt the MacBride Principles in the North. This came at an 
embarrassing moment for Ford as it was just about to receive £IOm in British government 
grants as part of a £30m expansion plan. Again the British government was uniquely 
placed to act and failed to do so. This followed on from earlier in the year when further 
political embarrassment had been caused by the discovery that Ford Dagenham in Essex, 
discriminated against black hourly paid workers in recruitment. 80 This in itself had 
attracted a high degree of attention in America. The Belfast situation intensified the 
pressure at Fords' US headquarters. They agreed to conduct a comprehensive review of 
employment practices in Belfast if the shareholders withdrew their motion. The INC had 
mounted a boycott Ford campaign and distributed a million leaflets detailing 
discrimination in Belfast. They utilised the Irish-American consumer market and church 
base of their leading figures to mark down Ford in the highly competitive American 
market. Fords responded by sending their vice-president for Employee and External 
Affairs, with a seven man executive team, to conduct the enquiry. 
The team confirmed the MacBride Principles would be used as "a measure of fair 
employment practices". The report covered Fords' employment history from 1965 to 
1985, with specific allegations from 1985 to 1987 considered separately. They visited the 
factory on 15th June and published their work Fair Employment Policies and Practices, 
on 15th September 1987.81 At the time of the survey Fords' work force had fallen to 800. 
The religious composition was found to be at May 1987,307 (38.4%) Catholic, 456 (57%) 
Protestant and 37 unknown. Catholics were under-represented in six major job categories. 
One out of 13 senior managers was Catholic; 1 out of 11 clerical staff; 5 (33.3%) middle 
managers; 45 (37.5%) supervisors and professionals; 231 (42%) semi- skilled and 
24 
(26.4%). The distribution of the work force within the factory confirmed a 
history of 
79 Fair Employment Agency, Ninth Annual Report for 1983-84, Belfast HMSO. 
80 The Guardian, 2nd October 1986. 
81 Fords', "Fair Employment Policies and Practices", at Ford Autolite, 15th September 1987. 
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inequality of opportunity. Catholics were concentrated in 7 departments were they 
accounted for 56.8% (192) whereas in 4 other departments Protestant domination was 77% 
(196). 
The American officials opened negotiations with the local TGWU to make St. Patrick's a 
holiday; a list of compliance principles to be monitored by the US and Ford's equal 
employment office in Britain were imposed; all internal and external forms were to carry 
Fords' commitment as a "constant reminder" and a scholarship was introduced to be 
offered on the "basis of equality of opportunity" with employment for a graduate trainee 
guaranteed. The nine point set of principles directly reflected the MacBride principles. 
Ford said that in adopting "the substance of the MacBride principles", they hoped to avoid 
"legal and operational obstacles to implementation". This comment reflected the fact the 
NIO and FEA were then engaged in a vigorous anti-MacBride campaign in the US. 
The report stated individuals from "under-represented religious groups", were to be 
increased; the display of "provocative religious or political emblems", prohibited and 
security arrangements enhanced. Job reservations and restrictions on apprentices were 
ended and training programmes "so far as the law permits", were to be established to 
advance "under-represented religious groups". Lay-offs had also to be free from "religious 
criteria". At this stage no action was taken against the existing managers who were 
responsible for the situation in the plant. Further pressure in the US led to the key figures 
being replaced by two Catholics. 82 
Irish-Americans hailed this as a breakthrough. For the first time an American employer 
had directly responded to their campaign by conducting an equal opportunity audit in the 
North. The work carried out over a few days made a stark comparison with six years of 
work by the FEA that produced four sentences in an obscure report that failed to even 
identify the company. 83 Fords' example demonstrated how the strength of money - in this 
case institutional investors with billions of dollars at their disposal and political clout in 
America could be deployed to progress equality of opportunity. Further food 
for thought 
for its workforce was provided by Fords' decision to sell its 60 year old 
investments in 
82 Ibid., see also Religion and Fair Employment in NI: Case Studies of Six American Companies, 
Bertsch, 
K. A. & Voorhes, M. Investor Responsibility Research Centre, January 1990, Washington, USA. 
83 FEA Engineering Report, 1983. 
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South Africa in response to sustained shareholders pressure. 84 Yet a major source of grant 
aid and tax breaks, the British government, remained silent and failed to act in accordance 
with its public commitment to end discrimination. 
Despite this report the general management practices of Ford UK remained of some 
concern. Trade unions identified Fords in Britain as an organisation, which utilised the 
Economic League-a right wing group that maintained secret "blacklists" of people they 
regarded as political troublemakers for employers. Although Ford stated they withdrew 
from this service in September 1990, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, claimed a new 
process of vetting would achieve the same result. At the end of November 1990, New 
York City's Comptroller, Elizabeth Holtzman, publicly criticised Ford Belfast for failing 
to deliver on its equal opportunity commitments. New York City owned $64.7m of Ford 
stock. She said Ford had failed to make "any special efforts to attract applicants from 
under represented groups and in some cases has limited hiring to internal candidates to the 
detriment of Catholic workers". Nothing had been done about the St. Patrick's holiday 
issue and Fords "still seem to have significant difficulties in achieving its goals and 
making its position clear in the community". 85 Internal sources reported that the new 
Catholic managers had proved unable or unwilling to take on the loyalist controlled shop 
stewards who were blocking progress. IDB promotional literature quotes, Fords former 
manager, Mr. Carruthers acclaiming "Work to the people of Northern Ireland is a way of 
life". Given the nature of the car industry which utilises short time working, temporary 
workers and lay offs as common work practices it is important in terms of equality that 
policies and objectives are consistent and verifiable. 
Ford UK for example lost £920m in 1991, and made 2000 workers redundant from its 
39,000 workforce during 1991-92. Over 1000 were at Halewood on the Merseyside with 
the rest at Dagenham in East London, Wales and Belfast. In April 1992, it decided to 
contract out the design and production of seats for the Escort, Fiesta and Orion models. 
86 
Ford also predicted a decline in its European markets losing $407m in 1993 although 
domestic production in Britain remained sound with Ford retaining market 
leadership. 
" The Guardian, 15th July 1987. 
85 Local press reports, Irish News, Belfast Telegraph, November 1990. 86 Interestingly among those who lost their jobs included women sewing machinists whose 
two week strike 
in 1968 secured a historic victory leading to the 1970 Equal Pay Act. Another six week strike 
in 1984 which 
cost the company £250m secured the women's claim for equal pay 
for work of equal value. 
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Ford for example invested £l5m in 1994 in its engine component plant in Belfast. By 
1994 Fords' workforce in Belfast was down to 635. This contained 277 Catholics. 87 
During 1996 Fords caused much controversy by "whiting out", the faces of black and 
Asian workers at Dagenham which was supposed to promote Ford's as an equal 
opportunity employer. In June 1996 seven black and Asian workers took the company to 
an industrial tribunal accusing the management at Dagenham of declining to transfer 
ethnic workers to the much coveted £32,000 a year jobs as lorry drivers. The assessors 
were accused of operating a family only policy which was not challenged by senior 
management. In 1998 Fords announced production of the new Jaguar would take place at 
Halewood. While this was welcome relief to Merseyside the evidence is that Ford UK and 
Ford NI in particular have failed to combat discrimination. A view reinforced by the 
controversy at Ford Dagenhams in late 1999 over racist bullying, assaults and threats that 
Bill Morris, general secretary of the TGWU described as the "tip of the iceberg". 88 
In an industry that suffers from such volatile swings as the car industry it ill behoved a 
government with equality as a "moral objective" to simply act as an observer. In NI it 
became exposed to intervention by Irish American interests who secured more in terms of 
public profile, education and expectation than it had achieved over 25 years. At the very 
least it illustrated the fact that the British governments' equal opportunity policy at this 
time was at best devoid of leadership and direction. It also underpinned the fact that 
inequalities became an issue only when groups other than the government made it one. 
Dreammakers. 
Two examples of enthusiastic British intervention to secure American investment provide 
an interesting footnote to this section. They are both important due to the unprecedented 
amounts of money Britain would deploy, very unwisely as it turned out, when it decided to 
intervene politically and economically in a company's development. They are also 
examples of what can happen when ad hoc decisions are made in the absence of any 
coherent strategy to secure equality of opportunity in manufacturing. 
One of the most colourful investors to grace Irish shores and leave as suddenly as 
he 
arrived was John Zachary De Lorean. The then Labour minister, Roy 
Mason MP, literally 
87 FEC Monitoring Returns, 1994. 
88 Beckett, Andy. Engine Trouble, The Guardian, G2 Feature, 6th October 1999. 
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threw £54 millions of public money at him. While De Lorean took off, his silver gull- 
winged car `bombed'. On August 3rd 1978, De Lorean announced his dream project, the 
DMC 2 was to be constructed from scratch at Dunmurray in Belfast. Mason promised 
2,400 jobs. Catholics were to gain by having the factory on their door step. Mason saw this 
as "weaning youngsters away from the IRA", or the `plastic bullets and leisure centre 
strategy' as it was locally known at the time. De Lorean secured as his legal representative 
a former senior insider to the NIDA who had also been Stormont's Minister of Commerce. 
A shelf company, GPD Services, was set up in Panama, then moved to Geneva, 
Switzerland, in order to transfer funds received from the government. Lotus undertook the 
development work for £ 12m. They claimed later none of the $17.8m research costs were 
ever paid. The official receiver later reported he found it unusual for a company to 
guarantee development costs and then for Lotus to invoice the De Lorean Research Ltd 
partnership for over £11.5m for the very same work as "astonishing". When Lotus claimed 
not to have received the $17.8m he said, "To say we were surprised, is understating it". 
The conclusion was a massive fraud had been perpetrated against the public purse. As it 
began to fall apart in 1980, the report showed Humphrey Atkins, then Secretary of State, 
ignored those advising against further grants by giving De Lorean another £14m for the 
project. 89 
De Lorean claimed to have secured $300m of orders before the first car was built. 
Rejected by Puerto Rico and Dublin, Mason proudly declared he had "nailed the deal in 45 
days". 90 De Lorean's financial contribution was a relatively small sum of $0.5m. This also 
happened to be the figure he chose as his annual salary and excluded the £65m he would 
transfer from DMC in interest free loans to his American based company. Hotel California 
had come to Belfast. Production started in 1981 and 8000 were actually built before 
closure. 3000 were sold with some difficulty at discount prices as the car proved 
technically flawed, treacherous in the rain and a fire safety risk. As financial problems 
intensified, James Prior, then Secretary of State, declared that at £93m enough was 
enough. The plant closed on 31 st May 1982 with 1000 cars still on the 
line. The receivers 
were called in on October and twenty other companies across Britain went 
bankrupt as a 
result. US dealers were owed $1 m and the last 16 maintenance workers went 
home. At the 
same time De Lorean was arrested by the FBI for alleged cocaine dealing. 
89 How De Lorean Came to Belfast, Fallon, Ivan. & Srodes, James. Irish Times Supplement, 
18th June 1983. 
90 Roy Mason MP, MO press statement. 
179 
The official receiver informed the Commons Public Accounts Committee in July 1984, 
$17.65m of public money had gone missing. $9m had been traced to various holding 
banks and it was discovered De Lorean and his management team had paid themselves 
£1.8m a year. 91 Liquidators were still trying to recover the £113m owed by the company 
from auditors Arthur Anderson in 1989. In July 1989, the former chairman of Lotus car 
company was charged with conspiring with De Lorean to defraud the company of £3.5m. 
Earlier in 1986 De Lorean had been cleared of embezzling £5.9m. The Accounts 
Committee described the project as "one of the gravest cases of the misuse of public 
resources", and "a shocking misappropriation of public and private money". 92 As Mason's 
fellow MP's charged him and others with "dishonesty, duplicity and incompetence", he 
asserted "I have no regrets. No private enterprise employer would go into West Belfast". 93 
The following assesses just how much of this investment went to the community, for 
whose benefit, all this had allegedly been done. 
At the point of closure 1439 were employed. De Lorean claimed 2000 had been employed 
by August 1981 and for a brief week in January 1982,2600. Despite the massive 
investment and political importance of the project no equality monitoring was ever carried 
out by the FEA. However the Department of Manpower Services (DMS), conducted a 
number of exercises covering recruitment from inception to March 1981. Classified as 
"Restricted", some reasonable assessments in terms of religion can be made from the 
information gathered. 94 
The first 469 employees were in place by mid-November 1980. The bulk, 287 were 
production workers. The majority, 284, came from the Belfast and Lisburn district council 
areas. Wards which provided more than 10 employees included, Andersonstown, Clonard, 
Finaghy, Ladybrook, St. James and Whiterock. Suffolk provided 30 and Dunmurray 82. Of 
these 284, approximately 118 came from predominantly Catholic wards. One significant 
fact discovered was that 65% of the total work force were `job changers'. This suggests 
the unemployed regardless of religion were benefiting to a lesser degree than expected. 
91 Belfast Telegraph, 18th July 1984, Irish News 2nd May 1985. 
92 All Party House of Commons Committee Report, HMSO, 11th July 1986. 93 The Guardian report, 12th July 1986. 94 De Lorean Motor Cars Ltd. Monitoring Report No. I on Employment up to Mid-November 1980, and 
Monitoring Report No. 2 on Employment November 1980-March 1981. DMS, Northern Ireland. 
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A second report completed in July 1981 examined the intake between November 1980 and 
March 1981. Of the 560 employed the majority, 474, again came from the Greater Belfast 
and Lisburn areas. When broken down to the district council level, 130 of the 341 from 
Belfast and Lisburn were Catholic. For example the Protestant Dunmurray ward provided 
88, the Catholic Ladybrook 24, New Lodge 1, Milltown 8 and so on. The unemployed 
fared better this time with 46% (257) recorded as job changers. With 1092 recruited by the 
middle of July 1981, the religion could be ascertained for around 625 production and 
clerical workers. Catholics accounted for 248 (39.7%) of this number. With the origin of 
others recorded at a less specific level religious labelling becomes highly speculative. 95 
It is clear however some short term benefits occurred for both Catholic and Protestants 
employees. As De Lorean chased his own silverstreak dream, significant investment in 
West Belfast was dealt a mighty blow. As a footnote on this sorry episode, De Lorean's car 
was used in the successful Hollywood movie, Back To the Future. On the 6th May 1992, 
the RUC issued a warrant for his arrest. The week previously, former Lotus Car Company 
chief, Fred Bushell, admitted to conspiring with DeLorean to defraud DMC and the public 
purse of £10m. Delorean cannot be extradited from the US. Bushell was jailed for three 
years and fined £2.25m. The judge accused them of a "barefaced, outrageous and massive 
fraud". Both De Lorean and Chapman would have merited a sentence of ten years had they 
been before the courts. Bushell's sentence reflected the state of his health and a guilty plea. 
Between them they had netted half the initial £35.9m in government grants to themselves. 
Another American high flyer and fast talker to bite the dust was Lear Fan. His 
revolutionary carbon fibre executive jet promised 2,800 jobs, this time 
in Protestant areas 
at Newtownabbey and Antrim. When it `crashlanded' in August 
1984,380 lost 




A more stable investor was General Motors subsidiary, 
Fisher Body, which manufactures 
seat belts. Established in East Belfast at Dundonald, the 
former Rolls Royce plant, it 
95 Authors analysis of data. 
96 All Party House of Commons Committee 10th July 1986, 
Irish News 11th July 1986. 
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received £35m in grants. The plant was decorated with the standard loyalist regalia. In 
1981 the management in response to US pressure ordered the removal of these symbols. 
The workforce went on strike. A climb down ensued although when another plant was 
opened at Kennedy Way in 1982, - the Catholic side of town, - displays were expressly 
prohibited. The unions operated a "first in last out", policy which led to 60% of the 350 
employed at Kennedy Way being laid off when design problems occurred in 1985. The 
900 at Dundonald were not effected although 100 were laid off in 1991. 
This led to institutional shareholders proposing motions calling on GM to adopt the 
MacBride Principles. In 1987, the New York Comptroller's office and other investors 
forced GM to instruct local management to remove the sectarian flags and emblems at 
Dundonald. 97 It was also a year of 114 job cuts and threats to close the Kennedy Way 
plant completely which were imposed with AUEW support without regard to any concept 
of equity or an employment strategy that sought to promote and afford equal opportunities 
during cut backs. 
Again these examples illustrate the capacity and willingness of the British government to 
grant and maintain large inducements to secure external investment but critically with "no 
strings" attached. It is noteworthy that each of these "Catholic" investments occurred 
during periods of major civil conflict. However it has been apparent throughout that even 
when sectarian disputes occur and become international issues there has been no overt 
public intervention or utilisation of public funds to direct and promote equality of 
opportunity by punitive or other measures. 
Smoking 
The two main cigarette manufacturers were Carreras (Rothmans) and Gallaghers 
(American Brands) which was part of a larger group with sales profits of £3.4bn. Carreras 
opened at Carrickfergus in 1964 with employment peaking at 1500 in 1980. Many of the 
work force came from the nearby Protestant estates in Rathcoole, 
Greenisland and North 
Belfast. Its closure in August 1986 was a devastating blow. Between 
1980 and May 1986, 
the area had lost almost 7000 jobs in three international companies. 
Courtaulds alone had 
97 General Motors statement, reported in Irish News, 23ýd May 1987. 
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employed 4000. The local Protestant sense of security and well being brought about by 
two decades of employment was severely shaken. Another shock occurred in 1986 when 
Gallaghers announced the decision to close its Belfast plant that dominated the foreshores 
of North Belfast. 
Gallaghers imposing red brick factory overlooked the surrounding Catholic New Lodge, 
with the work force drawn from the Protestant Tigers Bay area, the Old Park, Whitecity 
and former communities devastated by redevelopment along the foreshore. Another plant 
was located in Ballymena. Together they employed 3000. In Belfast 34 of the 446 
workforce were Catholic; of these 3 out of 71 were managers, 2 out of 50 were staff; and 
11 of the 157 semi-skilled and unskilled. At Ballymena, 197 of the 197 of the 1559 em 
ployed were Catholic. Of these 2 out of 50 were managers; 13 out of 117 senior staff; 5 
out of 55 staff; 8 of 108 skilled workers and 166 out of 1023 semi-skilled and unskilled. 98 
Profits at the time of the closure were £87.1m. The Ballymena work force lost 290 from 
the 1570 employed, while 480 workers were retained from the Belfast plant. American 
institutional shareholders mounted investigations into management practices and 
concluded the company had "a notorious reputation for discriminatory hiring practices". 
As with other Protestant companies, the factories were adorned with loyalist 
paraphernalia, the workers participated in loyalist protests, and loyalist para-militaries 
recruited on the shop floor. 99 
New York's Comptroller's office, the Franciscan Friars and Sisters of Charity, New Jersey, 
put forward shareholder resolutions to oblige American Brands to endorse the MacBride 
Principles. The company, supported by the FEA, and BIO in Washington, claimed this 
"course of conduct would be illegal". The Comptroller's office sought a legal direction 
from the Federal District Courts to uphold the legality of their proposals. When the 
American courts sustained this view Gallagher's was forced to make a public commitment 
to equal opportunities and specifically prohibit displays, "which are either causing offence, 
apprehension or being blatantly provocative". 
100 Within a week workers protests at 
Ballymena led by Paisley led to the reversal of this position, with flags and emblems on 
98 IRRC, 1988,1990 USA. Case Studies of Six American Companies, Bertsch, K. A. and Voorhes, M. 
January 1990, IRRC, Washington USA, and Booth, H. E. US Companies and Fair Employment Practices in 
Northern Ireland, JRRC, 1988. 
" elfast Telegraph reports, 1st May 1986, Rhodes Boyson MP Minister of State press releases 
1st, 6th and 
27th May 1986, NTO. 
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display for July. 
The American institutions in turn threatened to disinvest pension funds which at the time 
would have left Gallaghers exposed to a take over bid by Hanson Trust. Honour and 
prejudice were finally satisfied by the trade unions accepting a ban on displays in return 
for the Union Jack flying on the company flagpole. The Transport and General Workers 
Union confirmed "A lot of this pressure was coming from the United States". '°'The 
position was reinforced in 1988 when 2000 warning letters were issued to employees. 
Despite Gallagher's reputation and the nature of this controversy the company was not 
subject to a formal investigation by the FEA. From 1976 to August 1982, Gallagher's 
personnel manager was a member of the FEA board deciding upon individual complaints 
and determining strategic issues such formal investigations. Not until December 1988, did 
the FEA conduct a compostional analysis which in itself was too late to influence any 
redundancy or training issues. The company dominates over 40% of the UK market. 102 
Flying the flag. 
Flying the flag during the Anglo-Irish Agreement protests became a common feature in 
Protestant work places. Tensions were high, tempers short, parades and displays frequent. 
The GEC plant at Lame was another important example. It received significant grant aid, 
and had direct connections with senior government ministers. For example the former 
Secretary of State, James Prior, became GEC chairman on his resignation from politics. 
By 1986,750 were employed at GEC with a growth target of 2,500 as part of the grant 
package. These targets however were never reached and GEC instead reduced its 
workforce by 265. Despite this insecurity and the reliance on government grants the 
workforce, management and trade unions did not alter the traditional loyalist band parades 
and displays. 
loo Irish News Report 30th April 1986,18th July 1986; 23rd, 24th, 27th, June 1987; ist July 1987. 
101 Irish News, 25th August 1987. 
102 By 1994 its total workforce of 1186 included 155 Catholics. Between 1992 and 1994 Gallaghers had 
reduced its workforce by 388 with further redundancies in 1996. In 1995 Gallaghers put its Prestige non- 
electrical houseware business and its Forbuoys CTN (confectioner, tobacconist and newsagent) chains for 
sale to raise betweeen £94m to £ 11 Om. The Co-Operative retailers which took over Gallaghers site in Belfast 
employed 80 Catholics in its 562 workforce across the North. (FEC Monitoring Returns, 1996). 
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The senior shop steward described the factory parades as "a traditional event with no real 
sectarian connotation. " The general manager expressed surprise that any of the few 
Catholics at GEC "felt intimidated". He felt "as it was a light hearted event it would be 
inappropriate to take any action which might have harmed overall industrial relations" , 
103 
Many Catholics in NI would consider loyalist parades in the workplace about as `light 
hearted' as a Klu Klux Klan cross burning ritual. Earlier in 1987 the IDB had supported a 
£20m investment programme with the prospect of another 100 jobs. GEC was also bidding 
for US contracts. As workers protests increased, the press reported that the English Board 
of Directors in Rugby advised local management it could not afford to have potential 
contracts jeopardised by sectarian loyalist demonstrations. 
The local manager accordingly issued a warning letter advising "that flags and buntings 
are totally inappropriate and unacceptable in a modern factory environment". This 
produced a vociferous reaction with larger parades and displays. An Irish News editorial 
condemned GEC as a "firm that permits the type of terrorism to be a traditional feature of 
life in one of their factories". The SDLP derided management as "weak and pathetic" in 
the face of "the most blatant example of loyalist bullyboy methods". 104 The INC attempted 
to have the US House Sub Committee on Appropriations suspend US contracts. The GEC 
board responded by instructing that disciplinary action be taken. Apart from minor 
warnings little was done and the plant settled down into the relative calm of the post 
marching season for another year. In April 1991, GEC announced it was to shed 900 jobs 
at four UK sites. This included the closure of the Larne plant with a loss of 500 jobs. 
Another opportunity for positive intervention by government in terms of equality over a 
decade had been lost. 
Flags and emblems are a serious matter. In some incidents workers have threatened to 
bring the whole economy to a halt should their "birthright" be infringed. During the Shorts 
protests for example Ballylumford power station workers asserted, "we are prepared to 
kick very hard, " to support workers at Shorts "in their struggle to fly the flag of the 
country freely". A work force could even prevent contractors getting work 
if they 
considered they employed too many "fenians". A High Court case involving a 
Catholic 
demolition company revealed the Ballylumford work force and trade unions 
had 
1031rish News, 11th June 1987 
104 Irish News, 3rd and 1 lth July 1987. 
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successfully blocked a contract award to a Catholic company even though they proffered a 
lower tender. In this case, the Northern Ireland Electricity Service management were 
found to have supported this, thereby effectively depriving the company of a living as the 
NIES was a monopoly supplier for this specialist work. '°5 
Conclusion. 
These examples in manufacturing demonstrate the absence of a consistent and 
comprehensive equal opportunity package directed by the British government. While 
investing millions of pounds in the attraction, maintenance and development of key sectors 
of employment this was done without setting any specific preconditions or demands to 
further equality of opportunity. The pressure when it came appears to have been in 
response to the degree of political violence or crisis and or American institutional 
intervention. 
The British government had commissioned major investigations into the causes of civil 
unrest, i. e. the Cameron Report; it had prorogued Stormont to avoid the possibility of civil 
war; it had been witness to violence, death and destruction in all parts of Britain, it 
provided enormous sums to fund and maintain manufacturing and public service 
employment; it was the parliament for the whole of the UK; yet it had not utilised its 
economic muscle or legislative making powers to produce a coherent anti-discrimination 
strategy that would fundamentally alter and reverse patterns of inequality. In this respect it 
has been argued that government cannot avoid a direct responsibility for the enduring 
quality of these differences and their often physical consequences. 
This has continued throughout the 1990's. For example the government placed orders 
worth £4bn to upgrade the RAF's defence capabilities. This included the development of a 
Storm Shadow missile, and 21 Nimrod 2000's. The main contractor is British Aerospace. 
Its sub-contractors include Shorts thereby sustaining 200 jobs and GEC as a main partner 
following vigorous government intervention (GEC was originally part of a rival 
bid). 106 
What the government did do however was try and ameliorate political unrest 
by 
105 Court case report in Irish News 12th June 1987; and Ballylumford report 
in Irish News 4th July 1987. 
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introducing the Fair Employment (1976) Act and Fair Employment Agency. We will now 
assess its degree of success by reference to specific investigations, key players and the role 
of government. It will be argued that from its introduction to its demise under the 1989 
Act, the record is one of failure. While the reasons for this are several ranging from 
political intervention, lack of leadership and incompetence a central thread to the argument 
advanced throughout the work is the unionist paradigm that constantly marked the 
limitations of any such social policy goals and objectives. We have already demonstrated 
by earlier comparisons with the American legislative model it did not have the power or 
indeed the objective to fundamentally alter sectarian employment patterns. We will now 
demonstrate that the FEA rarely tried and indeed became a wholly discredited broker for 
equality of opportunity. This will be exemplified by reference to original material. 107 
106 The Times, 26 July, 1996. 
107 The Fair Employment and Treatment (NI) Order 1998 and the Race Relations 
(NI) Order are not part of 
this analysis 
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Chapter 7. Quis Custodiat Ipos Custodes: FEA In Action 1976-89. 
Introduction. 
This chapter reviews the application of the Fair Employment Act 1976 by the Fair 
Employment Agency (FEA). The failure of the Agency to achieve any change in patterns 
of inequality or attitudes are assessed against a British agenda to sustain the unionist status 
quo. The reasons for abandoning formal investigations, changing findings or not 
publishing reports in the context of external political pressures and in the opinion of 
several Agency staff the political prejudices of Agency Board members are examined. It is 
argued that the FEA Board allowed the application of the Act to be reduced to no more 
than a propaganda vehicle. This theme is developed further in Chapter 8, which outlines 
the government's response to the intense Irish American campaign for equality of 
opportunity in NI. It also serves as a critical pointer to the successive reviews of the 1976 
and 1989 Fair Employment Acts carried out by the NI Standing Advisory Committee on 
Human Rights (SACHR). 
While the Act came fully into effect on 1 st December 1976 the Agency itself was set up in 
September with eight staff. The Department of Manpower Services published a voluntary 
Code of Manpower Policy and Practice and the Agency in accordance with Section 6 of 
the Act encouraged employers to sign a "Declaration of Commitment and Intent", to 
implement principles of equality of opportunity. The CBI and unionist controlled councils 
opposed signing this due either to their opposition to the Act or the implied implication, 
they claimed, that to sign such a Declaration would be construed as evidence they had 
discriminated in the past. The CBI for example sought and obtrained agreement from the 
FEA that employers could agree to sign Declarations which had the statement, "we will 
continue to promote and protect .... 
" equality of opportunity. The FEA Board acceded to 
this demand in practice despite stating "that before accepting such a form it would be 
necessary in each case for the Agency to satisfy itself about the past practices"! The equal 
opportunity Declaration was however awarded automatically on request without any 
preconditions or verification. Those who wished to sign could do so. The FEA chairman 
made numerous public declarations that he could not envisage any circumstances whereby 
I FEA First Annual Report, 1976-77, p. 9,30`h November, 1977, Belfast HMSO. 
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a company's name would be removed from the register. At the Agency's first major 
seminar for commerce and industry in March 1979, Without Fear or Favour, a Catholic 
Board member Tom Conaty, speaking as an Agency representative put forward what he 
saw as the causes of discrimination. He first of all informed the conference delegates he 
was a bigot. He explained: 
"I find, quite honestly, that my reflex action is to discriminate. That's my gut 
reaction... to discriminate. I don't think I'm different from most of the rest of us, 
therefore, I feel that we should try to convince ourselves that we haven't got rid of 
that, that our gut reaction is to discriminate in Northern Ireland". 2 
Neither Cooper nor Conaty in their presentations chose to make reference to the interplay 
between the forces and consequences of history, vested interests, economic, political, and 
military conflict or the role of the local and British state. The conference message from the 
Agency was simply one of reducing everything to the plane of individual "gut reactions". 
At the same conference, Cooper reassured the audience that although the Act contained 
enforcement powers, he and "everyone is reluctant to have to use" them. At this stage 
only four findings of discrimination had been made. Cooper added, he did not see the need 
to seek any extension to the legislation or the Agency's resources as he was heartened that 
employers had "come to recognise the advantages", and by the "substantial adherence to 
the Declaration". Agency officers were aware that many employers were hostile to the 
legislation and that adherence to the "Declaration" had not been tested nor was any proof 
of adherence required to secure this endorsement from the FEA. By any standards it was a 
startling claim. 3 Indeed Cooper reported in the FEA's first Annual Report that at 31St 
March 1977 only five out of 26 district Councils had signed the Declaration and that 
reports, "of District Councillors actually tearing up the Fair Employment Act and the 
Statutory Declaration are hardly calculated to instill in the general public confidence in the 
Equality of Opportunity provided by their Councils". 4 
Cooper declared that the use of the FEA symbol by company's advertising jobs would act 
like a beacon to those who might otherwise be wary of applying. He said this is "A symbol 
to be proud of possessing, it declares that anyone who applies to that employer can 
do so 
2 FEA Conference Report, "Without Fear or Favour", 6th March, 1979, Fair Employment In Action, NO. 2 3 FEA operational practices and evidence presented in Chapters 6 &7 from investigations and FEA staff . 4 FEA First Annual Report, 1st September 1976-31St March 1977, p. 9,30th November 1977, HMSO. 
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in the knowledge that he or she will be considered on merit, and merit alone". 5 While most 
employers didn't use it, Harland and Wolff, Shorts, and the NIES did. The effect of this 
may be gauged by examining a contemporary jobs page of the Belfast Telegraph's 
Thursday edition at random. On one night, 176 notices appeared for 250 jobs, excluding 
education. The FEA's symbol appeared twice. 6 By the time the 1976 Act was replaced by 
the 1989 Act in 1990, not one of the more than 9,500 employers on the equal opportunity 
register had been removed for failing to afford equality of opportunity. This included those 
where discrimination had been proved and upheld in the Courts. 
Individual Complaints (i). 
The first year of the Agency's existence was marked by a low level of complaints. Cooper 
attributed this to "the present climate of violence". He added, "For this, as well as for other 
reasons, our wider investigative powers are likely to bear much more fruit". 7 In reality 
Cooper declined to use these powers as he informed staff he saw "educating employers" as 
a preferable low key strategy option likely to secure greater support. This would lead to 
serious internal dissension. By 1988 he had exercised his personal discretion not to pursue 
100 individual complaints. These included several charging him directly with political 
discrimination as an employer and in dealing with complaints brought against other 
employers (see below). Despite this overly accommodating approach employers continued 
to be hold the FEA in very low regard. A complaint against the DoE's Property Services 
Agency exemplifies this. 
A Catholic male upon applying for a permanent position in a job in which he was already 
employed was found "unsuitable". In response to the individual's complaint, the PSA lied 
to the FEA. They claimed there was "a freeze on recruitment" and the "man's suitability 
was not in doubt". Meanwhile the job was offered to a Protestant, not once but twice. 
When this was discovered the DOE claimed there was some doubt "as to his security 
standing". When the duplicity was exposed by other means to the FEA, Agency members, 
taken aback at being taken at "face value", issued a letter expressing "deep concern that a 
Westminster government department should attempt to deceive", the FEA. 
The deception 
5 FEA Conference Report, Without Fear or Favour, 6th March 1979, FEA. 
6 Belfast Telegraph, Thursday, 3rd April 1988. 
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was discussed at length at successive Agency meetings for eight months with threats of 
legal action eventually petering out into simply recording the matter in the annual report. 8 
When Peter Shore MP, Labour's under-secretary of State, replied he agreed this "was most 
unfortunate", but was more due to "administrative confusion ... coupled with a concern to 
avoid compromising the nature and source of certain information". 9 The department 
declined to address the role and motivation of an individual's colleagues dubbing him a 
security risk in order to secure a Protestant in the post. The FEA maintained the view 
"there was a clear and deliberate attempt to deceive the Agency". 10 The DoE's "scant 
regard for the role of the Agency", was found to be the prevailing attitude among private 
and public sector employers by FEA staff. 
The increasing issue of Section 42 certificates by the Secretary of State to stop 
investigations further undermined credibility and led to protests by nationalist political 
parties. Public bodies such as the NIES, the civil service, and the MOD, frequently sought 
and gained exemption under this power. A typical case for example was a 17 year old 
Catholic youth seeking an apprenticeship with the NIES. Having passed all the tests he 
was turned down in 1984. Once a complaint was registered the NIES secured a certificate 
blocking any enquiry on the grounds of national security. One that slipped the net was the 
man who applied for a ship-keeper's vacancy in 1984 on HMS Caroline, the local 
headquarters of the Royal Naval Reserve. A clerical officer told the man he had failed to 
get security clearance. He informed the man's brother who also worked on the ship, "There 
is no way I could start another one of you. I have already been classed as a Fenian lover by 
ship-keepers". The brother himself had only been employed in response to complaints the 
MOD were not employing Catholics. At the appeal before the County Court in December 
1987, the complaint of discrimination was upheld. The hazards and vicissitudes an 
individual has to endure before having their "day in court", is amply demonstrated by this 
case which lasted three years. Only the inexplicable failure to issue a Section 42 certificate 
allowed some redress and insight into employment practices at MOD establishments. 
l l 
7First Annual Report of the FEA for NI, 1St September 1976 to 31st March 1977, p. l 1, HMSO, 30th 
November 1977. 
8 FEA Chairman' letter to Peter Shore MP, Under Secretary for Environment 22nd November 1977. FEA 
Board Minutes, 12th Meeting, 9th August 1977; 13th Meeting, 13th September 1977; 14th Meeting, 11th October 
1977; 15th Meeting, 8th November 1977; 16th Meeting, 13th December 1977; 17th Meeting, 10th January 
1978; 18th Meeting, 14th February 1978 and 19th Meeting, 14th March 1978. 
9 Peter Shore, W. op. cit., pp. 20-21, FEA Second Annual Report, 1977-78 HMSO, 13th June 1979. 10 Second Annual Report. FEA, 1977-1978, pp. 19-21, Belfast HMSO, 1979 
11 FEA case files. 
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A Protestant who had served in the TAVR for 18 years had his employment terminated as 
a civilian driver for the MOD. The reason was his membership of the Loyalist Prisoners 
Aid organisation. Any enquiry by the FEA was stopped by the issue of a S42 certificate. A 
young Protestant was turned down for the RUC because his father was a prominent 
Vanguard loyalist councillor. A Catholic female serving in C company 9 UDR was `stood 
down' from duties when she complained about being denied overtime. She said this was 
because of her religion. The Commanding Officer accused her of "disloyalty" and asserted 
the Battalion "was totally open minded about religion and discrimination was not part of 
their make up". As a Catholic himself, he said "all other Catholic members of the Battalion 
were extremely happy and totally integrated". No action was taken by the FEA except to 
report the case against a "Public Body", in its annual report. 12 In another case involving 
the MOD, a Protestant joiner was marched off Thiepval military barracks at Lisburn where 
he had been working for five weeks. His employer sacked him. The MOD later admitted 
their mistake. No recompense was offered, no public debate took place. Another example 
included the Secretary of State depriving a working class woman of her livelihood as a 
civil service cleaner because her son had been convicted for activities as a member of the 
loyalist Woodvale Defence Association in 1972, - long before the Act existed13 
Secrecy. 
Secrecy as an instrument of government is a common administrative practice among 
British government agents and institutions. However within the context of promoting 
equality of opportunity in a society riven with political and military conflict and where the 
government claimed its objectives were to reach an accommodation between competing 
visions and aspirations it is highly doubtful that secrecy could ever be an effective tool for 
cementing a sense of common purpose and objectives. It did not aid or contribute to the 
educational process of promoting equality. Secrecy certainly proved no friend to 
Protestants, Catholics, or equity. Indeed secrecy mitigated against the effective monitoring 
of employers and prevented any sense of public accountability within the FEA. Secrecy 
in 
administration has produced a variety of dubious practices without redress 
in the British 
12 FEA Fourth Annual Report, 1979-80, Case No. 112, p. 27-28, HMSO, 7" May 1981. 
13 FEA Third Annual Report, 1978-79, Case no. 24, case files. 
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system of government. Where the possibility of challenge or explanation is denied then 
any concept of natural justice founders immediately. This would become a fatal flaw for 
the FEA in its operational practices. For by so readily agreeing with employers that they 
would not be identified or material would not be published its credibility suffered as did its 
capacity to act as an advocate. Secrecy allowed the FEA to conceal from the public the 
extent of acts of discrimination by the UDR, the RUC, the TAVR, the Civil Service 
Commission, the NIHE, the postal service, all the Health and Social Service Boards, the 
Electricity Service, GEC, Ormeau Bakeries, Scottish Widows, Bass Charrington, Ratners 
Jewels, Abbey Meat Packers, the Belfast Telegraph, - in short a full spectrum of local 
employers including the FEA itself. In some cases, such as the NIES, on more than one 
occasion. 
14 
From the outset the Agency regarded education as an ambitious and critical goal. Officers 
in the FEA however came to see `education' as increasingly equated with a policy 
objective of concealing or acquiescing in questionable practices as they considered the 
Chairman increasingly made his decisions with reference to political expediency. 15 It was 
felt large scale investigations with potentially negative findings could somehow add to 
destabilising the situation within NI. Even during the latter period of the 1976 Act 
requests by Labour MP's in the House of Commons seeking to identify which employers 
had been subject to the law were not revealed. A stock response was: "It would not be in 
the best interests of the work of the Agency to release the name of the parties involved. "16 
Employers, regardless of their practices remained cloaked in the Agency's veil of secrecy. 
Over 40 of these where compensation had been paid were directly funded by government. 
The public, except when a case ended up in court, remained ignorant as to the promotion 
and effectiveness of equal opportunities. In some incidents the FEA would take this to 
extremes. For example some ten years after an enquiry had taken place the FEA refused to 
provide the House of Commons with information. An individual complaint of 
discrimination made by a Catholic male on 6thJuly 1979 had revealed on a partial analysis 
the workforce on the shop floor at the Belfast Telegraph was 6 Catholics and 126 
Protestants. The paper had a circulation of 86,000 and in effect exercised the role of a 
14 See FEA Second, Third and Fourth Annual Reports where in some of these cases a brief and anonymous 
synopsis was presented for individual cases. The FEA did not make an in principle decision to publish, (in a 
heavily abbreviated form) its anonymous reports on Section 12 investigations until 1982. 's Northern Ireland Public Service Alliance, Branch 147 Secretary Files and correspondence to FEA. 
16 Hansard, 23rd May 1988. 
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`national' daily for NI. In May 1988 the FEA still refused to disclose this. 17 In this the 
government were equally culpable as they could have demanded a change of practice and 
provided the leadership to develop a culture of transparency from the outset. Although the 
FEA accepted the Telegraph's rejection of the applicant as being over qualified for the 
post and made a finding of "no discrimination" a further enquiry was conducted in March 
1980. This showed that out of the total workforce of 814 the main NI daily employed 18% 
Catholics. Most of these were in Classified Advertisements (25 out of 76) and Accounts 
(28 out of 77). In the production department where the print unions ran a closed shop 14 
out of 295 staff were Catholic. The Belfast Telegraph defended this on the grounds that 
"as the industry itself is, for whatever reason, mainly Protestant in its workforce, it follows 
that most of its Production workforce will be Protestant". They absolved themselves of 
any responsibility even though the non-printing part of production employed 72 workers 
that included two Catholics. '8 This data was available to the FEA and became part of the 
internal struggle to achieve forceful action and publication. A report was finally published 
in September 1983 
Secrecy prevented Warne Surgical in Lurgan, with a reputation as a Protestant employer, 
from demonstrating that 40% of its 220-250 workforce were Catholic. It prevented Town 
and Country Fuels from explaining the majority of its drivers were Protestants. It 
prevented Abbey Meat Packers responding publicly to complaints by Protestants of 
discrimination that 108 of its 209 workers at Whiteabbey were Protestant. It allowed 
Scottish Widows Fund and Life Assurance to promote a caring image in advertising while 
its 29 Protestant workers at Belfast, subjected the only Catholic to 18 months of racial and 
sectarian harassment. She resigned distraught with her doctor confirming she was not 
fit to 
work. 19 
It is a common place that to educate requires an engagement in some 
form of discourse. 
Debate, questions, answers, can assist in the promotion of public confidence, and 
contribute to the exposure of positive and negative examples. Oppressive acts can 
become 
accountable for the employer and public enforcement body via such 
discourse while 
17 Hansard, 2nd May 1988; FEA Case file 1979 and Fourth Report of the Fair Employment 
Ageny, 1st 
April 1979-31" March 1980, Case No. 136, Belfast HMSO, 7`h May 1981. FEA Board 
Minutes, 38"' Meeting, 
11`h December 1979 & 40th Meeting, 12th February 1980. 
18 FEA Section 12 Investigation into Belfast Telegraph Newspapers Ltd. September 
1983. 
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promoting a process of change and accommodation. By opting for an extremely low 
profile and silence it may be argued that the FEA contributed instead to the promotion of 
prejudice, suspicion, and intolerance. In addition it may also be argued that such actions 
and too much concern with the political consequences of an enquiry was no more than to 
acquiesce in individual acts of discrimination. An early example in 1978 involved Mike 
Farrell, a leading civil rights figure at the time employed by Belfast Technical College. 
Since then he has written such books as the Orange State, and Arming the Protestants, and 
numerous articles for academic journals and national newspapers. In 2000 he became a 
Human Rights Commissioner for the Irish government. Farrell's complaint was the first of 
several to be lodged against the college. The evidence gathered supported Farrell's 
contention he had been deliberately passed over for promotion in favour of a less qualified 
candidate. The public problem for the Agency chairman was how to deal with this given 
Farrell's high profile as a civil rights activist and reputation as a Marxist who supported a 
united socialist Ireland. To make a finding of discrimination would have in effect meant 
the FEA accusing college representatives and the Board of Governors with perjury in the 
light of the evidence they gave. The chairman asked the Agency research officer (the 
author) to look at all past promotions and applications since 1974 to see if some other 
explanation than discrimination could be discerned. None was apparent. Cooper felt he 
had on balance to accept the college view in `good faith' at Farrell's expense. The 
conclusion was that this was "found to be a most difficult case to decide" although "the 
Complainant was arguably a more suitable candidate than the successful applicant in terms 
of academic qualifications, academic publications, overall teaching experience and staff 
seniority". 20 An attempt to sack Farrell by the college had been made in 1973 when he had 
been interned and thereby missed two days of the academic term. 
The defence offered by the Board of Governor's rested on the unusual claim for an 
academic institution that teaching experience and academic qualifications were only 
nominal requisites for promotion. Instead the college stressed attendance at social 
functions such as Christmas parties were considered more important. A member of the 
appointment panel claimed he was unaware of Farrell's political activities. This was quite 
remarkable given Farrell's frequent appearances on local TV news and 
features and 
19 FEA case files: - 301 March 1979,6th March 1979,17th 
July 1979,24th October 1979,38th and 42nd FEA 
Board Meetings, 11th December 1979,15th April 1980. 
20 Third Annual Report of the FEA . 1978-79, p. 
62,63, Case No. 88, HMSO, 13th March 1980. 
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numerous press articles by himself. 21 The wheel came full circle however in 1984 when a 
prominent loyalist, Major Bunting, who in his day had assisted Paisley ambush civil rights 
marchers at Burntollet accused the college of discrimination. Bunting felt the "Unionist 
party hierarchy", were forcing him to pay the price for his alliance with Paisley. Although 
he lost the case, the FEA were obliged to note that the College had still failed to act on its 
recommendations to "find a solution", to the absence of any selection system as it had 
recommended in 1979. The college did not consider it had a problem. 22 
In another case involving the post office, it took six years for the FEA to settle the case. 
An older Catholic was turned down for a job at a local office near Coleraine. The reason 
given was he was already employed and aged 43 could only have offered 17 years service 
before retiring as opposed to the successful candidate who was aged 22. The complainant 
was informed of his lack of success a full month before the successful candidate was told 
he had got the job. A previous incumbent had been killed by the Provisional IRA. The 
Head Postmaster in Coleraine confirmed no Catholic had ever been employed at the 
office. He did however attempt to offer a temporary post once, but the person happened to 
be out when he called at his home. The job went to a Protestant who happened to be in. 23 
At a more general level the FEA had to accept the policy of the Post Office in denying 
employment to former internees. This policy first came to light in 1978 when an ex- 
internee passed the aptitude test but was denied employment. The Post Office explained, 
"it would not be prudent to recruit anyone who could be regarded as a security risk", and 
this was "not because of any political beliefs". 24 Thus those who had been arrested under 
draconian powers and denied any right to a trial, to challenge any evidence or suspicion 
leading to their internment found that upon release they were condemned to long term 
unemployment. 
By May 1988, just before the Act's demise, the FEA had submitted 51 appeals to the 
County Courts. Of these 21 were settled out of court, in 10 the original findings of 
discrimination were upheld, and in the case of one individual and nine employers the 
courts overturned the Agency's decision. Of the 14 cases where employers saw the legal 
proceedings through, only five findings were upheld. As the courts represent critical 
Zl FEA, Farrell v Belfast Technical College., 1978-1979. 22 FEA, Bunting v Belfast Technical College, 1984. 23 FEA Fourth Annual Report, Case No. 82. 
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mechanisms for developing or impeding any law, and the development of public debate, in 
fact the only mechanism during this period, it will be useful to illustrate their role with 
reference to several cases. 
Before the courts. 
The first case before the local courts encapsulated all the essential elements that make up 
life in the North. The aggrieved was a 23 year old Catholic graduate Ms. Doris. The 
respondent was the NI civil service in the form of the Petty Sessions Office at Cookstown. 
Doris had applied for the job as a clerk in November 1976. She made a formal complaint 
to the FEA on 25th January 1977. The FEA made its finding that unlawful discrimination 
had taken place on 18th October 1977. Judge Kenneth Topping presided at the County 
Court appeal in 1978. A former Stormont Minister he had a reputation as an ardent 
unionist. Doris carried the added burden of having a brother who had been president of the 
NICRA. The manager of the local social security office, one of the panel members made a 
point of bringing this to the attention of the others. They recorded their "dislike of her 
manner" and offered the job as a clerk to a 17 year old without qualifications or 
experience. In the evidence first presented to the FEA, one panel member said he marked 
her last, because she made "a constant effort to be polite but the facade would drop and 
she bordered on the aggressive". For good measure, he added, the fact her application 
form indicated she went to a Catholic school and had two Catholic Christian names 
"would not have been a strong indication to him that she was a Catholic". 25 
Judge Topping found in favour of the civil service. His extremely brief two page 
judgment criticised the Agency for being "unduly anxious to find discrimination", and "In 
my opinion the Fair Employment Agency, probably convinced that this attitude was 
expected of it, appears to have gone to considerable lengths to reach a finding that 
unlawful discrimination had taken place". 26 Topping died three weeks after the appeal. 
The Agency's lawyers did not urge an appeal although they considered Topping's 
judgment "is very scanty and lacking in quality in that it avoids any discussion of the Act 
itself or the concept of discrimination". They also considered his comments were 
2' Post Office to FEA, 1978, Case No. 83/78, Fourth Annual Report, 1979-80, HMSO, 13th March 1980. 
25 FEA Second Annual Report, 1977-78, pp. 29,31,33,27-35, Belfast HMSO, 13th June 1979. 
26 Judge Topping Finding, 1978. 
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confused (and incorrect in law)" with references that were "a gratuitous and unjustified 
slur" on the Agency. 27 Matters along with Topping were allowed to rest. The Agency was 
left becalmed as staff felt the failure to challenge Topping struck a body blow leading to 
an extreme state of inertia and reluctance to vigorously enforce the law. 28 Nationalist 
frustration at the lack of progress in the courts was further exasperated by a number of 
high profile victories by Councils they considered to be sectarian. 
Armagh Council members, for example, publicly tore up the Act and refused to support 
equal opportunity codes practice and legislation. Craigavon Council had a high profile as 
an extreme loyalist council and was accordingly the subject of constant allegations of 
discrimination by Catholics. They accused the Council's elected members of establishing 
Unionist majorities on interview panels to give jobs to Protestants even when unqualified. 
One case, Timothy Duffy, began on the 15th September 1977 and was not settled until 
1983. The FEA made a finding that the Council had unlawfully discriminated against 
Duffy for the post of an outdoor recreation officer in 1978.29 Although Duffy, a Catholic, 
was marked by the majority of the panel to have superior qualifications and experience 
only one of the panel voted for him, five against, including the chief recreation officer, 
with two abstentions. The FEA concluded the process showed that the cause of a change 
of mind, "was religious prejudice on the part of certain powerful Council members which 
had induced the Chief Recreation Officer (Mr. Scott) to recommend the inferior 
candidate". 30 The successful candidate was a former gardener to the late Lord 
Brookeborough, a former Prime Minister for NI. 
Duffy was asked, "Are You Loyal" by Alderman Wright the chair of the interview panel. 
DUP Councillor David Calvert, who arrived half-way through the interview and played no 
active part strongly opposed Duffy. Scott was identified as the "prime mover", along with 
Councillor Calvert. Judge Russell at the Armagh County Court threw out the case. He 
accepted Duffy was the better candidate but suggested he was "perhaps too ambitious to 
progress quickly". He also accepted that Councillors Calvert and Wright were 
determined 
Duffy was not "to get the job under any circumstances". While raising questions as 
to 
Scott's marking the judge exonerated him from any "wilful 
injustice to Mr. Duffy". 
27 Letter of 14th June 1978 from Elliott Duffy Garrett Solicitors to FEA 
Chairman. 
28 See `Dissension in the ranks', below. 29 FEA Finding, 27t` November 1978. 
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Russell concluded his judgement stating: 
"If the Agency's findings had been that the individual persons had been guilty of 
unlawful discrimination I could readily have understood why the Agency came to 
such a finding but no evidence was placed before this Court to how or why the Council which consists of 25 or 26 members should be affixed with the prejudice 
of two Councillors. " 
The responsibility of the Council as a body in law for the actions of its members was 
ignored. He also suggested the actions of Councillors Calvert and Wright may not have 
been to due to prejudice but "an unclear or incorrect recollection of the circumstances 
3 under which Mr. Duffy left the Councils employment in 1976". 1 
At the Court of Appeal (NI) chaired by Lord Chief Justice Lowry in June 1980, the 
original finding of discrimination was confirmed with £25,000 costs to be paid by 
Craigavon. The Law Lords found the judge had erred in law on three important counts, the 
exoneration of Scott was discounted, as "Everything Mr. Scott did at the meeting was 
consistent with his subservience to the ends of Messrs. Wright and Calvert". In fact "there 
was no truth in evidence", that they were not motivated by prejudice. Russell had also 
erred by failing to appreciate "The Council is in law responsible for the discrimination of 
the panel" . 
32 This is an extremely basic legal concept as to public accountability that 
should be familiar to every local authority councillor and employee. It would require 
further court action to oblige Craigavon to pay £3000 compensation to Duffy in 1983. 
Craigavon Council and Mr. Scott were to appear in the County Court again on further 
charges of unlawful discrimination. Pat McGahan a colleague of Duffy's working in the 
same department had been dismissed for failing to accept a change in duties as he felt they 
represented a downgrading. McGahan alleged this was because he was a Catholic and that 
of the 24 staff employed at this level none were Catholic. He accused Scott as "being the 
main instrument against him". Scott in his evidence when asked by Judge Doyle if 
discrimination existed in Craigavon, stated, "he hadn't found it, nor could he say that the 
Council was discriminatory". 33 He did accept however he had been appointed over the 
30 FEA Third Annual Report, Case 44, pp. 37/38; Fourth Annual Report, pp. 15-16. 
31 All quotes taken from Judge Russell QC, Armagh County Court, September 1979, Craigavon v 
FEA. 
32 Lord Lowry Lord Chief Justice, Court of Appeal in NI, FEA v Craigavon Borough Council, 
30th June 
1980. 
33 Judge Doyle, County Court Judgment, Craigavon Borough Council v FEA, 24th June 1981. 
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head of his former boss, a Catholic to his current position for which he had no comparable 
qualifications. Judge Doyle after a detailed assessment concluded discrimination had not 
taken place. His finding noted: 
"The truth unfortunately is that his original employment prior to his employment 
with the appellants had been of a manual nature, that his experience, education and background suggested that he was fitted and indeed adequately fitted for such 
employment but was very far from being a suitable managerial prospect. He 
conceived as I have indicated an idea that office routine, office work, deployment 
of staff and authority in relation to staff was his field although there is no justification in his make-up or background to enable him to come to such a 
conclusion. It became a phobia with him .... 99.34 
When Scott retired in October 1980, he said of the FEA, it "degrades the people of 
Northern Ireland - it drags down the sense of dignity of everyone, and could well be done 
without". The vagaries of the courts in the other direction may be captured in decisions 
against nationalist councils. Newry and Mourne was found guilty of "benign 
discrimination", by the FEA. The council in an attempt to balance its workforce appointed 
a Protestant against an equally qualified Catholic. Newry and Mourne's appeal to the 
courts in February 1981 was upheld. Judge Rowland concluded the gap was so narrow and 
the decision so subjective, he was obliged to give them the benefit of the doubt. However 
the political and legal point being pursued by the FEA was that positive action strategies 
were illegal and should not be adopted. 35 A similar example concerned Derry Council. As 
in Craigavon the case involved a recreation officer, Mr. Seddon, this time a Protestant. 
Again there was another equally qualified candidate, Mr. McCaul, a Catholic. Both had 
been recommended by the staffing committee for internal promotion to Deputy Chief 
amenities officer. McCaul got the job. In a 48 page finding the FEA concluded "the 
change took place because of religious factors" as the: 
"non-unionists realised that if they accepted the advice of the Chief 
Amenities Officer, three of the four deputy posts would be held by 
Protestants in an area which a population that was two-thirds Catholic, and 
that politically speaking this was unacceptable in view of past history". 
36 
Judge Hart at Derry Recorders Court, rejected the FEA's case as one "based on 
inferences", as opposed to the express statements made in the Duffy case. The balance of 
34 Ibid. p. 14. 35 FEA Fifth and Sixth Annual Reports, 1980-81,1981-82, HMSO. 36 Notice of Finding, FEA, 10th December 1985, p. 46 
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probabilities weighed in the Council's favour. 37 
The Agency's first annual report placed "considerable importance on the education 
function" as great faith was placed in "a commitment from both sides of industry" and the 
general public with a lesser role for the law in developing equality of opportunity. 38 Later 
annual reports noted an "individual has to overcome a number of social and psychological 
barriers before the Agency is made aware that a grievance or potential grievance 
concerning religious discrimination might exist". 39 An individual had to be particularly 
determined and or well supported to bring a case. The added context of potential 
assassination and intimidation was not to be lightly dismissed during these early years by 
accusing one's employer and colleagues of discrimination. This placed an even greater 
onus on the law to demonstrate due consideration and sensitivity as the law developed 
through these cases. The decisions by the like of Judges Topping and Doyle did not secure 
this. The mixture of class prejudice and identification with the Stormont regime was 
unfortunate. While the legal establishment may feel the law must always take its course a 
period of almost seven years for an individual to secure £3000 compensation was unlikely 
to inspire confidence in procedural mechanisms the state claimed were there to provide 
redress. Justice was not seen to be done. In addition the absence of case law simply 
compounded the difficulties for advocates, representatives and judges. It was not until the 
impact of the 1981 Hunger Strike and decision by Republicans to adopt highly 
interventionist strategies to challenge the British state locally and nationally on equality 
that the issue became more vital. 
The FEA's emphasis on education created a culture of conciliation and understanding of 
the employers position without a corresponding understanding of the need for swift 
redress for the individual. The lack of confidence in the FEA as a potential source of 
redress was not helped by the plain fact it contained a representative of a strongly 
hostile 
loyalist paramilitary group on its complaints panels. Finally the culture and ethos that 
had 
produced a judiciary whose senior judges were Protestant and identified with 
Diplock no 
jury courts, internment and the application of the Special Powers 
Act presented ready 
confirmation for nationalists that the British state agenda was 
inimical to their interests. 
37 Judge Hart QC. Judgment, January 1986, Derry City Council and the FEA. 
38 FEA First Annual Report, 1976-March 1977, p7, HMSO. 
39 FEA Third Annual Report, 1978-79, p. 23. 
201 
The British government had indeed failed to introduce due process that enabled the 
development of swift, transparent and informed justice. It also failed to challenge the legal 
executive in NI during a critical period or question the fact several leading judges were 
Orangemen, former Stormont MP's or with a record of sectarian utterances. The 
responsibility to drive forward an equality agenda was great in this context. It failed to do 
so in many aspects of its administration including the law. 40 
Section 12 of the 1976 Act provided a powerful tool for the conduct of formal 
investigations that could lead to strategic remedies. No equivalent power existed in the 
Race Relations Act. Section 12 was critical as the initiative lay with the Agency and could 
lead to action in the County Court if a company failed to implement any 
recommendations. Several investigations are presented to demonstrate how this power was 
subverted. 
The Engineering industry. 
The history of engineering employment in Belfast has been violent and intimidating 
for Catholics. There was a general anticipation some of these companies- especially Shorts 
and the shipyard would be the subject of early enquiries. Within the FEA proposals to do 
this were made in July 1977. Cooper, the FEA's chairman, opposed this and argued these 
firms should be `examined' and not subjected to formal investigations. He considered the 
management and workforce of firms such as the shipyard were, "ready to welcome more 
liberal recruitment but this was militated against not only by the environment but also by a 
contracting labour market situation". 41 This was in line with his strategy that "individual 
firms should not be put under the microscope right at the outset", adopted at the FEA's 
second board meeting. 42 It was another seven years before such firms were put under the 
"microscope", i. e. a proper Section 12 investigation. 
The concept of "examination" became a major impediment to operational progress. An 
examination did not have the status of a formal enquiry. It could not lead to any 
formal 
findings or binding directions upon employers. It was in effect an `understanding' without 
40 Belfast Bulletin No. 10, Spring 1982, Workers Research Unit, Belfast, see pp. 21-31 for the origins of 
many of NI's senior judges and Belfast Bulletin No. 11, Summer 1984 for 
details on the Supergrass system. 
41 FEA Board Minutes, 10th May 1977. 
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fear of any redress. In embarking on this `examination' the range of jobs to be studied was 
restricted to certain skilled engineering trades. This meant for example only 60 out of the 
1700 employed by Standard Telephone and Cables (STC) would be scrutinised. The study 
lasted six years with an extremely vague report being published in September 1983.43 The 
report did not identify the firms, nor was any analysis of their employment patterns or 
recruitment practices presented. Instead a series of census tables were reproduced 
indicating patterns of employment in Belfast. The following table is a useful benchmark 
for measuring progress in engineering. Taken from the 1971 Census it shows the 
distribution of skilled engineering jobs and the need to carry out a comprehensive analysis 
rather than the partial approach limited by a voluntary examination. If progress was being 
made in a critical area of traditional dominance it may have signaled that the Agency's 
belief that employers were well disposed to equality of opportunity had some justification. 
If on the other hand a comprehensive analysis demonstrated the opposite the figures may 
have been utilised to achieve a more effective legislative framework and resources beyond 
the eight Agency staff deployed. In short the scale of the task would have been apparent. 
The focus on a narrow range of occupations over a six year period proved unproductive 
both in terms of the credibility of the Agency, its internal coherence and its capacity to 
take forward an equality agenda. It also failed to achieve a positive outcome on 
recruitment practices of those companies selected. 
Table 1.1971 Population Census for NI 44(Roman Catholic/RC; Protestant/Prot. ) 
SKILLED JOBS. Total. RC. Prot. Not Stated. 
Engineering Foremen 27 0 26 1 
Turners 545 51 450 44 
Machine Tool Setters & 
Operators. 407 60 311 36 
Toolmakers & Toolroom 
Setters. 325 40 264 21 
Maintenance Fitters & 
Engineers. 1241 102 979 100 
Other fitters & 
Machine Erectors. 3374 411 2711 252 
TOTALS. 5919 664 4741 454 
A further analysis of the religious composition for the Engineering and Vehicles category, 
wherein many of these occupations are, found Catholics represented 20% 
(4406) of the 
42 FEA Board Minutes, 5th October 1976. 
43 Report on Employment Patterns in the Belfast Area with Particular Reference to 
Engineering, FEA 1983. 
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21,898 workforce. Thus the opportunity for Catholics to secure long term skilled 
employment and or pass the opportunity on through their families was slight when 
compared to their Protestant counterparts. These figures indicated the strength of a skilled 
working class Protestant heritage and the size of the challenge for any mediation in the 
market place. The data formed the basis for the investigation but was not utilised to 
establish objectives in terms of strategic findings and direction for the Agency nor to 
challenge the complacency and resistance of the employers `under the microscope'. 
During March and April 1977, Ford Autolite in West Belfast was accused of 
discriminatory practices by Peoples Democracy in its newspaper. Picked up by others it 
became a major story. Labour were then in power and the relevant Minister was Don 
Concannon MP. He, through his senior civil servant, Mr. Crozier, contacted the FEA on 
25th April 1977. Senior Agency staff understood the approach had been to seek Cooper's 
support to play the matter down and avoid public controversy. Following further contact 
between Cooper and the department any specific investigation of Fords was rejected on 
3rd July 1977, to be replaced by a general enquiry into engineering. 45 Cooper said this 
would be completed in 3 months. It would take six years. The scope of this examination 
was originally to include the total number of employees by occupation, the employment 
catchment area for each company and their methods of recruitment with particular 
reference to apprentices. Approximately 18 firms in construction and industry were to be 
examined. 
Concannon reported his further alarm when he went on an investment seeking trip to the 
US where he reported "stiff opposition. " The National Council of Irish Americans were 
running a counter campaign declaring, "If you're looking for trouble invest in N. Ireland", 
and "Political instability always breeds violence. A violent society never produces a 
healthy economy ... or profits. 
" 46 The allegations against Ford occurred just as AVX, New 
York, manufacturers of electronic capacitors decided to establish a 600 job plant 
in 
Coleraine. AVX said their decision was based on "a get the truth mission", carried out 
by 
the wives of three senior officials. Concannon requested a meeting with Cooper to 
discuss 
"some aspects of the engineering enquiry". Following this meeting on the 
17th January 
44 Census of Population, Religion Tables, NI, Belfast: HMSO 1975. 45FEA Correspondence with Crozier, 3rd July 1977. 46 Irish National Caucus Publicity campaign, 1977, Washington, USA. 
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1978, Cooper reported back to the FEA board in February. He stated, "basically all that the 
Minister wished to make clear was the importance of Ford in Ireland, and the use the 
government is making of that company to try and encourage future investment. The 
Minister is anxious that the Agency's investigation should not cause any security 
problems". 47 No formal Section 12 enquiry was undertaken. Agency staff and at least two 
leading Board members, Bannon and McCormack concluded the Minister wanted any 
enquiry stopped lest it aid the Irish American campaign. This decision became a 
significant source of internal Agency conflict between the Agency Board and its senior 
staff (see Chapter 8). 
The consequent absence of results by the FEA also made it difficult for the British 
government in the USA when confronted by the H Block protests and 1981 Hunger 
Strikes. Irish Americans and their allies focused in particular on the absence of any change 
in the employment practices of well known sectarian employers such as Shorts, Harlands, 
Sirocco, Fords etc. These were the very companies at the centre of the FEA enquiry. Due 
to the nature of the engineering "examination", however and the ability of employers to 
stop progress a substantial body of evidence was simply not available. The missing names 
and religious composition from the 1983 FEA report are given below. Two companies, 
Grundig and Strathearn Audio were part of the investigation but closed during the 
enquiries long 'hiatus'. Most firms refused to provide any figures for over four years. 
Tilley Lamp was the only one to monitor religion. In some cases, the `investigation' was 
no more than a brief phone call, with employers confirming or denying their workforce 
was 98-100% Protestant. 
Table 2, FEA Engineering Employers Analysis, 25th November 1980. 
COMPANY PROTESTANT CATHOLIC 
(skilled/apprentices) (skilled/apprentices) 
Harland & Wolff 267 na 0 0 
Shorts 931 90* 49 6 
Hugh J. Scotts. 97 65 0 0 
Mackie & Sons. 1000 331 na 69 
Hughes Tool 53 7 7 na 
STC 62 7 7 na 
Davidsons(Sirocco) 145 10 4 0 
Tilley Lamp 13 3 5 na 
47 Board Minutes, 17th Meeting of the FEA Board, 10th January 1978. 
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Ford 82 18 8 12 
Shorts recruited 100 apprentices per annum. These refer to 1979. 
na - not available or unknown. 
This and other failures had a debilitating effect on staff morale leading to what became a 
fundamental schism between the senior operational staff (the Deputy Coordinating 
Director, the two Conciliation Officers and the Research Officer) and Cooper. They 
severely censured him for refusing to implement the Act and put forward proposals to 
complete the work in November 1979. They wanted the full powers of Section 12 to be 
used and where companies such as "STC, Hughes Tool, Ford and Grundig", continued to 
prevent progress they demanded subpoena's be issued. 48 Cooper rejected this and decided 
to muddle on. The companies would later accuse him, with some justification under the 
circumstances, of an act of duplicity. This was because having begun as an `examination' 
attempts were made during the political maelstrom of 1981 to try and establish a Section 
12 footing for any findings. In response to staff proposals to terminate the `examination' 
and conduct a formal investigation into the composition of the workforces Cooper did 
accept, "it is not worthwhile seeking more information from Hugh J. Scott's and that we 
should accept Harland and Wolff s statement that there are, to all intents and purposes, no 
Catholics employed on the engineering side". 49 
A year later a progress report (see table 2 above) noted that in the case of Mackies, "Out of 
130,1977 recruits (apprentices) 69 survived to May 1980". Shorts had failed to 
"encourage Catholic recruits" despite having a pool of 600 apprentices in a workforce of 
2000. In Davidsons "there was a major problem of workforce hostility". At Hughes Tool 
trade union hostility was strong while Scott's in East Belfast only visited Protestant 
schools and encouraged a strong bible movement in the workforce. The following 
provides a more informed assessment than presented by the FEA. 
"Deep Sleepers". 
At a meeting between FEA officials and the managing and personnel 
directors of 
Harland's, on 23rd November 1977 they expressed opposition to any enquiry while 
48 NIPSA B147 Secretary Files, Correspondence to Chair FEA, October 1979. 
49 Mr R Cooper, 16th November 1979 to FEA Research Sub Committee, Engineering Enquiry Summary of 
senior Agency staff proposals, 1st November 1979. 
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claiming the workforce was 15% to 20% Catholic. However they freely confirmed the 
Engine Works, especially the machine shop, which had a skilled workforce of "three 
figure strength (276)" was totally Protestant. If there were any Catholics they added, they 
would be "sleepers". Harland's felt, "the existing workforce would not accept Catholics 
amongst them". 50 Following this, the FEA "saw no reason to do any sort of compositional 
exercise since such an exercise might serve to expose one or two employees who hitherto 
had been accepted by their workmates". 51 
The prevailing environment within the company was demonstrated for the FEA when a 
Catholic careers teacher, Des Bannon, became a member of the FEA's Board. He sent two 
boys to the yard and two to Shorts for a weeks work experience in early March 1979. On 
the first day their religion was ascertained and they were followed to their bus stop home. 
On the second day when the other apprentices began singing "We don't want any fenians 
here", they left while the going was good. 52 When the FEA sought specific details of the 
catchment area for engineering employees in 1977, Harland's replied three years later on 
11th January 1980. Later in June 1981, the company cited the failure of Catholic school 
principals to attend annual apprentice prize giving days as evidence that its efforts were 
constantly rebuffed. They added, "in spite of these disappointments and despite a 
continuing deterioration of (the) employment prospects", they "would continue to try and 
widen the Company's appeal to the Catholic community". Harland also claimed its 1981 
apprentice intake of 54 included 3 Catholics. 53 
The FEA on the basis of their interviews in 1977 with Harland's management and 
subsequent correspondence referred to, concluded, "the Agency is satisfied that despite 
there being no deliberate intention to discriminate against potential Roman Catholic 
employees, Harland & Wolff limited does not provide equality of opportunity in its 
Engineering Works". They suggested Harland's monitor applications and set "itself a goal" 
of "not less than 10%" of applications from Catholics. Management and trade unions 
should also "encourage the development of an atmosphere at work which does not deter 
any new employee". 54 Harland's replied in an eight page letter demanding the clauses 
be 
so Report of meeting between FEA and Harland &Woo 23rd November 1977. 51 FEA draft Report on Harland & Wo ff , January/February 
1981. 
52 Report of Interview with pupils, FEA, 11th April 1979. 53 Mr. Punt, Managing Director, Harland & Wolff to FEA, June 1981. 
54 FEA Report, Harland & Wow June 1981. 
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deleted including the failure to afford equality of opportunity. The managing director, 
Mr. Punt, accused the FEA of trying "to bring about an improvement in opportunity for, 
and an increase in numbers employed from the Roman Catholic members of the 
community", alone. Harland's believed, "this basis is in itself discriminatory". Punt 
asserted, "we firmly believe that we do give equality of opportunity for employment", and 
that to "categorically state(s) that we do not provide such equality of opportunity, is 
incorrect, unfair and potentially damaging to the Company. The main purpose of this reply 
is to have this statement removed from your Report". 
Punt ridiculed the `investigation', as a "single short meeting in 1977", and a letter in 
November 1979. He suggested "this is a very poor basis on which to formulate and justify 
a damaging report which has taken nearly four years to prepare". Punt rejected any form of 
religious monitoring as a "breach of their professional ethics", adding we "cannot force 
Roman Catholics to apply". Punt in conclusion suggested that if the FEA "modifies its 
apparent views" and "make recommendations that would be totally acceptable to the 
Company", then the subject of a written undertaking may be considered. The final part of 
the letter continued under the heading: 
"WHAT THE COMPANY WANTS". 
(a) We consider that the statement in the Agency's Conclusions that the 
Company does not provide equality of opportunity for employment is 
unsustainable and must be deleted. 
(b) We believe that the report should state categorically that the Company 
does provide equality of opportunity for employment in all departments. 
We request that such a statement be included. 
It is accepted that the number of Roman Catholics who take up 
employment opportunities does not reflect the effort made by the Company, 
and this could reasonably be mentioned. 
(c) We believe that to ensure that a reader will form a true view of the 
situation it is necessary to record the positive actions taken by the 
Company. We request that these be incorporated in the report". 
55 
The FEA adjusted its final report on Harland's to faithfully reflect Punt's 
letter. The 
company's "considerable efforts to achieve equality of opportunity" were now noted. 
The 
fording that existing "employees would harden against accepting Catholics when at 
the 
same time prospects for their co-religionists or Unionist neighbours were 
deteriorating", 
was also omitted. The general FEA report on engineering published 
in 1983, reduced 
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comment further to one unidentified paragraph. The shipyard thereby was officially 
endorsed by the FEA as an equal opportunity employer. This was then utilised in bids for 
American contracts. Thus when a prime opportunity presented itself to demonstrate that an 
enforcement agency could challenge one of NI's most potent sectarian symbols the FEA 
declined to do so. In this they abrogated the responsibility to educate and combat 
discrimination. The wider population instead saw an agency supporting this employer in 
pursuit of contracts for Protestant workers and were denied the opportunity for redress 
against generations of sectarian employment practices. 56 This approach was carried right 
across the engineering sector as the FEA sought to bring the `examination' to a close. 
In the case of Shorts much of the material has already been covered earlier in terms of its 
employment practices and composition. However in terms of this "examination" it 
warranted an anonymous two sentence entry in the FEA's 1983 public report. The FEA 
first approached Shorts on the 18th November 1977. The FEA officer, a Mr. Peter Sefton, 
Co-Ordinating Director, English Catholic and former Shorts employee conducted the 
examination. On his return from this visit he informed Agency staff he had been treated 
with contempt and lied to. He reported it was clear Shorts would offer no co-operation and 
were hostile to the FEA. At a later meeting in early 1978, Shorts personnel manager 
asserted, "religious belief was irrelevant", and "the Catholic members of the workforce 
were in no way harassed by their Protestant workmates". He claimed, management, 
"would not allow any sectarianism", and were unaware of any religious bias or intolerance 
in the plant. As reported earlier Shorts considered contact with Catholic schools "a waste 
of time". Their intake of 98 apprentices in 1978 for example included 6 Catholics only. 
57 
After two years of open refusal to co-operate, the FEA again urged Shorts to provide 
information on 20th March 1979. As this and further requests were ignored senior FEA 
staff demanded the chair subpoena Shorts. FEA board members such as Bannon and 
McCormack were also restless leading to numerous meetings with the chair. Cooper 
phoned the managing director, Philip Foreman late in June and advised him of the 
possibility of formal action by the FEA to subpoena the information due to 
internal 
pressure. Despite this no data was provided until 25th January 1980. This was 
limited to 
ss Mr. Punt Harland & Wolff to FEA Chair, 28`h July 1981. 
56 Farrell, M. Sunday Tribune, Dublin, 28th September 1983, `Harland & Wolff got agency to change 
discrimination report'. 
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information on 980 fitters. On this basis Cooper decided there "to be no necessity to seek 
further information" as the analysis showed them to be 90% Protestant. Mr. Cockram, 
Shorts personnel manager, demanded the FEA pay Shorts £450 for its co-operation. This 
represented a reduction from the original £2,700 demanded in 1979. Approximately 53 of 
the 980 fitters were Catholic. The unpublished FEA report criticised Shorts for 
"insufficient positive action to encourage Catholic recruits", and "in the wider sense ... you 
fail to provide equality of opportunity". 58 By July 1981, Shorts had still failed to reply. 
Instead they took up the matter directly with the Secretary of State. 59 At the end of 
February 1983, with the engineering examination still incomplete, the Irish-American 
campaign exploded in the US. When the final report was published in September 1983, 
Shorts as with the shipyard received a clean bill of health. The findings in the original 
report were deleted and the FEA's endorsement was used to counter the campaign to 
prevent Shorts winning any USAF orders unless they changed their employment practices. 
Hughes Tool was an American company manufacturing oil-drilling equipment. 
Established in NI in 1954 Hughes claimed to be an equal opportunity employer but 
refused to sign the Agency declaration. Its personnel manager, Mr. McCutcheon and the 
four main shop stewards representing TASS and the AUEW, proved hostile and 
obstructive when approached by the FEA. The managing director in 1977, Mr. Irwin, 
emphasised the company's obligations to comply with US policy as determined in 
Houston. The FEA `examination' focused only on the religion of 26 skilled workers and 7 
apprentices. Hughes Tool declined to provide any information for three years. The FEA 
discovered however that applications from job centres in Catholic areas were given "short 
60 
shrift", and from then "progress with the enquiry was effectively blocked". 
In a meeting with AUEW shop stewards, they expressed their belief in the "rights of a 
particular religious group to a particular occupation", and they, their sons and friends and 
relatives had a "right" to preferential treatment. This was endorsed by McCutcheon. 
61 With 
the unions and management blaming each other for the impasse, the FEA suggested 
it may 
use the courts to take action against the union. Eventually the matter was referred to the 
57 Shorts employment data. sß FEA Shorts Report, January/February 1981. 
59 FEA Research Sub-Committee papers July 1981. 
60 Hughes Tool Report, January/February 1981, and Report 3rd February 1982. 
61 Personnel Manager, Hughes Tool to FEA Meeting of 15th February 1980. 
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US and in October a phone call from the personnel manager met the needs of the enquiry. 
He advised the FEA there were now 60 skilled men, seven Catholic. Thus over the period 
in dispute the work force had doubled without regard to equality of opportunity. Draft 
findings by the FEA stated, "your company is not providing equality of opportunity", and 
,, your works should provide an opportunity for Catholic employment, but apparently does 
not". The recruitment methods used within the context of its 3000 work force which "is 
predominantly Protestant must be a disadvantage for Catholics". The FEA report noted, 
"Your factory is readily accessible from a wide area which is populated by 
Catholics as well as Protestants. Whereas other factories with Catholic and 
Protestant work people have been cutting back on their labour, your 
company has been steadily expanding. Your works should provide an 
opportunity for Catholic employment, but apparently does not.... The 
Agency believes that open recruitment wold have resulted in 20% to 30% 
Catholic participation rather than the 10%99.62 
These comments were absent from the final engineering report published in 1983. Indeed 
only a passing anonymous reference to Hughes in a partial sentence is made. In 1986 
Hughes Tool began to contract reflecting the world oil crisis and shut its branch plant at 
Monkstown. Another important manufacturer with a sectarian reputation second only to 
Shorts and the shipyard was Davidson's or Sirocco Works as it was better known. Founded 
in 1881 on a site at Bridge End just over the River Lagan, near to Belfast's city centre 
Sirocco Works at one stage, 1939, manufactured 70% of the worlds tea drying machinery 
and fans. In 1971 it was taken over by Abercom's Investments, a South African company. 
As part of its fan division with other plants in Pittsburgh and Dearborn Michigan, 
it 
manufactures a wide range of industrial fans, air conditioning and dust collection systems. 
Since before 1881 there has been the only cohesive Catholic community in East Belfast on 
its door step in the Short Strand. Access was therefore not a problem. 
There is also a large 
RUC barracks nearby. The Bishop of Down and Connor as 
long ago as May 9th 1966 
made formal protests on behalf of his Catholic flock to Sirocco. 
His correspondence with 
the chairman, Mr. Maguire was subsequently published in the Irish 
News on 28th May, 
1966. At this time between 1 to 4 Catholics were employed in the 1500 work 
force. 
Maguire accepted "there are indeed very few Catholic", which 
he attributed to the fact 
Sirocco recruited from the immediate Protestant streets, 
"since the earliest days" . 
He added 
"Catholics probably do not feel at home in a Protestant atmosphere". 
At this time Stormont 
62 Hughes Tool Report, January/ February 1981. 
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was attempting to sanitise the local "atmosphere" by a programme of slum clearance 
which had already forced 500 households out leaving 2000 adult Catholics and their 
families fighting to stay. This process was not completed until the late 1980's leaving a 
reduced but still significant Catholic community in the Short Strand. 
The Bishop replied to Maguire noting: 
"your firm has been regarded by generations of Catholics as a symbol and 
concrete evidence of the economic and social injustice they have had to 
suffer for many generations in this city. There is a tradition here of 'No 
Catholic need apply' it . 
63 
On the 5th November 1979 the FEA concluded its "Enquiry was complete and written as 
at 1977/78". The three or four Catholics in the skilled work force of 250 were attributed 
"to the hostility of the work force itself'. 64 At the time of the FEA's final report in 1983, 
850 were employed and the firm had a healthy sales turnover of £ 16.9m. 65 When Abercom 
took over Davidson's in 1971,1300 were employed. The three Catholics started in 1973 
following a brief foray into the local Catholic community which management in their own 
words rapidly abandoned. The status quo had remained unchanged since 1966. 
The managing director believed the absence of Catholics was due to the alleged activities 
of "certain small extreme elements in the neighbourhood population (which) provoked 
hostility with the work force". Recruits for apprentices were "often the sons of existing 
employees", or drawn from the two predominantly Protestant government training centres 
at Feldon and Dundonald in Belfast. Cooper adopted a sympathetic approach and 
concluded "that through no fault of the present management, equality of opportunity is 
generally not afforded". He also expressed the hope that the expansion of the works then 
taking place would produce "a change in attitudes within your work force, and a greater 
willingness to offer themselves for employment on the part of the surrounding Catholic 
66 Population". 
He added, establishing local community links may "breakdown the prejudice which causes 
63 Irish News, 28th May 1966. 
64 FEA Davidson and Company Ltd., FEA Report, 5th November 1979. 65 Stock Exchange Official Year Book, 1983 London. 
66 FEA Davidson and Company Ltd., FEA Report, 5"' November 1979 and 
3rd February 1982. 
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these people to believe it is useless to apply". In the interests of "balance", he said, "At the 
same time the local Protestant community would have to be aware of what work was 
available and they have to be given equivalent opportunity for consideration as their 
67 Catholic neighbours". In the FEA's ninth annual report Cooper referred to this as an 
"affirmative action programme" at an unnamed company. 
The FEA did not analyse why no changes had been achieved in the attitudes of the work 
force since 1971 or in the patterns of employment nor why the management accepted the 
prevailing Protestant climate and symbols at the expense of equality and fair access. In 
response to an equality campaign in 1984 by the Irish National Caucus, Davidson's 
company president claimed many Catholics "have now risen to senior positions in the 
company". In support of this he said, "8 people from the Short Strand area are employed 
in our plant". 68 As employment was down to 550, this gave a Catholic ratio of 1.45%. 
Against the FEA's view that Catholics needed to overcome their prejudices to gain 
employment stands the Bishop's comments to Sirocco in 1966. They do not appear to have 
lost their force over time. "I find the implication that you can and should do nothing to 
correct the extreme form of religious discrimination for which your company is 
responsible a matter of grave concern". In the late 1990's Sirocco moved to a new site 
away from the Catholic Short Strand while retaining the site as its car park. 
Another major international investor was Standard Telephone and Cables (NI), STC, who 
were part of the American International Telephone & Telegraphs Corporation. With 
government grant aid factories were established at Monkstown in 1962 and Enniskillen in 
1965. Employment peaked in 1984 at 2000 with proposals for another 500 jobs due to 
investment in optic fibres and lasers. 69 At the time of the FEA's initial contact in 1977, 
1700 were employed of which around 60 were classified as skilled by STC. The company 
considered the workforce was 85-90% Protestant. STC workers proved hostile to any 
enquiry. The general manager claimed the AEUW trade union representatives refused to 
"allow the Company to provide the information requested". STC predicted the demand 
for 
67 Ibid. 
68 Patterson, John. R. President Davidson to Father Sean McManus, National Director INC, 13th June 1984. 
By 1992 Sirocco (now Howden Ltd) claimed there were 19 Catholics employed in its 408 workforce. 
By 
1994, this was down to 13 out of 240 workers. FEC Monitoring Returns 1995. 69 Fall in demand however, led to 300 job losses in May 1985 and further redundancies in 1986, leaving the 
work force at 1440. In June 1990 the Secretary of State opened STC's new telecommunications engineering 
centre at Monkstown with public support via the IDB worth £ 13m. NIO, 3rd 
January 1986; Belfast Telegraph 
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skilled workers was "was steadily decreasing" as mechanical engineering skills were 
rapidly being replaced with electronics. Recruitment policy rested on using "people with 
relatives already employed in the company". Twenty buses were laid on to ferry workers 
to the factory and advertising was rarely used. STC accepted the "proportion of Catholic 
workers in the company had reduced somewhat since the troubles started". This was 
attributed to "movement of Catholics away from strongly defined Protestant areas and the 
reluctance of others to travel into the area of the factory". 70 
Matters rested there until the FEA renewed its enquiry on the 16th January 1980. This 
elicited information that of the 69 skilled tradesmen employed at March 1980, 
approximately six or seven were Catholic. The FEA's 1981 report to STC suggested that 
recruitment efforts be made to overcome the influence of recommendations by existing 
employees. This met with a scathing rebuttal from Mr. Fulton the personnel manager. He 
dismissed the report as "based on rather dubious evidence". Fulton pointed out that 
Cooper, in his original letter of 8th November 1977, had "emphasised that this is a general 
enquiry into the overall picture in Belfast". Fulton in turn stressed, "At no time since the 
date of that letter, either in correspondence or in conversation, was there any indication 
that your Agency was carrying out an individual investigation into the company or that an 
individual report would be issued. We feel that we have been singularly misled in this 
respect". With reference to any objective of increasing opportunities among skilled 
workers STC noted: "the requirement that this company will have for this type of 
tradesman in the future will be non-existent. This must cast some doubt on the practicality 
of your proposed recommendations "". 71 
In reply Cooper said, "it was always envisaged some sort of report would result". 
72 STC's 
grievance had some justification. The FEA had failed to exercise its responsibilities in a 
timely and proper manner. It was now perceived to be responding to the massive 
nationalist protests surrounding the Hunger Strike and its consequences rather than 
carrying out a professional and impartial exercise. The FEA final report concluded, 
"there 
73 is no deliberate intention to discriminate against Roman Catholics" by STC. 
28th June 1984; Irish News 18th May 1985. 
70 FEA meeting with STC Mr. Fulton Personal Manager and General Manager, 
24 th November 1977. 
71 STC. Mr. Fulton, to FEA 23rd June 1981. 
72 FEA to STC, 1st July 1981. 
73 FEA Report STC, 3rd February, 1982. 
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The pattern of refusal to co-operate, a failure to accept responsibility for the issue, open 
hostility to equality by the trade unions was common across the engineering industry in 
Belfast. Sectarian recruitment practices especially via the vehicle of the existing workforce 
were regarded as the best way to maintain local employment traditions. Mackies, for 
example as a manufacturer of textile machinery with annual turnover of £30m provided 
employment to generations of Protestants. A family firm, it took some public pride in its 
"Protestant atmosphere". Subject to the normal ebb and flow of demand workers were laid 
off and recruited again with ex-workers "Especially welcome to apply". Mackies 
estimated, they were 90% Protestant. Situated on the Springfield Road, the factory was 
readily accessible to the Catholic Population of West Belfast. Mackies openly opposed 
equal opportunity legislation and refused to provide any information to the FEA or sign 
the equality Declaration. It eventually signed the latter as part of wider process of selling 
the company eleven years after the enactment of the Fair Employment Act. Loyalist 
emblems, flags and the Orange Order were a significant presence in the factory. Its 
directors had worked their way up from lower management and recruitment was 
conducted through friends, relatives and contacts. The FEA was able to conclude that 
"whereas in the past your company has not encouraged recruitment of Catholic tradesmen, 
there has been a shift of emphasis over recent years". There was no evidence to support 
this statement. Indeed in May 1987, a Catholic's complaint of discrimination was upheld 
due to Mackies' refusal to remove intimidating loyalist displays and emblems. 
74 
In August 1989, Mackies chairman resigned breaking a 150 year old family tradition as 
the company entered into negotiations for a buy out by the American company Lurnmus 
Industries, from Columbus Georgia. Initial proposals to move site and the remaining 950 
workers to the staunchly Protestant Woodvale in East Belfast, were changed to a parkland 
setting following a £20m modernisation deal with the Industrial Development Board. 
75 
A final engineering example is Hugh J. Scotts another family engineering 
firm. Located on 
74 FEA Report on Mackies, 1980,1981,3d February 1982. 75 NIO, 4t' April 1990. Mackies 1992 workforce of 626 included 84 Catholics. By 1994, this was 
down to 80 
out of 354 workers. (FEC 1995) Lummus sold its interest for a nominal sum to one 
larger than life Pat 
Dougan. Richard Needham MP and minister poured IDB funds into a rescue package. 
When Bill Clinton 
visited Belfast in 1995, following the IRA ceasefire, he chose Mackies to make a keynote speech 
for peace. 
"The textile machines you make permit people to weave disparate threads 
into remarkable fabrics. That is 
now what you must do here". This aspiration however became lost in 
its own threads as Mackies went into 
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the Ravenhill Road it employed Protestants from East and South Belfast. It was also 
within walking distance or a short bus ride for Catholics from the lower Ormeau and Short 
Strand. Scott's attracted two sentences in the FEA's published report, albeit shared with 
another company in the FEA's anonymous fashion. This did however reflect the extent of 
the FEA's investigation. Scott's refused to endorse equal opportunities and its directors 
made no bones about their contempt for the FEA. One director, Mr. Bolton, while 
confirming the work force was 100% Protestant, claimed "he and the rest of the 
management did not enquire into the religious beliefs of their work people". Bolton said 
there had been Catholics employed, "but generally they only stayed a few hours before 
finding some excuse to leave". He added "there was a strong Bible study movement within 
the company which was not unwelcome to the Management". 76 
Any recruits were obtained from the company's wider "Protestant family". The local 
engineering unions also played a critical role in ensuring jobs went to Protestant trade 
union card holders. The FEA investigating officer, in this case the Deputy Director for the 
FEA, Mr. Sefton, concluded, "Some major inducement such as enhanced profitability, or 
the threat of much reduced profitability would be necessary to provoke any real interest in 
an equality of opportunity programme, " by Scotts. 77 
The final unpublished report in 1982 however deleted this and "accepted the assurances 
given that Hugh J. Scotts Ltd., does not deliberately discriminate against Roman 
Catholics". Scotts was asked as "far as is practical and expedient", to use "its best 
endeavours to find practical means to persuade its existing work force to accept the need 
for equality of opportunity including direct discussions when this is deemed to be 
productive". 78 In 1981, employment dropped to 300. The company was later wound up 
and taken over by a Danish concern. 
Conclusions. 
One of the remarkable features of this six year enquiry into engineering employment 
in 
Belfast was the fact none of the companies were found guilty of failing to afford equality 
receivership in February 1999 leaving the remainin 350 workers to weave their way to the 
dole. 
76 FEA meeting with Scotts Managing Director, 24 November 1977. 77 FEA Draft Report, Scotts, January/February 1981. 
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of opportunity. This stood in marked contrast to their history, local reputation, the 
activities of their workforce and the evidence found. The above demonstrates several 
principal points of the thesis. The first that inequality of opportunity in employment 
remained and was endorsed by management and workforce alike. This Protestant ethos 
permeated every facet of employment and created expectations and aspirations directly 
associated with Protestant identity and loyalty. Secondly that in terms of convincing 
nationalists or Catholics that Stormont and then Direct Rule could provide fairness and 
equity in the field of employment the government and its agents were unable to provide 
significant evidence of progress. Thirdly despite overwhelming evidence of sectarian 
inequalities in patterns of employment and the individual practices of significant public 
and private employers, the government chose not to utilise its vital role as a primary 
source of financial aid, support and investment, to oblige key industries to reverse or 
challenge such inequalities. Fourthly the administrative agency created by the government 
to promote equality of opportunity and challenge those that discriminated completely 
failed. This failure may be attributed to a mix of poor leadership, the absence of political 
will and indeed opposition to challenging the source of such inequalities within the 
Agency and the fact government was content with such failure. Finally by the mid 1980's 
the FEA and central government were fully aware no fundamental progress had been made 
in terms of creating a greater access to the labour market nor had any significant public or 
private employer embraced the ethos and practice of equality of opportunity. Thus the 
legal mechanisms introduced to ameliorate the market and give it credibility in nationalist 
eyes had singularly failed against the rocks of a Protestant heritage in employment. While 
the political approach would become more sophisticated in the late 1980's and 1990's in 
response to Irish-American pressure, at this time the only real challenge to this state of 
affairs came from Agency staff themselves. The next section elaborates on their role and 
failure to achieve change from within. 
Dissension in the Ranks (ii). 
Introduction. 
Internal dissent within the FEA reflected the wider tensions within NI. On the one hand 
78 FEA Report 3rd February 1982. 
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there was an Agency Board and Chair who made it clear they considered employers were 
doing a great deal already and that conciliation not investigations coupled with an 
incremental strategy was the way forward. The FEA stressed education would be the 
major tool for achieving change in the attitudes and practices of employers and employees 
rather than law enforcement. 79 On the other hand were a group of the four most senior 
staff directly responsible for research, policy, individual complaints and formal 
investigations. Their agenda was that in face of the civil conflict, sectarian murder 
campaigns and a history of deliberate inequality in employment it was absolutely vital to 
achieve results by fully implementing all aspects of the 1976 Act. Their aspirations 
included for example the full utilisation of Section 12 powers to conduct formal 
investigations; tackling intimidation on the shop floor and the use of Section VI to 
subpoena information and impose injunctions via the County Courts. They felt sectarian 
employers should not be included on the Register of Equal Opportunity Employers; 
findings of a failure to afford equality of opportunity where this was justified should be 
made and employers denied access to government contracts and removed from the 
Register. In short there was an enthusiasm and strong personal commitment to meet the 
challenge of tackling discrimination in employment. As they constituted four of the six 
operational staff directly responsible for implementing the law matters became fraught 
when a perception developed that they were being victimised for seeking to carry out their 
duties and the conclusions of reports were being radically changed, decisions not 
communicated and access to meetings and minutes denied. In addition there was the 
presence of a very active trade union branch that had already played a leadership role in 
achieving fundamental reforms of the local Equal Opportunities Commission. This had led 
to the NIC (ICTU) withdrawing its membership from the EOC Board until it was agreed 
by the EOC it would use its investigative powers and call employers to account. 
80 The 
Branch Chairman and Branch Secretary happened to be two of the four senior Agency 
staff. 
79 FEA First Annual Report, 1976-77, p. 7,30th November 1977, Belfast, HMSO. 80 NIPSA Branch 147 Files; and a review carried out by Christopher McCrudden, Balliol College Oxford, 
for the NI EOC, The Sex Discrimination (NI) Order 1976 and the EOC for NI. The FEA employed five 
senior officers and an assistant to enforce the law. This excluded an executive chairman and seven 
administrative staff. The author was Research Officer and Branch Secretary. Its worth noting, as these things 
are important in NI, that the religious composition of the four staff were two middle class Catholics and one 
East Belfast Protestant and another residing in East Belfast but originally from North Belfast. 
The other two 
operational staff were the Co-Ordinating Director, an English Catholic and a Employer 
Liaison Assistant 
who was also a Catholic from Belfast. 
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These staff (the Deputy Co-Ordinating Director, Research Officer and the two 
Conciliation Officers) accused the Agency of what amounted to maladministration and the 
effective repeal of the 1976 Act by failing to find failures to afford equality of opportunity, 
"against any company, public body or any organisation in Northern Ireland"; a failure to 
follow up evidence and provide directions to employers to adjust employment practices or 
remove anyone from the equality Register; preventing officials from using the full range 
of enforcement powers, and political victimisation against Agency staff. 81 On the 14th 
November 1980 the local NIPSA trade union branch passed a resolution calling for "a 
comprehensive enquiry into the Fair Employment Agency". 82 This was followed up by a 
23 point dossier submitted to the NIPSA General Secretary, Jim McCusker, and the 
Minister of State, Adam Butler MP. The dossier concluded that: 
"The general feeling within the staff is one of frustration and failure that the 
goals and actions of a body that was created to provide redress for some of 
Northern Ireland's ills has been circumvented by the Agency as constituted 
leaving the staff with no confidence in the willingness or the ability of 
those chosen to promote the legislation". 83 
Cooper responded to this in a letter to the NIPSA General Secretary declaring that Agency 
members had much longer experience than staff in the field of equality of opportunity and 
that, 
"All of them brought to it a realistic approach to what could be achieved and also a 
realistic appreciation that the Agency has within its power not just the ability to 
contribute to a redress of these ills but also to make the ills greater". 
84 
While expressing his "deep resentment" of the charges by his senior staff Cooper has 
captured the heart of the problem. The degree by which a sense of "realism" influenced 
the nature and range of work undertaken differed dramatically in the organisation. 
On the 
one hand a range of highly committed staff felt that more could have 
been done and the 
Agency had abrogated its duties and another group, Agency members, whose sense of 
"realism" acted as a break due to the apparent potential for law enforcement 
to make the 
situation worse. In short it may be concluded that Agency members 
felt that enforcement 
could lead to a dangerous destabilisation of the market place. 
By so doing they failed to 
81 Branch 147 Committee to NIPSA General Secretary, 7t' January 1981. 
82 Branch 147, NIPSA Branch Secretary to Agency Board Members, 14th November 
1980. 
83 Branch Committee147, correspondence to NIPSA General Secretary, 
7 January 1981. 
84 Chairman FEA, Mr. Cooper to Jim McCusker, General Secretary NIPSA, 2 1St 
January 1981. 
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challenge the legitimacy of inequality in the market. For their part in response to this 
Agency staff demanded some form of independent arbitration while noting they, 
"were not aware of the length or degree of involvement in promoting religious 
equality outside the confines of the Fair Employment Agency, of members of the 
Agency like Mr. Glen Barr (UDA), Mr. Donald Francis (Gallaghers), Mr. Michael 
Mclaron (CBI), Mrs. Margot Neill (EOC Chair), Mr. Ted Lamont, Mr. Tom 
Conaty (Catholic fruit merchant) .... However, as individuals directly involved in 
the work of the agency their contribution like that of all the other members can 
only be assessed in terms of the achievement of the Agency itself'. 85 
In their letter to Adam Butler MP, Minister of State responsible for the Agency, the staff 
stated, 
"As officers of the senior ranks in the Agency, we wish to state to you in the 
strongest possible terms, our serious concern at the consistently failed performance 
of the Agency as a consequence of the mismanagement of work by the Agency 
members and its sub-committees. Dubious practices have also occurred. 
This has led to a startling series of events over the past months: 
1. A member of the Agency has resigned in protest at the Agency's lack of 
progress and the manner in which Agency business is conducted. 
2. The Secretary of State has received a damning documentary indictment of 
incompetence and cover up in the Agency. 
3. The Branch for the Public Service Alliance have formally written to the 
Agency members calling for a private, independent and urgent enquiry into the 
Agency's affairs. This matter now rests with the General Secretary of NIPSA. 
4. Another member of the Agency had indicated an intention to resign. 
5. The Deputy Director of the Agency has been continually subject to 
victimisation because he has privately expressed reservations and criticisms of 
the way the Agency has conducted its business. He has consequently been 
excluded from the management of the affairs of the Agency. 
6. The character and commitment to the Act of other senior staff has been 
maligned. 
7. To date each and every approach to the Chairman and Agency members for a 
resolution of the Agency's problems has led to constant rejections. 
It is in these circumstances that we have decided to write to you as soon as your 
ministerial responsibilities were announced to appeal for an urgent meeting with 
you in order to begin serious dialogue as to how the Agency's problems could 
be 
successfully resolved and the Agency saved from disintegration 
before an 
irrevocable situation is reached". 86 
The Branch representatives and senior staff found themselves lined up against an 
Agency 
alliance of Cooper, the UDA's representative Glenn Barr, and Tom 
Conaty who presented 
85 Branch Committee, Branch 147, to General Secretary NIPSA, 26th January 1981- 
86 Letter to Adam Butler MP Minister of State 8th January 1981 from Galway, 
Graham, Patterson and 
O'Keefe - the four senior operational staff of the 
Agency. 
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himself as the voice of the Catholic hierarchy. Two dissenting Agency Board members, 
Des Bannon a careers teacher and Inez McCormack from NUPE supported the general 
position of the staff in the desire to achieve results. These two Agency members and the 
senior staff provided separate and distinct comprehensive dossiers to the Secretary of 
State's office expressing their concerns. Des Bannon met ministers and civil servants 
privately. The minister's office declined to act. 87 
Political Intervention. 
There were a number of specific issues with which the staff had grave concerns. One of 
the first contentious matters focused on instructions given to the Agency by the minister of 
state. Staff felt this exposed the agency to a charge of malpractice in enforcement. The 
Deputy Co-Ordinating Director responsible for complaints, Peter O'Keefe, a barrister, 
requested that Cooper put the case involving a small asphalt firm before an independent 
assessor "to determine if we had responded properly to the ministerial decision that we 
investigate". He expressed deep concern "at the improper way we handled the case", and 
asked Cooper to explain to the full Agency why he had withheld the facts from them 
including O'Keefe's report which advised them of his view. 88 
This case was the first investigation carried out by the FEA to assess a company's 
continued entitlement to a government contract. Contrary to FEA policy not to act upon 
anonymous complaints such a source formed the basis for this action. Around October 
1978 Paisley, the DUP leader had received a crude hand-written scrawl alleging a small 
asphalt sub-contractor employing 15 people in West Belfast discriminated against 
Protestants. Paisley in turn passed it on to Ray Carter, then a Labour Minister of State, on 
23rd October 1978. The essence of the complaint focused on the fact the employer owned 
a pub in Co. Louth in Southern Ireland rather than the absence of any Protestant 
employees. The letter writer added, "he is reported to entertain 
Republicans who are 
extremists". 89 
Carter told his senior civil servant Mr. Darwin to instruct 
Cooper to mount an 
87 Contemporary conversations and correspondence between Agency members and staff 
members 
November, December 1980, January 1981 and staff experience throughout 1981. 
88 O'Keefe, P. Deputy Co-Ordinating Director to Cooper, R. Chair FEA, 18th October 
1979. 
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investigation, "and that if it is established the firm practices discrimination then the 
question of placing government contracts with the firm will be considered". He added "the 
minister expected an investigation to proceed without complications". 90 By 15th December 
1978 the Co-Ordinating Director, Mr. Sefton had visited the company following several 
telephone calls. Thus the weight of government was swiftly brought down not against 
employers that were wholly owned government enterprises such as Harland and Wolff, 
Shorts or others with high profile sectarian reputations but a comparatively insignificant 
asphalt firm. FEA staff regarded the whole exercise as highly irregular and formally 
withdrew from any and all involvement in the enquiry. O'Keefe stated "the way in which 
the senior management of the Agency (Cooper and the Co-Ordinating Director, Mr. Sefton 
who carried out the enquiry) conducted themselves in this case is deserving of criticism 
and censure". 91 
This opinion was based on the fact that the whole procedure was against Agency policy. 
There was insufficient evidence for a public authority, the Department of Finance in this 
case, to form an opinion that the contractor had breached the equal opportunity 
Declaration. No agreement existed between government and the Agency that gave the 
FEA authority to monitor the granting of government contracts, and the anonymous source 
did not indicate he had been the subject of any direct or indirect act of discrimination by 
the employer. 92 Furthermore Agency staff had encountered fierce resistance from Cooper 
when they demanded he seek from government the power to monitor contracts and deny 
equal opportunity certificates to those who failed to demonstrate they were de facto equal 
opportunity employers. Indeed it would be four years, March 1982, before the government 
conceded that businesses seeking government contracts should at least sign the Agency's 
equality Declaration. Signatures then flooded in and were accepted without question as to 
why they had declined to sign the Declaration for six years, nor was any analysis as to 
their employment practices carried out. The FEA thereby gained the right to withdraw this 
certificate. It never did so. In 1978, the threat of this was not even available so any enquiry 
could be no more than "sabre rattling". A small firm however was unlikely to 
have 
89 Anonymous letter to Ian Paisley MP, undated 1978. 
90 Mr. K. Darwin Department of Finance (NI) to Agency Chairman, 28th November 
1978, and to Ian Paisley 
MP on 28th November 1978. 
91 O, Keefe, P. to Cooper R. 18th October, 24th October 1979. 
92 The law at the time gave the responsibility to the Department of Finance to require all contractors 
to sign a 
non-discrimination Declaration. This dated from the Stormont regime. The FEA mentioned this 
in its Second 
Annual Report but dropped the issue. It does not appear in the Third Annual Report at all. 
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appreciated this. 
The manner by which Cooper responded to the NIO and Paisley was also considered 
highly questionable by senior staff for the following reasons. The matter was not brought 
before the Agency board or its sub-committees, a copy of the `investigation' report went to 
Mr. Darwin on the 27th June 1979, who asked the Agency to forward a copy of the report 
to Paisley in late July as the "Minister took the view that it would look better all round 
and, preserve the straightforward independence (sic) of the thing". The company was not 
forwarded a copy until the 22nd August 1979. A Protestant sub-contractor who knew the 
Catholic contractor well, informed the FEA the allegations were "a load of rubbish" and 
the if 93 work of a crank". 
The internal staff view was the government and Cooper were intent on appeasing militant 
unionism. Due to the failure to adhere to any formal or legal procedures the findings had 
no status and were therefore unenforceable. Directions could not be given or undertakings 
sought. Such was the confused state of matters that Carter's office expressed the view that 
it was extremely difficult to determine whether any finding had actually been made. As 
O'Keefe pointed out, ministers and the FEA had done nothing to challenge large public 
and private employers that while benefiting from or totally reliant on government aid 
refused to sign the equality Declaration and "are known to have severely imbalanced 
workforces". He continued: 
"Bearing this in mind one could consider that the alacrity with which the 
Rev. Paisley, Ray Carter, the Department of the Environment, the NIO, the 
Department of Finance, and last but not least the Fair Employment Agency, 
saw fit to evaluate the entitlement to a government contract of an employer 
of 15 employees, is a reprehensible state of affairs and could be construed 
as evidence of the double standards which prevail in this society in relation 
to inequality of opportunity on religious grounds; double standards which 
may have pervaded this body set up specifically to solve some of the 
problems associated with attitudes and behaviour which have made the 
Declaration a nonsense. Regrettably the question must be asked, quis 
custodiat ipos custodes'". 94 
Cooper declined to circulate O'Keefe's report and denied that any investigation took place 
93 O'Keefe, Peter. Memorandum and report, 18th October 1979 to R. Cooper, Chairman 
FEA. 
94 Ibid. p. 5 
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and that the matter was not referred to the Agency Board. 95 The first draft was completed 
by Mr. Sefton, the Co-Ordinating Director on 13th March 1979, a final draft was signed by 
Cooper on the 22nd June, and a copy and covering letter sent by Cooper to the Department 
of Finance on 27th June 1979. A copy of the report was sent to the company concerned on 
22 °a August 1979 by Mr. Sefton. No evidence of discrimination was found. 
Government Contracts. 
A second major issue was the absence of any link between the award of government 
contracts and equal opportunity practices. The FEA had arranged a meeting with the 
minister, Hugh Rossi MP, to discuss government contracts for 29th October 1979. O'Keefe 
had spent most of 1979 pressing the Chairman to consider a range of Agency 
shortcomings and in particular government contracts and the possibility of using the 1976 
Act to initiate prosecutions against those holding the Declaration were there was evidence 
they failed to afford equality of opportunity. Matters came to a head on 30thAugust 1979 
with negotiations breaking down between them. In the face of the pending meeting with 
Rossi, O'Keefe prepared a searing indictment of the FEA's record for the Agency Board to 
consider. Cooper refused to circulate this. O'Keefe pointed out that contrary to practices in 
the US where employers bidding for Federal contracts had to prove themselves de facto 
equal opportunity employers, the FEA's view that anyone who signed the Declaration, 
should automatically be considered such, was "ill conceived, technically ineffective and 
morally unconscionable". No sanction or incentive existed. American equal opportunity 
bodies considered this as the single most effective weapon in their armoury. O'Keefe said 
the rejection of "this pivotal role" was, "a betrayal of the next generation of young people 
seeking equal opportunities in this society". He added that by pursuing an American style 
strategy, the FEA would: 
"restore to this Agency some measure of credibility and utility which 
has been 
absent since the day in 1978 when the Agency or its responsible official 
(Cooper) 
agreed to abandon the engineering enquiry because of the grossly 
improper 
interference of the then Minister of State Mr. Concannon". 
6 
95 Cooper's denial is cited in The Sunday Tribune, Dublin 19th February 
1984, `Why the North's Jobs 
Agency Cannot Give a Fair Deal'. 9'O'Keefe, P. The Role of Government Contract Allocation and the meeting with 
Mr. H. Rossi, MP to 
Cooper and Agency Board Members, 15th October 1979. 
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He continued: 
"The many so far successful attempts to subvert the Agency and render its 
existence a mere window cosmetic for an international audience must warn 
Agency members against proceeding to any deal with the Minister until our 
policy in this vital area of government contract allocations has been 
reviewed and amended". 97 
His document recorded the fact that the FEA in its first three years of existence had "failed 
to discover a single employer who is not affording equality of opportunity'", remove 
anyone from the register nor "adequately complete a single section 12 enquiry". He listed 
14 major "areas of policy mismanagement", which he considered had "resulted in the 
virtual administrative repeal of certain parts of the Fair Employment Act". These included 
the above plus failures to use sections of the Act which could impose broad remedies such 
as the prevention of incitement, intimidation, etc. by making the employer liable and the 
absence of any Appeals Board which was required under the Act. He considered that on 
the evidence collected by FEA officials 27 findings of discrimination from the 98 
complaints received could have been made instead of seven. Faced with the refusal to 
distribute this O'Keefe charged the Agency with maladministration and told Cooper that 
his "refusal to actually discharge the huge and historic obligations that fortune has 
favoured you with, amounts to a betrayal of the next generation of young people" . 
98 In his 
report on government contracts O'Keefe had asserted that : 
"I consider that I am in a position to prove that throughout the whole range of the 
Agency's statutory remit its onerous and historic responsibilities have been 
subverted". 99 
In a telling comment O'Keefe attributed the lack of progress to an inability to grasp the 
fundamentals at stake. 
"The definition of what is equality of opportunity remains obscure within 
the Agency since there has been no need these past three years to 
understand what it means. In not comprehending what the concept means 
we have been unable to recognise failures to afford equality of opportunity 100 
as and when they regularly presented themselves to us". 
The rest of the senior management team, the research officer and conciliation officers 
97 Ibid. 
O'Keefe, P. Deputy Co-Ordinating Director to Chairman FEA, 16th October 1979. 
99 0 Keefe, P. to Cooper, R. Chairman FEA, 15thOctober 1979. 
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wrote a note to the chairman supporting O'Keefe's position and suggested "it would be 
both constructive and stimulating if this memo were circulated". 101 Cooper finally 
conceded by allowing O'Keefe to address the Board. Prior to this however Cooper issued a 
paper supporting the government. He dismissed the view that a firm should produce 
"figures showing the religious breakdown of its employees and where there was an 
imbalance be required to produce a programme to rectify this", as "official sectarian head 
counts". 102 Much later in 1992 Cooper declared, "One of the most important aspects of the 
1989 Fair Employment Act was the introduction of monitoring" for all public and private 
sector employers. 
In his address to the Agency Board at the end of October, O'Keefe cited a "catalogue of 
humiliation, failures, shabby deals ... which have lost us the only irreplaceable asset we 
had in 1976, namely our credibility". He deplored the low level of findings of 
discrimination, the failure to seek any undertakings from employers to remedy their 
practices; the failure to complete any section 12 investigations and the many misleading 
statements issued in the Annual Reports. He noted that many `decisions' had simply been 
taken for the record without any intention for these to be implemented. He attacked the 
Agency's decision to assess the impact of family size and family planning on inequality 
(25th October 1979) while "Section 12 investigations into the attitudes, practices and 
compositions of even one employer or even one trade union in Northern Ireland have not 
been completed". He added: 
"While we seek to explain or justify workforce and occupational imbalances in 
terms of attitudinal, educational, aspirational, sociological, geographical, demo- 
graphical phenomena, the phenomenon, the illegality or the plain custom of 
religious discrimination both direct and indirect remains virtually unchallenged by 
your efforts, by our efforts in your collective name". 
103 
The argument presented on government contracts focused on the "government's role 
(is) 
absolutely crucial in this area of public morality". For government: 
`By contracting with an employer who practices religious 
discrimination, be it 
direct or indirect and who fails to afford equality of opportunity regardless of 
religion, the Government finances discrimination ... 
When Government monies, 
100 O'Keefe, P. to Cooper, R. Chairman FEA, 19th October 1979. 
101 FEA staff to Chairman, 160' October 1979. 102 102 Cooper, R. Chairman FEA to FEA Board 24th October 1979. 
103 O'Keefe, P. Address to the Members of the Fair Employment Agency, 29th October 
1979, p. 6. 
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levied from tax payers of both religions, are paid to an employer with a grossly imbalanced workforce ... unless that employer is engaging in efforts to create an 
appropriate balance, to create equality of opportunity, then the Government is 
funding the creation, the continuance and the entrenchment of religious inequality 
in employment". 104 
O'Keefe's detailed analysis was rejected. The Agency instead chose to embark on 
disciplinary action against him. The minister, Rossi on the other hand had earlier indicated 
movement might be possible. This was at a price. In a private meeting with Cooper he had 
asked that the proposed investigation into the civil service be dropped as "he felt the 
situation was being rectified and that the statistics which exist in the higher echelons were 
already well known". Cooper reported to the Agency Board that: 
"the Minister appeared to be suggesting that if the Agency held back on the 
question of the civil service, he would be more helpful in respect of Government 
Contracts. ... The Minister 
has asked that should be dropped. The Minister 
apparently believed that to follow through with the Civil Service investigation 
would do nothing but damage. He felt the situation was being rectified and the 
statistics which exist in the higher echelons were well known. "105 
Inez McCormack an FEA board member and trade union representative leaked the story to 
the Dublin based Hibernia which ran it under a "Dirty Tricks", banner headline. Rossi's 
efforts were referred to as a "squalid deal", and a "sinister attempt at Ministerial 
blackmail". 106 This proved highly embarrassing for Britain in the USA where 
Congressional committees were discussing their refusal to sell guns to the RUC and the 
European Courts were examining Britain's violations of human rights at the time. The 
meeting with Rossi however produced nothing. It would be three years later amidst fears 
that NI was on the point of total civil war that government required contractors to 
be 
signatories to the Declaration and almost five years before an investigation report into the 
civil service -considered a `whitewash' by those 
involved- was published by the FEA. 
O'Keefe's unwelcome address identified several central issues. Firstly the 
Agency had 
singularly failed to carry out its mandate. The law had not been applied or vigorously 
pursued. The Agency, as part of its education programme, was seeking to 
direct much of 
the FEA's extremely limited resources away from formal 
investigations while its public 
104 Ibid., p. 8. 
1% 
105 FEA Board Minutes, 26th June 1979. 
106 Hibernia, Dublin, `Dirty Tricks in the North's Fair Employment Agency', 26th 
July 1979 
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credibility had crashed. The SDLP leadership described it publicly as "totally useless". 107 
The government did not carry out its own moral mandate in a society riven with conflict 
that desperately needed some semblance of progress. The actions by government only 
confirmed its mandate was a unionist one in practice and very often in name. 
Ormeau Bakeries. 
A third contemporaneous issue involved Agency Board member, Des Bannon, Branch 
147, senior staff and the Agency chairman. The controversy arose from an individual case 
of discrimination against a Catholic man in 1979. Ormeau Bakeries is located in an area of 
South Belfast that is accessible to both religions. Of the 1038 employed, 10% were 
Catholic. Of these 72% had been recruited in 1979 alone when Ormeau expanded to take 
advantage of the closure of Peter Pan Bakeries in West Belfast. In Derry, however, at its 
Stevenson's outlet, the 187 employed were 46% Protestant and 52% Catholic. When an 
individual complaint of discrimination was rejected by the FEA, Bannon forced through 
the Agency an agreement to conduct a broader equal opportunity investigation. As Cooper 
was vigorously opposed to this he referred the matter to the research sub-committee to 
which Bannon had no access. Bannon then pursued the matter with the Secretary of State's 
office. 108 There matters rested until the Irish National Caucus intervened by mounting a 
campaign to ban Ormeau's' products from a St. Patrick's Day exhibition at Maceys in 
Washington. Ormeau's managing director, Mr. Logan urgently sought a "clean bill of 
health" from Cooper. At a private meeting on 22nd April 1980, Cooper accepted Logan's 
claims on "the major strides which had already been taken". 
109 
Between November 1980 and January 1981, Ormeau recruited 97 workers. Thirteen were 
Catholic. By November 1981, from 223 applications received, 28 were Catholics. The 
local Employment Service Office reported that between 1976-1981 Ormeau rarely notified 
it of any vacancies and when they did applicants were usually Protestant 
due to Ormeau's 
reputation. The FEA assured Ormeau, "spectacular progress cannot 
be expected". "o 
Bannon resigned accusing Cooper of "evasion, delay, deception .. and cover up". 
He said 
107 Gerry Fitt MP, SDLP, Hansard, 7t' March 1979, Cols. 1351,1352. 
108 Bannon, Des. Agency Board Member to Branch Secretary NIPSA, Branch 147 
Files, 5th November 
1980. Forty-Eighth Board Meeting of FEA, 9t' December 1980 
109 Note of Meeting between Cooper and Mr. Logan, Managing Director of 
Ormeau Bakery and Mr. Kelly 
Administration Director on 22nd April 1980 - dictated in June 
1980 by Cooper and placed on file. 
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he had "much common ground for agreement", with O'Keefe and was left "sadly 
disillusioned about its (the FEA) less than diligent progress". "' He followed this up with 
a private meeting with Rossi and submitted a lengthy dossier to the Secretary of State. 
Bannon relayed to Agency staff the contents of the meeting. The Minister claimed to share 
his concerns and promised action would be taken. Cooper was called to a meeting with 
Rossi following this and reported back that O'Keefe was also seeking a meeting with the 
Minister. The Agency authorised Cooper and the Staffing Sub Committee "to take such 
action as they deemed necessary". 112 Bannon reported that he found himself under 
pressure from the Catholic hierarchy to drop the subject as Conaty had `put the word 
about'. A Catholic narrowly escaped assassination from a UDA death squad by dodging 
between bakery trucks at Ormeau in 1992. By 1994, Ormeau Bakeries, had consolidated 
its role as leading baker through an acquisition process that included Catholic bakeries. Its 
workforce included 114 Catholics out of its 603 workforce. ' 13 
The Agency Board was composed of 12 members. The religious composition was nine 
Protestants to three Catholics. Bannon's experience as a Catholic Agency member 
reflected the overwhelming desire among Agency members that employers should not 
have the full force of the Act applied against them. The prevailing prejudice was that 
employers were doing all they could and that incidents of actual discrimination or 
intimidation on the shop floor were exceptions to the rule. Employers were thereby always 
given more than the benefit of the doubt rather than obliging them to prove beyond a 
shadow of a doubt that they did indeed seek to offer equality of access to employment. 
The evidence presented throughout this chapter demonstrates this policy was misguided 
and ignored the harsher realities of seeking and holding onto gainful employment where 
opportunities were few and fiercely contested. Education without enforcement was a 
strategy that left the FEA adrift. 
The internal crisis continues. 
Matters intensified when McCormack, NUPE's regional organiser and the 
NIC ICTU's 
llo FEA to Ormeau Bakeries, 18th September, 1981. 
11 Des Bannon, NIPSA B147 Files; Forty-Eighth Board Meeting of FEA, 9th December 1980. 
112 Conversation with author following the meeting with Rossi and the ministers claim 
that matters would be 
taken up by the office of Humprhey Atkins W, Secretary of State 
for NI. December 1980. 
113 FEC Monitoring Returns 1994, Report No. 5, FEC, March 1995. 
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representative resigned in disillusionment, "due to its failure to implement the Fair 
Employment Act". ' 14 Her replacement in 1981 John Coulthard, held private meetings with 
staff in their homes and while agreeing with their stance would later use these frank 
exchanges and confidences to assist the Agency take disciplinary action against them as 
the staff continued to seek reforms of the Agency's policy and practices following the 
NIPSA Branch resolution calling for an urgent and independent enquiry into the FEA on 
the 14th November 1980.115 The Co-Ordinating Director, Sefton, made it clear he would 
do everything possible to sack staff at the centre of the conflict. The Branch Committee, 
in turn threatened industrial action and: 
"expressed their concern at the manner in which the Chairman ran the Agency, the 
total breakdown in communications with staff and management, the failure to 
recruit extra staff and their lack of confidence in the ability and willingness of the 
Agency to pursue the implementation of the Fair Employment Act. "" 
In the midst of this turmoil Sefton confirmed he was manufacturing job descriptions with a 
view to "further reduce and isolate the responsibilities" of O'Keefe and was developing 
proposals for an FEA company trade union whose representatives would be determined by 
himself and the Chairman. Sefton's proposals included refusing to recognise NIPSA; for 
the Agency to have a veto on who Branch Officers were; to establish an "involvement 
committee", to replace the trade union which would conduct its own elections and 
establish representatives approved by the Chair and himself. One concession was that if 
NIPSA remained they would be permitted to nominate a Branch official to be included in 
the "involvement committee". Sefton also prepared a 20 page, 52 point private paper on 
the actions of O'Keefe that included a range of suggestions to sack him, make him 
redundant and cited a list of alleged quotations critical of the Agency and chairman. This 
included being "positively insolent" and casting doubts on "the integrity of members". 
Point 13 for example states: 
"His vilification of the chairman was constant. O'Keefe referred to 
him as "that 
toad", "a liar" and inferred he was using his position in the Agency to advance 
himself politically in West Belfast. He also started his veiled threats of exposing 
the "corruption" of the Agency". 117 
114 Branch 147 NIPSA Minutes of meeting with Inez Mccormack, 13th November 
1980, at 12.15pm at FEA 
offices, Lindsay House, Belfast. 
115 NIPSA Branch 147 Resolution, 14th November 1980. The private meetings with Coulthard 
in 1981 
included Patterson, Galway, Graham and O'Keefe followed by numerous telephone calls with 
Branch 
officials that were then cited in disciplinary processes in February 1982. 116 Branch 147 Correspondence and minutes with NIPSA General Secretary and 
FEA, November 1980,7t' 
January 1981. 
117 Peter Sefton, Co-Ordinating Director FEA, Untitled dossier, Point 13,1981. 
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Under his options for dealing with O'Keefe, Sefton added that "in any event the other staff 
members will have to be dealt with re their joint letters to Rossi and Butler". 118 Sefton's 
document also confirms that in the case concerning the asphalt company, the Minister, 
Ray Carter MP and the anonymous complaint raised by Ian Paisley MP, ( see Political 
Intervention above) that "The Chairman and the Co-Ordinating Director decided to carry 
out an informal investigation in order to avoid adverse political reaction as Paisley had 
passed on the letter to the Minister". 119 Demands to see personal files were refused. For 
the local branch which had just completed a high profile and successful campaign in 1981 
to oblige the EOC to change its ways and implement the law this came as a shock. 120 The 
difference between this struggle and the EOC was that the issue of religion went to the 
heart of the state of NI. Gender could be safely debated as a universal issue. 
When this was reported to the NIPSA General Secretary, Jim McCusker, he expressed 
alarm lest the trade union movement be accused of sectarianism by joining "the chorus of 
criticism of the Agency that stems from certain quarters". As the Branch Committee 
pointed out, to ignore such issues would make the union very much a part of the 
problem. 121 From this time Agency staff were denied access to files essential to their work, 
excluded from attendance at Agency meetings, all staff meetings ceased as the FEA 
embarked on what the branch officials considered was a campaign of political 
victimisation. The Branch Secretary's mail was opened and formal grievance procedures 
initiated against the Agency chairman by him ignored. 122 In short the FEA embraced all 
the worst attributes of a discriminatory employer. On 2nd December 1980 O'Keefe raised 
the stakes by writing to Rossi directly seeking a meeting to discuss "the future of the FEA" 
118 Ibid., p. 14, Option 5 of six options. 119 Ibid., Point 11. 
120 The EOC enquiry was carried out by leading barrister Geoffrey Birdman, author of Race and 
Law 1972. 
An administrative report was also produced by Chris McCrudden. The EOC and FEA shared office space 
and were organised into one trade union branch. In 1982 Sefton presented what he termed "incident reports" 
which were a range of allegations made by him against individuals. This was in 
breach of the disciplinary 
procedure and denied the opportunity to challenge or comment and led to formal protests 
by NIPSA full time 
official John Corey at such conduct by the FEA. 121 General Secretary NIPSA to Branch Secretary, 18th November 1980. 
122 Due to the failure to adhere to normal personnel practices the Branch demanded 
independent arbitration 
"to allay any problems about confidence and impartiality". Branch Chair to 
Cooper, 26th February 1982. The 
standard practice in the FEA, despite protests from staff in 1978 and 1979, was that 
Cooper read all 
incoming mail first before distribution to anyone. Trade union mail had 
been excluded so the conclusion 
reached by branch officials was that instructions had been given to open this mail 
by the Co-Ordination 
Director, Mr. Sefton who was in charge of administration. Branch 147 
Files, October 1980-1982, 
Correspondence to FEA Chair, 10th July 1979. 
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and its record. The FEA "expressed great concern at this development", leaving staff 
feeling O'Keefe would be removed by the Agency. In the middle of a totally chaotic 
Agency Board meeting McCormack reported to Branch 147 she had secured an agreement 
that an external advisor be asked to review the organisation. The terms of reference 
however excluded any question of malpractice. 123 
In order to protect O'Keefe, the research and conciliation officers, Graham, Patterson and 
Galway, wrote similar letters to the Minister and informed the FEA. The atmosphere of 
vendetta and intrigue was so intense at the time that they all felt they were setting 
themselves up for the sack. A meeting was held with the NIPSA General Secretary on 23d 
December 1980 and a 23 point letter detailing many of the failures and questionable 
practices was produced which was sent to Cooper seeking a response and assurances on 
behalf of staff. The staff letter expressed concern over victimisation, the "maligning of the 
character and commitment of staff' and concluded, "the general feeling within the staff is 
one of frustration and failure". Protection was sought against any attempt "to dismiss staff' 
over the affair. 124 This was followed up by a letter to Adam Butler MP, who replaced 
Rossi. It stated: 
"As officers of the senior ranks in the Agency, we wish to state to you in 
the strongest possible terms, our serious concern at the consistently failed 
performance of the Agency as a consequence of the mismanagement of 
work by the Agency members and its sub-committees. Dubious practices 
125 have also occurred" 
Bannon's "damning documentary indictment of incompetence and cover up", which was 
provided to the Secretary of State was also referred to. Given the Agency's peculiar 
paramilitary connection some staff considered themselves at risk and strengthened their 
own personal security. This reflected both the intensity of the dispute within the 
FEA and 
the loyalist para-military murder campaign that was targeting 
both Catholics and 
Protestants deemed to be "fenian lovers". At the time this fear was real and present. 
The Agency staffing sub-committee which included Cooper the chair, 
Barr from the UDA, 
Inez McCormack NUPE, Conaty and Gallagher's personnel manager 
Mr. Francis who 
been specially co-opted for a meeting to interview O'Keefe on the 
21St January 1981. 
123 FEA Board Meeting, 9th December 1980, Inez McCormack to Branch Secretary and 
Chair. 
124 Letter to General Secretary NIPSA 7t' January 1981, NIPSA General Secretary to 
Cooper, 14th January 
1980. 
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Having considered the correspondence around this meeting the Branch Committee 
considered the FEA were simply attempting to submit O'Keefe to a "kangaroo court" and 
determined to represent him. Cooper and the panel refused to allow NIPSA to represent 
him, demanded to see him alone without specifying why and instructed the Branch 
Secretary as an employee to "make no further statement", on his behalf. The result was 
that the Branch Committee as a body `stormed' the meeting and asserted their right to 
represent union members. Glen Barr the UDA member walked out after the Branch 
Secretary ignored his declaration "that he was an agency member and a staffing sub- 
committee member and as such your employer and he was instructing the Branch 
Secretary to make no further statement". The Branch representatives made a number of 
statements asserting NIPSA's right to represent members facing disciplinary action 
including a long statement protesting at the political victimisation and smear campaigns 
against staff, and recorded their formal: 
"protest to the Staffing Sub-Committee at what we can only regard as a 
process of victimisation against this member of staff while the Agency is 
aware that four of the five senior officers of the Agency have made similar 
requests to the Minister of State including the present incumbent 
Mr. Butler". 126 
They then withdrew having won the day for the moment. An increasingly bitter struggle 
continued. As further appeals to Butler fell on stony ground, the staff endeavoured to 
make a final effort to resolve matters internally. A private meeting was convened with 
Cooper on Sunday 15th February1981 in a member of staffs' home. Cooper requested that 
the Branch lift the resolution calling for an enquiry. When the staff declined he offered to 
write a letter of reconciliation to the Board which would allow everyone to start afresh. On 
the Monday however at a further meeting he said "such a formula of settlement", would 
not be accepted by the Board. The latter apparently desired "victims" to be sacked. In 
reply staff condemned the "intransigence of the Agency", and "pointed out they 
had taken 
every step possible to conciliate and reach a settlement acceptable to both parties while the 
Agency had offered nothing except intimidation, disciplinary threats and a maligning of 
the characters of staff members. The Agency was unable to be 
fair to its own employees". 
On the 19th February they handed Cooper a sealed letter and told "him unless there was 
125 Correspondence with Ministers Hugh Rossi MP, 15th December 1980 and 
Adam Butler MP, 8th January 
1981,11 th February 1981 and letter to NIPSA General Secretary 7th January which was enclosed. 
126 Branch 147 Committee record of meeting 21St January 1981. Ms. McCormack 
left the building before the 
meeting took place. 
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some agreement on the terms contained", it would be delivered to the Minister by 3pm and 
the contents made public. Cooper was under the added pressure of having reached the end 
of his term of office and was still unsure whether this would be renewed. He capitulated 
and a joint statement was prepared for the Agency Board on the 10th March 1981 that 
sought to map a way forward. This included providing a joint letter from the chairman and 
Agency staff to the Minister, Adam butler MP and agreeing to accept the involvement of 
Chris McCrudden (an academic lawyer from Lincoln College Oxford) in reviewing the 
Agency's "procedures and structures". It also included a note of the Board meeting that it 
would "not take disciplinary action arising from the letters they sent to the Ministers". 
Butler was advised and replied on the 26th stating, "I shall observe developments 
concerning the review being conducted by Mr. McCrudden and the Agency's progress with 
great interest". 127 This reconciliation did not last. 
The problem was precipitated by McCrudden. When he arrived in June to conduct his 
review the FEA denied the trade union access to him. He confirmed his brief was 
restricted to an examination of procedures alone. 128 The staff had understood his review 
would have assessed policy and enforcement as well. His first attempt was rebuffed by 
staff as no more than a reproduction of a 1974 Race Relations Manual that was already on 
FEA premises which had been carelessly edited following a cursory visit to the Agency. 
They considered it "indefensible" and so poor as to jeapordise progress. 
129 The manual 
was rejected as wholly inadequate. McCrudden found these criticisms "offensive" but 
went on to produce a revised report and then advised the staff he would pursue a "review 
of the Agency's structure". 130 Tensions and conflict came to the fore as staff and the 
Branch felt the FEA would use this report to avoid the matters of substance behind the 
original resolution seeking a formal and independent enquiry. 
While McCrudden was conducting his review NIPSA's General Secretary contacted 
Cooper and suggested a trade union/Agency Working Party be set up to try and resolve 
matters. At the preliminary meeting between Agency representatives and the 
Branch 
Committee, the Branch Chairman, Patterson, noted this was an "historic" occasion as 
it 
127 Letter to Minister Adam Butler MP, 13th March and his response of, 26th March, 
1981. Minutes of F- 
First meeting of FEA Board, 10th March 1981. 128 Branch 147 to Chairman FEA agreeing McCrudden terms of reference, 25th 
March 1981. 
129 FEA staff to FEA Co-ordinating Director, 9th October 1981. 130 McCrudden, C. to Agency staff 18th November 1981. 
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was the first formal meeting in five years. He stressed that "a major proportion of the 
blame for this dichotomy between members and staff is the responsibility of the Chairman 
of the Agency". They recorded their dismay at being denied access to McCrudden and 
suggested an immediate improvement could be achieved by ensuring Agency minutes and 
agendas, stopped being treated as "secret documents" to be kept from staff. The Branch 
Secretary stated: 
"that members of staff had been barred for almost two years from attending 
Agency meetings, sub-committee meetings and meetings of management .... 
he 
(on behalf of the Branch) found it incredulous (sic) that a body such as the Agency 
should operate behind locked doors and have discussions and make decisions about 
areas of Agency work and expect Agency staff to implement any such decisions 
when the very same staff neither knew or were informed as to what decisions or 
discussions had taken place ..... 
Such practices from a body allegedly committed to 
equality of opportunity only served to create suspicion and mistrust and was 
detrimental both in terms of morale, industrial relations and the very credibility of 
the Agency itself'. 131 
Staff were promised agreement, progress and a joint working party to take matters 
forward. Agency members at the meeting, which included Coulthard and Francis, even 
thanked the committee for their forthright views and claimed not to have been fully aware 
of them. A document outlining proposals for "Reforming the Fair Employment Agency" 
was drafted by staff and presented with some optimism. NIPSA's General Secretary 
allocated a full time official to be part of the joint Working Party. At his first meeting the 
FEA suddenly went back on all agreements leaving NIPSA's full time official astonished. 
He was further taken aback to discover Cooper had drafted a minute "totally at odds with 
the agreed minutes" and presented instead his own version to the board. When challenged 
"The Agency side could offer no satisfactory explanation". 
132 The sticking point at this 
time was the Branch's formal rejection of McCrudden's procedural manual carried by 
secret ballot. O'Keefe by this stage gave up hope of any meaningful change and instructed 
the union to negotiate a positive severance package. His absence however, particularly 
with his legal skills as the only lawyer in NI at the time with an in depth knowledge of the 
Act left those remaining severely weakened. By the 28th January 1982 the 
Working Party 
minutes record the Branch chairman and secretary seeking formal "written assurances 
that 
victimisation of staff would not occurr", nor disciplinary action 
for rejecting McCrudden's 
13' Minutes of Branch 147 meeting with FEA Staffing Committee, 
3rd November 1981. 
132 Minutes of Ad Hoc Working Committee, 7th January 1982. 
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manual 133 They wished to see the procedures as part of a total package and were trying to 
link procedures to policy and enforcement. 
Cooper and other members (according to NUPE's John Coulthard) decided the way to 
resolve matters was to mount a vigorous attack on the Branch Committee. John Coulthard, 
NUPE's regional organiser who replaced McCormack on the Board requested a private 
meeting with the committee. This took place in the privacy of a staff members home. 
Coulthard expressed the view that if there was to be any progress, "Cooper and Sefton 
will have to go". He warned the branch secretary, "he should protect himself', as the FEA 
were about to embark on a sustained campaign to force him out. 134 At the next meeting 
with a full time NIPSA official present the FEA set out their latest position. NIPSA' right 
to represent its members was rejected as was the presence of a full time official. Agency 
members wished to have the right of veto over whom should serve on the branch 
committee, otherwise no meetings would take place. Sefton proposed a company union 
composed of himself, the chairman and other members of staff. This was presented as 
having the full support of the FEA Board. 135 Access was denied to staff personal files as 
Branch staff were informed "dossiers" of criticisms made against the chairman were being 
collated (see above). 
The FEA's proposals to create a company union were vigorously rejected by NIPSA 
official John Corey and the Branch representatives. All negotiations ceased and a series of 
measures were taken against the branch secretary by Sefton and Cooper. ICTU was asked 
to withdraw its nominees. NIPSA's General Secretary was informed "nothing has been 
achieved despite strenuous efforts on our part and we believe the ICTU nominees should 
withdraw from the Agency as in the case of the EOC". 
136 Butler was informed "that 
neither the substance nor the spirit and intent of that joint minute (13th March 1981) had 
been adhered to" by the FEA. 137 A formal complaint of political discrimination was 
lodged against Cooper and Sefton by the branch secretary. Sefton's secret dossier and the 
Agency's whole campaign were cited as supporting evidence. Despite the 
fact this was a 
133 Minutes of Working Party, 28th January 1982. (this is the same as note 116, titles varied 
by meeting). 
134 John Coulthard, Regional Officer NUPE discussion with Branch 147 Committee members, November 
1981. 
135 Branch 147 Files, Branch Secretary to NIPSA 15'' February; Branch 147 correspondence to 
FEA. 12th, 
15d' February and correspondence from FEA 12th February 1982. 136 Branch 147 correspondence to General Secretary NIPSA, 24th February 
1982. 
137 Branch 147 to Adam Butler MP, Minister of State (NI), 26th February 1982. 
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formal complaint under the Act citing them as the respondents, Sefton and Cooper decided 
it should not be investigated on grounds of time procedures. As the branch secretary's 
position became untenable he joined O'Keefe and resigned late in 1982 with a financial 
settlement and reference from Cooper made by the FEA to avoid what would have been a 
high profile industrial tribunal case claiming political victimisation. With the loss of two 
of the key protagonists and the resignation of the only two Agency members to express 
any genuine concern, - McCormack and Bannon - the struggle that had effectively lasted 
four years ended in defeat. Everyone else was put on `probation'. 138 
A surprising coup de grace was however given by McCrudden and the Northern Ireland 
Office. In his analysis, despite the constraints of his terms of reference, McCrudden's 
confidential report concluded: 
"The direct experience of the legal enforcement of the Fair Employment 
Act is a depressing picture of a massive task, of the possibility of change, 
but of an Agency which has failed to meet that challenge. A complete 
overhauling of the FEA is necessary. Agency procedures, structures, and 
policy must all be rethought before the type of forceful role for the legal 
process in the eradication of inequality of employment opportunity, 
envisaged by the van Straubenzee Working Party, is even remotely 
possible. It is by no means certain that the Act will then prove successful. 
What is clear however, is that without such changes the ideals which the 
Act was meant to achieve stand little chance of success". 139 
He stressed that "law enforcement and follow up action based on the results of law 
enforcement should be the central function of the Agency". He criticised the fact that by 
1982 only one investigation, a draft report on the Electricity Service, had been completed. 
He gave support for the staff views that a coherent enforcement strategy was essential. He 
endorsed the research officer's views that statistical evidence rather than the `feel' of 
Agency members should form the basis for inferring whether inequality existed and that 
research should be an integral tool of enforcement.. McCrudden's confidential report 
noted that the absence of any legal tradition similar to the US model between enforcement 
138 By 1987 the rehabilitation was so complete that Galway and Patterson were entrusted to accompany 
Agency members as they traveled across the US as part of the NIO's propaganda 
initiative in the US to 
block the MacBride Campaign. Galway later moved to Short's as their personnel manager. 
139 The McCrudden Report, FEA 8tht February 1982, p. 36, Appendices 15th February 1982. (unpublished). 
McCrudden produced a version of this report in Religion, Education and Employment, 
(1983), Cormack, 
R. J. & Osborne, R. D., `The experience of the Legal Enforcement of the Fair Employment 
(NI) Act 1976', 
Ch. 10, pp. 201-21. Appletree Press, Belfast. 
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agents and the courts "had a major adverse effect on the FEA itself'. Having become 
embroiled in the bruising internal encounter he observed that "the working environment 
within the Agency has deteriorated to such a degree that the quality of the work produced 
is being seriously effected, in particular because of lack of clear definition of what staff 
are supposed to be doing... ", and that the absence of recognition or reward for good work 
would leave staff, "likely to desert what, to some at least, seems like a sinking ship". 140 
He also noted the lack of investment by government in pursuing its declared policy 
objectives. At the time -1980-81- the FEA had a staff of 12 with a budget of £208,000 
controlled by the Department of Manpower Services. The local Labour Relations Agency 
by comparison had a budget of £595,917 and the CRE had a staff of 224 with a budget of 
over £7 million. The degree of investment by the British government would change 
however in the face of the growing political threat presented by republicanism following 
the 1981 Hunger Strike. In his assessment of the legal effectiveness of the FEA he 
concluded, 
"If one way of assessing the success of the Agency in carrying out its statutory 
duties under Part III of the Act is its ability to have findings of discrimination 
supported in the courts, it has clearly failed". 141 
This was derived from the fact that up to the end of March 1981, only 10 findings of 
discrimination had been made by the Agency from 216 complaints made. Of these six had 
been appealed to the courts and of the four then heard, all had been overturned by the 
County Court. In short the presence of an equal opportunity culture in employment and the 
judicial process had not been achieved. The FEA's emphasis on voluntary change had 
failed. McCrudden recommended "that law enforcement and follow-up action based on 
the results of law enforcement should be the central function of the Agency around which 
every other function should revolve". 142 The rigorous enforcement of the Act with 
particular emphasis on powers to conduct investigations under Part II of the Act was not 
welcomed by the Agency. His report was quietly shelved by the FEA No plans of action, 
strategies or response were developed by the FEA or government departments responsible 
for promoting equality of opportunity as a result of this work. McCrudden 
however had a 
second opportunity to assess the policy and practices of the FEA as a member of 
the 
SACHR review team that was commissioned to undertake a review of 
the 1976 Act's 
i4° Ibid., pp. 13,14,15. 
Ibid., p. 18. 
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implementation between 1985-1987 (see Chapter 8). 
Given the turmoil and external worsening political situation the government declined to 
reappoint Glen Barr, the UDA's representative. Prior to the decision Cooper and Barr had 
endeavoured to get the Agency Board to collectively endorse Barr by moving a vote of 
confidence in him. Barr formally raised the issue of his position and the role of the UDA 
externally at an Agency Board meeting and then withdrew to allow members to discuss his 
position. Cooper proposed the vote of endorsement and made the point the UDA could not 
be compared with Provisional Sinn Fein as he claimed SF did not support equality of 
opportunity. As members put their hands up to endorse Barr, the Chair of the EOC, 
Margot Neill, (also a member of the FEA Board) intervened to make the point, that the 
FEA should not allow the UDA to use it for the UDA's political ends. This was agreed. 143 
The contradiction at the heart of the internal struggle were competing visions as to how 
fast and what methods could be utilised to achieve reform. One was a vision which 
actually saw the implementation of the law and its development as essential first steps in 
pursuit of equity in the marketplace and the other which saw any significant challenge to 
the predominating powers of this local market as a source of instability and political 
conflict. These contradictions would be manifest again in the late 1980's over the 
MacBride Principles campaign. The intensity of the struggle and the personal commitment 
may have reflected a sense of idealism but the reaction by the FEA may be considered as 
out of proportion to the challenge given every effort was made to keep it "in house". The 
risk to the Agency was that if its staff had no faith in its capacity or commitment to 
implement its legal remit then why should anyone else. This occurred during and after the 
1981 Hunger Strike. Political tensions could not have been higher. The FEA could not 
respond by a vigorous application of the law, partly because the will and vision were not 
there but also partly because the Agency's strategy rested on not alienating employers. 
Even when external political pressure to be seen to be doing something was intensifying 
142 Ibid. p. 22. 143 Barr found favour again in June 1989, when the MO invited him back to serve on a new Community 
Relations Council with the objective of promoting the "improvement of community relations between the 
different parts of the community". In February 1998 he was appointed by the government to serve on the 
Parades Commission to adjudicate on where loyalist parades should take place. He would later storm out at 
the decision to reroute the highly sectarian and controversial Drumcree march away from a Catholic estate 
that July. 
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the Agency proved extremely reluctant to act. 
On 3rd February 1982, the Research Sub-Committee discussed a proposal to recommend 
to the Agency Board to publish "all investigation reports in full". Cooper claimed such a 
step would be illegal particularly in the light of the undertakings he had personally given 
to employers that nothing would ever be published. The CBI representative, Michael 
Maclaran, described the proposal as a "regrettable fork in the Agency's path as employers 
try to work together with the Agency". He said employers had willingly made "data 
readily available", as they knew it would not be published. FEA staff were unable to cite 
any examples of this co-operation at the time and Coulthard emphasized "that there was a 
problem with both trade unions and employers who on occasion had combined to impede 
the work of the Agency's investigations". When it came to the vote, Cooper declined to 
support the move and the CBI opposed. The decision to publish and thereby attempt to 
improve "the poor image the Agency has in the public and private eye", was carried with 
the caveat, "that reports of investigations should be published except where the Agency 
otherwise directs". 144What this meant in practice however can be illustrated by reference 
to the FEA's most important undertaking, the investigation into the NI civil service. 
At a meeting in May 1978 with Don Concannon MP, Minister of State, the civil service 
and representatives of the Agency Board, the civil service stated they did not monitor 
religion in accordance with the Guide to Manpower Policy and Practice "since they felt 
that they had no need as they followed the other recommendations of the Guide in respect 
to job selection". 145 In December 1978 proposals were made by the research officer to 
carry out a formal investigation. Cooper wished to restrict it to around 1,400 out of around 
23,000 people. Cooper also suggested and agreed with NIPSA that a voluntary tear off slip 
indicating religion would achieve the result intended. A strenuous 
bout of infighting 
however persuaded Cooper to accept proposals by the research officer who 
had insisted 
data be gathered from personal records and should 
include age, length of service, 
education, grade, etc. In a memo to the chairman he stressed, 
"It is crucial that a study of 
this magnitude should not be allowed to degenerate 
into the farce the engineering enquiry 
has become". 146 This debate stemmed from a vigorous internal 
debate between the author 
144 FEA Research Sub-Committee, Contemporaneous record and Minute, 3rd February 
1982. 
'45 Discussion note of meeting 22nd May 1978. 
146 FEA, Memo from Research Officer to Chairman, 2nd July 1979. 
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and the Agency's Co-Ordinating Director, Mr. Sefton, over what should be the terms of 
reference, scope and range of data to be sought in the civil service investigation. Sefton 
had proposed a narrow range of options that restricted the investigation to a small number 
of staff above staff officer level and a limited range of employment indicators due to his 
opinion that it "was optimistic to think in terms of an intellectually acceptable report from 
the sort of exercise we can do". 147 The author by comparison had put forward a terms of 
reference that included, age, salary, sex, length of service, department occupied, religion, 
promotions, place of birth, local government transferee, etc. he argued that to do otherwise 
would result in, 
"an incomplete exercise from which it will be totally impossible and irresponsible 
to infer or draw any conclusions concerning either the civil service as a body or 
any changes that may or may not be occurring in this crucial sphere of 
employment. In short, we will have wasted our time... ". 148 
By 1980 the research officer was still demanding that Agency members be informed of the 
proposals existence. In the end they were eventually adopted but more due to a mixture of 
external pressure and internal dissent than an enthusiasm to carry it out. 149 
An external team of experts were recruited to help. They included an American academic 
from Queen's University, Bob Miller to carry out the statistical modeling and analysis; 
Michael Pearn, formerly of the Runnymede Trust, then a management consultant in equal 
opportunities was recruited as the independent assessor for the whole project. An Advisory 
Group consisting of NIPSA, the civil service, the consultants and the FEA's research 
officer and co-ordinating director was formed. From the outset the Department of the Civil 
Service (DOCS) demanded that the research be split into two and that only if imbalances 
were revealed in terms of a straight head count would further analysis be permitted. Sefton 
volunteered to exclude "the Prison Service and Staff in similar security situations". 
The 
initial study was completed by June 1981 and demonstrated major 
inequalities in the 
DOCS which was then responsible for recruitment. The secretary to the civil service 
commissioners who served on the advisory group declared when 
faced with this evidence 
that "He had no intention of hiring a particular officer to promote equality of opportunity", 
and "no intentions of monitoring the number of Roman Catholics 
hired at Promotion 
lay Peter Sefton to the author, 22nd January 1979. 
148 
149 
Graham, D. "Research Policy Discussion Paper for Chairman", February 1980. 
149 The pressure from Minister Hugh Rossi to abandon the investigation or 
do a deal on it and the publicity 
around the exposure of this has already been discussed above. 
FEA Board Minutes, 26th June 1979. 
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Boards". 150 
Miller's analysis of the overall situation was completed in November 1981. It established 
that an individuals occupational group, department and salary level were determined by 
religion. He concluded "religion has a distinct unique effect ... (which) cannot be 
swallowed up in any combination of the effects of the other three variables ". 151 Miller had 
conducted a log liner analysis by breaking down around 585 occupational categories into 
salary scale equivalents and testing for significance. He found strong associations between 
four primary variables: religion, occupational group, salary level equivalent, and 
department were strongly associated. Miller found that, 
"an inescapable conclusion is that regular, cumulative, religious disparities do 
appear. Those results cannot easily be explained away by ascribing the disparities 
to the indirect effects of other variable. The results assume even more import when 
one also considers that all the analysis is internal to the civil service and does not 
take into account that Roman Catholics are under-represented within the Civil 
Service as a whole in comparison to their representation within the general 
population of Northern Ireland". 152 
This finding proved uncomfortable to the Agency Board and the civil service who 
immediately rejected it. Pearn persuaded the Agency to commission the Institute of 
Manpower Studies from the University of Sussex to apply their manpower modeling 
techniques to explain this distribution and secondly to project employment patterns 
forward to 1990. The IMS showed a younger age profile of Catholics in the service due to 
their more recent recruitment. Secondly that the Catholic "promotional lag" was not 
overcome in later years and that this promotional disadvantage held for all occupational 
groups investigated regardless of gender or educational qualifications. If all things were 
equal between both religious groups then 1 to 1 and a half percent more of Catholics 
would reach the highest pay level compared to about one half per cent of the Protestants. 
For other grades the range would vary between two and 7%. 
153 Thus without an 
aggressive intervention patterns of inequality would remain well into the 21 St century. 
151 
150 FEA Advisory Group meeting 23rd June 1981. 151 Miller, R. "Analysis Results Incorporating Occupational Groups and Pay Levels", July 1981. 
152 Miller, Robert. (July 1981 and 19th November 1981), Analysis Results, Incorporating Occupational 
Groups and Pay Levels, p. 21. Unpublished. 153 Institute of Manpower Studies (1983), `Report of an Investigation by the Institute of 
Manpower Studies 
into the Non-Industrial Northern Ireland Civil Service', Fair Employment Agency, Belfast. See also Miller, 
Robert. `Evaluation Research in a Politicized Context: An Investigation of the Northern Irish 
Civil Service 
by the Fair Employment Agency', (December 1987), unpublished. 
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Pearn in correspondence with Miller recalling the dispute gave his view that while Miller 
as a, 
"university-based social scientist (who) is primarily concerned with correct 
methodology and validly drawn conclusions The FEA is similarly concerned with this form of "truth", but it must measure its success by criteria which may not all be the same as yours". 
He continued with regard to his role in meeting the civil service "counter-analysts", and 
his correspondence with the FEA, as an 
"attempt on my part to get the balance right between a report that had enough of 
the truth in it, and in a form that could not be denied, but not so uncompromising in 
its approach that the report as a whole would be rejected out of hand. The 
subsequent decisions by the FEA to modify substantially the nature of their 
original draft report and to incorporate findings of the NICS were made entirely 
without my involvement". 154 
As Miller defended his analysis the civil service and FEA combined to produce a version 
that was more amenable to the prevailing political situation. The civil service enquiry had 
by this time become of sufficient importance in the USA that the British Information 
Services Office (BIS) in Washington produced a press statement and briefing note for US 
senators. The agreement to include Miller's dissenting report was rescinded. Miller later 
concluded, 
"One cannot so easily explain why the Fair Employment Agency apparently 
acquiesced to (in fact, actively assisted in) the reformulation of its own 
investigation along lines that it knew were in error and that would seriously 
weaken its impact. Taking the published Fair Employment Agency report seriously 
would lead one to conclude that no problem in fact exists and that the personnel 
policies in effect at the time of the investigation had been adequate for securing 
equality of opportunity". '55 
As the consultants from the Institute of Manpower Services at Sussex University upheld 
Miller's central analysis he went further and demonstrated that a rewrite by the civil 
service was at odds with the actual data and "totally incompetent" or a deliberate 
mystification of the results. 156 By 1983 the wrangling continued as the civil service 
154 Pew Michael. PKA Occupational Psychologists, to Robert Miller, 14th May 1987. 
iss Miller, Robert., `Evaluation Research in a Political Context', (1987), p. 22. 
156 FEA Advisory Group meeting, 16th November 1981, Research Sub-committee 3rd December 
1981. 
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supported by the FEA blocked progress. Pearn informed the FEA in February 1983 he was 
"distressed" at the turn of events and the non-publication of the investigation. Sefton went 
as far as flying to Heathrow airport to meet Pearn, as he was en route to another 
destination to persuade him to adopt a position at odds with Miller. In a confidential letter 
to the FEA in September 1983, Pearn stated what "no analysis by the civil service can 
challenge is that there is, or has been a lack of equality of opportunity for Catholics within 
the civil service". 
The story was leaked to The Times in October and became an issue in the USA. 157 The 
Irish American lobby demanded to know why `if a public service totally controlled by 
government is a major discriminatory employer what hope was there to end discrimination 
in any sphere of employment? ' Miller's analysis had indicated that even if equality of 
opportunity existed forthwith, the patterns of inequality would remain well into the next 
century. As public criticisms mounted the FEA and NIO rushed out an agreed version in 
December 1983. The British Information Office in Washington mounted a news blitz 
claiming "Report Finds No Discrimination". Recruitment and promotion procedures were 
described as fair and "substantial discrimination", was referred to as something which 
occurred in the past. They asserted that "For the modem civil service, (the almost 15,000 
officers recruited since 1967, who made up three quarters of those studied by the FEA) 
religion determines neither their job prospects nor their salary levels". '58 
This conclusion was in direct contrast to the unexpurgated findings that stressed the 
"distinct and unique effect " of religion. Furthermore as 60% of this 15000 were recruited 
under Direct Rule, the responsibility for existing inequalities lay firmly with the British 
government. Cooper also reneged on agreements with Miller that a dissenting report by 
him would form part of the appendices. Miller stated, "The Agency has thrown away the 
only real lever it had. The civil service could now say what is the need for affirmative 
action when things are going all right as they are? " 
159 The FEA's former research officer 
(the author) who devised and participated in the investigation stated the: 
"record of the FEA offers no evidence to suggest it is concerned with 
157 The Times, 10th October 1983. 
158 'Northern Ireland: Fair Employment Agency report on Civil Service Finds No Discrimination', BIO 9t` 
December 1983, USA,; James Prior Secretary of State, NIO, 8thDecember 1983. 
159 Sunday Tribune, Dublin, 19th February, 1984, and Miller to author. 
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anything but the maintenance of the status quo and the continual direct intervention, formally and informally of government ministers to ensure little or no progress, suggests that Westminster has deliberately opted for a 
policy of containment rather than confrontation with sectarianism". 160 
Cooper made strenuous efforts to suppress any other version of events. From 1986 -1987, 
he made a major effort to prevent the Journal of Social Policy, 161 from publishing a paper 
"Evaluation Research in a Politicised Context", by Miller. It detailed the "regular, 
cumulative disparities in favour of Protestants, particularly at higher ranks ... and projected 
that the disparities would persist for at least a decade". He also recorded how, "under 
pressure from the civil service the FEA subsequently reversed the majority of its findings 
and incorporated alternative work by the civil service into its report". 162 Miller however 
made the mistake of advising colleagues engaged with the FEA and actually sent a draft to 
the civil service for comment. Cooper responded by sending letters to the JSP demanding 
the publication be suppressed under threat of legal action. 
Cooper's letters and telephone calls to Dr. Alan Deacon editor of the JSP, declared the 
article contained "distortions which would call into question my integrity and that of 
members of the Agency". He dismissed the article as one which "grossly misrepresents the 
position and relies heavily on speculation and innuendo". 163 The JSP editor offered Cooper 
a right of reply in the same issue. Leading external referees confirmed the merits of the 
piece, Pearn urged the JSP to publish and the FEA's former research officer offered to 
verify the accuracy of the analysis. Cooper declined the challenge and instead threatened 
"to consider taking legal action for defamation". 164 As the JSP's deadline arrived the article 
was withdrawn "without prejudice to the final editorial decision". Cooper had achieved an 
NIO primary objective, secrecy and silence. In May Cooper flew out to the USA to 
support the NIO's anti-MacBride campaign in California. The 1987 British general 
election proved timely as a series of questions had been tabled challenging the FEA and 
160 Graham, D. `Discrimination in NI: the failure of the Fair Employment Agency', Critical Social Policy, 
Spring 1984. See also Critique 16, A State Beyond Reform, pp. 66-71,1983. 
JSP, Cambridge University Press. 
162 Miller, R. `Evaluation Research in a Politicised Context: An Investigation of the Northern Irish Civil 
Service by the Fair Employment Agency', 1986. 
163 Cooper, R. Chair of FEA to Editor Journal of Social Policy, 26th January 1987; Editor of JSP to 
Cooper, 
4th February 1987; Cooper to Editor JSP 20th February 1987 and 9th April 1987. 
164 Cooper to JSP, 9th April, 1987. 
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NIO to explain their role in this matter. 165 When questions were finally asked in 1988, 
Ministers refused to place the original reports in the Commons library and claimed direct 
answers could not be given as the FEA is "independent of Government". 166 The 
opportunity to engage in public discourse on the application and promotion of the law was 
denied. 
As Pearn had stated earlier the "subsequent decisions by the FEA to modify substantially 
the nature of their original report and to incorporate findings of the NICS", severely 
undermined any credibility the work might otherwise have had. 167 In the long term it 
means that any monitoring work carried out by the civil service, such as that in 1986 and 
1987 which used a flawed enquiry as its base line cannot be taken at face value. The civil 
service has in effect deprived itself of an independent basis for monitoring progress and 
placed the equivalent of a statistical albatross around any of its equal opportunity 
reporting. In its monitoring return to the FEC in 1991, the NICS reported that Catholics 
accounted for 12,201 or 33.7% of the workforce. In the very same year as Ministers 
proclaimed all was well in the service, the Derry Recorders Court was hearing a case of 
discrimination by the DoE which involved the Masonic Order conspiring to ensure a 
Catholic was not promoted to a senior post. The publication by the FEA of a report largely 
dictated by the civil service which Miller decried as one that goes "against the bounds of 
common sense", did nothing to promote confidence in the service or the FEA. By such 
activity and the overt participation in the government's anti-MacBride campaign, Cooper's 
singular achievement was to make the FEA indistinguishable from any other British 
agency in a tawdry propaganda war. 
Conclusions. 
The civil service was merely one investigation among many that was either not published 
or so reduced that the objective of education could not be realised. The manner by which 
165 Mitchison, Amanda. & Graham, D. `Suppressed Report sparks Ulster row', New Society, 26. June, 1987, 
and Graham, D. Labour and Ireland, No. 17., 1987 
166 Marshall, Jim. MP, Written Questions, Hansard, Cols. 197,198,206,26th February 1988; Cols. 78,120, 
2nd March 1988.. 78,1205 2. March, 1988) 
167 Pearn, M. A., `Assessors Report on the Investigation and the NICS Response to the Agency's 
Report in 
Draft', Esher, Surrey: Saville & Holdsworth, Ltd.; Pearn, M. Correspondence to Miller, R. 14th May 1987 
with copy sent to Peter Sefton FEA. 
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such work was treated by the FEA time after time alongside their resistance to the full 
application of law simply reflected the contradictions and tensions prevalent in NI. By so 
doing the FEA failed to meet Cameron's original objectives. They failed to meet the 
requirements of the situation and they failed to advance the pursuit of equality of 
opportunity. Attributing the lack of inequality to the individual actions of potential 
employees who chose not to apply for jobs as they did in the 1978-83 engineering enquiry 
may have in the words of Agency Member, Tom Conaty, been a "gut reaction". If so it 
was one that blamed the individual for a lack of courage in entering a workplace that was 
wholly hostile. It also sought to absolve the FEA for failing to vigorously enforce its 
enforcement powers or challenge employers. The courts shared this cultural milieu. The 
net result was an internal implosion lasting five years on issues of principle and practice. 
The evidence presented in response to the challenge by staff shows that the FEA displayed 
the worst virtues of a discriminatory employer. The matters at the centre of this conflict 
were not normal industrial relation matters but issues at the heart of the Fair Employment 
Act and the manner by which the Agency failed to carry out these responsibilities. In a 
small conservative society characterised by conflict that challenged the role of the state 
and its legitimacy there could only have been one outcome. The internal struggle had to be 
crushed. This enabled the Agency to maintain its very low key strategy of avoiding 
engaging the wider public, private and public sector in an educational or enforcement 
process that exposed both historical inequalities, contemporary practices and their 
enduring strength. The end of the internal challenge meant that the Agency's complacency 
and ineffectiveness remained. 
To do otherwise would have required confronting the political and economic rationale of 
discrimination and the role of government in reinforcing existing inequities. The Cameron 
Report had stressed that the primary function of equal opportunity law was "to secure on 
all sides loyal acceptance of the Constitutions of Northern Ireland". 
168 By embracing this 
objective, any agenda must necessarily have as its starting point the union and loyalty to 
the crown. This in turn meant that the vital relationship between a Protestant skilled 
workforce and unionism could not be broken. Inequality in terms of access to the labour 
market was not an aberration in NI. It was an essential part of its character and dynamics. 
To challenge its fundamentals and endeavour to reverse such historical inequalities was 
168 Cameron Report, p. 58. September 1969, Belfast HMSO. 
247 
not the purpose of the 1976 Act. Its primary purpose was to ameliorate the conditions 
within the labour market by giving it a credibility that neither employers or the workforce 
desired. At this stage in the evolution of equal opportunity laws the FEA was simply not 
capable of taking the Act beyond their own cultural limitations and vision that were 
primarily one of sustaining the unionist edifice. This was their "gut reaction". To do 
anything else would have required reversing employment inequalities at the expense of 
Protestant opportunities and employment. This was not on anyone's agenda. 
The success of this policy however became unstuck as the Irish American lobby adopted a 
more aggressive institutional shareholders attack on the failure to provide equality of 
opportunity by American companies in NI. This developed into the MacBride Principles 
Campaign which was complemented by a lobby in NI and Britain which constantly 
challenged the efficacy of the FEA, its failure, leadership and readiness to adopt an 
approach which was wholly partisan. The FEA had by this stage become a propaganda 
liability not an asset. The British government reflecting the changing international context 
chose to act. The next chapter examines its response - the SACHR Review - and the 
impact of the MacBride campaign on the equalities agenda in NI. 
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CHAPTER 8. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS RESPONSE. 
Introduction. 
Two additional pressure points occurred. The first was a critical equalities review carried 
out by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights for NI (SACHR). 1 The 
second was the development of the MacBride Principles Campaign. Together they laid the 
ground for the 1989 Act reforms and the creation of the Fair Employment Commission. 2 
Both parties in their reports and campaigns alongside the Irish government under the 1985 
Anglo-Irish Agreement can claim the credit for taking equal opportunities into the 
mainstream of political and public debate. 3 
Another new beginning. 
A critical political period for the British government in the US and Europe was 1985- 
1988. Irish-Americans and the European courts seemed to be handing down one 
propaganda problem after another. This was coupled with the major impact of Sinn Fein as 
political representatives and MP's on the local and national fronts alongside loyalist 
protests at the Anglo-Irish Agreement on the shop floor. The absence of equality, 
intimidation on the shop floor and findings by the European courts that Britain was guilty 
of abusing human rights in NI became sustained international issues. During these three 
short years an unprecedented range of reports, reviews and draft legislation were 
produced. The Secretary of State asserted the government was committed to the `merit 
principle' and wished to place equal opportunity policy on the "soundest foundation for 
future development". The failure of the FEA was in effect conceded. The DED "Future 
Strategy Options " review noted that: 
"At the same time it has to be recognised that progress is slow and unsatisfactory.. 
the message of equality of opportunity in employment does not appear to making a 
significant impact in relation to any dimension. 
' SACHR. Religious and Political Discrimination and Equality of Opportunity in Northern Ireland, Report on 
Fair Employment, Cm 237, HMSO, October 1987. 
2 The Fair Employment (NI) Bill 1989 received Royal Assent on 27th July 1989 and came fully into effect on 
I" January 1990. 
3 Article 6 of the November 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement provided for the Irish government to put 
forward 
views and proposals for a number of bodies including the FEA and EOC(NI). 4 Equality of Opportunity in Employment in NI. Future Strategy Options, A Consultative 
Paper, pp. 20-21, 
16rß September 1986, DED Belfast HMSO. 
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The DED also noted that since 1981 the government did not "normally" accept tenders for 
contracts unless they held an FEA certificate - the Declaration-: 
"but there is no systematic monitoring of certificate holders' practice....... 
certification -once obtained - usually remains undisturbed and 
unchallenged. In the absence of effective monitoring it is impossible to be 
satisfied that all those certified are providing equality of opportunity in 
employment. ,5 
The Fair Employment Commission (FEC) was, remarkably, introduced under the same 
chairmanship although the managerial responsibilities were shifted to a new post. The 
FEA's powers to hear individual complaints were passed to a new Fair Employment 
Tribunal divorced from the FEC. This was in response to the many criticisms leveled at 
the manner and inordinate length of time the FEA took to process cases. This meant the 
onus was on the new FEC to select strategic cases that would have a potentially wide 
impact on employment. The Agency Board opposed both the creation of the FEC and this 
emphasis in particular on the grounds that as one Board member put it: 
"To move to a system of sponsoring only strategic cases will inevitably 
mean that sponsoring would virtually always be offered to Catholics as 
very few, if any, cases involving Protestants would set precedents. This 
would lead to unnecessary Protestant and unionist alienation". 
6 
He added with reference to the creation of the FEC that, "It will be tainted as a partial 
rather than an impartial body, supporting Catholics rather than equality for all". For its 
part the government made it clear that they opposed quotas or reverse discrimination on 
moral grounds and because they were "inconsistent with the merit principle". 
7 This was 
put more bluntly by the Secretary of State Tom King when he opened a 
debate on the new 
legislation in the House of Commons on 1St July 1988. Referring to the principle of merit 
he stated: 
"We have set ourselves against quotas and reverse discrimination. 
Their 
effect could be catastrophic, in the climate of 
Northern Ireland, to the 
acceptance by the wider community of the 
fairness of equal opportunities 
proposals". 8 
5 Ibid. p. 22. 
6 Paul Donaghy Agency Board and NIPSA Council member to NIC ICTU conference press report, 
21St April 
1988, quoted in An Phoblacht/Republican News. 
7 Future Strategy Options, DED, p20 1986. 
8 Tom King MP, Secretary of State, 1$t July 1988, NIO press statement. 
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At the same time he stated a willingness to use the "government's economic muscle to 
support good practice", while simultaneously adopting the position that, "We do not want 
to transfer hardship from one section of the community to another". 9 Thus as legislation 
changed the risk remained that to tackle structural inequalities would be to risk political 
catastrophe. The prevailing "climate" was the "Protestant heritage". The Secretary of 
State's dire warning was probably correct. That however was no more than an admission 
that the prevailing mores of NI's Protestant labour market must remain essentially the 
same. The "wider community" was the majority Protestant community. For equal 
opportunity laws to be acceptable they must be demonstrably not capable of reversing the 
status quo. Fairness in an area of consistently high unemployment rates would mean that 
the success of the individual may be acceptable as long as this individual did not represent 
part of a programme that would create the conditions for the success of a whole 
community. The exception to the rule. The core objectives of both Acts were namely to 
ameliorate conditions for the individual at the point of access to employment. By so doing 
the deduction was that the institutions of NI would gain credibility and acceptance among 
those opposed to them. The difference between the Acts was the 1989 Acts' potential to 
manage matters more efficiently. Responsibility for individual complaints was given to a 
separate tribunal, compulsory monitoring by employers of their workforce was introduced 
and the capacity to remove an equality certificate by linking its validity to tender 
acceptance and potential grant denial for government contracts was reinforced. Indirect 
and direct discrimination was outlawed. The FEC's chairman, however, maintained his 
stance that he could not envisage removing an employer from the register of equal 
opportunity employers. The government now presented equality of opportunity as 
"fundamental to a democratic and mature society". 
10 Part of this maturity was the 
presentation of some difficult facts in relation to inequalities. The government published 
its research accepting: 
"that between 1971-85 the Catholic community's disadvantage in 
employment remained both quantitative and qualitative, (even 
in areas of 
relatively high unemployment) and persisted despite progressive 
convergence of educational attainment between the two communities". 
" 
9 Tom King MP, Secretary of State, 25th May 1988, NIO press statement. See Fair Employment 
in NI, White 
Paper, May 1988, London HMSO, Cm. 380. 
10 
1 
Future Strategy Options, p3, Department of Economic Development, Belfast, HMSO, 
September, 1986. 
11 Ibid. p. 5. Also see Appendix 1 Tables 2 and 3. 
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Catholic male unemployment rates remained 2.5 times that of Protestants. For Catholic 
women the rate was 1.5 times. In terms of occupational categories Catholics composed 
16% at the professional and managerial levels and 12% of the skilled manual class. 
Women were concentrated in low status occupations with over one third employed part- 
time. Catholics endured longer terms of unemployment, and worked in semi and unskilled 
occupations that were more susceptible to recession and recurrent high rates of 
unemployment. Patterns of inequality at the occupational and structural levels for 
Catholics had not improved under Direct Rule While the traditional Protestant East and 
Catholic West divide remained the DED noted the existence of widespread differentials 
with Catholic unemployment generally twice as high in most areas. 
The DED concluded that to attribute these inequalities solely to discrimination would be 
"misleading because the operation of any labour market is always complex". These 
findings confirmed however the unique and historical influence religion as the expression 
of political power and patronage has had on the labour market. For example the DED 
referred to a "high level of immobility", by the population seeking work, combined with 
the fact 71% of Catholics and 45% of Protestants live in the less industrialised areas of the 
Province". They asserted these indigenous factors directly contribute to "the high 
unemployment rate among the Catholic community". 12 Within this context the DED 
concluded, "Equality of opportunity in employment is of vital concern in Northern Ireland 
... It is fundamental to a demonstration of a mature society". 
13 The enduring nature of the 
religious differentials and the scale of the challenge they presented may be more fully 
grasped by reference to successive census and occupational data. The 1971 Census 
showed that overall the Catholic unemployment rate was 2 and one half times that of 
Protestants. For Catholic males it was slightly higher. 
Table I. Unemployment Rates for Catholics and Protestants. 
ßf0 ýI fl 
Males. Females. All. 
Protestant. 6.6 3.6 5.6 
Catholic. 17.3 7.0 13.6 
Census of Population 1971, Religion Tables. 
12 Ibid. p. 9-11. 
13 Ibid., p. 3. 
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These difficulties were compounded by the location of Catholics in occupations with her 
rates of unemployment such as clothing, footwear and construction. For Catholic women, 
clothing and footwear followed by Professional and Scientific Services and Miscellaneous 
Services were significant sources of employment. Protestants dominated engineering, 
utilities, insurance, banking, finance and business services. Table II shows the wider 
distribution for Protestant males as compared to the concentration of around 56% of 
Catholic males in four occupational classifications. 
Table II. Proportion of all Catholics and Protestants in Industrial Orders. 14 
14 1971 NI Population Census, Religion Tables, (1975) Belfast, HMSO. The base 
line for the table is the 
total population enumerated as Catholic and Protestant economically active and 
in employment. See also the 
Second Annual Report, FEA, 13th June 1979, pp. 8-13. Belfast, HMSO. 
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Proportions of all Catholics and Protestants in Industrial Orders 
(Base- Total population enumerated as Cathol ic and Protestant economically active and in employment) 
% Roman Catholic % Protestant 
Industrial Order All Male Female A11 Male Female 
1. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 9.5 14.3 0.8 9.6 10.9 3 1 II. Mining, Quarrying 
. 0.5 0.7 --- 0.4 03 
. 1 0 III. Food, Drink and Tobacco .. 3.7 3.9 3.4 5.1 4.9 
. 4 5 IV. Coal and Petroleum Products . 
V. Chemicals and Allied Industries . 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 VI. Metal Manufacture 
. 0.1 0.1 - 0.1 0.2 --r VII. Mechanical Engineering 1.3 1.8 0.3 2.5 3.3 l. 1 
VIII. Instrument Engineering 
. 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 IX. Electrical Engineering 
. 1.8 1.6 2.2 2.8 2.5 3.3 X. Shipbuilding and Marine Engine- 
ering . 0.3 0.5 - 2.4 3.6 0.2 XI. Vehicles 
. 0.8 1.1 0.2 2.2 2.9 0.6 XII. Metal Goods not elsewhere 
specified .. 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.5 XIII. Textiles 
. 6.7 5.8 8.3 8.0 7.1 9.9 XIV. Leather, Leather Goods and Fur 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
XV. Clothing and Footwear . 6.9 1.2 17.3 3.6 1.0 8.5 XV I. Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Cement . 0.8 1.2 0.2 0.8 1.1 0.3 XVII. Timber, Furniture, etc. . 0.7 1.1 0.2 0.8 1.1 0.3 XVIII. Paper, Printing and Publishing . 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.4 1.3 XIX. Other Manufacturing Industries . 1.6 2.1 0.7 1.4 1.6 0.8 XX. Construction 
. 14.6 22.4 0.7 8.5 12.6 1.1 XXI. Gas, Electricity and Water .. 0.8 1.2 0.2 1.7 2.4 0.5 XXII. Transport & Communication . 4.6 6.3 1.5 4.7 6.1 1.9 XXIII. Distributive Trades . 11.9 11.1 13.5 14.2 12.1 18.1 XXIV. Insurance, Banking, Finance and 
Business Services 1.4 1.2 1.8 2.7 2.3 3.4 
XXV. Professional and Scientific 
Services .. 
14.0 6.4 27.7 12.7 7.1 23.2 
XXVI. Miscellaneous Services . 10.7 8.5 14.6 8.0 5.9 12.1 XXVII. Public Administration and 
Defence 
.. 
4.4 4.5 4.2 6.5 7.2 5.1 
TOTAL .. 100 100 1 
00 100 100 100 
Figures may not exactly total 100 due to rounding. 
Source: 1971 Northern Ireland population census: religion tables. 
These differentials were reflected across the region so that in `peripheral' areas 
Catholics 
experienced two and three times that of Protestants. The strength of the 
East/West divide 
was evident in that 52% of the Catholic male workforce as compared 
to 26% for 
Protestants were located in such areas as Derry, Fermanagh, 
Newry and Mourne, etc. The 
DED's analysis for the period 1971-1985 confirmed the 
depth of this problem. They noted 
that increased unemployment had adversely affected 
both communities. For Protestants 
the overall unemployment rate had doubled from 
6% in 1971 to 13% in 1985; 
with the female rate moving from 4% to 11%. However 
despite higher levels of 
unemployment in both communities, the differential experience of 
the Protestant and 
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Catholic communities endured between 1971-85.15 Again this phenomena remained 
consistent across the region and within occupational classifications as shown by Table III 
and Figure 1.16 
Occupations of the Employed Population by Religion 
Occupational Order % Roman Catholic % Protestant % Not Stated %Total 
1. Professional & related supporting managment; senior 
national & local government managers 15.7 67.3 17.0 100.0 
2. Professional & related in education, welfare & health 30.7 52.2 17.1 100.0 
3. Literary, artistic & sports 17.6 57.8 24.7 100.1 
4. Professional & related in science, engineering, technology 
&similarfields 14.5 66.6 18.9 100,0 
5. Managerial 21.5 63.4 15.2 100.1 
6. Clerical & related 20.1 62.9 17.0 100.0 
7. Selling 19.0 64.8 16.2 100.0 
8. Security & protective service 10.9 75.2 13.9 100.0 
9. Catering, cleaning, hairdressing & other personal service 26.9 56.7 16.4 100.0 
10. Farming, fishing & related 23.3 61.0 15.7 100.0 
11. Materials processing; making & repairing (excluding 
metal & electrical) 27.4 55.1 17.5 100.0 
12. Processing, making, repairing & related (metal & 
electrical) 18.0 65.1 16.9 100.0 
13. Painting, repetitive assembling, product inspecting, 
packaging & related 22.6 61.0 16.3 99.9 
14. Construction, mining & related not identified elsewhere 33.8 47.0 19.1 99.9 
15. Transport operating, materials moving & storing & related 23.9 58.4 17.7 100.0 
16. Miscellaneous 25.2 57.2 17.6 100.0 
%Total economically active population 25.7 56.3 18.0 100.0 
Source: 1981 Northern Ireland population census: religion report 
is Future Strategy Options, (1986), p. 6., DED, Belfast. 
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The 1981 Census revealed higher Catholics rates of unemployment in all of the 26 District 
Council areas except Carrickfergus and Castlereagh (Figure I). In areas such as Armagh, 
Cookstown, Craigavon, Dungannon, Newry & Mourne and Derry, Catholic male 
unemployment rates were twice as high. For women the patterns were similar. This led the 
DED to conclude that `equality of misery' was a misconception. 17 A combined analysis of 
the 1981 Census, the 1983 and 1984 Continuous Household Survey and the 1984 and 1985 
Labour Force Survey revealed three significant characteristics of women activity rates. 
Although female employment had grown this was principally in lower occupational 
categories. While activity in clerical and related occupations had increased they accounted 
for 16% of the professional and managerial categories. Around 75% of women were 
engaged in catering, cleaning and hairdressing occupations while 12% of those in skilled 
manual occupations were women. In overall terms the position of women remained the 
same as at 1971. Differentials between males and females were greatest in the East 
reflecting the higher rates of full time male employment. Around one third of female 
employment was part-time as compared to 2% for men. 18 Thus as with religion greater 
entry into the labour market did not lead to an inevitable and qualitative change in 
occupational profiles. As unemployment grew during this period the distribution of 
`differential misery' was widespread. 
Another factor not fully explored that compounded the consequences of these structural 
issues were the plain facts of ongoing physical intimidation on the shop floor and the 
location of the major sources of employment in Protestant areas where the potential 
for 
sectarian assassination was great. While North Belfast had become a killing ground 
by 
loyalists against random Catholics, rural areas proved no refuge. The murder of 
five 
Catholics in Cappagh and Belfast in the first week of March 1991 and the killing of 
five 
more and wounding of seven in a betting shop on the Ormeau Road on 
5th February 1992 
by loyalists were two examples of the many grim reminders of 
being a Catholic in the 
wrong place at the wrong time during this period. On Friday 
15th November 1991 the UVF 
killed three workers leaving work from Hyster Engineering company at 
Craigavon on their 
way home to Lurgan. One of them was a Protestant. The UVF said 
it "deeply regretted" 
the death of their Protestant victim. A total of 84 people 
had been killed. The UFF/UDA 
declared, "the only time the UFF will stop is when the 
Provisionals stop murdering our 
I' Ibid., p. 11. 
18 Ibid., Appendix III, Appendix IV, pp. 52-55. See 1981 Census Religion 
Report, HMSO Belfast 1984. 
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people". 19 This was the harsh reality of the period. 
The DED did recognise "that equality of opportunity in employment does not follow 
automatically from the fact that discrimination is illegal". They also contradicted the 
FEA/FEC chairman's view that little could be achieved because of unemployment by 
stating: 
"The moral imperative of equality of opportunity in employment is such that it cannot be made dependent upon the prevailing economic situation. Indeed the consideration of more effective policy options is all the more 
necessary when economic conditions are unfavourable in order to prevent 20 existing differentials from getting worse". 
This was precisely what the goverment and FEA had failed to do. The civil service was 
promoted by the DED as a leadership model for the private sector to emulate in its 
employment practices. The DED noted that when the Declaration was linked to tender 
acceptance in 1981, the number of signatories rose from 2500 to 8000. This represented a 
"potentially most useful lever and that it should remain". The DED reassuringly informed 
the private sector that such leverage on this sector must be restricted to the "unavoidable 
minimum". The government's philosophy of enforcement was made clear in their position 
statement that "the excision of any company from a tendering list would represent a 
defeat for the positive policy of promoting equality of opportunity". For good measure 
they added government's acceptance that "implementation may be slower in the private 
sector generally than in the public; companies will need to adapt recommended practices 
to their own particular requirements. In effect companies will need time to adjust; ... 95 . 
21 
Although the Declaration and its link to government contracts would change to a matter of 
employers' practice rather than intent its implementation would be regarded as a defeat 
rather than a positive and forceful message to employers. The impact on employers in 
terms of achieving a rapid cultural shift in attitude was still not grasped. This particular 
provision had been at the centre of major conflicts within and outside the FEA. Its 
19 The Guardian, press reports, 16th November 1991. For accounts of Provisional IRA activity see Harnden, 
Toby. (1999)Bandit Country, The IRA & South Armagh, Hodder & Stoughton; Taylor, Peter. (1997) Provos, 
The IRA and Sinn Fein, from the BBC TV series, Bloomsbury and Smyth, Marie, `The human consequences 
of armed conflict', Ch. 9. pp. 118-135 in Cox, Michael. Guelke, Adrian and Stephen, Fiona. (eds. ) A farewell 
to arms? (2000) Manchester University Press. 
20 Future Strategy Options, DED, 1986. p. 13 
21 Ibid. pp. 28-31. 
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concession was made at the height of the Hunger Strike. Not a single employer had 
suffered under its provisions. The government was now saying that despite thirteen years 
of equal opportunity legislation employers still needed time to adjust and if at all possible 
this provision would not be applied. Employers were therefore aware that unless their 
practices were absolutely blatant little would happen. They had been given the freedom to 
attribute any patterns of inequality to the historical situation and or the attitudes of the 
workforce. They had in effect been given `a get out of jail free card'. Cooper's submission 
to the SACHR review on this point strongly supported this position and opposed any form 
of positive action that included specific goals and objectives with timetables to achieve 
change. He argued this approach represented "preferential treatment" and a "reversal of the 
22 merit principle" . 
In the US by comparison the application of quotas, goals and targets, required employers 
to provide training in and outside the workplace to ensure the opportunity of gaining any 
appropriate skills was a possibility. It is important to note in this context that targets for 
increased minority representation are not based on recruiting a person who cannot do the 
job. They are specific objectives established within the framework of a complete equal 
opportunity programme which is directed at enabling those previously denied access to 
employment to gain entry to the market place on an equal footing. Targets and timetables 
provide benchmarks for measuring performance and taking corrective action if required by 
statutory agencies and employers themselves. They are totally in accord with competition 
at the point of entry to the labour market and reflect a desire to provide the gel for securing 
an accommodation where division exists. This practice covered 300,000 companies 
employing 41 million people in the US. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance 
Programmes assessed compliance in 6000 companies annually where it judged there was 
under-employment of blacks and women. This enabled employers to eliminate or tackle 
manifestations of discrimination by having goals and timetables whereby progress could 
be measured in the public domain. The OFCC was also subjected to criticism for not doing 
enough and failing to withdraw contracts. The difference however was the practice and 
expectation were very much part of the employment field and represented a powerful 
cultural and financial tool. The value of local and central government contracts at this time 
22 Cooper, R Chairman FEA, 1986. The SACHR review was published in October 1987 with an interim 
report published on 24th March 1987. 
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across Britain was estimated to be £34 billion. 23 During February 1986 the then Tory 
controlled House of Commons Select Committee declined to endorse contract compliance 
as a method of promoting equal opportunities at work. 
Christopher McCrudden, as a member of the SACHR review team pushed for much 
stronger legislation than the FEA or government desired. He had previously conducted a 
review of American law and made a substantial submission to the American courts 
demonstrating the legality of the MacBride Principles. In SACHR's interim report on the 
government's proposals, he recommended any new law should expressly prohibit indirect 
discrimination and that voluntary agreements between employers and enforcement bodies 
must contain compulsory measures if they were to be effective. Compulsory monitoring 
of the workforce was regarded as fundamental. McCrudden argued that the new 
Declaration must have goals and timetables rather than a very loosely worded open-ended 
approach. 24 
SACHR's 1987 report supported positive action programmes that targeted job 
advertisements at particular groups although they stopped short of the provisions then 
permitted under the British Race Relations Act 1976. These allowed specific training and 
recruitment programmes for particular minority groups when they are under-represented in 
the workforce or where membership of the group may be considered a genuine 
occupational qualification. When the government published a "Guide to Effective 
Practice", as its response to "Future Strategy Options" consultative process the Secretary 
of State's preface claimed the promotion of real equality of opportunity was one of its 
"highest political priorities .... essential 
for economic prosperity and fundamental to a 
democratic society". 25 He called on the community to work together to achieve this goal. 
As the guide was launched loyalist demonstrations were still taking place at Shorts and the 
chairman of LEDU, the government's small business agency was being accused of 
discrimination. The DED rejected positive action as "restrictive, inefficient, exclusive and 
23 Can, John. `Contract Compliance for the UK? ', Fabian Society, February 1986. See also `Government 
Contracts, and their Role in promoting Equal Opportunity in Employment', Race Relations Bill Briefing 
Group, Runnymede Trust, June 1974 London; Rees, Tom. `Equal Employment Opportunity in the USA', 
August 1974, Runnymede Trust; Claiborne, Louis. `Race and Law in Britain and the United States', Minority 
Rights Group Report No. 22, December 1974; `Contract Compliance Principles of Practice', CRE, September 
1987. 
24 SACHR `Interim Report on Employment', 24th March 1987; McCrudden C. Equal Opportunities Review, 
No. 8, No. I O, pp. 17-2 1, November/December 1986, Industrial Relations Services, London. 
25 Religious Equality of Opportunity in Employment: Guide to Effective Practice, DED, September 
1987. 
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unjust". Employers were further assured that should inequalities be apparent under the 
DED's seven-point checklist the DED would not conclude this implied "deliberate 
malpractice". The position on government contracts was weakened by the government's 
acceptance in its White Paper that suppliers and contractors who were in breach of their 
obligations under the Declaration: 
"will not normally be eligible to tender for any significant government business 
(although occasional exceptions may be necessary on grounds of security or public 
interest, or where the work or goods could not otherwise be secured without 
disproportionate expense)". 26 
Having laid great store in the moral objectives of fair employment and its potential to give 
"more people a stake in society and (is) a stablising influence" in NI the government 
accepted there would be exceptions on grounds of cost and security interests. In NI a 
significant source of employment and sponsorship for defence research and production 
occurred at places such as Shorts and Queen's University Belfast with a reputation for 
discriminatory employment. The existence of this however could be immaterial to the 
award of any contract. The moral basis for any legislative code that seeks to accommodate 
those previously disenfranchised requires consistency without exceptions. To be otherwise 
is not a moral code but a political judgement influenced by a range of particular political 
circumstances and distribution of power. To apply a moral code in NI would have meant a 
host of private and public sector employers losing the privilege of access to government 
contracts and employment. Goals and timetables for applications and appointment subject 
to "good faith" without the capacity to prescribe specific percentages in a workforce were 
included in the Fair employment Bill. 27 The objective was to demonstrate "fair 
participation" not to impose quotas or reverse discrimination. Government defined the use 
of quotas as "reserving a set proportion or number of jobs for particular individuals or 
members of a particular group". This was rejected "as being wrong in principle and 
divisive and counter-productive in practice". They concluded to do so "would 
involve 
discrimination in favour of under-represented groups and against individuals from other 
groups". The government stressed that even when inequalities are apparent this 
"must not 
be allowed to influence employers when selecting for recruitment, promotion and 
lay- 
off'. 28 The governments' position while being technically correct, the 
impact of quotas or 
26 Fair Employment in Northern Ireland, p. 44. May 1988, London HMSO, Cm380. 
27 Fair Employment Bill in NI, DED, 15th December 1988. See also NIO press summary. 
28 28 Fair Employment in NI, White Paper, pp. 30-31,25th May 1988, Cm 380 HMSO. 
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reverse discrimination would mean precisely that, it does not accept the need to reverse 
these patterns of inequality via a direct and strategic intervention. The emphasis is again 
on the manner by which the individual is given `fair participation' to the market. The 
market is accepted as a given entity that will enable this process to occur. The government 
thereby ignores its own evidence that the NI market has specific peculiarities militating 
against this process. This is a political decision not a moral one related to the concept of 
merit and quotas within the context of an unstable society. The government is simply 
recognising that to secure stability in NI is directly in proportion to securing the passive 
support of the "greater number" and at least the passive support of the Catholic middle 
class. The track records of many employers have rarely borne testimony that unequivocal 
declarations produced unequivocal practices promoting equality of access to the 
marketplace. 
The SACHR Report. 
The SACHR "Report On Fair Employment '129 was described by Kevin McNamara MP, 
then Labour's principal spokesperson on Northern Ireland, as "one of the most significant 
documents produced by a state agency in the recent history of Northern Ireland" . 
30 The 
report and accompanying analysis provided by the independent Policy Studies Institute 
was a watershed in terms of the equal opportunity debate. The analysis of the FEA's 
failure backed up by data confirming the entrenched nature of inequalities offered the 
government a significant challenge and opportunity. 31 SACHR's recommendation that the 
FEA be scrapped and replaced by a more viable and energetic body fitted in neatly with 
the British Information Service Offices' (BIS) efforts in the US to signal it was getting 
tough on equal opportunities. Although Cooper was a member of the SACHR committee 
his public opposition to the direction the review took was deflected by the presence of 
those familiar with FEA failures. This included Christopher McCrudden and the FEA's 
29 SACHR. `Religious And Political Discrimination and Equality of Opportunity In Northern Ireland', 
Report on Fair Employment. Cm237, London HMSO, October 1987. 
30 Speech by Kevin McNamarra MP, Principal Opposition Spokesperson on NI, 28th November 1987, 
Conference, "Ireland. - Cause of Labour? A trade union conference on employment discrimination and 
its 
context in NI". 
31 Policy Studies Institute, `Equality and Inequality in NI', Vols. 1-3, `Employment and Unemployment; the 
Workplace; Perception and Views'; Smith, D. J. & Chambers, G. October 1987. 
262 
solicitor who was also chair of SACHR until 1988, Seamus O'Hara. Cooper declined to 
participate in the decision making of the final report. 32 
O'Hara had submitted evidence to the Van Straubenzee Working Party on Discrimination 
in 1972, recommending a "a system of variable quotas". 33 The commissioning of the PSI, 
an established reputable body that had carried out the seminal work on racial inequality in 
Britain meant that a greater degree of independent academic scrutiny and rigour was 
achieved. Some unionist academics were given places on an advisory group that included 
a geographer, Paul Compton. His contribution to the debate on inequality was to 
recommend the mass emigration of Catholics, controls on their birth rate and to suggest 
there were only a fixed number of jobs for them in the first place. 34 The PSI was also less 
likely to be manipulated by the NIO or its agents. 
SACHR's work proved weakest when it chose to simply repeat the `accepted wisdom' of 
the government in relation to the economy. For example the level of inequality in the 
Catholic West during the 1970's was attributed to a "high level of paramilitary activity" 
and what were claimed to be the less attractive nature of areas to investors outside Belfast 
where Catholics predominate. This ignored the fact that external investment had already 
peaked by 1969-1970, leaving largely untouched the inherent structural inequalities 
promoted by the Stormont regime. 35 Production in factories and business in NI has only 
ever been significantly effected by loyalist strikes and protests, - "friendly fire". 
36 While 
the IRA had proven their capacity to carry out small scale acts of sabotage by placing 
small bombs at Shorts and the shipyard, their economic impact is perhaps best measured in 
the size of insurance claims made against the NIO as opposed to any real impact on the 
economy. The real costs of a war economy have been in terms of maintaining the forces 
essential to contain the conflict. Economic commentators have consistently identified the 
source of the economy's shortcomings as partition, the narrow base and paucity of 
32 This is noted within the SACHR report, p. v, Cooper in particular was opposed to the creation of a new 
industrial tribunal to hear cases outside the FEA and the creation of a new equality body. 
33 Seamus O'Hara, written submission to the Van Straubenzee Working Party, 1972. 
34 Compton, P. A. (ed) `The Contemporary Population of NI and Population Related Issues', Institute of Irish 
Studies, Queen's University Belfast, 1981. See SACHR Report, p. 41. Compton provided his papers to the 
FEA prior to publication which are much more explicit than the published document, `Religious affiliation 
and unemployment in Northern Ireland'. See Ch. 1. New Beginnings and discussion 
below. 
35 The Quigley Report, Economic and Industrial Strategy for NI: Report of the Review Team, Belfast 1976. 
36 Tomlinson, M. `25 Years On: The Costs of War and the Dividends of Peace', West Belfast Economic 
Forum, 8th August, 1984. 
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indigenous capital, the rapid decline of its manufacturing base and critically a total 
dependence on England, its major competitor. 37 Others have accepted that the deterrent 
factor of conflict cannot be fully evaluated but suggest the impact may have been around 
30,000 manufacturing jobs. 38 The IRA bombing of the City in London had greater 
political and economic impact in terms of the confidence of foreign investors in London as 
a financial capital. 
SACHR gave credence to Compton's view that "demographic characteristics", especially 
"family size", are one factor in explaining "the relative differences between Catholics and 
Protestants in employment and unemployment". 39 The acceptance of this rests upon a view 
that there will and always must be a fixed number of jobs already predetermined by the 
nature of the sectarian economy for Catholics. If this is accepted as the source of the 
unemployment differentials between Catholics and Protestants then arguments over merit, 
equity and morality are redundant. For this view is explicitly saying that the NI economy 
is fixed in favour of Protestants. The number of employment opportunities are such, that to 
maintain its character means there can only be a proportion set aside for Catholics. 
Compton then would be correct. To maintain this allocation of employment opportunities 
Catholics must emigrate. If Compton's views are accepted by government and SACHR all 
they are doing is reinforcing the evidence presented in this work that the economy has a 
particular characteristic where merit is linked to religious affiliation and entry to the active 
labour market is facilitated or impeded by religious identity. If this were not the case and 
the market was free from the impediment of religion then the question of differing fertility 
rates would not be a subject of debate that seeks to justify such inequalities. Compton has 
simply given expression to the fear and insecurities of the unionist viewpoint as a 
justification in itself for sustaining inequalities. He is also saying the responsibility for 
such inequalities is a result of individual behaviour independent of history, power and 
politics that have facilitated or denied access to the labour market and associated training 
opportunities. It is fatuous to suggest that if a community suffers from an 
intermittent 
37 cf. Barrit and Carter, , (1972) 
Isles and Cuthbert (1957), Quigley (1976), Rowthorn, Bob. 'NI: an economy 
in crisis' Cambridge Journal of Economics 1981,5,1-31, Academic Press, 
NIEC, Report 99, `Inward 
Investment in NI', 1992; Report 111, `The implications of Peripherality for NI'; Occasional Paper 4: June 
1995, `The Economic Implications of Peace and Political Stability for NI'. 
38 Moore, Barry., Rhodes, John. & Tarling, Roger., Cambridge Journal ofEconomics, (1978), `Industrial 
policy and economic development: the experience of NI and the Republic of 
Ireland', pp. 99-114, see p104- 
105; and Simpson, John. `Job Creation in NI: Policies and Constraints', 
Ch. 10, pp. 245-272, see pp. 247-251 
in SACHR Employment Equality in NI Vol. II, Policy Aspects of Employment Equality in 
NI, (1997). 
39 SACHR Report on Fair Employment, p41,1987 Cm 237, HMSO. 
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ability to gain employment, or that their place of location has as a result of strategic 
investment policies had a low number of job creation opportunities, and relies on welfare 
services as a consequence, that one single factor- family size- has created a state of 
unemployment that is inherent to that community. 
David Smith, PSI's lead researcher on the project in response to criticism of PSI findings 
by the NIO and Compton made a similar point. He said that the view that "excessive 
breeding" by Catholics was a root cause of inequality rested on the assumption there 
should only be a fixed number of jobs for Catholics. He added a difference in family size 
could not serve "as an explanation of the widely diverging rates of unemployment for 
40 Protestants and Catholics". 
SACHR did conclude however, "that after taking account of a number of explanatory 
factors religion in itself is consistently and strongly related to the chance of being 
employed or unemployed". 41 The PSI's analysis of census data, continuous household 
survey and labour force survey data demonstrated the success of discriminatory policies. 
Catholic rates of unemployment varied on average from, 2.5 to 3 times that of Protestants. 
More than half the Catholic males were unemployed for more than two years. This 
compared with 40% of Protestant males. Conversely 38% of Protestant males were 
unemployed for less than a year with 26% of Catholics. The pattern for women was 
similar. While the religious occupational divisions remained the growth area of security 
provided 30,000 overwhelmingly Protestant jobs. An analysis of the 1981 census 
indicated that to bring Catholic unemployment down to Protestant levels would have 
required up to 34,000 additional jobs for Catholic men and up to 8,000 for women. 
42 Table 
IV demonstrates how little change had occurred in differential rates of male 
unemployment. 43 
Table IV. Male Unemployment rates for Catholic & Protestants, 1971,1981 and 1983-85. 
Catholic Protestant Ratio of 
(a) (b) (a) to (b) 
40 Fortnight, Belfast, 19th March, 1988. 
41 SACHR Report, p. 15. 
42 Ibid. p. 23. 
43 Smith, David, J. Equality and Inequality in NI Part I: Employment and Unemployment, 
Policy Studies 
Institute, London 1987, Occasional Paper 39, P. 40. Table 2.1. See SACHR, 1987 & 1990. 
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1971 Census. 17.3% 6.6% 2.6 
1981 Census 30.2% 12.4% 2.4 
1983-85 Continuous 
Household Survey. 35.1% 14.9% 2.4 
Policy Studies Institute, Occasional Paper 39, p40. Table 2.1. 
Inequalities East and West of the River Bann remained strong. Unemployment 
differentials ranged from 1.7 in Belfast to 2.6 West of the Bann. Notwithstanding these 
findings SACHR managed to make the remarkable claim, that: 
"large and continuing differentials in employment and unemployment rates for 
Protestants and Catholics does not in itself show that there has been in the past or 
a4 that there still remains any discrimination or inequality of opportunity". 
This ahistorical approach is at odds with their own analysis and fails to offer any other 
explanation. The analysis by the PSI into factors such as age, class, education, family size, 
confirmed religion consistently acted as a major determinant in the reproduction of 
unemployment patterns. For SACHR's claim to have any validity the development of NI's 
history and its particular socio-political relations would have to be regarded as a value free 
development. The historical reality that NI's formation was a direct result of a very active 
and violent political process is not generally disputed. 
The PSI's interviews with 260 large and small employers confirmed the impact of the FEA 
was "overwhelmingly negative". More employers were familiar with the MacBride 
campaign than the FEA. Of the 15% who indicated the FEA had some influence on their 
practices, they added this was only temporary and related to actual investigations or 
complaints. Most (91%) were happy to let things "find their own level", with many 
considering discrimination in employment to be a justifiable practice. 
45 SACHR called on 
the government to urgently tackle these "substantial inequalities". It recommended 
specific goals be established to bring about a: 
"substantial reduction in the differential rate of employment between 
Catholics and 
Protestants ... 
An interim target to aim for would be the reduction in differential 
44 PSI. Part 1, Vol., Employment and Unemployment, Table, 2.13, p. 46,1987; SACHR Report, p. 
24 -26. 
45 PSI. Part 2, The Workplace, Chapter 2, pp. 18-40, October 1987. 
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between the male Catholic unemployment rate and the male Protestant 
unemployment rate from two and a half times to one and a half times within five 
years.... the Commission recommends this as a reasonable target which, on public 
policy grounds the Government should set itself to achieve". 46 
SACHR's argument rested on the fact that the local economy experienced an annual 
labour turnover of 100,000 vacancies per year. The opportunities for intervention thereby 
existed even within a weak economy. They added it "knows of no evidence which 
demonstrates that this is an impossible goal to achieve". If existing strategies proved 
ineffective they suggested they should be replaced by others, "including measures which 
are considered to be inappropriate at present". 47 "Reverse discrimination" was rejected by 
SACHR "as unacceptable at this time". The government had already specifically rejected 
this in favour of the concept of `fair participation' and `merit. ' SACHR echoed the distant 
concerns of Cameron by arguing intervention by government was justified as effective 
anti-discrimination laws were one element in stabilising NI and removing "longstanding 
feelings of injustice". While accepting this the government's considered opinion was that 
any attempt to reverse patterns of inequality by wholesale measures could only be at the 
expense of Protestants and even greater instability. 
In opposing reverse discrimination as an affirmative action measure SACHR also opposed 
positive action or applying the "tie break" principle when considering access to 
employment. That is where an employer has two candidates of equal merit but one is from 
a group under-represented in the workforce. They thought the adoption of this "may give 
rise to considerable resentment". 48 By the same token MacBride was opposed because 
"The name has associations which lead some to resent and reject the Principles without 
consideration of their content" (see below). More usefully SACHR supported making 
indirect discrimination unlawful; placing the burden of proof on the respondent and ending 
the privileged anonymity of employers under investigation to "encourage employers to 
avoid discriminatory practices". They suggested compulsory monitoring of the workforce, 
and placing independent commissioners in charge of recruitment and selection when 
public bodies refuse to comply with the law or continue in their public opposition 
to 
equality of opportunity. Government was asked to lead 
by example. 49 
46 SACHR Fair Employment Report, p. 42. 
47 Ibid. p. 42. 
48 Ibid., p. 73. 
49 Ibid, p. 146. 
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SACHR recommended the FEA be replaced by a new "powerful, respected and effective 
fair employment body to indicate a fresh approach". With reference to the manner by 
which Agency members heard cases SACHR said the "Cloaking of individual decision 
makers in anonymity fosters irresponsibility, encourages delay and creates difficulties for 
efficient management". They added "the FEA would seem on occasion to take into 
account the implications of a particular finding for its relationship with particular 
organisations in a position to influence the provision of equality of opportunity". The civil 
service investigation was cited as a specific example of this where there was "serious 
under-representation of Catholics in the senior grades". 5o 
By the extremely conservative standards of NI, SACHR's report was a strong one. The 
publication of statistics that confirmed Direct Rule and ten years of law enforcement had 
achieved extremely little was a bold step. 51 In many senses though the reports strengths 
was illusory. SACHR had only gone full circle. Their unqualified support for voluntary 
compliance over enforcement belied its own evidence. Many of the proposals and issues 
aired in the report were faint echoes of arguments which raged in the US during the 1960's 
and indeed during the production of the 1973 Van Straubenzee Report. A strategy for the 
late 20th and early 21 st Century demanded action and enforcement that reflected the depth 
of the challenge to be faced. To do this however would have been to risk challenging the 
North's founding principles, - power, privilege and prejudice. 
Further statistical analysis by Smith and Chambers (1991) that applied a 
logistic 
regression model to all sets of data accepted as relevant to equal opportunities 
for male 
unemployment found a "strong relationship between religion and the chance of 
being 
unemployed, after taking account of the other five factors [socio-economic group, number 
of children in household, age, travel to work area and academic and practical 
qualifications]. This relationship is statistically significant at a very 
high level of 
confidence". 52 They considered that socio-economic group would also play a significant 
part in gaining employment for both religions but that 
large differences remained within 
50 Ibid. p. 62. 
51 From the FEA's inception in 1976 to 1988,694 individual complaints were received, 
605 were 
investigated and 52 findings of unlawful discrimination made. 
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any socio-economic group. From their analysis they concluded that, 
"the predicted rate of unemployment is substantially higher among Catholics than 
among Protestants, no matter what are the other characteristics of the person under 
consideration. After allowing for the factors included in the model, there is still a large difference between Protestants and Catholics in the chance of being 
unemployed. It must be concluded that Protestant and Catholic men have 
substantially unequal opportunities for employment in Northern Ireland. In fact the 
logistic regression analysis understates the inequality of opportunity to a 
considerable degree. This is because the form of analysis takes out of the 
reckoning differences in the chances of unemployment between Protestants and 
Catholics that are associated with socio-economic group and number of children. 
Yet these differences are also evidence of inequality of opportunity. The tendency 
for Catholics to be concentrated to a greater extent than Protestants in the lower 
socio-economic 
53 
groups is in part a consequence of past and present 
discrimination. 
SACHR commissioned a review of policy aspects of employment equality during 
1995/96. The official unemployment rate was 12% with an increase in vacancies produced 
largely by a range of government training schemes. The rates of vacancies to job 
opportunities however was 22.6: 1 while the experience of almost 30 years of Direct Rule 
showed only marginal change in differential unemployment rates. Catholics still remained 
twice as likely to be unemployed and overrepresented in the long-term unemployed. 54 This 
is illustrated by Table V derived from Census figures. 









Ratio of Protestant Catholic Ratio of 
(a) to (b) (c) (d) (c) to (d) 
2.6 3.6% 7.0% 1.9 
2.4 9.6% 17.1% 1.8 
52 Smith, David, J. & Chambers, Gerald., (1991) Inequality in Northern Ireland, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 
182,185. 
Ibid., pp. 186-187. 
sa SACHR (1997), Employment Equality in Northern Ireland, Vol. III, pp. 2-4., Gillespie, 
Norman. 
"Employment, Unemployment and Equality of Opportunity", Ch. 1., pp. 1-25. 
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1991 12.7% 28.4% 2.2 8.0% 14.5% 1.8 
Source: SACHR Employment Equality in NI, Vol. II, Table 1.2, p. 4. 
These differential patterns were again shown to be consistent across the region. 
New legislation. 
On March 2nd 1988, the Secretary of State, Tom King MP confirmed legislative and 
administrative changes would be made. He asserted, these measures "will be more 
effective than the MacBride Principles could ever be in ensuring equal treatment for all". 
A White Paper was issued on 25th May 1988, a Bill on 15th December 1988 and a new Act 
published in August 1989 becoming law on 1st January 1990. The FEA became the FEC; 
monitoring of the workforce was made compulsory as was registration with FEC, 
excluding companies with less than 25 employees, e. g. the majority of LEDU sponsored 
firms. From 1992 this threshold fell to 10. Indirect discrimination was expressly 
prohibited; a new Community Relations Commission was introduced under the auspices of 
the NIO with a brief to foster good relationships between Protestant and Catholics. The 
responsibility for individual complaints was given to a new Fair Employment Tribunal 
with power to levy cash penalties. The Act provided the power to enforce criminal 
penalties on employers who failed to register, submit monitoring returns or supply false 
and misleading information. 55 . The oppressive 
Section 42 security clause was retained 
and specific goals on actual recruitment were excluded with goals restricted 
to"applications" to avoid misinterpretations. 56 Quotas and/or reverse discrimination were 
rejected. "Outreach" measures which recommended employers end the display of 
offensive flags and emblems, the visiting Catholic and Protestant schools, ending 
preferential treatment for certain types of organisations, offering training which could 
facilitate access by under-represented sections of the community were deemed to be more 
effective forms of `affirmative action'. As the government said in the White paper this was 
more in keeping with "the whole moral basis of the Government's approach to 
fair 
employment". 
ss Fair Employment in NI, Key Details of the Act August 1989, Code of Practice December 1989, 
DED. 
1989 Fair Employment (NI) Act HMSO. 
56 A Section 42 Certificate under the 1976 Act may be issued by a "Minister of the 
Crown or the head of a 
Northern Ireland department", to prevent disclosure of information in response to a complaint or 
investigation. Part VI, para. 52(2) Fair Employment (NI) Act 1976, p. 33. 
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In the USA legislation was a direct response to the civil rights movement and race riots. 
Major political upheavals produced equal opportunity provisions that included specific 
affirmative action programmes such as job quotas, goals and objectives to be met within 
an established time scale. Training may be targeted on specific groups and government 
contracts could and have been withheld. Enforcement and compulsion backed up by 
Federal and state courts with powers to impose heavy fines on an individual or class, basis 
exist. An equal opportunity culture has been fostered among large institutional investors 
to the extent that special Investment Responsibility Units funded by institutions to 
independently monitor and report on companies have been established. These statutory 
and voluntary measures all rest on a proactive approach where concepts of merit and 
equality are not at odds with the concept of quotas. The latter is more of a yardstick to 
assess progress upon which further action may be taken if it is apparent little has been 
achieved. In this context meaningful goals and objectives can be established. These are 
only a few features that are considered essential to any full-blooded affirmative action 
programme in the American sense. 
In the North, where there was a war on, the new laws contained no meaningful goals, 
targets or objectives. SACHR's proposal to reduce proportionately inequities in 
unemployment patterns from 2.5 to 1.5 times within five years was rejected. The 
inference must be that the stated objective of giving "more people a stake in society" and 
promoting greater stability via directly reversing inequalities was not as close to Britain's 
interests then as claimed or that nothing would be allowed to destablise a society that 
happened to be overwhelmingly unionist. Those registered on the FEC's 
list of employers 
can only have their Certificate of Co-Operation withdrawn if they are subject to successful 
criminal proceedings for willfully refusing to return or falsifying their monitoring returns. 
Compliance in terms of government contracts was restricted to major contractors and 
excluded local authorities, public owned industries and agencies. 
It also as noted earlier 
allowed exceptions for security or financial reasons. 
As the NIO said earlier, vigorous 
legislation similar to the US model were rejected as potentially 
"catastrophic". The 
legislation was drafted to "gain acceptance by the wider community 
of the fairness of 
equal opportunities proposals". 
57 The wider community was primarily Protestant. 
As 
previously noted (Chapter 3) the White paper made 
its case that to set aside merit was: 
57 Tom King MP, Secretary of State, MO press statement Ist July, 
1988. 
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"to make appointments or promotions on the basis of favouring one 
religious group over another would be grossly unfair to the individuals thus 
excluded. ... it would tend to exacerbate sectarian divisions rather than heal them. The fact that some would see it as being done from a good 
motive, e. g. to counterbalance historical disadvantage, would make it no less inequitable or unsatisfactory". 58 
In the debate at the House of Commons on discrimination in employment in NI the 
Secretary of State, Tom King MP declared the government was going to "get tough", with 
those who flout the law. King added, "It is important to say that discrimination is not 
practised exclusively by one community against another. It is not all against Catholics. In 
some significant areas of employment there is significant evidence of discrimination 
against Protestants". 59 His office failed to share this evidence with the public before he left 
the North to become Britain's Minister for Defence. Both the DED's report on Future 
Strategy Options, SACHR's Report on Fair Employment and the three volumes on 
Equality and Inequality in Northern Ireland had not produced this evidence. This is not to 
say that Protestants do not experience acts of discrimination or prejudice from Catholics 
but to make the point that access to employment in the public and private sector was 
overwhelming controlled by Protestants. This was the evidence of all these reports and the 
individual case studies assessed in this study. 
When the original Working party on discrimination reported in 1973, it quoted a US 
official defining affirmative action as "anything, you have to do to get results". 
60 The new 
laws were a direct response to US pressure and the recognition that if the FEA achieved 
anything it was not results. Outlawing discrimination was nothing new. The Government 
of Ireland Act 1920 expressly forbade the imposition of "any disability or disadvantage on 
account of religious belief'. This Act was the foundation stone of the Stormont regime. 
The Downing Street Declaration on 20th August 1969, promised equality of opportunity 
and effective redress; the Electoral Law Act 1969, promised universal suffrage, and the 
Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1969, gave the commission the power to investigate 
complaints of religious and political discrimination. In 1971 
it took on the power of 
monitoring those tendering for government contracts. Last but not 
least was the ill-fated 
58 Fair Employment in Northern Ireland, p. 13, HMSO, May, 1988. 
60 
59 MO press statement, and Hansard 1st July 1988. 
6o Report and Recommendations of the Working Party on Discrimination 
in the Private sector of 
Employment, (the Van Straubenzee Report) p. 14, HMSO, 1973. 
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Fair Employment Act, 1976. SACHR placed its faith in a "new powerful fair employment 
body", to make progress in the 1990's. Its then chairman, Seamus O'Hara in his evidence 
to the Van Straubenzee Working party in 1972, said in a private submission: 
"We believe that the history of discrimination in employment in Northern 
Ireland has been so widespread in its result that it is essential to authorise 
the Commission to fix variable quotas defining the number or percentage of 
Catholics and/or Protestants to be employed in various places and in 
various grades of employment both in the public sector and in the private 
sector .... Firms and bodies which fill their particular quota in any year 
will be given a certificate to this effect and only possession of such a 
certificate would entitle a firm to obtain full Government grants and 
allowances and to compete for or to obtain public contracts. Firms and 
bodies which fail to fill their quotas would lose or suffer reduction for that 
particular year in grants and allowances (including tax allowances) 
61 otherwise payable to them". 
Legislation and initiatives have not been in short supply. In the US much stronger 
legislation and wide ranging powers has not brought about equality of opportunity. The 
inherent structural unequal position of blacks and other minorities remains. Racism is still 
prevalent. Unemployment for blacks is twice the rate of whites. This pattern is true for all 
ages, both sexes and regardless of education levels. A contemporaneous national survey 
by the EEOC demonstrated the stability and structural nature of these inequalities. 62 The 
strength of the black lobby and stronger powers of enforcement -which included quotas, 
employment targets, positive action training and recruitment programmes, timetables, - are 
sufficient testimony of the limits of what can be achieved by legislation supported by 
energetic advocates. The strength and existence of pro-active legislation can enable 
punitive lawsuits to be taken and won. Black farmers successfully proved the agriculture 
department "did not treat them fairly in the area of lending and programme delivery and 
the servicing of loans. That's just a fact. " This was a statement by the departments civil 
rights specialist when the department conceded a wrong had been done since 1983 
leading 
to millions of dollars compensation to more than a 1000 farmers. 
63 On the other hand the 
riots in Los Angeles following the acquittal of four police officers accused of 
delivering 
56 blows to a prone unarmed Black man, Rodney King, by a non-black 
jury in the face of 
61 O'Hara Seamus, (in his submission he used the English James so is recorded as 
J. O'Hara written evidence 
which was his professional name as a lawyer until he became chair of 
SACHR). 
62 EEOC Job Patterns for Minorities and Women in Private Industry 1986, pp. 
1-620, US Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, Washington, D. C., USA, 1988. 
63 The Guardian Report, 6th January 1999. 
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a video capturing the assault, indicated the depth of the schisms which remain in the USA 
To paraphrase the DED's view however such class actions would be a defeat for the 
promotion of equality of opportunity and "exacerbate community tensions". The 
legislation and support for the concept in the North pales by comparison. While the new 
laws now assist documentation of the extent of inequality, counting inequities is no 
substitute for ending them. It was during this period of the mid to late 1980's that Britain 
launched its highest profile counter campaign in the US against those advocating a 
stronger equal opportunity agenda in NI. The Americans grouped themselves around the 
MacBride Principles. This struggle would prove the strength of American influence in 
obliging Britain to take matters seriously. It would force the government to introduce fresh 
legislation as embodied in the 1989 Act. It also demonstrated that `moral principles' had 
not proved enough in themselves to achieve legislative change. The 1989 Act and the 
many administrative changes including the SACHR and PSI reviews were a direct result 
of external political pressure and massive internal civil unrest and violence in NI. The 
primary driver for change was violence and the threat of disinvestment by American 
companies in response to the Irish-American campaign. The moral objectives were built 
around political necessity. It is to an assessment of this we now turn. 
The MacBride Principles Campaign. 
The MacBride Principles Campaign began in 1984. The scale of Britain's response 
reflected the knowledge that the Sullivan Principles upon which they were based enjoyed 
widespread domestic political support in the US as a voluntary code for companies 
investing in South Africa. Sullivan who was a pastor of the ZION Baptist Church in 
Philadelphia and a director of General Motors had introduced his equal opportunity code 
in 1976. Apart from demanding equal pay and non-segregation at work they also 
encouraged employers to provide positive training programmes 
for significant numbers of 
blacks and other non-whites. Employers who adopted the principles were also obliged 
to 
commit their company to "Improving the quality of employees 
lives outside the work 
environment in housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and 
health facilities". 64 By 
1984,128 US companies in South Africa were signatories with all work 
facilities 
64 Cited in `Report of Comptroller', New York City, South Africa Investment 
Responsibility Unit, 31St March 
1985, pp. 2-5. See also IRRC Annual Reports and their South Africa 
Review Service. 
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desegregated for around 65,000 or 1% of South Africa's labour force. Institutional 
investors funded a special South Africa Investment Responsibility Unit (SAIRU) which 
was charged with actively monitoring compliance by these firms. SAIRU awarded 
positive or negative ratings. The consequence would be the investor seeking compliance 
with the full Sullivan Principles or withdrawal of investment. This kind of pressure 
combined with the wider anti-apartheid struggle forced major corporations and American 
based banks to either liquidate their holdings or end operations altogether. Success on 
such a scale in NI was a frightening prospect for the NIO. 
The MacBride Principles campaign's strength was in its potential. It had the capacity to 
bring pressure from shareholders on American companies in the US that also had 
investments in NI. This included Hughes Tool, Ford, Standard Telephone and Cables, 
American Brands and so on. Fords for example had to endure a high profile Irish 
American campaign advocating the boycott of its cars for its refusal to support the 
Principles. This led to a special team from the US coming to NI to conduct their own 
investigation (see below). 65 Significant American investments peaked in the late 1970's at 
around 34 companies. Between 1960-82 the total cumulative US investment amounted to 
some £750m at prices in the mid-1980's. 66 The new blood of the late 1970's and early 
1980's included high profile disasters such as De Lorean and Lear Fan underpinned by 
massive public subsidies. Since then US investment has been fairly static with exceptions 
including the take over of Mackies by the Georgian based company, Lummus in 1989, 
expansion by the STC in 1990 and Fruit of the Loom's £60m IDB supported investment in 
1992 at Derry providing 250 jobs. In addition to this, the late 1980's saw significant US 
Federal defence contracts being awarded to Shorts. British government grants to investors 
ranged from £65m to Du Ponts since 1960; £35m to Fisher Body (General Motors) since 
1979; De Loreans's £50m shakedown and at the bottom end of the scale, £lm to VF 
Corporation at Newtownwards. 67 
When the MacBride Principles campaign was launched in November 1984 the number of 
US investors operational had fallen to 25. However if the measure of ownership utilised 
by the American Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC), is adopted (ownership 
65 The Irish Lobby, NewsLetter, February 1990, USA, Irish National Caucus. 
66 BIS Washington to Comptrollers Office, New York City, 3rd August 1984. 
67 NIO press statements on industrial investments and government grants. 
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of 10% or more of a subsidiary or affiliate), the total was 35.68 The 24 wholly owned US 
companies employed around 10,171 and accounted for 11% of the manufacturing 
workforce. At the campaigns' peak they supported 21,253 jobs and had invested since 
1980 more than £397.5m. 69 The NIO estimated the companies overall value in excess of 
$1.2 billion. American investment clearly had "clout" 
The MacBride campaign sought to utilise the muscle of institutional investors who 
controlled stocks in large US companies. Discrimination was regarded as Britain's 
Achilles' heel by Irish-American campaigners such as the INC and supporters in the 
American Congress. A propaganda war of some intensity was fought across the Atlantic 
during the 1980's. The NIO formed a "N. I. Partnership" to lobby in the US against the 
"unfair image portrayed by the media". This included unionist politicians, the SDLP, 
religious leaders, businessmen, Cooper, and Agency Board members. As this caravan of 
fellow travelers grew Irish-Americans forced the US Justice Department in 1990 to make 
it compulsory for all anti-MacBride campaigners to register under the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act. This forced them to register as British agents and disclose any fees and 
expenses gained for their efforts. When written questions were tabled in Parliament 
seeking to identify those involved and their costs, John Freeman of the local NIC( ICTU) 
demanded Kevin McNamara MP withdraw them on the grounds this would be an 
assassination list. 70 The questions were accordingly withdrawn. 
The MacBride Principles were a list of nine equal opportunity statements and objectives. 
In summary they sought to increase and promote under-represented groups in the 
workforce; ban provocative religious and political emblems at the workplace; to develop 
training programmes that would assist minority group employees acquire skilled 
employment; the provision of adequate security to protect minority employees; public 
advertisement of jobs and targeting minority group applicants; the abolition of any special 
job reservations or restrictions which discriminate against any religious or political group; 
ensuring lay off or redundancy practices did not favour a given group; establishing 
procedures which would actively assist the recruitment of minority group applicants and 
finally the appointment of a senior member of management to oversee 
true affirmative 
68 Booth, Helen. E. & Bertsch, A. `The MacBride Principles and US Companies in NI', 
IRRC, USA, April 
1989. See also `U. S. Companies and Fair Employment Practices 
in NI', Booth, H. E. IRRC, 1988. 
69 Hansard, Written Answers, 25 February, 1988, p. 318; 21 April, 1989. 
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action programmes were introduced, implemented and achieved within specific timetables. 
Named after Sean MacBride, an Irishman with an extraordinary political career, the 
Principles reflected equal opportunity practices in the US. Sean MacBride, who died in 
1988, was the son of Maud Gonne, fought in the 1916 Easter Rebellion, went on to 
become IRA Chief of Staff, fought against the British during the War of Independence and 
on the Republican side in the subsequent Civil War. He later became a co-founder of 
Amnesty International, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Order of Lenin and the 
American Medal of Justice. MacBride said he modelled his principles on the Sullivan 
Principles. The similarities of the codes enhanced the campaign's legitimacy and 
effectiveness in the US. Central to this was the sponsoring of investor's resolutions 
calling for companies to adopt the MacBride principles. The combined institutional value 
of the 24 companies remaining in NI in 1985, exceeded $29bn. 71 
Campaigners such as the Irish National Caucus and Comptroller's Office of New York 
City, argued that investment which sponsored discrimination would be illegal under Title 
VII of the US Civil Rights Act, 1984. This expressly forbade corporations from 
"perpetuating the present effect of past discrimination". New York City's pension funds 
were major shareholders in 13 out of the 24 companies then operating in the North, e. g. 
General Motors (Fisher Body), American Brands (Gallaghers). On a fact-finding visit in 
1985 New York's Comptroller, then Harrison Goldin and Assistant Pat Doherty were 
guests of the Secretary of State and his Ministers with the chair of the FEA at the Culloden 
Hotel outside Holywood. Goldin stressed that before US investment could be encouraged 
US investors had to be satisfied there was no discrimination in US plants. 
72 A 
comprehensive report by his office concluded there was a need to increase pressure on 
Britain to work more intensively for an equitable solution to the crises. Goldin's office 
also decided to support the MacBride Principles Campaign. 
73 
As support developed, 33 Senate members urged the US Secretary of Defence to prevent 
Shorts "furthering discrimination", by benefiting from $150m worth of contracts from the 
70 Kevin McNamara MP's office to author who drafted the questions. 
71 Standard and Poors, New York Stock Exchange Reports 1985. 
72 Pat Doherty Special Assistant to the Comptroller, to author at the time of the visit, January 1985. 
73 Office of the Comptroller, `Report on Northern Ireland Investment', 
Harrison J. Goldin, City of New York, 
February 4,1985, USA. 
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US air force. They demanded rigorous affirmative action programmes. 74 The AFL-CIO, 
the American trade union body, endorsed the Principles as consistent with established 
policy on equal opportunities and their support for the Sullivan principles. They dismissed 
representations by the Secretary of State, NIC (ICTU), the Irish Taisoeach and FEA as 
views strikingly similar "to discussions which took place in the US in the late 1950's or 
early 1960's". 75 Jesse Jackson declared, "Just as in South Africa, we must do everything in 
our power to ensure that US companies investing in Ireland do not follow any of the 
patterns of discrimination in employment practices so common in that country. We must 
see that no US government contracts are awarded to companies which practice 
discrimination". 76 The rapid progress by the campaign produced a major counter 
propaganda campaign by the British Information Services Office (BIS) in Washington. 
The BIS circulated an eleven-page rebuttal to leading newspapers, Congressmen and 
Senators in an attempt to discredit the reports produced by New York City. Every page 
quoted the FEA in support of Britains' claim that recruitment in the North "is based on 
equality of opportunity and selection according to merit". It asserted, "in most 
investigations the Agency has undertaken, it has found improvement (in the relative 
position of Catholics) over the last decade". The FEA's Civil Service investigation was 
referred to at length as evidence of this as was Shorts as an equal opportunity employer. A 
list of those opposed to the Principles included, the SDLP, the Supreme Knights of the 
Order of St. Columbanus, FEA members, Garret Fitzgerald and Dick Spring, as former 
leading southern Irish politicians. The BIO declared the campaign was "unnecessary and 
counter-productive" and in any case would be illegal as it sought to promote positive 
action or discrimination. Any "Special recruitment efforts", and training targeted at 
"underrepresented" groups were dismissed as "discriminatory and unlawful". The BIS 
asserted everything should be left to the FEA. No further measures were required. 77 The 
SDLP's stance was based on their view that while they had no objections to the 
"Principles as principles", but felt that that they may discourage potential investors from 
NI with so many other inducements available across Europe. 
78 In this regard the BIO 
74 Congressman Mario Biaggi, Chairman of Ad-Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs to US 
Secretary of Defence Casper Weinberger, reported in Irish Lobby, Spring 1984 Issue, INC. 75 AFL-CIO Executive Council Statement, 19th February 1983, Bal Florida, USA. 
76 Jesse Jackson press release on Northern Ireland, 1St April 1984. "BIS Briefing: Report on Northern Ireland by Comptroller Goldin, New York City Council -A Response, 
February 1985, paras. 13,26,28. 78 John Hume MP, SDLP Leader, letter to Irish News, 20th May 1987. 
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considered "De Lorean, notwithstanding the outcome, was in fact an inward investment 
success story". The line was any investment was worthwhile and to secure this it was best 
not to give support to issues that may deflect from that. 79 
Cooper shared this view. He earlier gave as the reason for any progress in equality of 
opportunity as the decline in manufacturing. "In that situation any progress will be very, 
very slow - if not existent. If companies are not recruiting and are paying off labour then 
progress will not be made". 80 Thus the voice of the Catholic middle class and British 
government were at one. The question of inequalities could only be resolved by creating 
greater employment opportunities. To accept this meant that the existing patterns of 
inequality could only be policed for excesses and not changed. The issue of labour 
turnover was not considered nor was the issue of principle that to "let matters find their 
own level" was to accept there was no basis to the moral objectives of the government in 
this regard. It was also a recognition that to change the fundamental patterns of inequality 
was impossible without risk of major civil unrest and military conflict with Protestants. As 
this was not part of the agenda the focus had to be on creating new sources of employment 
and trying to secure what would later be described in the 1989 Act as the `merit principle' 
and `fair participation'. Cooper reinforced this point in correspondence to Harrison 
Goldin, Comptroller of New York City. Cooper suggested that the MacBride campaign 
was unnecessary as any "improvement by existing American companies could make no 
more than a minimal difference to the employment disadvantage experienced by 
Catholics". He added "some American companies have made an enormous contribution 
towards securing equality for Catholics". Among those he cited in support of this was 
Ford. This was a claim not even Ford in the US made given the sectarian record of their 
local plant and Fords own investigations (see below). Cooper concluded his letter by 
declaring the campaign was detrimental to the Catholic population and suggested existing 
FEA practices offered the best hope. "Anything else I fear is more likely to lead to an 
even greater gap between the positions occupied by the two sections of the community". 
8' 
This debate reflected similar issues to that on apartheid in South 
Africa. One body of 
79 BIS, A. E. Huckle, Executive Director, 3rd August 1984 to Patrick Doherty, Comptrollers Office New 
York. 
80 Cooper, R quoted in `Why the North's Jobs Agency Cannot give a 
Fair Deal', The Sunday Tribune, 
Dublin, 19th February 1984. 
81 Cooper, R. Chairman FEA to Harrison Goldin, Comptroller for New York City, 19 
February 1985. 
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opinion, especially the governments' of South Africa and America advocated that more 
inward investment was more likely to achieve change than the threat of disinvestment. 
Others such as Bishop Desmond Tutu saw it as a tactic to be used in proportion to the lack 
of progress in South Africa. The MacBride campaign however was not pursuing 
disinvestment although it may be considered this was implicit if progress was not made 
but was the application of appropriate "economic muscle" in the right places to make a 
difference. In this case it was American companies who had the potential stand outside the 
local political complexities and act as a beacon for fair employment. The assumption 
behind Cooper's, the SDLP and the British government's viewpoint was that greater 
investment would directly and indirectly benefit the whole community in some way and 
thereby create the opportunity for progress on equality of opportunity. Throughout NI's 
history this was simply not the experience. Those best positioned to take advantage of new 
investment did so. They were primarily Protestant for the historical reasons already 
outlined. To take the argument further would mean that a significant amount of all new 
investment over a long period would have to be directed to areas where inequalities were 
greatest i. e. Catholic areas. This was not part of Britain's strategy in legislative or 
economic terms. Rather a general investment would be of general benefit. The skills and 
access differentials would thereby be diluted and more Catholics would generally benefit 
and be accommodated into acceptance of the constitution and status of NI. 82 Interestingly 
Reverend Leon Sullivan whose "Principles" had been running for ten years in relation to 
South Africa reversed his position in 1987. He called for total sanctions and disinvestment 
because the Principles had failed to end apartheid. The US State Department regretted this 
83 as they considered it more important to stay. 
In 1986 the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) was established by the British and Irish 
governments as a product of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Heavily sponsored by the US, 
Canada, New Zealand and the EEC its purpose was to alleviate poverty and promote 
economic and social developments. It was administered however 
by the very agents 
which both `respectable' Catholics and republicans had long accused of economic 
gerrymandering, the IDB, LEDU and the DOE. At the time of its first Annual 
Report in 
1987, Sinn Fein and the SDLP, criticised it for political vetting 
in the awarding of grants 
82 `Disinvestment', A Leadership Publication, June 1985, South Africa, presents a useful debate 
from 
politicians and investors on the South African viewpoint on the 
international campaign at the time. 
83 Associated Press Report, cited in The Guardian, 
0 June 1987. 
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and for spending almost four times the amount in Protestant areas as in Catholic areas of 
Belfast. The Irish Taoiseach, Charles Haughey, accused the Fund Board of allowing NI 
civil servants to control the Fund's dispensation and seeing it as no more than appendage 
of the IDB and LEDU. 84 In one case the SDLP accused the chairman of LEDU, Mervyn 
Hadden of discrimination. His company, Aircraft Furnishing in Kilkeel, had secured a 
£5m contract from British Airways. The workforce was increased from 50 to 247 during 
1987. Of the last 51 recruits monitored, only 8 were Catholic. South Down is 
predominantly a Catholic area so the question of access to opportunities was not an 
issue. 85 At the same time the DOE were intensifying their attack on community groups by 
withdrawing grant aid on political grounds. The groups and radical priests involved with 
them accused the IFI board of reinforcing the "pervasive system of economic inequality 
and discrimination created by successive Northern Ireland administrations". American 
campaigners succeeded in placing amendments on the 1990 Foreign Assistance bill which 
authorised a grant of $20m over two years to the IFI subject to an audit of its purpose. 
The comptroller General of the US was required to audit the IFI to determine if the 
objectives of the funds were being met. 
Prior to the MacBride campaign the British government's line in the US had been that 
discrimination was a minor aberration in the fabric of Northern society. Now they focused 
on the question of legality. The British Consul General, Frank Kennedy, wrote to Goldin, 
expressing "pity that your report did not acknowledge the measures taken and prompted 
by the British Government to protect human rights in N. Ireland". He added the positive 
recommendations contained inherent in the MacBride Principles would be "illegal, since 
discrimination in whatever form, is illegal". Kennedy complained that New York had 
produced a report on Britain's record without consulting the FEA and suggested that 
criticisms of the FEA indicated a less than "genuine interest in equality of employment". 
86 
The British First Secretary in Washington repeated these views verbatim to the AFL-CIO. 
The British shifted ground to attack those who supported the campaign. He stressed "As 
always with this sort of thing, it is important to look not only at the words used, but the 
people and organisations of promoting the initiative". The INC was accused of 
having 
"never seemed to us to have the interests of the people of Northern Ireland genuinely at 
" Press reports cited in Irish News, 11th December 1987; Irish Times assessment 
23rd August 1988. 
85 Press Report, The Guardian 23rd September 1987. 





Extra efforts to advertise jobs for Catholics were rejected by the BIS as "implying a lack 
of opportunity for other applicants or preferential treatment in appointments". The FEA's 
Seventh Annual Report was cited in support of this. There it records the FEA view that 
"successful candidates must be chosen on their merits without any regard to the balance of 
the workforce". 88 With regard to other aspects of the Principles the British claimed they 
were already consistent with existing law and any external intervention was unnecessary 
and counterproductive. Peter Archer QC, MP, a former British Attorney General, by 
comparison referred to the proposals as "moderate" which would in no way contravene" 
the Fair Employment Act. 89 In addition Article 1, Section 4 of the United nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination generally endorse 
positive action programmes, "taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement 
of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protections as may be 
necessary". The Convention requires that "Each State Party shall take effective measures 
to review governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any 
laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial 
discrimination wherever it exists". 90 
The British government signed this Convention on 11th October 1966, and ratified it on 7th 
March 1969. Given this commitment its stance that positive action is illegal and to be 
condemned in the North is extreme by comparison. Furthermore the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission notified New York City that it agreed with the view no violation of 
British law would occur if US companies adopted the Principles. The New York Federal 
District Court also ruled in favour of New York against American Brands and confirmed 
the Principles did not breach the Fair Employment Act. 
91 
87 N. E. Sheinwald, First Secretary, British Embassy Washington, on 1st March 1985 to Tom Donahue, AFL- 
CIO. 
88 BIS New York, Howard Beattie to Pat Doherty, Comptroller's Office, 
New York, 31St January 1985, FEA 
Seventh Annual Report, April 1982 - March 1983 p16, 
FEA, 8th February 1984. 
89 Peter Archer Q. C., MP, to Pat Doherty Comptroller's Office 
New York, 20, October 1985. 
90 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, Article 1, Section 4; 
Article 2, Section 1 C. The British government also supported the 
United Nations Declaration on 20th 
November 1963 to Eliminate All forms of Racial Discrimination. 
91 U. S. District Judge Robert Carter, American Brands v 
New York City Employees Retirement System 
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Support grew across the US as local municipalities and states with large institutional 
investments enacted legislation to force companies to comply with the Principles when 
investing in the North. They included, New York, Florida, Michigan, California, Illinois 
Maine, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island with around 25 other states during this 
period. Although California's state senate became the 13th state to pass the MacBride 
Principles into law, the Governor exercised a right of veto to stop the Bill on 24th 
September 1991. In so doing he quoted John Freeman Secretary for the ATGWU who 
claimed to have been "most aggressive in amending" the existing legislation for the benefit 
of his Catholic members which he now claimed to be 50%. Along with John Hume of the 
SDLP, both men were cited by the Governor as examples of men with the interests of 
Catholics at heart who argued the Principles were redundant and "bad for us". 92 
The British however found themselves with a liability in the form of the FEA. Apart from 
the widely cited criticisms over its performance and exposure of too many deals that failed 
to advance the pursuit of equality the advice given to companies by the FEA proved 
embarrassing. For example Hyster, Oregon which had a plant in Craigavon responded to 
Irish American pressure by informing the INC, "you must be aware that under the 
employment law of Northern Ireland, we cannot and do not keep records on the religious 
affiliation of our employees. " 93 Its workforce of 492 in 1986 was 62% (306) Protestant. 
By 1991 the workforce had fallen to 401 and included 133 Catholics. General Motors 
Directors in voting against a shareholders motion sponsored by the Sisters of Charity of 
St. Vincent de Paul in New York, claimed its Belfast subsidiary, Fisher Body adhered to 
the FEA's guidance and did not record religious affiliation as it: 
"would be unlawful to require such information and because management believes 
requests for such information would be regarded with suspicion and resentment. 
General Motors cannot endorse such action". 
94 
When one of its corporate shareholders, visited the plant at Dundonald in Belfast, on 10t' 
April1986, the workforce walked out because she was a Catholic nun whose organisation 
supported the MacBride Campaign. 95 At a meeting with corporate Church investors and 
New York City that were sponsoring MacBride resolutions on 5th February 1985 GM's 
92 Governor's Office, Sacramento, California, 24th September 1991. 
93 W J. Fronk, President Hyster, Portland, Oregon, 10 May, 1985 to Father Sean McManus, Director INC. 
94 General Motors Corporation, Detroit Michigan to the Sisters of Mercy, 8th March, 1985. 
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management team including the Belfast plant manager informed the meeting that Cooper, 
had phoned them "informally" to advise GM that should the MacBride Principles be 
adopted it would be illegal and he would use his position as chair of the FEA to take 
action against them". 96 As a compromise the shareholders agreed to withdraw their 
resolution when GM agreed to issue a public statement supporting the spirit of MacBride 
and that in a new contract with its Belfast workforce provocative emblems would be 
banned. GM had confirmed they allowed workers to decorate the Dundonald plant with 
loyalist insignia and flags on every 12th July. They confirmed 80% of the then workforce 
of 836 at Dundonald in East Belfast came from the local Protestant housing estates. 
This kind of consistent advocacy against discrimination by US shareholders and the local 
political crisis may be considered to be the primary motivating factors for the 
government's review carried out by SACHR and the subsequent strategy and discussion 
papers. As the presentation of the matter had become serious for major business it had to 
be taken seriously by government. The BIS in its information briefs in Washington had 
utilised the example of Fords as a company that had been investigated and endorsed by the 
FEA as an equal opportunity employer. The example was used to demonstrate the 
MacBride Principles offered no more than the current 1976 Act could deliver. The impact 
of these assertions was to focus attention on Fords leading to a boycott of Ford cars in 
America. New York City held over a million shares in Ford with a stock value in 1985 in 
excess of $50m. They began to use their economic muscle. Pressure from Irish-American 
supporters of MacBride and Ford shareholders forced the company to send over an 
American team led by Ford Vice President of Employee and External Affairs, to carry out 
a full appraisal off the workforce. While noting Cooper's threat may put "companies at 
risk of legal action", which mitigated against a proactive approach to equal opportunities, 
Ford, US, stated: 
"The issues in Northern Ireland far transcend the responsibility of any one 
employer or even all employers acting in concert. Industry cannot be the 
primary instrument of political change in any society. International 
companies like Ford can, however, exercise and influence through 
employment policies and practices and make a contribution to the 
communities in which they operate in a way that overcomes some of the 
95 Press coverage Irish News, 11th April 1986 and conversation with author on 
10th April 1986. 
96 Notes of meeting with General Motors, USA, 5,8th February, 1985. 
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disadvantages of minority groups". 97 
The report condemned the St. Patrick Day's incident whereby Catholic workers requesting 
time off were denied while Protestant workers were granted time off to play golf. They 
also expressed their support for adopting a statement of fair employment for NI that 
"adopts the substance of the MacBride Principles while avoiding legal and operational 
obstacles to implementation". 98 Ford's trade union ACTSS declared a previously 
unknown "unequivocal support", adding this "means more than simply avoiding 
discrimination but requires an active commitment to sound personnel policies rather than 
passive compliance with anti-discrimination legislation". They stressed that, "It is our 
belief that any display of inactivity or indifference on this matter might be viewed from 
America as an acceptance of inequality and would not augur well for the future of the 
plant". 
Although supporters of the MacBride campaign asserted that their objective was not 
disinvestment, it was seen as a logical step by opponents of the Principles should patterns 
of inequality within companies remain unchanged. The NIO considered this a "very real 
threat to investment and job opportunity". 99 Unlike Britain and the US, the position of 
supremacy by the prevailing power in NI was much more finely balanced and was one that 
had never been afforded the status of legitimacy found in those countries. Acutely aware 
of this Britain had to counter the campaign. In NI those who supported the campaign 
found themselves subjected to threats of dismissal and disciplinary measures. One public 
example of this was the sacking of Oliver Kearney, from his job as general secretary to the 
Licensed Vintners Association (LVA) in May 1987. He traveled to California and 
submitted evidence to the state assembly in support of a resolution to adopt the MacBride 
Principles on 13th May 1987. This was broadcast by the BBC on 21St May. Speaking 6000 
miles from home in his capacity as a member of the Fair Employment Trust, 
'°° was not 
considered a defence. The LVA made clear to Kearney and in the press this was the only 
reason for his summary dismissal. Kearney believed the move was a result of pressure by 
the NIO on Guinness who in turn pressurised LVA'°' Other executive members of the 
Fair Employment Trust were forced to resign from these positions or face disciplinary 
97 Fair Employment Policies and Practices at the Ford Britain Plant in NI, 15th September 1987. 
98 ACTSS public statement, September 1987. 
99 NIO press statement, 28th April 1987. Irish News, 29th April 1987 report. 
100 Kearney and others established the Fair Employment Trust as a campaign body on 29th October 1985. 
101 Press reports. Irish News, 6th June, 9th June, 22nd June. 1987. 
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action by their employers, the NIHE (see Chapter 5) 
Cooper by comparison was not censured for utilising public funds as a government agent 
to travel the US including California speaking against the MacBride principles. The NIO 
by comparison said "It was not appropriate for a government representative to testify to 
the committee". 102 Cooper on the other hand could. Thus the FEA was allowed to reduce 
its standing to no more than a propaganda vehicle for the NIO. Sean MacBride condemned 
the SDLP for "simply defending the existing system in Northern Ireland". The Secretary 
of State, Tom King MP embarked on a mission to counter the campaign in September 
while Paddy Devlin former SDLP and trade union leader described the Principles as 
"dangerous because they are divisive - they are evil". The Workers Party joined the NIO 
caravan by travelling to Washington and dismissing the Principles as "the opening of 
another front in a vicious terrorist campaign". The monitoring by religion of workforces 
was opposed as an objectionable form of "labelling" and something which would 
"maintain a system of religious differences". They endorsed Cooper's view in opposing 
"labelling of the workforce". 103 ICTU adopted the paradoxical position of not having a 
position, they were neither for nor against the Principles in deference to Protestant trade 
unionists in the North. 
The local press coverage was reflected in the British and American press. MacBride had 
become a vital matter for British foreign policy. Within the space of three years (1985-88) 
Irish-American pressure had forced Britain to review the experience of enforcement, draft 
new legislation and place equal opportunities at the centre of its political agenda, both in 
the US and NI. Future Strategy Options was launched in September 1986 by the Secretary 
of State. This was followed by a new equal opportunity Guide to Policy and Practice in 
October. In April 1987, the NIO produced 40,000 copies for international distribution of a 
brief entitled, Fair Treatment for All. An unabashed piece of propaganda it indicated the 
strength of the MacBride campaign by including a specific booklet within the package 
attacking MacBride. The Principles were dismissed as "counterproductive efforts to 
impose unnecessary employment conditions". 
104 The SDLP and FEA were quoted at 
1°2 NIO 13th May 1987. 
103 Press Reports. Irish News, MacBride, May 1987; Devlin P. Belfast Telegraph, 31St August 1987; Workers 
Party, 15th August 1987,7th December, Irish News; Belfast Telegraph 14th August 1987. ICTU, July 1987. 




length opposing MacBride and supporting the NIO position. The government now 
accepted "there was discrimination in the past", but asserted "Real Progress has been made 
in the past 15 years". 105 Examples cited in support of this included the NI Civil Service, 
Shorts, the Ambulance Service, the NIHE and the Fire Authority. The booklets stress that 
while the FEA is in place to afford protection the "best way to end inequality in 
employment in Northern Ireland is to increase the prospects of jobs by further encouraging 
investment. "' 06 
As more US states and city districts endorsed the principles, the Orange Order complained 
of "an orchestrated attempt to discriminate against Orangemen", by acts of "industrial 
sectarianism". 107 The IRRC reported the campaign was "having a swifter impact in state 
houses and City Councils than anti-apartheid activism did in the 
1970's". 108 By this stage over $2bn of institutional investors control was committed to 
the campaign. One example was Cleveland City Council's ordinance that came into effect 
on 16th March 1992. This prohibited British Petroleum from gaining any new contracts 
and threatened fuel contracts worth £5m. The City demanded BP comply with the 
Principles and redress the religious imbalance in its workforce. 
A joint committee representing both Houses of the US Congress agreed to sponsor 
legislation on defence procurement with specific equal opportunity requirements. It was 
proposed that contractors would have to comply with the much more stringent US 
requirements before a contract was awarded. The late Congressman Joseph Kennedy, with 
reference to Shorts, stated the company would thereby lose its contracts if a specific 
undertaking to "support equal opportunities for Catholics", were not given. He added: 
"I think this action by the US Congress sends a strong message to the hundreds of 
thousands of Catholics in Northern Ireland and their supporters around the world 
that America is ready to use its influence, and the power of its pocket book, to try 
to correct the wrongs that existed for too long in Northern Ireland". 
109 
Kennedy further claimed that, Shorts had agreed to channel $5m of a $60m USAF contract 
to Catholic sub-contractors and agree specific recruitment goals. Targets of 17.5% for 
105 Ibid. Introduction p. 2. 
1°6 Ibid. Fair Employment and the MacBride Principles. 
107 Press report Belfast Telegraph 10th July 1987. 
'°8 Investor Responsibility Research Center, News, 1987. Washington D. C. 
109 IRRC, 'Investors News for Investors', Vol. XV, No. 10, November 1988, pp. 216-217.. 
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Catholic recruits in 1988,25% in 1989, and 33% in 1990 were agreed between Shorts and 
the American Under Secretary of the Army, Michael P. W. Stone. The British Under 
Secretary for State, replied claiming Shorts commitment was limited to using its best 
endeavours only to "ensure full equality of opportunity is adhered to". 110 However this 
attempt to gloss over the agreement was exposed by Stone's Memorandum For the Record 
drafted on the 11th June1988. This confirmed Stone had a 45 minute meeting with Shorts 
managing director, Roy McNulty to discuss, "opportunities that would be provided to 
Catholics in Northern Ireland as a result of the impending legislation to authorise Army 
procurement of Sherpa aircraft". McNulty confirmed Shorts "efforts" would include the 
following two significant actions: 
"1. The company will design and implement what in the United States 
would be termed a 'set aside'. The set-aside would stipulate a volume of 
subcontract work available for employers having predominantly Catholic 
employees'. While no specific amount of work can be set aside until the 
precise amount of the contract is known, a figure of $5m of set-aside was 
discussed. It was understood between us that the set-aside contracts would 
be related directly to Sherpa work or could also be satisfied by 
subcontracting other corporate work of an equivalent dollar magnitude. 
2. Short Bros. presently has a total of approximately 1,000 workers. 
Turnover rate is 5% per year, meaning that the company hires about 350 
new employees per year. As a base line for 1988 the company expects to 
achieve a rate of 17.5% for Catholic new hires in relation to total new hires. 
In 1989 the goals will be to achieve a rate of 25% and in 1990 the goal will 
be to achieve a rate of 33%. "111 
While Short's undertaking may be considered a cynical exercise to achieve a contract it 
remains a significant demonstration that even the most sectarian employer may be forced 
to respond to economic pressure. Any failure to achieve the goals agreed carried the real 
danger of jeopardising future contracts. Secondly, although the FEA and 
NIO were fully 
aware of this agreement no dire warnings or public denouncements were made. 
Conversely no proclamations of a major breakthrough in affirmative action was made 
by 
the FEA either. As silence enveloped the proceedings no educational process or 
discourse 
apart from denial could take place. 
The success of the MacBride campaign lay in its appeal to 
investors who wished to ensure 
11° Hansard, 1st July, 1988, pp. 644,698. 
"I Michael P. W. Stone, Under Secretary of the US Army, `Memorandum 
for the Record' 11th June, 1988. 
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the large sums they controlled were placed in ethical, moral or increasingly ecologically 
sound companies. The onus was therefore on the company to demonstrate its practices 
and purpose was not at odds with the investor's principles. There was little room for a 
halfway house. Therein lay the danger for sectarian employers. The strength of investors 
motivated by some sense of morality meant that to maintain their validity their code must 
not be breached. Such investors, whether it be in opposition to apartheid, sectarianism, or 
the killing of dolphins represented a new and powerful force beyond the control of less 
principled governments. Disinvestment and the potential trauma associated with it was a 
new phenomena for protestant workforces and their ideologues to confront. In such 
situations Britain has sometimes found it necessary to offer a `sacrificial lamb'. 
Sherard Cowper-Coles was the First Secretary for the British Embassy in Washington, 
D. C. For a diplomat he could be surprisingly frank. One such occasion was the 
proceedings on fair employment in the North before the Boston, Massachusetts PRIM 
Board that is composed of institutional investors and state representatives. His purpose 
was to counter representations by MacBride supporters. In his evidence he described 
Protestants as having a lot in common "with the Afrikaaners in South Africa, or the 
Zionists in the kibbutzes in Israel .... they have embarrassed successive British 
governments by proclaiming their loyalty to the Crown and to the Union". Britain's 
involvement with Ireland was summarised as: 
"starting with Henry III, (Britain) has committed many crimes and mistakes 
in Ireland. The biggest and worst mistake of the Westminster Parliament 
was to let Northern Ireland govern itself between 1922 and 1972. That was 
a very, very bad mistake. There was majority rule in Northern Ireland but.. 
the tyranny of the majority, or of majorities, often produces very unfair 
government. 
And what happened in that period was that the Protestant majority 
successively rigged the political system to ensure Protestant dominance. 
They did it by gerrymandering political districts,... twisting the balance of 
the Northern Ireland economy. They did it in housing. They did it in 
virtually every area of public life, and perhaps private life, so that the 
largest slice of the cake went to the Protestant majority". 
112 
He described Britain's continued involvement as "an enlightened, benevolent dictatorship", 
trying to persuade people to "behave like grown-ups", especially 
Protestants, "people 
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whom you and I would probably find it rather difficult to relate to" 
In response to questions on the lack of any concrete progress over the years, Cowper- 
Coles informed the hearing, "I can assure you that privately we have said to the Fair 
Employment Commission that nothing would be more helpful to us over here than to have 
a few early sacrificial lambs. And I'm sure they will move vigorously, ' . 
113 When this 
became public Cooper claimed "I haven't seen him (Cowper-Coles) for a long time. 
Obviously we make our own decisions". 114 In response to Cowper-Coles evidence, Pat 
Doherty from New York's Comptrollers Office, stressed "We are only going to see strong 
enforcement measures taken by the government - given the very serious countervailing 
pressures that exist on the ground not to take strong measures - as long as the US 
investment community demonstrates an interest in this issue". 115 
As Cowper-Coles expressed Britain's resentment at the campaign and his delight that "we 
have actually been able to block very large numbers of MacBride Bills", further evidence 
produced by American research indicated the investment community would be obliged to 
maintain its interest. Ford in particular was cited as an issue that was not going to go away 
although "Ford hoped that it would". 116 In summary Cowper-Coles accused MacBride 
campaigners as "evil people with evil ends", whose activities were "desperately 
depressing" for people like John Hume "who is a saint", when he goes round supporting 
Britain and "has MacBride thrown in his face at every turn". 1 7 At the end of 1991, the 
Secretary of State was still referring to advocates of the MacBride Principles as people 
intent on attacking the interests of working people! 
18 
Conclusions. 
While the 1989 Act marked an improvement on the 1976 Act, the government's data 
demonstrated how little had been achieved and the enormity of the challenge. The 
112 11th October, 1990, Transcript, IRRC, Social Issues Service, USA. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Irish News, 28th November, 1990. 
115 IRRC Social Issues Service, October 1990. 
116 `Religion and Fair Employment in Northern Ireland: Case Studies of 
Six American Companies', IRRC, 
January 1990, Bertsch, K. A. & Voorhes, M. The six companies were Fords, AVX Corp., American Brands, 
Digital Equipment Corp., Nynex Corp., and VF Corporation. 
11 IRRC, l lth October, 1990, USA. 
118 NIO 4th September 1991. 
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integrity of structural inequality had not been undermined and the credibility of achieving 
individual redress was severely damaged. It was now clear however that anti- 
discrimination measures and outcomes would be subjected to external scrutiny and a 
growing level of internal expertise and interest had been generated by the MacBride 
campaign. Policy makers had expressed much energy in the production of analysis and 
proposals. This in itself was positive as by showing the extent of the inequalities created 
an official body of material now existed in the public domain around which an informed 
educational process could take place. This information could thereby inform strategic and 
policy developments by government. The material however effective as a monitoring aid 
was not to be used by government as a justification for strategic use of its economic 
muscle in the direct linking of investment to location and recruitment of Catholics. Quotas 
or reverse discrimination in individual concerns were not to be introduced to correct the 
position of the `underepresented'. Fair participation was to be achieved by having a range 
of more effective procedures for seeking redress. The government concluded that to try 
and pass the burden of inequality from one community to another was to risk a political 
catastrophe. The source of this disaster would be the reaction of the Protestant majority. 
This political conclusion may be considered self evidently right then and in 1972. 
If this view is accepted however it confirms that the limitations of any legislation within 
the context of the powerful religious and political relationships in NI are predetermined by 
the nature of that society. This may be obvious. The governments' public agenda is to give 
all a stake in society and overcome the destructive influence of perceived discriminatory 
nature of the institutions of the state and private employers. The state has produced enough 
material indicating that it regards individual acts of discrimination unacceptable. 
It 
believes "Fair employment is more likely to be achieved in practice 
if it is pursued in ways 
which tend to unite the community rather than divide it along sectarian 
lines". 119 NI's 
employment market reflects the weight of these divisions and the contemporary 
failure to 
change sectarian patterns of inequality. Employers and their workforces 
have shown 
throughout this period that maintaining a position of privileged access 
to and actual 
employment was their priority. This position was complemented 
by their militant activities 
on the shop floor and in public demonstrations resisting 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement or 
external pressure from abroad. 
119 Fair Employment in NI, White Paper, May 1988, p. 12 
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Thus in trying to develop equality measures that will secure an accommodation with 
Catholics and nationalists the British governments' terms of reference have been fixed by 
the very nature of NI. This has produced an insular response that must always falter or be 
renegotiated with the forces of unionism. The premise for unionists is that NI is "their 
country". The starting premise for Catholics is that "it could be theirs also" but not as a 
unionist bastion. The labour market and access to it is thereby regarded by both groups as 
one possessed by Protestants. Some such as Compton have argued this is wholly correct as 
there are fixed proportions for Catholics and Protestants. The exacerbation of this delicate 
balance by being overly fertile and not emigrating in appropriate numbers, Compton 
argued, would disturb the balance. The intervention by Irish American interests reinforced 
the unionist view that the balance is increasingly under threat by external powers. The task 
of the government has been to square this particular unionist circle. Its problem was the 
degree of inequality that showed Catholic males were still two and a half times more likely 
to be unemployed as in 1971. There had been the exposure of the limitations and practices 
of the Fair Employment Act and Agency during the most violent decade in NI's brief 
history. There remained no consensus as to the future nature of NI and its place inside or 
outside the UK. 
The British governments' response has been to focus on the individual's perception of 
achieving "fair treatment for all". By concentrating on this it is hoped that those previously 
disaffected will experience at the point of entry to the labour market fair treatment in the 
knowledge that if they don't they will have access to a complaints procedure with the 
capacity to provide individual redress at some stage. What this ignores however 
is that the 
integrity of the process while being of importance to the individual cannot of 
itself change 
the market place. It is likely that the market will have the capacity to 
facilitate entry by a 
range of professionals and individuals in particular areas such as public administration 
but 
it cannot change its raison d'etre by permitting the wholesale entry of 
those previously 
denied access. For this, to adopt the phrase of Tom King 
MP, for NI would be "to transfer 
hardship from one section of the community to another". 
Or as another British official 
commented much earlier: 
"The accusation against the Government of 
Northern Ireland of religious 
discrimination is somewhat difficult to deal with. In one sense 
it is of 
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course obvious that Northern Ireland is and must be a `Protestant State' 
otherwise it would not have come into being and would certainly not 
continue to exist". 120 
120 Malcolm McDonald's Office, Secretary of State for 
Dominions, 1938, PRO, File XIU123, London. 
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Chapter 9. What's On Offer -A Framework for Peace? 
Introduction. 
Significant developments after the introduction of the 1989 Act are commented on to offer 
some insight into the ongoing impact on local market behaviours during the 1990's of the 
equality agenda, data from the 1991 census and further government partnership initiatives. 
The merit principle is examined with reference to fresh research carried out by SACHR in 
1997 into developments on employment equality. This leads into the final chapter that 
summarises the conclusions of this work. 
Partnership for Equality. 
The Policy Studies Unit carried out a further review of good employment practices for 
SACHR in 1996. Their survey of employers demonstrated two-thirds of employers in NI 
were unaware of the voluntary Guide to Manpower Policy and Practice. Less than one in 
ten had any written statements on equality for employees and more than 85% reported 
their personnel recruitment and training policies and practices had remained largely 
unchanged since 1976. This position was the same as in 1987 when the last workplace 
survey had been conducted. The various Acts had not impacted on the behaviour of 
employers to any significant degree. ' Aggrieved individuals experienced a high drop out 
rate in pursuing complaints. The reasons they gave were inadequate support from the FEC, 
an inordinate length of time to conduct an investigation, 3 to 4 years, a lack of 
transparency by the FEC with a "major weakness in the fair employment machinery" a 
constant factor. 2 The PSI survey was carried out in January 1996, i. e. after the 
first IRA 
cease-fire and was directed at those who had actually made complaints. 
The respondents 
were 59% Catholic and 33% Protestant. 1744 questionnaires were sent out, the usable 
return rate was 702 or 41%. An earlier Social Attitudes Survey3 cited 
by the PSI team had 
found that over the previous ten years, 8% of the population claimed 
to have suffered 
personal discrimination at work due to their religion. Miller considered 
this would equate 
1 Yarrow, Stella. & Steele, Jane. `Religion and Political Discrimination in the 
Workplace, Seeking Justice in 
NI', PSI, No. 836,1997; FEC Annual Review 1994-95, p-29- 
2 Ibid. Chapter. 4, p. 49. Chapter 7, p. xv. 
3 Miller, R. Queen's University Belfast, 1994. 
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to 80,000 people. 4 The number of complaints registered annually with the FEC by 
comparison averaged 148. 5 
The impact of the equality agenda remains limited. The strategy of fair participation and 
the emphasis on the merit principle had not made inroads into the inherent structural 
inequalities. The unchanging circumstance that Catholics are disproportionately 
represented among the unemployed was again confirmed by unemployment data from the 
1991 census and interim official research confirmed this remained approximately 2.5 
times to almost two times for Catholic males and females respectively. The 1987 SACHR 
report had called for government to reduce this differential within five years from two and 
a half times to one and a half times. This goal was rejected. SACHR'S 1997 report 
considered that Catholic representation was increasing in the expanding activities of 
administration, management, professional and sales. However the overall ratio of 
unemployed claimants to vacancies was 22.6: 1. This compares to an UK average of 9.6.6 
Catholics with qualifications at every level remained twice as likely to be unemployed as 
Protestants. Research by Tomlinson and Sheehan reported in the same SACHR volume, 
into the long term unemployed in West Belfast found they had a higher than average 
educational attainment in this category. Once unemployed Catholic males were much 
more likely to be unemployed for five years or more. 71 per cent of Catholics surveyed 
stated they would not work in security-related occupations as compared to 21% of 
Protestants in the survey. Short-term work programmes - ACE now called CWP - 
provided 29,500 jobs. 7 In 1994 government ministers publicly linked increased provision 
and access to such employment with corresponding reductions in security expenditure. 
Those who wished to provide such schemes had to be security vetted as part of the 
strategy to undermine republican community groups by denying or withdrawing funds. 
Tomlinson in groundbreaking research demonstrated the degree of economic subvention 
without which the NI economy would simply collapse. 
8 Since 1990 this has averaged £3.5 
billion or one half of NI's total expenditure programme. Around 62% of this was spent on 
4 Miller, R. 1996, pp. 59-60, op. cit. Ibid. pp. 9-10 PSI, `Public Opinion on Fair 
Employment' SACHR 1997, 
Vol. 1I1-, pp. 51-85. 
5 Authors analysis of reported figures in FEC Annual Reports. 
6 PPRU, 1995, op. cit Gillespie, N. `Employment, Unemployment, and 
Equality of Opportunity', Chapter 
One. pp. 1-5, Vol . 11, SACHR, 
1997. 
7 Tomlinson, M. & Sheehan, M. SACHR 1997, Vol. 11, Chapter 3, pp. 53-54, 
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health, education and welfare. Another £1 billion was spent on prisons, security and courts. 
Tomlinson estimated that since 1969 maintaining a low-level war economy has cost 
Britain at least £23.5 billion. The police force required to manage a peaceful state of 
affairs was estimated to be 23% of its current size. This would be approximately 3,750 
employees including civilian staff. The impact of such a reduction on the consumer 
industry and employment opportunities for Protestants would be dramatic. It is likely that 
should the peace process continue Britain would seek to manage this over several decades 
rather than a short sharp approach. 9 It is also likely that the degree of subvention will be 
challenged as the process of devolution develops by other regions of the UK. In 1991 the 
Government introduced the Targeting Social Need initiative. The stated policy objective 
was to: 
"eradicate the significant inequalities which persist in the social 
and economic conditions experienced by Protestants and Catholics. 
By identifying where the highest levels of disadvantage and 
deprivation exist, by analysing the precise extent to which their 
whole range of policies has a differential impact on each side of the 
community and by targeting the programmes and resources much 
more sharply on those areas suffering the highest levels of social 
and economic disadvantage, the Government are genuinely and 
constantly seeking to remove differentials and rectify yg fy injustices". 
TSN stemmed from an internal analysis in the NI civil service that "on all major social and 
economic indicators, Catholics are worse off than Protestants". 11 Policy Appraisal and Fair 
Treatment (PAFT) followed this in 1994. This required government departments and 
`Next Step' agencies to proactively seek to secure the elimination of discrimination by 
promoting fair treatment in implementing and developing policy. However an analysis by 
Quirk and McLaughlin on behalf of SACHR concluded there was: 
"little evidence that TSN, as it was initially framed politically, has had a 
substantial influence on the spending and decision-making departments. 
This is not surprising, given the reluctance of most departments to monitor 
or research expenditure programmes and policies in terms of their impacts 
on the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland". 
12 
This stands in marked contrast to former secretary of state, Peter Brooke, that TSN was to 
8 Tomlinson, M. International Policy Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 69-74, and, ' 25 Years On: the 
Costs of War and the Dividends of Peace', West Belfast Economic Forum, 8th August 
1984. 
9 The Patten Report on policing and reforming the RUC suggests a figure of around 7,500. 
'o Lord Belstead, House of Lords, 13th February 1992. 
" Internal memorandum cited in Chapter 7, p. 156, SACHR Vo1. II, Quirk 
P, & McLaughlin E. 
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be the ``third public expenditure priority". 13 The authors noted their research received the 
underwhelming support or passive opposition of the civil service despite being carried out 
for SACHR. The indications remain that a cultural leap has not been as yet made by those 
who are after all part of a wider cultural context that sees loyalty to the union and their 
Protestant birthright as more deserving of support. Quirk and McLaughlin concluded that 
"TSN has not been a public expenditure priority - rather it is a principle awaiting 
definition, operationalisation and implementation". 14 In short it largely remains the 
property of public relations and packaging. 
NI local regional economy has endured some of the highest and sustained unemployment 
rates in the UK. The various regional employment promotion initiatives have essentially 
worked hard to stand still. The greatest source of employment was the rapidly expanded 
public sector under Direct Rule. In the 1990's the DED echoed earlier comments by Isles 
and Cuthbert 40 years earlier in their assessment of the local economy's deficiencies. The 
lack of an enterprise tradition, low levels of managerial and training competence, 
peripheral location, declining manufacturing sector and too great a dependency on the 
public sector for direct employment and a host of grants. In short the economy was and 
remained wholly dependant on government subvention to maintain current standards of 
living which unionists now stress is a primary reason for dismissing unity with Ireland. 
Within the context of a public sector driven economy it appears the Catholic middle class 
has been able to grow. Vani K. Borooah (SACHR) considered that while the impact of the 
"troubles" has been small in comparison to the lack of competitiveness the growth of the 
public sector has enabled the development of dual-earner households to skew economic 
rewards to the middle class. 15 This in itself may give rise to a shift in aspirations 
between 
the Catholic working and middle class whereby the SDLP and Sinn 
Fein may find the 
class nature of their respective bases accentuated. Unity may 
become a very long term and 
soft aspiration for Catholics while in poorer rural regions or working class areas 
bereft of 
employment opportunities see it as a more tangible and meaningful aspiration. 
How this 
tension plays itself out remains to be seen. 
Few consider the local economy can sustain itself without 
the British subvention. Many 
12 Ibid., see pp. 181-83. 
13 CCRU Equality Review Conference, 1991. 
14 SACHR Vol. 11, p. 153-185, p. 183. 
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consider a sustained peace process can lead to increased job opportunities. 16 The challenge 
is to move from an economy where significant numbers are engaged in the pay of policing 
and controlling a significant minority to an economy where short-term policies of 
economic and political containment are replaced by aspirations to provide for the 
betterment of all. To achieve this the historical weight and contemporary impact of 
structural economic discrimination must be challenged and overcome. " It may be that the 
single European market inexorably drives the two economies of Ireland into a common 
strategic purpose before any political settlement out of necessity and pursuit of greater 
rewards. Or it may be that the political framework remains an iron grip that sustains the 
status quo. 
The Peace Agreement and Merit. 
The terms of this status quo however now formally include the dimension of the Irish 
government, a new local elected Assembly and an IRA cease-fire under the April 1998 
Belfast Agreement. 18 The fresh initiatives proposed for the economy and fair employment 
in the Peace Agreement were outlined in the White Paper, Partnership for Equality. 19 
The latter referred to a range of measures aimed at combating unemployment and 
progressively eliminating the differential in unemployment rates between the two 
communities by targeting "groups and areas objectively defined as being in greatest need, 
irrespective of community background". 20 Former Secretary of State, Mo Mowlam, 
refers in her introduction to the general blight of unemployment and its correlation with 
disadvantage. She states the government is: 
"opposed to discrimination between unemployed people on the basis of 
their community background ..... we propose to put 
in place a new 
statutory framework requiring the public sector to promote equality of 
opportunity. This legislation would require public sector bodies in Northern 
Ireland to ensure that, wherever possible, public policies and functions are 
is Ibid. Vani K Borooah. SACHR Vol. 11, pp. 273-91, p. 278-80. 
16 Munck, R., Hamilton, D. `Politics the Economy and Peace in NI', Chapter 7, in Rethinking Northern 
Ireland, Miller, D. ed. Longman 1998. NIEC Through Peace to Prosperity, Paper 
3, April 1995 and 
Economic Implications of Peace and Political Stability for NI, Paper 4, June 
1995. 
17 See Smith, D. J., & Chambers, G. Inequality in NI, Clarendon Press, Oxford Univ. Press 1991. 
18 The Belfast Agreement: An Agreement Reached at the Multi-Party Talks on Northern Ireland, April 1998, 
Cm 3883, HMSO. 
19 Partnership for Equality, The Government's proposals for future legislation and policies on Employment 
Equality in Northern Ireland, March 1998, Cm 3890 HMSO. 
20 Ibid. Targeting Social Need., p. 28. 
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carried out with due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity in those areas covered by the Policy Appraisal and Fair Treatment (PAFT) 
"21 guidelines. 
A new Equality Commission to discharge the functions of the FEC, EOC, Commission for 
Racial Equality and Disability Council was proposed. These in turn were linked to the 
wider British agenda of devolution and the introduction of a Human Rights Act. The 
Secretary of State declared the government's objective was to promote a "fair society, 
whether government is by Direct Rule, as now, or by agreed new arrangements. Our 
proposals are aimed at that, and that alone". 22 Adam Ingram stated in the parliamentary 
debates on a new Fair Employment and Treatment Order (1998), the objective of the 
legislation was also a moral one. In this assertion he unknowingly repeated the sentiments 
of Labour MP, Stan Orme (Minister of State for NI) in 1976 on the second reading of the 
Fair Employment Bill when he declared the principal objective of the Bill, was, 
"essentially a moral one .., the activities of the FEA would be primarily educational in 
nature". 23 The underlying principles were the same as the 1980's debate, merit and fair 
participation. 
"There is no question of reverse discrimination, quotas or tampering with the 
merit principle"; equality of opportunity "must be planned for worked for, like 
other business objectives. "24 
The market has primacy over the moral principle. The Act contained no challenge to the 
peculiar character of the NI market. The Draft Order defined "affirmative action", as 
action "designed to secure fair participation in employment by members of the Protestant, 
or members of the Roman Catholic community", by adopting practices to encourage such 
participation and to modify or have practices abandoned that restrict or discourage such 
participation". 25 The terms and concepts of redistribution or reversal of employment 
opportunities were absent. While recognising the 1989 Act improved on the 1976 Act, 
it 
was still fundamentally flawed. Concepts such as affirmative action, 
fair participation, 
merit and equality of opportunity within the Act were seen as vague and confusing. 
Several authors noted that the government had rejected any concept of positive action or 
21 Ibid., p. 4-5. 
22 Ibid., p5. 
23 Official Report, House of Commons, 16th Feb., 1976, Vol. 905, cols. 989-1070. 
24 Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, 10 December 1998. 
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reverse discrimination or the use of legislation to expressly correct serious imbalances in a 
workforce. In his contribution McCrudden challenged the concepts of `merit' and the 
`merit principle'. He saw them as "competing conceptions of the concept of merit which 
usually point in different, and sometimes incompatible, public policy directions". 26 
McCrudden argued these matters cannot be divorced from issues of scarce resources, the 
role of the state, negative and positive conceptions of merit; the relationships between 
merit and virtue and merit and equality of opportunity. 
In short, the social and political context of `merit' will inform the value and attributes 
associated with the concept and its application. A situation of scarcity, i. e. few permanent 
employment opportunities in a structured environment with high unemployment 
differentials, as in NI, could impose severe constraints on the potential opportunities 
associated with merit. The practical implementation of the concept - merit - could simply 
be a mechanism to sustain inequality by failing to challenge or reverse the historical and 
contemporary impact of discrimination. The advocates of the concept realise in the context 
of NI that `merits' worth is its value as an aspirational objective. The pursuit of the future, 
as of now -a new Act, a new peace agreement, a new political structure etc., - merits 
worth is in its potential for fresh recruits within a competitive market. This ignores the fact 
however that markets are by definition, competitive and highly unequal starting and 
finishing points. The economy of NI is and always has been a dependant economy wholly 
reliant on British direct and indirect subventions. Many have recorded its inability to 
sustain itself and to spend above what it generates. The state has not been a passive 
bystander allowing merit to take its course. It has directly intervened in the development 
of the North's infrastructure, location of business and development of public services. It 
did not intervene to ensure merit or fair participation were more than conceptual 
frameworks that sought to mitigate access to the market place as opposed to a 
force to 
change it. Their permissible force or context was and remains a society were more than 
twenty years of fair employment legislation have made no material change 
to the 
fundamental differentials in employment opportunities between Catholic and 
Protestant. 
Equality legislation has existed since partition in 1921. The result 
has not been a product 
25 The Fair Employment and Treatment (NI) Order 1998, HMSO. The 
1997 SACHR reports explored these 
concepts in some detail. Employment Equality in Northern 
Ireland, Vols. I-III, {series ed. }, McLaughlin, E. 
1997. 
26 SACHR, Vol. I, Chapter Two, McCrudden, C. "The Merit Principle", and 
Fair Employment in Northern 
Ireland, p. 27, pp. 27-46. 
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of merit but a history of covert and overt inequality that have exacerbated and reflected 
fundamental schisms in this society. 27 
Conclusion. 
As McCrudden argues, to accept merit as a given principle, out of context in legislation, is 
to assume the state and other employers will always act in a fair manner. Ipso facto this 
has patently not been the case. Phrases such as "fair participation", are meaningless and 
become no more than an opportunity to avoid the harder edge of quotas and overt policies 
to reverse inequalities at a strategic level. There is no debate or initiative by government 
on the concept of redistribution and its moral grounds. In this context merit then, sees all 
things as equal, and the state is committed to intervene to ensure this is indeed the case- at 
least at the point of entry to the employment market. The concept of merit is not taken a 
stage further to commit the state to intervene on behalf of those who have suffered a 
strategic and historical absence of merit, to directly benefit from a positive action 
programme to restore "merit" to a state of equilibrium. This equal market has of course 
never existed but in conceptual and legal terms any endeavour to exercise a redistributive 
process is absent. Merit then becomes a "background constraint"28 denying the possibility 
of affirmative action. The conceptual framework clouds the debate by linking the 
legislation to a philosophical view of a market economy that has never existed. The state 
and its agents can thereby promote propaganda rather than results and shunt any 
fundamental structural changes to the inherently sectarian nature of the local market into 
the sidings. This is containment. 
Within these parameters the challenge to the British State is to secure at the very least the 
passive acquiescence of a significant Catholic minority in NI that the British government 
and the executive institutions it will introduce to restore devolved government will play 
according to the rules. The closest parallel is more South Africa than America or the rest 
of Britain. For as with the black majority in South Africa the Catholic minority 
in NI has 
the capacity to destroy any accommodation that is not accepted as 
legitimate. The 
inequalities that Western liberal thought regards as essential to the social cohesion of 
society and legitimate rewards of enterprise are to 
be seen to be derived from an 
27 See Graham, D. 'NI: Employment and the Law', Irish Studies Review, Vol. 6. No. 2 1998.; 
Tomlinson, M. 
IPR 1995, NIEC reports. 
28 Mcrudden, C. SACHR Vol. I., Chapter Two, p. 42, (1997). 
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inheritance and distribution of wealth, power and privilege that is deemed as reasonable 
and acceptable. It is the management of this process that presents difficulties and 
sometimes as we have seen leads to violent protest. A debate that focuses on jurisprudence 
is no more than an intellectual and realpolitik struggle over the art of the possible within a 
predetermined intellectual outcome which takes as given the confines of western 
parliamentary democracies and privileges. The historic accommodation that Cameron 
sought in 1969 is one now fully supported by Irish and British governments. The nature of 
NI however precludes a fundamental reconciliation along such broad lines because the 
inequalities in terms of power, privilege and employment outcome have been the core of 
its very existence. This is the essence and fibre of society in NI. 
While the British government's review of legislation within the context of the peace 
process will lead to a range of further statutory obligations to promote equality of 
opportunity, it has stated, it "will not differentiate between Protestant and Catholic 
unemployed in the implementation of its policies". Instead it hopes that its general 
economic and social policies will have the effect, "over time, of eroding the 
unemployment differential". 29 There are however no economic indicators that point to 
increased economic opportunities or turnover to drive this objective forward. Rather 
"over 
time", simply indicates this will be the problem for future generations. 
The evidence 
presented in the American experience does not lend weight to the efficacy of 
the moral 
weight of merit as a power for change in itself. 
29 Partnership for Equality, p48, March 1998, Cm 3890 
HMSO. 
302 
CHAPTER 10. FEARING EQUALITY. 
Conclusions. 
This thesis undertook to demonstrate the depth and extent of underlying inequalities in 
employment produced by the creation of a sectarian state - Stormont. Chapter Two 
provided the historical context of this development and outlined the administrative and 
policy measures taken to secure this vision. In chapter three a comparative history, with 
reference to the American equal opportunity practices was provided. As the American 
model was drawn on by those commissioned to draft proposals for NI their strength and 
outcome are highly relevant in terms of demonstrating what was needed in a much larger 
society with greater opportunities and wealth to achieve progress. Yet despite this much 
more forceful approach the material benefit to working class blacks has proven to be 
relatively slight. This offered an incisive lesson for those engaged in promoting a Fair 
Employment Act that was discounted in critical areas. 
The British government declined to adopt affirmative action in a class or individual sense 
either in legislative terms or by specifying that grant aid or investment should be directly 
linked to reversing patterns of inequality. It has been argued that this singular failure in a 
society at war sustained significant patterns of inequality, and at the very least presented 
no challenge at all to the prevailing Protestant culture in employment. The opportunity to 
reverse these contemporary and historical inequalities over three decades was avoided. 
This view has been supported by reference to employment patterns and recruitment 
practices in significant areas of public and private sector employment. The examples 
studied included Shorts and Harland & Wolff that have been at the epicentre of loyalist 
resistance to any challenge to Protestant hegemony. The range and depth of examples 
given demonstrates that the culture of exclusiveness and sense of right in this purpose is 
deeply and popularly held. 
While chapter five acknowledges the material progress made 
in terms of the physical 
environment and social housing the case studies presented 
indicated both the potential for 
and actual practices of significant acts of discrimination and a 
failure to carry out its 
specific strategic policy mandate with reference to equality. 
A blinkered or "religiously 
blind" approach may have been comfortable for 
NIHE officers and executives but this 
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simply prevented any capacity to see the impact of resource allocation and strategic 
direction on the community. The research by Hillyard and the PSI raised fundamental 
questions as to the absence of any coherent investment and repair strategy that takes direct 
cognizance of the ability to change tenure by leaving social housing, historical investment 
decisions, spatial mobility and segregation. The inability of a non-accountable quango to 
be independent or engage residents in critical decision making areas that were politically 
driven is illustrated by reference to two international cause celebre's in the housing world, 
Divis and Unity Flats and the response to military planning. 
The assessment of the modem equalities enforcement agency - the FEA - response to this 
has been shown to be wholly inadequate in chapter seven. A conclusion supported by 
several independent reviews and finally accepted by the British government. It has been 
demonstrated that the British government through such agencies and at a wider political 
level has been content to maintain the status quo and leave major inequalities 
unchallenged in the public and private sector. The evidence of the unchanging strength of 
employment patterns and specific case studies presented make this conclusion 
overwhelming. The comments on the internal struggles within the FEA while exposing a 
range of failures and shortcomings by the British government and its agencies in the 
conduct of investigations or their emasculation also serves to demonstrate how closely 
fought any struggle on this "narrow ground" can and will be. The FEA's lack of vigour in 
prosecuting the law in favour of adopting a secretive attitude to investigations that put the 
interests of the employer first has been exemplified. Access to data on inequality as a 
result was restricted or prevented thereby ensuring that any public debate on equality 
became ad hoc subject to some revelation or incident. It has been argued this was an 
abrogation of responsibility motivated by a desire to appease on the whole a unionist 
status quo. This would not have changed without the intervention of Irish-American 
pressure in the form of the MacBride Principles and that this campaign directly led to the 
creation of a new Act and legitimised equality of opportunity in the religious sense 
entering a broader public arena. The campaign obliged the British government to 
develop 
a more sophisticated approach that also accepted the Irish-American 
interest was 
legitimate. This became a much broader policy matter with the interventions of 
former 
President Clinton and the Irish American lobby. Without the 
MacBride Principles 
Campaign the priority given to policy development in equality would 
have remained low 
and matters such as compulsory monitoring, certificates of practice 
for employers and the 
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development of a broader agenda such as TSN, PAFT are highly unlikely to have 
occurred. The MacBride Campaign by linking investment to ethics for the first time in NI 
provided a vital external driver for change and, of equal importance presented to 
Protestant workers a force beyond theirs or the British government's direct control. 
The wider more recent political developments embraced by the Peace Process reinforce 
the underlying principle of the thesis that legislative enforcement agencies- however 
efficient- do not offer solutions in themselves. Rather that as part of a wider solution they 
can reflect the aspirations, ethos and goals of a society. However neither the reorganisation 
of the enforcement agencies into one body nor the Assembly's Equality Unit have any 
aspirations that go beyond seeking to contain the pursuit of equality to the exact point of 
entry to the labour market. This is to be assessed and measured by an evaluation against 
the concepts of "merit" and "fair participation". As stated at the outset, NI's peculiar 
labour market already has a built in differential that means access to this market will 
always weigh heavily in favour of those that created it. Indeed there is no evidence at all 
of any systematic programme with specific targets to reverse unemployment differentials 
that are two to two and a half times against Catholics. Such an option as suggested by 
SACHR in 1987 would require a sea change not simply in the role and purpose of 
enforcement agencies but in the aspirations, goals and ethos of a whole society. Nor are 
their any proposals or legislative mechanisms that will oblige sectarian employers to 
deliberately and radically alter the composition of their workforce. As McKay's' seminal 
work Northern Protestants illustrates for Protestants this would indeed be another world. 
Protestants as a group have no material interest whatsoever in such an agenda. The 
primary difference is the capacity of several organisations to monitor the difference. One 
of the questions raised by FEA staff in this work was, "quis custodiat ipos custodes". Its 
resonance remains a powerful one. 
Republicans placed the equality agenda at the centre of their negotiations with the British 
government. The Belfast Agreement expressly affirmed, "the right to equal opportunity in 
all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity, 
alongside, "the right to freedom from sectarian harassment". 
2 In order to promote these 
liberties new institutions that include a Human Rights Commission and a unified equal 
1 McKay, Susan. Northern Protestants, An Unsettled People, Blackstaff Press Belfast, 2000. 
2 The Belfast Agreement, p. 16, April 1998. 
305 
opportunity body under a new statutory framework were proposed. 3 The New Labour 
government has therefore accepted that if any accommodation is to be achieved access to 
the means of labour must not wilfully be denied; protection against the invasion of others, 
including the state must be provided; and by these means, access to the means of life and 
their quiet enjoyment will be secured. 
A fundamental fear for unionists however is that a degree of greater egalitarianism in 
terms of equal access to the employment market could very well be at their expense. It is 
for this precise reason that Britain will not introduce quotas or impose any redress that 
would be widely detrimental to Protestants. To do so would oblige too many historical and 
contemporary wrongs to be corrected thereby fracturing any ability to manage the process 
which the vague concept of "fair participation", permits. It also ensures the perception of 
sustaining a "Protestant Heritage", is not undermined within unionism as they seek to 
maintain their dominance. Something explicitly recognised by Peter Mandelson, former 
Secretary of State, in his statement that the post agreement talks between Sinn Fein and 
David Trimble's unionists in November 1999 offered unionists the "opportunity to control 
their own and NI's destiny". 4 The formal introduction of a foreign power to the equation 
in the form of Ireland generated more hostility and undiminished suspicion. The fact some 
unionists and the British prime minister see the Agreement as securing the union while 
Sinn Fein see it as the thin edge of the wedge only confirms the strength and disparity of 
competing visions. Possessive Protestantism does not wish to be the author of its own 
demise. Can the circle be squared? 
The challenge for the 21 st century will be whether Britain and now Ireland will be allowed 
to settle for a Peace Agreement as solution that appears strikingly colonial, while the 
"locals" endeavour to square the unionist circle. Inequalities, conflict and the struggle 
for 
domination have been the prevailing characteristics of NI. Those most directly effected 
have been the respective Catholic and Protestant working classes. 
From their ranks have 
also been drawn the primary protagonists, foot soldiers and victims. 
It is also inevitable 
that their overt and active support is essential in sustaining any 
long-term solution. Some 
elements of the Protestant para-military forces have 
declared their desire for change but 
wholly within the context of NI. 
3 partnership for Equality, March 1998, HMSO, Cm 3890. The Human Rights 
Act is now in force. 
4 Guardian, press and media interviews 20th November 
1999. 
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The short-term expediency of British governments in partitioning Ireland ensured the 
dangerous mix of anti-colonial freedom struggles, nationalism, religion and territorial 
claims continued to simmer. The potential for any accommodation, at least with the 
Catholic middle and professional classes, were dashed by the sectarian geo-political 
economic objectives of the Stormont regime. Britain exacerbated the conflict by enabling 
Stormont to rule by imposition of draconian powers and a systematic denial of civil 
liberties enjoyed in other parts of Britain. The artificial imposition of borders derived from 
a crude religious apportionment created a society that saw itself under siege. The mentality 
of Protestants to "hold what we maintain", was intensified by the nationalist rejection of 
the new state and the claim of unfinished business by the Free State. A running suspicion 
as to the duplicity of British government and the desire to provide economic and political 
patronage to `one's own' completed a heady mix. 
Catholics in turn found themselves under internal siege by a state they initially refused to 
recognise and which they have yet to afford any full legitimacy. Republicans have already 
declared they regard the latest Assembly as only a staging post in the struggle to finally 
remove Britain. Stormont was regarded as a state created by force of arms that imprisoned 
them within its borders as reluctant guests and saw Catholics as uniformly nationalists not 
to be trusted or allowed any semblance of power or influence. Given frequent public 
expression by unionists to keep Catholics in their place this approach won few Catholic 
supporters. Stormont's colonial perspective supported by an ideology of supremacy, 
racism and daily prejudice loaned itself to sustaining an authoritarian social order where 
aggressive, hostile actions by the state and its agents found popular sanction among 
Protestants. British justice found its own peculiar criminal deviance in the North - trial 
without jury, internment, sanctioned torture, assassination and terror of its enemies. 
5 Or as 
Brigadier Kitson's oft quoted dictum proclaimed, "the law should be used as 
just another 
weapon in the government's arsenal, and in this case it becomes 
little more than a 
propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public". 
6 
Having applied a wide range of these policies since partition 
in support of unionism, 
5 See Hillyard, P. `Political and Social Dimensions of Emergency Law 
in NI', in Justice Under Fire, pp. 191- 
212 and Jennings, Anthony. ed. Justice Under Fire, the 
Abuse of Civil Liberties in Ireland, 1990 Pluto Press. 
6 Faligot, Roger. Britain's Military Strategy in Ireland - The Kitson Experiment, 
Zed/Brandon 1983. 
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Britain now appears to have accepted that greater sophistication is required to achieve an 
accommodation with nationalists and possibly republicans. The SDLP was a key target. 
When attempts to divide the SDLP from Sinn Fein under the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement 
failed, the government pursued a joint policy of securing the interests of the professional 
Catholic classes while keeping Sinn Fein and militant republicanism on board. The result 
of two IRA cease-fires (August 1994 and 1998) and subsequent loyalist ones have 
essentially remained intact. Both these initiatives have involved the Irish Government and 
endeavoured to embrace all local parties including loyalist para-militaries. Previously seen 
as "simply criminals"7 by successive British governments, the `men of violence', and their 
respective political prisoners became the key to at least the end of violence on the streets, 
if not a long term political accommodation. In July 2000 the last 86 republican and loyalist 
prisoners left the Maze or Long Kesh harbouring eight prisoners guarded by 850 prison 
staff. 
As the issue of equality became a central feature of the Good Friday Agreement the British 
government sought to reinforce the framework for an accommodation within NI. The 
Agreement may indeed offer opportunities for the Catholic middle class to separate 
themselves out from their more militant nationalist brethern. The formal creation of the 
new Assembly or Power Sharing Executive for NI prior to any IRA disarmament with 
Sinn Fein taking ministerial posts in education and health on 2nd December 1999, was a 
highly symbolic Act. It is one riven with qualifications that may yet unravel to the 
detriment of a permanent peace. Having collapsed in April 2000 and resurrected in June 
2000, to be suspended and restarted in 2001 over Trimble's demands for decommissioning 
by the IRA, this stop-start approach does not inspire confidence in the ability of local 
political parties to create a common agenda. The proposals for the RUC if implemented 
will offer a serious political and practical hurdle - will Catholics be persuaded to 
join in 
significant numbers, will unionists who regard the RUC as "their police 
force" accept such 
a change as inevitable? Do such changes invalidate this aspect of this thesis? 
While it is 
too early to evaluate the impact of proposals that remain to 
be implemented several points 
can be made that are relevant. 
The Assembly will not exercise power over the exchequer, security or 
foreign relations. It 
7 James Prior MP Secretary of State, 28th June 1983, NIO Press statement. 
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therefore does not have the economic power - nor the desire as yet - to intervene directly 
and ensure public investment in employment makes a fundamental difference to the 
overwhelming culture and character of employment in NI. The case studies presented 
show the depth of feeling that have led to violence if what is regarded as militant 
Protestant's narrow ground is trodden upon on the shop floor. They also show how 
political expediency and plain incompetence left a trail of lost opportunity and inequality 
to the detriment of both individuals and broader educational or cultural progress on the 
merits or lack of in the promotion of equality of opportunity. The need for open 
engagement on the actual employment practices by critical employers simply foundered 
on an employers veto. Nationalists with the memory of the tumultuous days of the 1985 
Anglo-Irish Agreement alongside the tortuous negotiations in establishing the Assembly 
have much evidence to argue a political veto is still in place. 
New Labour, new politics. 
New Labour has expended a reasonable degree of energy in pursuit of a resolution to 
Britain's longest running internal war since coming to power in 1997. The Good Friday 
Agreement reflected the multi-party aspirations with the Irish and British governments in 
partnership to achieve a settlement. The tortuous negotiations over the detail of its 
implementation have kept the cease-fires in place although SF formally rejected unionist 
attempts to deny them executive seats on the new Assembly for NI. The IRA have made it 
plain they do not accept decommissioning is linked to the role of SF and they will not 
hand over their arsenal in any case. They do however endorse the Good Friday Agreement 
and their decision to allow inspection of specified bunkers was a step few considered 
possible. A return on this political investment by republicans is now expected. 
The Agreement sought to address constitutional issues, the creation of democratic 
institutions in NI; joint interlocking governmental councils, policing and justice, prisoners, 
decommissioning and the provision of rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity. The 
"Declaration of Support", signed by all the participants expressed their 
belief, "that the 
agreement we have negotiated offers a truly historic opportunity 
for a new beginning". A 
commitment was given to "partnership, equality and mutual respect", as the 
basis of 
relationships alongside a "total and absolute commitment to exclusively 
democratic and 
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peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues". 
On the constitution this meant all accepting "the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely 
exercised by a majority of the people of NI with regard to its status, whether they prefer to 
continue to support the union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland". For 
unionists and Blair this copper fastened the union. Republicans appear to have considered 
that in the very long term demographic changes will lead to a voluntary vote for union 
with the rest of Ireland and in the mean time there existed the opportunity to persuade 
unionists to give their consent. For Britain's part the position reflects the fact that any 
political or economic interests can be secured regardless of any border in partnership with 
Ireland. The changed world position that has left America as the world's primary 
superpower also deprived Britain of any military strategic interest in terms of the North's 
link in NATO's radar and monitoring systems. It also reflected the broader devolution 
developments within the UK with the creation of Scottish and Welsh Assemblies. In short, 
Ireland was no longer perceived to be in an emotional or rational sense the source of any 
political threat to the stability of the North or Britain. The possibility of an All Ireland 
Socialist Republic- in the sense advocated in the 1920's or 1960's and 1970's, with the 
possibility of a Soviet Union playing some ill defined role has gone. 8 As an EEC partner, 
Ireland is also in the same economic market - the threat of it becoming an equivalent to 
Cuba in the British Isles is no longer a fantasy of even the most demented British 
chauvinist. 
To provide for some form of democratic and accountable institutions - the Agreement 
proposed a democratically elected Assembly capable of exercising executive and 
legislative authority. Safeguards would be introduced to ensure the "rights and interests of 
all sides of the community", are protected. It is anticipated these safeguards will act to 
prevent a resurrection of the sectarian Stormont regime. Apart from a new Human Rights 
Commission and a new Equality institution, the Assembly structure required the allocation 
of chairs, ministers and committee membership in accordance with party strengths; a 
bar 
on infringing on any Bill of Rights or the work of the Human Rights Commission and 
decision making arrangements to ensure cross-community support was sought 
by 
requiring a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, 
including at least 
8 Reed, David. Ireland - The Key to The British Revolution, 
Larkin Publications, 1984. 
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40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting. (Strand One, 
the Agreement) Taxation and defence are excluded from the remit. The Assembly election 
results in July 1998 saw Sinn Fein obtain 18 seats, the SDLP 24, the UUP 28 and the DUP 
20. Others made up the rest of the 108 seats. Sinn Fein obtained the highest number of first 
preference voters. This democratic expression however led to the Agreement's most 
serious crisis. The result effectively secured SF two ministerial seats to govern the 
proposed ten departments. Trimble of the UUP, the DUP and the British government 
blocked this by demanding the IRA decommission before they be allowed to take their 
seats at the table with Trimble. Sinn Fein formally rejected this ploy (April 1999) and 
criticised the British for endeavouring to appease the unionists at the expense of the peace 
process and in breach of the Agreement. SF had made it clear in late 1994 and early 1995 
when Britain refused to recognise their electoral mandate that "decommissioning IRA 
weapons is, at best, a stalling tactic and, at worst, an attempt to create a situation of crisis 
in the peace process around the issue". 9 As stated above the Assembly with Sinn Fein 
present was formally instituted on 2nd December 1999. Is this the key to fundamental 
reforms, is it enough to alter patterns of inequality within NI? Recent reviews and debate 
suggests not and reinforce the central tenets of this thesis. The link between the state, 
allocation of scarce resources and active intervention is still not being made. The approach 
remains one of passive reaction. 
Challenging Times. 
Without legitimacy or credibility among those the British government is dependent on 
for 
a settlement or an accommodation it is likely a long war of 
low key attrition will continue 
as and when required. Hence the desperate measures taken to 
fudge everything while talks 
about talks and tortuous process of interpretation continue 
between the various parties. 
While the British government has asserted they no longer 
have a selfish economic or 
strategic interest in NI they have also declared the union remains safe. 
In support of this 
the Irish government have replaced their claim to the whole of 
Ireland as of right to one 
that enables the unionist majority to have a right of veto over any 
future settlement or 
union. The Belfast Agreement or the Peace Deal 
invites the players to become persuaders 
rather than enforcers. The desired outcome - an end 
to violence and the physical 
9 16 January 1995, Sinn Fein to British Government. 
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expression of resistance to British rule - in many senses directly resonates British policy 
from the time of conquest. The British government appeared to have successfully 
contained the situation for the moment. By acts of coercion and war Britain has sought to 
suppress resentment and rejection of its mandate. In this period of history Ireland cannot 
be seen as a potential threat or ally to an invading enemy -France, Spain or indeed 
communism - it is an economic and competitive partner in the same European market and 
the North is a financial and political liability. In addition the independent government of 
Ireland fully supports the accommodation proposed. The raft of administrative laws -a 
Human Rights Commission, a Bill of Rights, fresh equality laws, economic support, the 
reform of the RUC - all give expression to the recognition by both governments that a 
new style and form of management is essential. 
The challenge remains however that the balance of forces within the North retains the 
strength of their competing visions and identities. These are reinforced by the patterns of 
inequality that have not fundamentally altered since 1921. Over a quarter century of Direct 
Rule has seen a range of lost opportunities to promote reconciliation. The oppressive 
legislative and physical apparatus in place today would be all too familiar to those 
engaged in the struggles of previous centuries. Today Irish, English and American 
governments are urging all to engage in a fresh start. The Peace Process brings its own 
rewards - loyalist and republican prisoners are freed; the physical apparatus of the state is 
toned down, an opportunity for returning to devolved government is presented, promises 
of more economic support are made and critically the fear of sudden death and destruction 
are removed. All the trump cards have now been played. The devil is in the detail. 
A critical detail is inequality in employment. No one has been able to indicate that this 
circle can be squared within the context of the geo-political formation currently known as 
Northern Ireland without simply accepting NI as it is. A strategy to change the nature of an 
economy wholly dependent on the public purse and incapable of indigenous growth that 
can sustain its economically active population is absent. The Partnership 
for Equality 
agenda and the Peace Agreement offer the opportunity for an accommodation 
between the 
Catholic middle class and militant unionism. Whether this will suffice 
for the rest is a 
matter for future commentators as events unfold. It appears that the generations 
formed in 
militant struggles since the 1960's have decided to take a 
"time out", to see if the last card 
of their generations will produce the equitable and 
fair society all claim to desire. 
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This thesis has advanced the view that structural inequalities are essential to the 
maintenance and existence of the Northern state in its current form. The conclusion is that 
these inequalities cannot be fundamentally altered if the state is to remain true to its 
origins and purpose. If it is to become something else it will have to be in a different geo- 
political context than the present. The Irish and British governments supported by all the 
major parties in the North have agreed to enter into an agreement that supports the "right 
of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and 
South, to bring about a united Ireland". This is the successful outcome and apex of a 
British strategy of containment. 
While it is not exactly "business as usual" given the new frameworks and potential 
reforms of the states coercive apparatus the solution is strikingly colonial. As such it is 
likely to secure some form of stability, as the protagonists appear to have settled for a very 
long game in pursuit of their objectives. The Irish government formally signed their claim 
on the North away on the 2nd December 1999 while Peter Mandelson as Secretary of 
State, signed the British-Irish Agreement thereby replacing the 1985 Anglo-Irish 
Agreement, much detested by unionists. Mandelson also committed the government to the 
implementation of the Patten report on reforming the RUC, although no timetable has 
been set and everything is subject to the prevailing security situation. l0 The competing 
objectives remain, as always, to be a part of the UK and to be part of a United Ireland. 
While Britain chooses to sustain the unionist veto through a myriad of political, economic 
and legal means the opportunity to create a society that is not driven by a post-colonial 
culture and consequent fractures is lost. The culture of Protestant possessiveness will 
continue to pervade because Northern Ireland is indeed their birthright, heritage and 
creation. It must always be so for to paraphrase McDonald, to be anything else is to 
deprive it of any purpose to exist. In the interim the players will line up at the gates of 
Stormont for a new form of devolution with Sinn Fein in government. As they 
do it is 
worth remembering nationalists have taken similar steps 
before. Failure has resulted in 
guerilla war and an internecine spiral of sectarian murders that the 
North is desperate to 
avoid returning to. 
10 Northern Ireland Office, `Security - Return to Normality', 
22nd December 1999 
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